{"id":"full_commission-H308141-2025-09-05","awcc_number":"H308141","decision_date":"2025-09-05","opinion_type":"full_commission","claimant_name":"Rachel Boyce","employer_name":"Bald Knob School District","title":"BOYCE VS. BALD KNOB SCHOOL DISTRICT AWCC# H308141 September 05, 2025","outcome":"unknown","outcome_keywords":[],"injury_keywords":[],"pdf_url":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/Boyce_Rachel_H308141_20250905.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/full-commission-opinions/","filename":"Boyce_Rachel_H308141_20250905.pdf","text_length":8068,"full_text":"NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION \n \n \nBEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION \n \nCLAIM NO. H308141 \n \nRACHEL BOYCE, EMPLOYEE  CLAIMANT \n \nBALD KNOB SCHOOL DISTRICT, EMPLOYER RESPONDENT \n \nARKANSAS SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION,  \nINSURANCE CARRIER/TPA RESPONDENT \n \n \nOPINION FILED SEPTEMBER 5, 2025 \n \nUpon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, \nArkansas. \n \nClaimant represented by the HONORABLE C. MICHAEL WHITE, Attorney \nat Law, North Little Rock, Arkansas. \n \nRespondents represented by the HONORABLE MELISSA WOOD, Attorney \nat Law, Little Rock, Arkansas. \n \nDecision of Administrative Law Judge:  Affirmed and Adopted. \n \n OPINION AND ORDER \n Respondents appeal an opinion and order of the Administrative Law \nJudge filed April 29, 2025.  In said order, the Administrative Law Judge \nmade the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: \n1. The  Arkansas  Workers’  Compensation  Commission  has \njurisdiction over this claim.  \n \n2. The  stipulations  set  out  above  are  reasonable  and  are  hereby \naccepted. \n \n3. That the claimant satisfied the required burden of proof to prove by \na preponderance of the evidence that she suffered a compensable \ninjury to her right foot by specific incident. \n \n\nBOYCE - H308141  2\n  \n \n \n4. That the claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical \nbenefits in regard to her compensable right foot injury.  \n \n5. That the claimant is entitled to Temporary Total Disability benefits \nfrom the day following her injury up to the day of March 6, 2024.  \n \n6. That the claimant is entitled to attorney fees.  \n \n7. If not already paid, the respondents are ordered to pay for the cost \nof the transcript forthwith. \n \n We have carefully conducted a de novo review of the entire record \nherein and it is our opinion that the Administrative Law Judge's decision is \nsupported by a preponderance of the credible evidence, correctly applies \nthe law, and should be affirmed.  Specifically, we find from a preponderance \nof the evidence that the findings made by the Administrative Law Judge are \ncorrect and they are, therefore, adopted by the Full Commission.  \n We therefore affirm the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, \nincluding all findings of fact and conclusions of law therein, and adopt the \nopinion as the decision of the Full Commission on appeal. \n All accrued benefits shall be paid in a lump sum without discount and \nwith interest thereon at the lawful rate from the date of the Administrative \nLaw Judge's decision in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-809 (Repl. \n2012). \n For prevailing on this appeal before the Full Commission, claimant’s \nattorney is entitled to fees for legal services in accordance with Ark. Code \nAnn. § 11-9-715(a)(Repl. 2012).  For prevailing on appeal to the Full \n\nBOYCE - H308141  3\n  \n \n \nCommission, the claimant’s attorney is entitled to an additional fee of five \nhundred dollars ($500), pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-715(b)(Repl. \n2012). \n  IT IS SO ORDERED. \n                                       _____________________ \n    SCOTTY DALE DOUTHIT, Chairman \n \n                                       _____________________ \n    M. SCOTT WILLHITE, Commissioner \n \n \n \nCommissioner Mayton dissents. \n \n \nDISSENTING OPINION \n \nI must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion finding that the \nclaimant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a \ncompensable injury to her right foot on December 18, 2023, which would \nentitle her to reasonable and necessary medical benefits, temporary total \ndisability benefits from the day following her injury up March 6, 2024, and \nattorney fees. In my de novo review of the record, I find that this claim is not \ncompensable. \nThe claimant alleged she sustained a compensable injury on \nDecember 18, 2023, when she tripped over a rug as she walked in the \nschool building.  The respondents have taken the position the claimant was \nnot performing any employment duties at that time.  After a hearing, an \n\nBOYCE - H308141  4\n  \n \n \nadministrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that the claimant had met her burden of \nproving that she sustained a compensable injury.  The respondents appeal. \nOur rules define a compensable injury as \"[a]n accidental injury . . . \narising out of and in the course of employment.\"  Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-\n102(4)(A)(i).  A compensable injury does not include an \"[i]njury which was \ninflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not \nbeing performed.\"  Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii).  The Act, however, \nfails to define the phrase \"in the course of employment\" or the term \n\"employment services.\"  Wood v. Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers, \n2010 Ark. App. 307, 374 S.W.3d 785 (2010).  \nOur Supreme Court has held an employee is performing \n\"employment services\" when he or she \"is doing something that is generally \nrequired by his or her employer.\"  Texarkana Sch. Dist. v. Conner, 373 Ark. \n372, 284 S.W.3d 57 (2008).  The Commission uses the same test to \ndetermine whether an employee was performing employment services as it \ndoes when determining whether an employee was acting within the course \nof employment.  Id.  \n Specifically, it has been held the test is whether the injury occurred \n\"within the time and space boundaries of the employment, when the \nemployee [was] carrying out the employer's purpose or advancing the \nemployer's interest directly or indirectly.\"  Id.  The critical inquiry is whether \n\nBOYCE - H308141  5\n  \n \n \nthe interests of the employer were being directly or indirectly advanced by \nthe employee at the time of the injury.  Id.  The issue of whether an \nemployee was performing employment services within the course of \nemployment depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each \ncase.  Id. \nIn the present case, the claimant is a preschool teacher with the Bald \nKnob School District.  Her job duties included preparing students for \nkindergarten, teaching them the basics of the alphabet, numbers, and \ncolors.  \nWhile children who have parents that work for the school district and \narrive by 7:15 a.m., most students arrive at 7:30 a.m.  The claimant’s \ncontracted hours with the school district are 7:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.   \nThe claimant sustained an injury at 6:30 a.m. on December 18, \n2023, when she tripped over a rolled-up rug as she walked in the building. \nWhile the claimant testified at her disposition that she may arrive early to \nprepare her classroom, write lesson plans, unstack chairs, or pick up items \nfrom the previous day, she had not done any of those things at the time of \nher fall.  In fact, all she had done prior to her fall was turn on the light.  \nThere were no students in the classroom at that time nor were there any \nother teachers or aides present.  Id.  At her deposition, the claimant testified \nher lesson plans had already been completed for that day. \n\nBOYCE - H308141  6\n  \n \n \nIn short, an employee is performing employment services when \nengaged in the primary activity he or she was hired to perform, or in \nincidental activities that are inherently necessary for the performance of the \nprimary activity, or when an employee is performing employment services \nwhen he or she is engaging in an activity that carries out the employer's \npurpose or advances the employer's interests.  Olsten Kimberly Quality \nCare v. Pettey, 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997); Hightower v. Newark \nPub. Sch. Sys., 57 Ark. App. 159, 943 S.W.2d 608 (1997). \nAt the time of her injury, the claimant was not performing any \nservices for which she was under contract with the school district, nor was \nshe engaged in any activities that would further her employer’s interest.  \nShe had simply turned on the light.  Merely being present in her classroom \nor having the intention to begin working is insufficient for the claimant to \nmeet her burden of proof.  \nAccordingly, for the reasons set forth above, I must dissent. \n \n                                       _____________________ \n    MICHAEL R. MAYTON, Commissioner","preview":"NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION CLAIM NO. H308141 RACHEL BOYCE, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT BALD KNOB SCHOOL DISTRICT, EMPLOYER RESPONDENT ARKANSAS SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION, INSURANCE CARRIER/TPA RESPONDENT OPINION FILED SEPTEMBER 5, 2025 Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T22:29:43.983Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/full_commission-H308141-2025-09-05","pdf":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/Boyce_Rachel_H308141_20250905.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/full-commission-opinions/"}}