{"id":"alj-H501849-2026-03-20","awcc_number":"H501849","decision_date":"2026-03-20","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Anthony Steen","employer_name":"Garland County Sheriff’s Office","title":"STEEN VS. GARLAND COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE AWCC# H501849 March 20, 2026","outcome":"granted","outcome_keywords":["granted:1"],"injury_keywords":["neck"],"pdf_url":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/STEEN_ANTHONY_H501849_20260320.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"STEEN_ANTHONY_H501849_20260320.pdf","text_length":28258,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \nCLAIM NO. H501849 \n \n \nANTHONY STEEN,  \nEMPLOYEE CLAIMANT \n \nGARLAND COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, \nEMPLOYER  RESPONDENT \n \nASSN. OF ARKANSAS COUNTIES  \nWORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST/ \nAAC RISK MGT. SERVICES, INC.,   \nCARRIER/TPA RESPONDENT \n \n \nOPINION FILED MARCH 20, 2026 \n \nPursuant to the parties’ mutual agreement and in lieu of a hearing this  claim  was submitted  for   \ndecision based on the stipulated record and briefs filed December 23, 2025, before the Arkansas \nWorkers’ Compensation Commission (the Commission), Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Mike \nPickens, Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas. \n \nThe claimant is represented by the Honorable Gregory R. Giles, Moore, Miles & Matteson, L.L.P., \nTexarkana, Miller County, Arkansas. \n \nThe respondents are represented by the Honorable Carol Lockard Worley and the Honorable Jarrod \nS. Parrish, Worley, Wood & Parrish, P.A., Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.   \n \n \nINTRODUCTION \n \nOn October 21, 2025, the above-styled claim came before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) \nMike  Pickens  for  a  prehearing  conference. The  claimant  was  represented  by  the  Honorable \nGregory R. Giles, and the respondents were represented by the Honorable Carol Lockard Worley. \nIn lieu of a hearing the parties agreed to submit the issues to be litigated on the parties’ blue-backed \nstipulated facts, prehearing questionnaire responses, briefs, and agreed exhibits which, along with \nthe October 23, 2025, prehearing order, shall constitute the record in this matter. \n   In addition to the parties’ mutually agreed stipulated facts document contained in the record \nas Joint Exhibit 1, pages 1-3, the parties have agreed to the following stipulations:   \n\nAnthony Steen, AWCC No. H501849 \n \n \n \n \n2 \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission (the Commission) has \njurisdiction over this claim. \n \n2. The  employer/employee/carrier-TPA  relationship  existed  at  all  relevant  times \nincluding March 21, 2025, when the claimant sustained an admittedly compensable \ninjury in the form of a stroke/brain bleed for which the respondents paid medical \nand indemnity benefits.  \n \n3.    The claimant’s average weekly wage (AWW) was $1,037.34, which corresponds \n      to weekly indemnity rates of $692.00 for temporary total disability (TTD), and \n      $519.00 for permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits.   \n \n4. The  parties  specifically  reserve  any  and  all  other  issues  for  future  litigation  and/or \ndetermination. \n \n(Commission Exhibit 1 at 2). Pursuant to the parties’ mutual agreement, the issues litigated on the \n \naforementioned record are: \n \n1. Whether the respondents controverted this claim. \n \n2. If the respondents are deemed to have controverted this claim, whether and to what \nextent, if any, the claimant’s attorney is entitled to a controverted fee based on these \nfacts. \n \n(Comms’n Ex. 1 at 2). \n        \nThe  claimant  contends he  suffered a compensable  injury  to  his  brain,  specifically a   \nstroke/brain bleed, which occurred during a deputy sheriff qualification/training exercise in which \nhe was sprayed in his face. The claimant contends the medical treatment he has received to date \nhas been related to and reasonably necessary for treatment of his compensable injury, and that he \nis entitled to additional medical treatment at the respondents’ expense. The claimant contends he \nis  entitled  to  TTD benefits  from  March  22,  2025,  to  a  date  yet  to  be  determined. The  claimant \ncontends further that the respondents initially controverted this claim which required him to hire \n\nAnthony Steen, AWCC No. H501849 \n \n \n \n \n3 \nan  attorney  to  persuade  the  respondents  to  pay  him  any workers’ compensation benefits  and, \ntherefore, his attorney is entitled to the maximum statutory attorney’s fee on the controverted \nindemnity  benefits. The  claimant  specifically  reserves  any  and  all  other  issues  for  future \ndetermination and/or litigation. (Comms’n Ex. 1 at 2-3; Claimant’s Exhibit 3 at 1-4).\nThe  respondents  contend they  did  not  controvert  this  claim  since  the  claimant  initially \nfailed and/or refused to provide them any medical documentation relating his stroke/brain bleed to \nthe subject March 21, 2025, incident until after the claimant’s attorney eventually provided them \nmedical documentation supporting causation at which time the respondents accepted the claim as \ncompensable  and  committed  to  pay  all  appropriate  medical  and  indemnity  benefits.  The \nrespondents contend they never controverted this claim since it is the claimant’s responsibility to \nobtain  and  provide  them the  necessary medical  documentation relating  the  work  incident  to  his \nalleged  injury. The respondents contend that once the claimant’s attorney provided them the \nrequired  and  necessary  medical  documentation  relating  his  injury  to  the  subject  work  incident, \ninitiated  an  independent medical records review which  led  to  their  accepting  the  claim  as \ncompensable. The respondents reserve the right to amend and supplement their contentions after \nthe completion of any and all necessary investigation and discovery, and they specifically reserve \nany  and  all  other  issues  for  future determination and/or litigation. (Comms’n  Ex.  1  at  3; \nRespondents’ Exhibit 3 at 1-8). \nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE \n \n     In  addition  to  the standard  stipulations  set forth  above,  the  parties mutually  agreed to  the \nrelevant  facts  enumerated  in  the “Proposed Stipulated Facts” document which  they both signed \n\nAnthony Steen, AWCC No. H501849 \n \n \n \n \n4 \nand which is contained in the record as Joint Exhibit 1 at 1-3. I hereby incorporate these stipulated \nfacts as set forth word-for-word herein. These stipulated facts will be addressed in more detail as \nnecessary in the “Discussion” section of this opinion, infra. \n     DISCUSSION \nThe Burden of Proof \n     When deciding any issue the ALJ and the Commission shall determine, on the basis of the \nrecord  as  a  whole,  whether  the  party  having  the  burden  of  proof  has  established  it  by  a \npreponderance of the evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704(c)(2) (2025 Lexis Replacement). The \nclaimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence he is entitled to benefits. \nStone v. Patel, 26 Ark. App. 54, 759 S.W.2d 579 (Ark. App. 1998). Here, of course, the burden of \nproof is on the claimant to prove the respondents controverted his claim and, therefore, his attorney \nis entitled to a fee.  \n     Ark.  Code  Ann. Section  11-9-704(c)(3)  (2025  Lexis  Repl.)  states  that  the  ALJ,  the \nCommission, and the courts “shall strictly construe” the Act, which also requires them to read and \nconstrue the Act in its entirety, and to harmonize its provisions when necessary. Farmers Coop. v. \nBiles, 77 Ark. App. 1, 69 S.W.2d 899 (Ark. App. 2002). In determining whether the claimant has \nmet her burden of proof, the Commission is required to weigh the evidence impartially without \ngiving the benefit of the doubt to either party. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704(c)(4) (2025 Lexis Repl.); \nGencorp Polymer Products v. Landers, 36 Ark. App. 190, 820 S.W.2d 475 (Ark. App. 1991); \nFowler v. McHenry, 22 Ark. App. 196, 737 S.W.2d 633 (Ark. App. 1987). \n\nAnthony Steen, AWCC No. H501849 \n \n \n \n \n5 \n     All claims for workers’ compensation benefits must be based on proof. Speculation and \nconjecture, even if plausible, cannot take the place of proof. Ark. Dep’t of Corrections v. Glover, 35 \nArk. App. 32, 812 S.W.2d 692 (Ark. App. 1991); Deana Constr. Co. v. Herndon, 264 Ark. 791, 595 \nS.W.2d 155 (1979). It is the Commission’s exclusive responsibility to determine the credibility of \nall the evidence in the record, including witness testimony. Whaley v. Hardees, 51 Ark. App. 116, \n912 S.W.2d 14 (Ark. App. 1995). The Commission is not required to believe either any facts \ncontained in the record including but not limited to witness testimony, but may accept and translate \ninto findings of fact those portions of the record testimony it deems believable. See, McClain v. \nTexaco, Inc., 29 Ark. App. 218, 780 S.W.2d 34 (Ark. App. 1989); Farmers Coop. v. Biles, supra. \nControversion \n     Pursuant to Arkansas workers’ compensation law a claim is considered “controverted” for \nthe purpose of  deeming the  respondents  liable  for  payment  of  an  attorney’s  fee  when  the \nrespondents dispute the claim in whole or in part. Arkansas law concerning controversion is long-\nstanding  and  the  subject  of  a  significant  amount  of  caselaw. While most of  the informative, \ninstructive, and significant caselaw predates the passage of Act 796 of 1993, the applicable law \nwith respect to determining when the respondents have controverted a claim for purposes of paying \nan attorney’s fee, what  factors  should  be  considered  in  making  the  determination, and  what  the \nunderlying purposes are for making the determination remain the same.  \n     Whether the respondents have controverted a claim and should be deemed responsible for \npayment of an attorney’s fee is a question of fact for the Commission to decide on a case-by-case \nbasis and is, therefore and obviously, dependent on the specific facts and circumstances of each \n\nAnthony Steen, AWCC No. H501849 \n \n \n \n \n6 \ncase. Lee v. Alcoa Extrusion, Inc., 89 Ark. App. 228, 201 S.W.3d 449 (Ark. App. 2005); Southeast \nArk. Human Dev. Ctr., 99 Ark. App, 257 S.W.3d 554 (Ark. App. 2007); Revere Copper & Brass, \nInc., v. Tally, 7 Ark. App. 234, 647 S.W.2d 477 (Ark. App. 1983).  \n     In Aluminum  Co.  of  America  v.  Henning,  260  Ark.  699,  543  S.W.2d  480  (1976),  the \nArkansas Supreme Court (in an opinion in which renowned Arkansas Justices George Rose Smith \nand C.J. Harris participated) provides a refreshingly detailed, articulate and instructive recitation \nof   the   law   of   controversion   which   includes   the   purposes   and   rationale   underlying   the \ndetermination, as well as what factors should be considered in making the determination a claim \nhas been controverted. In Henning the court “rejected the mechanistic construction of the act that \nwould permit an employer, or carrier, to refuse  compensation until after the employee has been \nforced to employ an attorney and then escape liability for the attorney’s fees by formally advising \nthe  commission  that  it  will  not  controvert  the  claim  asserted  by  that  attorney.” Henning,  543 \nS.W.2d 480, 487.  \n     The Henning court  also  explained that  when  the  Commission  finds  a  claim  has  been \ncontroverted  in  whole  or  in  part the  respondents  are  only  responsible  for  the  amount  of  the \ncontroverted compensation; and, furthermore, even when the Commission finds the respondents \nhave not controverted the claim, but further finds the claimant’s attorney has provided bona fide \nlegal services in the claim, “the Commission shall direct the payment of such fees out of the \ncompensation awarded...And in any case where attorney’s fees are allowed by the Commission, \nthe  limitations  expressed  in the  first  sentence  herein  [Ark.  Code  Ann. Section  81-1332  (Repl. \n1960), now Ark. Code Ann. Section 11-9-715(a)(1)(B) (2025 Lexis Repl.)] shall apply. Henning, \n\nAnthony Steen, AWCC No. H501849 \n \n \n \n \n7 \n243 S.W.2d 480, 485 (Bracketed material added).  \n     Citing the well-recognized and highly respected persuasive authority, Larson on Workman’s \nCompensation  Law,  the Henning court  goes  on  to  explain  the  purposes  underlying  a  finding \nrequiring the respondents to pay the employee’s/claimant’s attorney’s fees “serves legitimate \nsocial  purposes.  Among  them  are  discouraging oppressive  delay  in  recognition  of  liability, \ndeterring arbitrary or capricious denial of claims, and insuring the ability of necessitous claimants \nto obtain adequate and competent legal representation.” See, 3 Larson, Workman’s Compensation \nLaw, 15-584 through 15-611, Sections 83.10 – 83.13 (1976); Note, Workmen’s Compensation – \nAttorney’s Fees and Amount of Recovery, 8 Ark. L. Rev. 195.” Henning, 243 S.W.2d 480, 485. \n     It should also be noted that the mere fact payment of benefits is delayed does not constitute \ncontroversion per  se and there  are  other  factors  the  Commission  may  and  should  consider  in \ndetermining whether the claimant’s attorney’s services were necessitated by the actions of the \nclaimant or the respondent. See, Ridgeway Pulpwood v. Baker, 7 Ark. App. 214, 646 S.W.2d 711 \n(Ark. App. 1983); Henning, supra; Hamrick v. Colson Co., 271 Ark. 740, 610 S.W.2d 281 (1981). \n(And see, RX3 at 4-5).          \n     In summary, the Commission’s determination as to whether or not the  respondents  have \ncontroverted a claim requires a factual analysis of both the respondents’ and claimant’s conduct, \nas  well  as  the  necessity  of  litigation. Henning,  supra; Tyson’s Foods, Inc. v. Fatheree,  16  Ark. \nApp.  41,  696  S.W.2d  782  (1985); Talley,  supra. Moreover,  one (1) of  the  primary  purposes  of \nawarding attorney’s fees is to place the economic burden of litigation on the party that made the \nlitigation necessary. Lee, supra. (And see, CX3 at 1). \n\nAnthony Steen, AWCC No. H501849 \n \n \n \n \n8 \n     The relevant facts in this case are undisputed. (See “Stipulations”, supra, and JX 1 at 1-3). \nThe sole issues for determination herein are whether the respondents controverted this claim for \nthe purpose of being responsible for payment of the claimant’s attorney’s fee; and if they did \ncontrovert the claim, to what extent, if any, the claimant’s attorney is entitled to a fee. Based on \nthe  applicable  law  as  applied  to  the  facts  of  this  case and explained  in  more  detail, infra, I  am \ncompelled  to  find  the claimant  has  met  his  burden  of  proof  in  demonstrating  the  respondents \ncontroverted  the  compensability  of  his  claim which  necessitated  his  hiring  an  attorney and, \ntherefore, his attorney is entitled to a fee on the controverted TTD benefits. \n     It is undisputed the claimant sustained an injury on March 21, 2025, when he was sprayed in \nthe face with pepper spray during a training exercise and that he suffered a brain bleed/stroke \nresulting in “sudden left sided paralysis of the upper extremity, left sided facial droop and tongue \ndeviation to the left with dysarthria” and he was diagnosed with “acute intraparenchymal hematoma \nin the right basal ganglia measuring up to 4.0 cm”. (JX1 at 1, Stipulated Fact 1). Relevant medical \nrecords reveal that very soon after he was sprayed with the pepper spray the claimant began \ncomplaining of a severe headache and neck pain which necessitated a visit to the CHI St. Vincent \nemergency room (ER) in Hot Springs. (Claimant’s Exhibit 2 at 1-2).  \n     The respondents were immediately aware of the injury and filed a Form AR-1, “First Report \nof Injury”, on March 24, 2025. (Respondents’ Exhibit 2 at 1). At this time the respondents became \naware of the injury and they had a duty and obligation to conduct a good faith investigation of the \nincident and alleged injury to determine whether the injury met the Act’s requirements for a \n\nAnthony Steen, AWCC No. H501849 \n \n \n \n \n9 \n“compensable” injury before they filed their initial Form AR-2 accepting or denying the claim and \nstating their reasons therefor.  \n      The  facts necessary  to  establish  a  compensable  injury  were  and  are  well  known  to  the \nrespondents. For any specific-incident injury to be compensable, at a hearing the claimant must \nprove  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  his injury:  (1)  arose  out  of  and  in  course  of  his \nemployment; (2) caused internal or external harm to his body that required medical services; (3) \nis supported    by objective findings, medical evidence, establishing the alleged injury; and (4) was \ncaused by a specific incident identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-\n9-102(4); Cossey v. Gary A. Thomas Racing Stable, 2009 Ark. App. 666, at 5, 344 S.W.3d 684, \n687  (Ark.  App.  2009). The claimant  bears  the  burden  of  proving  the  compensable  injury  by  a \npreponderance of the credible evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(E)(i); and Cossey, supra.  \n     Moreover, of  course, at  the  hearing the  claimant  must  prove  a  causal  relationship  exists \nbetween his employment and the alleged injury. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Westbrook, 77 Ark. App. \n167, 171, 72 S.W.3d 889, 892 (Ark. App. 2002) (citing McMillan v. U.S. Motors, 59 Ark. App. \n85, 90, 953 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Ark. App. 1997). Objective medical evidence is not always essential \nto establish a causal relationship between the work-related accident and the alleged injury where \nobjective medical evidence exists to prove the existence and extent of the underlying injury, and a \npreponderance  of  other  nonmedical  evidence  establishes  a  causal  relationship  between  the \nobjective  findings  and  the  work-related  incident  in  question. Flynn  v.  Southwest  Catering  Co., \n2010 Ark. App. 766, 379 S.W.3d 670 (Ark. App. 2010) (Emphasis added). “Objective findings” \nare those findings which cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient. Ark. Code Ann. \n\nAnthony Steen, AWCC No. H501849 \n \n \n \n \n10 \n§ 11-9-102(16)(A); Long v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 98 Ark. App. 70, at 80, 250 S.W.3d 263, at 272 \n(Ark. App. 2007).  \n     In  this  case  it is abundantly clear the claimant’s injury undoubtedly met  the  first  three  (3) \nrequirements of the Act’s definition of a compensable injury at the time the March 21, 2025, pepper \nspray incident occurred. The only reasonable question remaining was whether the claimant’s injury \n– the  stroke/brain  bleed – was  causally  related  to  the subject  March  21,  2025,  pepper  spray \nincident. Consequently,  after  receiving  notice  of  the  incident  and  alleged  injury  one  would \nreasonably expect  the  respondents to  have  immediately taken any  and  all investigatory  steps \nnecessary   for   them   to   make   an   informed   decision   concerning   causation   and, therefore, \ncompensability before they file their initial Form AR-2. Investigating the injury would consist of \naffirmative  actions like taking the claimant’s recorded statement as soon  as he was able to give \none;  interviewing  any  witness(es);  asking  the claimant  to  sign  a  medical  authorization  so  the \nrespondents  could  receive  any  and  all  relevant  medical  records  relating  to  the  March  21,  2025, \npepper  spray  incident;  speaking  to  his  doctor(s)  and  other  healthcare  providers, etc. If the \nrespondents  took  any  or  all  of  these  or  other  actions;  and if the  respondents  allege  the  claimant \nfailed to cooperate in their investigation before they filed their initial Form AR-2 on April 1, 2025, \nsummarily  denying  the  claim,  the  record  is completely devoid  of  any  evidence demonstrating \neither of these scenarios (RX2 at 2; JX1 at 2-3).  \n     The respondents contend they did not have the documentary evidence necessary to establish \ncausation/compensability until after the claim was denied, the claimant hired an attorney and filed \n\nAnthony Steen, AWCC No. H501849 \n \n \n \n \n11 \na Form AR-C, discovery was conducted, the hearing/litigation process had been initiated, and they \nobtained a second opinion from Dr. Counce after which they reversed their initial position and \naccepted the claim as compensable by filing an amended form AR-2 on October 8, 2025. (RX3 at \n1-3; JX1 at 3, Stipulated Fact 22). This amended Form AR-2 finally accepting the claim as \ncompensable was filed some two (2) months after the claimant’s attorney requested a hearing, and \nsome 201 days after the claimant required and received emergency medical treatment following \nthe pepper spray incident. (CX2 at 22; CX3 at 3).    \n     Ark. Code Ann. Section 11-9-803 (2025 Lexis Replacement) is entitled “Controversion of \nright to compensation.” Section (a)(1) of this statute requires any employer who controverts a claim \nto file a form with the Commission advising in pertinent part that they are controverting the claim \nand to state their grounds for controverting the claim within 15 days of the date they received notice \nof the alleged work-related injury or death. Section (b)(1) of this statute goes on to state: \n          (b) \n             (1) If an employer is unable to obtain sufficient medical information as to the \n                alleged injury or death within fifteen (15) days following receipt of notice, \n                although the employer has acted in good faith and with all due diligence, the \n                employer may apply in writing for an extension of time for making payment \n                of the first installment or controverting the claim.  \n \n     In Sections (b)(2)-(3) this statute goes on to require the written application for an extension \nof time to be post-marked within the immediately aforementioned 15-day period, and states the \nCommission  has  the  discretion  to  grant  the  extension  request  and  to  set  a  deadline  for  the \nemployer’s response. In Section (b)(4) the statute states that the fact the employer applies “for an \nextension shall not be deemed to be a controversion of the claim.” Therefore, if the respondents \n\nAnthony Steen, AWCC No. H501849 \n \n \n \n \n12 \nneeded additional time to investigate the claim before filing their initial Form AR-2 summarily \ndenying it, pursuant to the immediately foregoing statute they simply had to submit a written \nrequest for an extension of time to file the Form AR-2. The record reveals such a request for an \nextension was never filed.  \n     And while the respondents contend they could not accept the subject claim as compensable \nsince they did not have a medical opinion relating the claimant’s stroke/brain bleed to the subject \nMarch  21,  2025,  pepper  spray  incident  until  they  received  Dr. Counce’s second opinion on \nSeptember 24, 2025 (RX3 at 1-3), since objective medical evidence is not essential to establish a \ncausal relationship between the work-related accident and the alleged injury(ies) where objective \nmedical  evidence  exists  to  prove the  existence  and  extent  of  the  underlying  injury(ies),  and  a \npreponderance  of  other  nonmedical  evidence  establishes  a  causal  relationship  between  the \nobjective  injury(ies)  and  the  work-related incident in question, it is questionable that a doctor’s \nopinion concerning causation was even necessary given the known facts and circumstances of this \nclaim as established in the record. See, Flynn, supra. \n     In addition to contending they did not “controvert” this claim, the respondents also contend \nthere was no “award” of benefits and, therefore, no attorney’s fees are or can be owed. (RX3 at 5-\n7). Respectfully, this is not only inconsistent with the law of controversion and the numerous cases \ncited, supra, if this truly was the law then no claim could ever be deemed controverted before a \nhearing was held and an opinion awarding benefits was issued and filed. \n\nAnthony Steen, AWCC No. H501849 \n \n \n \n \n13 \n     The only reasonable and equitable opinion that is consistent with the law of controversion \ncited above is that the respondents in fact controverted this claim for purposes of being deemed \nliable for payment of the claimant’s attorney’s fee based on any and all benefits owed to the \nclaimant pursuant to the Act beginning from the date of the claimant’s injury, March 21, 2025. The \nrespondents’ filing of the amended Form AR-2 on October 8, 2025, came too late to avoid a finding \nof controversion on these facts. To find otherwise would be to essentially hold that respondents \nneed conduct little or no investigation before denying a claim; would be contrary to the purposes \nset forth in Henning, supra; and would ignore the fact that in this case and based on the facts of \nrecord but for the involvement of the claimant’s attorney herein the respondents more likely than \nnot  would  never  have  accepted  the  claimant’s  injury  as  compensable and  paid  medical  and \nindemnity benefits. \n     Indeed, all one need do is to review the 22 stipulated facts contained in JX1, as well as the \nundisputed facts stated in both parties’ post-trial briefs (CX3 and RX3) to see the claimant’s \nattorney put a great deal of time and effort into handling this claim – and essentially did everything \nnecessary to litigate the claim – from the date he was hired in April 2025 until the date the \nrespondents finally accepted the claim as compensable on October 8, 2025. Again, as the record \nreveals, but  for the good and hard work of the claimant’s attorney more likely than not the \nrespondents would never have accepted this claim as compensable.  \n     Consequently, based on the specific facts of this claim and consistent with the law of \ncontroversion as set forth in detail, supra, a finding of controversion and award of an attorney’s fee \nis the only legal, fair and equitable decision an objective trier of fact could reach in this matter. See, \n\nAnthony Steen, AWCC No. H501849 \n \n \n \n \n14 \nHenning, Talley, Lee, Hamrick, Tyson’s Foods, Ridgeway Pulpwood, et al, supra. Remember and \nplease note what our supreme court said in Henning when the court stated it:  \n           ...[R]ejected the mechanistic construction of the act that would permit an \n           employer, or carrier, to refuse compensation until after the employee has \n           been forced to employ an attorney and then escape liability for the attorney’s \n           fees by formally advising the commission that it will not controvert the claim \n           asserted by that attorney. \nHenning, 543 S.W.2d 480, 487. (Bracketed material added).     \n     Finally, consistent with one (1) of the primary purposes of awarding attorney’s fees, a finding \nof controversion and award of any attorney’s fee in this specific case places the economic burden \non the party that made the litigation necessary: here, based on the specific facts of record, the \nrespondents. Lee, supra. (And see, CX1 at 1).  \n     Therefore, for all the aforementioned reasons I hereby make the following: \n \nFINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \n \n1. The stipulations set forth in the prehearing order filed October 23, 2025, and the \nstipulations set forth in the stipulated facts document contained in the record as \nJoint Exhibit 1 hereby are accepted as facts.  \n \n2. The claimant  has  met  his  burden  of  proof  in  demonstrating  the  respondents \ncontroverted the  compensability  of this  claim for  the  purpose  of  being  deemed \nliable for the payment of an attorney’s fee from the stipulated date of injury of \nMarch 21, 2025, through the date they finally accepted the injury as compensable, \nOctober 8, 2025.   \n \n3. Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. Section 11-9-715(B) (2025 Lexis Supplement), the \nclaimant’s attorney is entitled to the maximum statutory attorney’s fee based on \nany  and  all TTD benefits owed  and/or  paid  to  the  claimant after  the  date  of  his \nMarch  21,  2025, compensable  injury and continuing  through  the  end  of  the \nclaimant’s healing period. \n\nAnthony Steen, AWCC No. H501849 \n \n \n \n \n15 \n \n                          AWARD \n \n     The respondents hereby are directed to pay the claimant’s attorney’s fee in accordance with \nthe “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law” set forth above and in Ark. Code Ann. Section 11-\n9-715(B). All accrued sums shall be paid in lump sum without discount, and this award shall earn \ninterest  at  the  legal  rate  until  paid  pursuant  to Ark.  Code  Ann. Section  11-9-809,  and Couch  v. \nFirst  State  Bank  of  Newport, 49  Ark.  App.  102,  898  S.W.2d  57  (Ark.  App.  1995); Burlington \nIndus., et al v. Pickett, 64 Ark. App. 67, 983 S.W.2d 126 (Ark. App. 1998); and Hartford Fire Ins. \nCo. v. Sauer, 358 Ark. 89, 186 S.W.3d 229 (2004).   \n    IT IS SO ORDERED.   \n \n \n \n \nMike Pickens \nAdministrative Law Judge \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMP/mp","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION CLAIM NO. H501849 ANTHONY STEEN, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT GARLAND COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, EMPLOYER RESPONDENT ASSN. OF ARKANSAS COUNTIES WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST/ AAC RISK MGT. SERVICES, INC., CARRIER/TPA RESPONDENT OPINION FILED MARCH 20, 2026 Pursuant to the parties’ ...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T22:31:08.022Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H501849-2026-03-20","pdf":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/STEEN_ANTHONY_H501849_20260320.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}