{"id":"alj-H502654-2025-09-19","awcc_number":"H502654","decision_date":"2025-09-19","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Reginald Davis","employer_name":"Paschall Truck Lines, Inc","title":"DAVIS VS. PASCHALL TRUCK LINES, INC. AWCC# H502654 September 19, 2025","outcome":"dismissed","outcome_keywords":["dismissed:7","granted:1"],"injury_keywords":["shoulder","neck"],"pdf_url":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/DAVIS_REGINALD_H502654_20250919.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"DAVIS_REGINALD_H502654_20250919.pdf","text_length":8284,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \nWCC NO. H502654 \n \n \nREGINALD D. DAVIS, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT \n \nPASCHALL TRUCK LINES, INC., \n EMPLOYER RESPONDENT \n \nGREAT AMERICAN ALLIANCE INS. CO., \n CARRIER RESPONDENT \n \n \nOPINION FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2025 \n \nHearing  before  Administrative  Law  Judge  O.  Milton  Fine  II  on September  19, \n2025, in Jonesboro, Craighead County, Arkansas. \n \nClaimant, pro se, not appearing. \n \nRespondents represented by Mr. Zachary F. Ryburn, Ryburn Law Firm, Attorneys \nat Law, Little Rock, Arkansas. \n \n \nI.  BACKGROUND \n This  matter  comes  before  the  Commission  on the Motion  to Dismiss  by \nRespondents.  A hearing on the motion was conducted on September 19, 2025, in \nJonesboro,  Arkansas.    No  testimony  was  taken  in  the  case.    Claimant,  who \naccording  to  Commission  records  is pro  se,  failed  to  appear  at  the  hearing.  \nAdmitted  into  evidence  was Commission Exhibit  1 (see Ark.  Code  Ann. § 11-9-\n705(a)(1) (Repl. 2012)(Commission must “conduct the hearing . . . in a manner \nwhich  best  ascertains  the  rights  of  the  parties”), forms,   pleadings,   and \ncorrespondence related to this claim, consisting of 22 pages. \n\nDAVIS – H502654 \n \n2 \n \n The record shows the following procedural history: \n Per  the  First  Report  of  Injury  or  Illness that was  filed on April  29,  2025, \nClaimant  purportedly  suffered an  injury to  his  left  shoulder at  work  on April  17, \n2024, when wind caught the trailer door that he had been holding.  According to \nthe Form AR-2 that was filed on April 30, 2025, Respondents accepted the claim \nas compensable and paid medical and indemnity benefits pursuant thereto. \n On May 2, 2025, he requested his one-time change of physician.  Nothing \nin  the  file,  however,  reflects  that  the  request  was  processed.  Respondents’ \ncounsel entered his appearance on December 20, 2024. \n On June 22, 2025, Claimant filed a Form AR-C.  Therein, Claimant stated \nthat he also hurt his neck in the alleged incident.  When marking the benefit(s) he \nwas seeking, he checked “Other” and added:  “Appeal MMI and IR and jurisdiction \nof claim.”  He attached a typewritten statement to the form.  Respondents’ counsel \nentered  his  appearance  before  the  Commission  on  June  24,  2025.   On  July  18, \n2025, Claimant wrote the Commission: \nI   am   requesting   a   mediation   hearing   to   determine   whether \nArkansas has jurisdiction of this claim[.]  [A]attached is [a] Location \nof  Employment  stating  all  work[-]related  injuries  will  be  under \nKentucky Workers['] Compensation. \n \nHowever,  the  Legal  Advisor  Division  declined  to  conduct  the  mediation,  noting \nthat  the  claim  was  still  before  the  Medical  Cost  Containment  Division  to  process \nthe change-of-physician request.  The request ended up not getting addressed on \nthe basis that the Claimant elected to pursue relief in Kentucky instead.  See infra. \n\nDAVIS – H502654 \n \n3 \n \n \n The record reflects that nothing further took place on the claim until July 18, \n2025.  On that date, Respondents filed the instant motion, asking for dismissal of \nthe claim because Claimant has indicated that “he has taken steps to file his claim \nin Kentucky . . . [and] has no interest in pursuing his claim in Arkansas.”  The file \nwas  assigned  to  me on July  29,  2025;  and on  July 30,  2025,  my  office wrote \nClaimant, asking for a response to the motion within 20 days.  The letter was sent \nby  first  class and  certified mail  to the Bay  City,  Texas address for Claimant that \nwas listed  in  the  file  and  on  his Form AR-C.  The  certified  letter was  returned  to \nthe  Commission,  unclaimed, on September 2,  2025; but the  first-class  letter  was \nnot returned.  On August 3, 2025, Claimant filed a response to the motion, stating \nthat   he   was   joining   in   the   request   that   the   claim   be   dismissed   because \nRespondents “acted in bad faith” in filing the First Report of Injury or Illness in \nArkansas, when the matter should have been brought in Kentucky. \n On August 5, 2025, a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss was scheduled for \nSeptember  19,  2025,  at 12:30 p.m.  at  the  Craighead  County  Courthouse  in \nJonesboro.   The  certified  mailing  of  the Notice of  Hearing  to  Claimant was \nreturned to the Commission, unclaimed, on September 9, 2025; but the first-class \nmailing was not returned. \n The  hearing  on  the Motion  to Dismiss  proceeded  as  scheduled.    Again, \nClaimant  failed  to  appear  at  the  hearing.    But  Respondents appeared  through \n\nDAVIS – H502654 \n \n4 \n \ncounsel  and  argued  for  dismissal  under AWCC  R.  099.13 (now  codified  at  11 \nC.A.R. § 25-110(d)). \nII.  FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \n After  reviewing  the  record  as  a  whole,  to  include  documents  and  other \nmatters  properly  before  the  Commission,  the  following Findings  of Fact  and \nConclusions of Law are hereby made in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-\n704 (Repl. 2012): \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction \nover this matter. \n2. The  parties  were  provided  reasonable  notice  of  the Motion  to \nDismiss and of the hearing thereon. \n3. The  evidence  preponderates  that  Claimant  has  failed  to  prosecute \nhis claim under 11 C.A.R. § 25-110(d). \n4. The Motion  to Dismiss  is hereby  granted;  this claim is hereby \ndismissed without prejudice under 11 C.A.R. § 25-110(d). \nIII.  DISCUSSION \n 11 C.A.R. § 25-110(d) (formerly AWCC R. 099.13) reads: \nUpon meritorious application to the Commission from either party in \nan action pending before the Commission, requesting that the claim \nbe  dismissed  for  want  of  prosecution,  the  Commission  may,  upon \nreasonable notice to all parties, enter an order dismissing the claim \nfor want of prosecution. \n \n\nDAVIS – H502654 \n \n5 \n \nSee  generally  Johnson  v.  Triple  T  Foods,  55  Ark.  App.  83,  85,  929  S.W.2d  730 \n(1996). \n As the moving party, Respondents under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-705(a)(3) \n(Repl. 2012) must prove their entitlement to the relief requested—dismissal of the \nclaim—by a preponderance of the  evidence.    This  standard  means  the  evidence \nhaving greater weight or convincing force.  Barre v. Hoffman, 2009 Ark. 373, 326 \nS.W.3d 415; Smith v. Magnet Cove Barium Corp., 212 Ark. 491, 206 S.W.2d 442 \n(1947). \n As shown by the evidence recounted above, (1) the parties were provided \nreasonable  notice  of  the Motion  to Dismiss  and  of  the  hearing  thereon;  and  (2) \nClaimant  has  failed  to  pursue  his claim  because  he failed  to appear  at  the \nSeptember  19,  2025, hearing  to  argue  against its dismissal.   This  stands  to \nreason, since he  has  expressed  his  agreement  with the dismissal  because  he \nwishes to pursue relief before the Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Commission \ninstead.   Thus,  the  evidence  preponderates  that  dismissal of  the  claim is \nwarranted under the above-referenced authority. \n That  leaves  the  question  of  whether  the  dismissal  of  the  claim  should  be \nwith  or  without  prejudice.    The  Commission  possesses  the  authority  to  dismiss \nclaims  with  prejudice.   Loosey  v.  Osmose  Wood  Preserving  Co., 23  Ark.  App. \n137,  744  S.W.2d  402  (1988).    The  Commission  and  the  appellate  courts  have \nexpressed  a  preference  for  dismissals without  prejudice.   See Professional \n\nDAVIS – H502654 \n \n6 \n \nAdjustment   Bureau   v.   Strong,   75   Ark.   249,   629   S.W.2d   284   (1982)).  \nRespondents at  the  hearing  asked  for  a  dismissal  without prejudice.   Based  on \nthe  foregoing,  I agree  and find  that  the  dismissal  of  this  claim  should  be  and \nhereby is entered without prejudice.\n1\n \nIV.  CONCLUSION \n In  accordance  with  the Findings  of Fact  and Conclusions  of Law  set  forth \nabove, this claim for initial benefits is hereby dismissed without prejudice. \n IT IS SO ORDERED. \n      ________________________________ \n      O. MILTON FINE II \n      Chief Administrative Law Judge \n \n \n1\n“A dismissal ‘without prejudice’ allows a new [claim] to be brought on the \nsame cause of action.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 825 (abridged 5\nth\n ed. 1983).","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION WCC NO. H502654 REGINALD D. DAVIS, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT PASCHALL TRUCK LINES, INC., EMPLOYER RESPONDENT GREAT AMERICAN ALLIANCE INS. CO., CARRIER RESPONDENT OPINION FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2025 Hearing before Administrative Law Judge O. Milton Fine II on September 19, 2025,...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T22:36:32.787Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H502654-2025-09-19","pdf":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/DAVIS_REGINALD_H502654_20250919.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}