{"id":"alj-H500958-2026-05-14","awcc_number":"H500958","decision_date":"2026-05-14","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Genesis Taracena-Lopez","employer_name":"My Hr Professional Benefits","title":"TARACENA-LOPEZ VS. MY HR PROFESSIONAL BENEFITS AWCC# H500958 May 14, 2026","outcome":"denied","outcome_keywords":["dismissed:1","denied:2"],"injury_keywords":["neck","back","shoulder","knee","cervical"],"pdf_url":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/TARACENA-LOPEZ_GENESIS_H500958_20260514.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"TARACENA-LOPEZ_GENESIS_H500958_20260514.pdf","text_length":18394,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \n   \n CLAIM NO. H500958 \n \nGENESIS TARACENA-LOPEZ, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT \n \nMY HR PROFESSIONAL BENEFITS, EMPLOYER RESPONDENT \n \nCCMSI, CARRIER/TPA RESPONDENT \n \n OPINION FILED MAY 14, 2026 \n \n \nHearing before ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE JOSEPH C. SELF in Fort Smith, Sebastian \nCounty, Arkansas. \n \nClaimant represented by EDDIE H. WALKER, JR., Attorney,  Fort Smith, Arkansas. \n \nRespondents represented by JARROD S. PARRISH, Attorney,  Little Rock, Arkansas. \n \n \n STATEMENT OF THE CASE \n  \n \n On  March 24, 2026, the above captioned claim came on for a hearing at Fort Smith, Arkansas. \nA pre-hearing conference was conducted on August 21, 2025, and a pre-hearing order was filed on \nAugust 22, 2025. A copy of the pre-hearing order has been marked as Commission’s Exhibit #1 and \nmade a part of the record without objection. \n At the pre-hearing conference the parties agreed to the following stipulations: \n1.    The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction of this claim.  \n2.   The employee/employer/carrier relationship existed on May 23, 2024.  \nBy agreement of the parties, the issues to be litigated and resolved at the forthcoming hearing \nwere limited to the following: \n1.  Whether claimant sustained a compensable injury on May 23, 2024. \n2.  If compensable, claimant’s compensation rate. \n\nTaracena-Lopez-H500958 \n2 \n \n \n3.  If compensable, whether claimant is entitled to medical benefits. \nAll other issues are reserved by the parties. \nThe claimant contends that “As  the  result  of  a  job-related  fall  on  May  23,  2024,  claimant \nsustained  injury  to  multiple  body  parts  including,  but  not  necessarily  limited  to,  her  neck,  both \nshoulders, back, and lower extremities. The claimant contends that her authorized treating physician \nis  recommending  surgery  regarding  her  right  shoulder  and  that  the  respondents  are  refusing  to \nauthorize  said  surgery  although  they  initially  accepted  the  injury  as  compensable  and  authorized \nconsiderable  medical  treatment  prior  to  the  point  that  surgery  was  recommended. The  claimant \ncontends  that  the  respondents  have  now  controverted  any  disability  or  medical  compensation  to \nwhich the claimant is or may become entitled.” \nThe respondents contend that “Claimant did not suffer compensable injuries on or about May \n23,  2024,  as  she  was  not  performing  employment  related  services  at  that  time. Alternatively, \nrespondents contend that the claimant’s diagnosis is not associated with acute objective findings and, \ninstead, is related to preexisting underlying and chronic issues for which respondents are not liable.”   \n           From a review of the entire record including medical reports, documents, and other matters \nproperly  before  the  Commission,  and  having  had  an  opportunity  to  hear  the  testimony  of  the \nwitnesses and to observe their demeanor, the following findings of fact and conclusions of law are \nmade in accordance with A.C.A. §11-9-704: \n  FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \n \n 1.   The stipulations agreed to by the parties at a pre-hearing conference conducted on August \n21, 2025, and contained in a pre-hearing order filed on August 22, 2025, are hereby accepted as fact. \n 2.  Claimant  has  failed  to  prove  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence that she  suffered  a \ncompensable injury on May 23, 2024. \n\nTaracena-Lopez-H500958 \n3 \n \n \n \n HEARING TESTIMONY \n  \n Claimant  first  called  Sylvia  Rosales  as  a  witness. Ms. Rosales is claimant’s mother, and she \ndrives claimant to work each morning. On May 23, 2024, she drove claimant to work and watched \nher enter the building. Ms. Rosales drove away and realized that claimant had left her bag in the car. \nAccording to Ms. Rosales, she called her daughter and said “Gen, you forgot your lunch with your \nmagnifier in the car. I am going to go around and then wait for me downstairs.”  When Ms. Rosales \narrived back at claimant’s place of employment, she saw claimant come out of the building crying and \nbleeding. Claimant told her mother that she had fallen down the stairs on the way back outside of the \nbuilding. \n Ms. Rosales was definite that she saw the magnifier that claimant uses in one side of the bag. \nMs. Rosales believed that claimant used the magnifier when she was working from home.  \n On cross-examination, Ms. Rosales said that claimant uses the magnifier away from work, but \ndid not know if the claimant needed the magnifier for the work she was going to do that day. She \nconceded that claimant had a lunch box that had her food in it and the magnifier stayed in the pocket \nof the lunch box.  \nClaimant then testified on her own behalf. Claimant agreed that her mother had called her to \ntell her that her bag with her lunch and magnifier was still in the car. As claimant went down the stairs \nto retrieve her bag, she fell down the stairs. She said that she had used the code to get into the building \nand gone up the stairs to her workstation when her mother called. She did not know why she fell but \nremembered trying to grab onto the rail but did not know what caused her to fall. She said she hurt \nher shoulder.\n1\n \n \n1\n Claimant also mentioned an injury to her knee and foot, but this claim was limited to claimant’s right shoulder. \n\nTaracena-Lopez-H500958 \n4 \n \n \nWhile  claimant  was  in  the  parking  lot,  her  boss,  Jonathan  Lyon  arrived  and  was  told  that \nclaimant  had  fallen  down  the  stairs. He  went  inside  and  came  out  with  the  first aid  kit. Claimant \nreentered the building and worked that day but was then sent to a medical provider the next day. She \ncontinued to receive medical treatment for several months, including physical therapy until the claim \nwas denied based on a records review from a physician that did not examine the claimant. She then \nwent to see Dr. Greg Jones in June 2025, and had surgery on her right shoulder, which she attributed \nto injuries she sustained during the fall. Claimant testified that before the fall on May 23, 2024, she \nwas not in need of any kind of medical treatment for her right shoulder.  \nOn cross-examination, claimant conceded that her answer in the deposition regarding previous \ninjuries, symptoms, problems, or conditions involving her cervical spine was not true, because she had \nbeen treated for such prior to May 23, 2024.  Claimant explained that she told the doctor that treated \nher before this incident she had some pain, but denied it was due to an injury.   \nAt  the  time  of  the  injury,  claimant  worked  as  a  benefits  specialist  for  respondent  My HR \nProfessional Benefits.  She had her own computer, desk, and cubicle.  She occasionally had to get up \nfrom her desk to get mail or scan a document, but most of her work was done at the computer station.  \nShe was allowed to work from home at times but did not take work home with her.  She explained \nthat before her fall, she was the only person in the building and had not performed any job tasks yet \nat the time she fell down the steps. \nClaimant said the magnifier was not something she had with her every day at work.  While she \nhad   ADA   accommodations   for   visual   impairment,   the   magnifier   was   not   part   of   those \naccommodations.  Claimant did not know whether she used the magnifier for her work that day.  She \ndoes use it in everyday life to read print that is too small for her to see without it; it is a personal item \nthat she carries with her like a pair of glasses.  There was then the following exchange: \n\nTaracena-Lopez-H500958 \n5 \n \n \nQuestion (By Mr. Parrish) You would agree with me that if this magnifier was \nnot  part  of  the  story  and  it  is  not  a work-related item  that  you  are  going  to \nretrieve, there is nothing else you could point to as potential job task? \n \nAnswer (Claimant) Correct. \n \n Q.  Okay.    You  agreed  with  me, also,  at  the  beginning of the  claim,  the \ninformation  you  provided to  the  insurance company  and  your  supervisor  as \nfar as what you were doing was you were going to get your food, your lunch, \nout of the car; correct? \n \nA. Correct. \n \nQ.  We have a portion of a statement  you gave to the adjuster on page seventy-\none of my exhibit two that says, “ I was going downstairs because I left my \nfood in the car.”  That is the information you provided at the beginning of the \nclaim; right? \n \nA. Yes. \n \n Claimant agreed that she did not mention the magnifier or the need for such when the matter \nwas being investigated as a workers’ compensation claim.  \n On redirect examination, claimant explained that she was born with congenital glaucoma and \nis considered legally blind.  She worked from home two days a week with three days in the office.  She \nstated she used the magnifier for work, “To read stuff clearer”.  She said that she needed the magnifier  \nto perform her job and that she used it on a regular basis to do her job more efficiently.  Claimant \ntestified that it was a benefit to her employer for her to have the magnifier with her in the office.   \nClaimant rested and respondent called Jonathan Lyon, who is the benefits director at My HR \nProfessional benefits.  He was claimant’s direct supervisor when she worked with the company.  He \nrecalled seeing her in the parking lot after her fall and helped her get her belongings and her purse \ninto the building after the accident.  He said that claimant did not say anything to him about retrieving \nthe magnifier, but rather she had gone down the stairs to retrieve her lunch. \nMr.  Lyon  testified  that  claimant  was  provided  with  a  desk  magnifier  as  part  of ADA \n\nTaracena-Lopez-H500958 \n6 \n \n \naccommodation.  He described it as a standing tool that she could use, when and if she needed to \nreview  any  paper  documents,  it  was  available  to  her  at  her  desk.    She  was  also  provided  with  an \noversized monitor with a very large grain so she could zoom in to read what was on the screen.  The \nmagnifier on her desk was suitable for looking at checks or any other paperwork that needed to be \nmagnified.    It  was  his  opinion  that  the  handheld  magnifier  would not do  anything  that  the  one \nprovided to her could do. \nOn cross-examination Mr. Lyon agreed that claimant needed a magnifier of some type in order \nto perform her job.  He did not see the magnifier in her lunch bag but did not search her personal \nproperty or have any reason to wonder about whether she had a magnifier in her bag.  Mr. Lyon said \nthe magnifier provided at work was not one that could be easily transported and was meant to stay at \nthe  office.    He  did  not  believe  claimant would  need  a  magnifier  in  order  to  do  her  work  at  home \nbecause the work comes through electronically, meaning there would be no paper products on which \nto utilize a magnifier.  Claimant’s work at home involved PDF files on which she could enlarge; he \ndid not believe she would need a magnifier while working at home.  Her work done away for the office \ninvolved  working  on  enrollments  and  assisting  with  disability  claims,  all  of  which  were  done \nelectronically.  She also did work with disability claims and reviewing employer responses on claims \nfor short-term disability.  Mr. Lyon agreed that claimant did a lot of reading in her role with My HR \nProfessional Benefits.  While Mr. Lyon did not know if she has an oversized computer screen at home, \nhe did know that the days she was working from home, her work was getting done.  From that, he \nconcluded she had adequate equipment at home to be able to perform her job. \n \n \n \n \n \n\nTaracena-Lopez-H500958 \n7 \n \n \n \nREVIEW OF THE EXHIBITS \n \nClaimant’s Exhibit #1 is 79 pages of medical records; Exhibit #2 is the incident report made \nSouthern Personnel Management and two email exchanges regarding claimant’s case; Exhibit #3 is a \nphotograph of a magnifier and a zoomer; Exhibit #4 are wage records.  Respondents Exhibit #1 was \n57 pages of medical records; Exhibit #2 is 86 pages of non-medical records, including the 74-page \nemployee handbook and forms submitted to the Workers’ Compensation Commission.  \nClaimant proffered the deposition of Dr. Gregory Jones, which was taken on March 13, 2026, \nat respondents’ request.  Because claimant had not listed this as a potential exhibit, respondent \nobjected to its introduction.  Claimant argued that it was already in respondents’ possession, the seven-\nday rule regarding identifying exhibits did not apply.  While I believe the better practice would have \nbeen  for  claimant  to  have  specifically  alerted  respondents  that  she  intended  to  introduce  the \ndeposition, respondents  candidly  admitted there  was  no prejudice  other  than  the  deposition  was \ndetrimental to its defense.  I am going to exercise my discretion pursuant to A.C.A. §11-9-705(c)(3) \nand admit  the  deposition  over respondents’ objection,  as the  contents  of  the  deposition  were  well \nknown to respondent.   \nAs the threshold issue in this matter is whether claimant was engaged in employment related \nservices at the time of her injury, an exhaustive review of these exhibits is unnecessary.  The medical \nrecords contain ample objective proof of an injury to claimant’s right shoulder.  Any exhibits relevant \nto the adjudication of this matter will be discussed in that section of the opinion.    \n \nADJUDICATION \n \n In order to prove a compensable injury as the result of a specific incident that is identifiable \nby time and place of occurrence, a claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) an \n\nTaracena-Lopez-H500958 \n8 \n \n \ninjury arising out of and in the course of employment; (2) the injury caused internal or external harm \nto  the  body  which  required  medical services  or  resulted  in  disability  or  death;  (3)  medical  evidence \nsupported  by  objective  findings  establishing  an  injury;  and  (4)  the  injury  was  caused  by  a  specific \nincident identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Odd Jobs and More v. Reid, 2011 Ark. App. 450, \n384 S.W. 3d 630.   The proof was sufficient to establish claimant identified a specific incident that \ncaused an injury to her body which was established by objective medical findings.  She was a credible \nwitness to the fall down the stairs at work, and her supervisor did not question that the accident had \noccurred as he was getting to work.  \nThus, the  threshold issue in this case is whether claimant was performing employment related \nservices  at  the  time  she  fell  down  the  stairs  at  work.   Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11-9-102(4)  provides,  in \npertinent part: \n(B) \"Compensable injury\" does not include: \n(iii) Injury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment \nservices were not being performed...  \n \n An employee is performing employment services when he is doing something that is generally \nrequired by his employer. Dairy Farmers of America v. Coker, 98 Ark. App. 400, 255 S.W.3d 905. The \nArkansas  Supreme  Court  uses  the  same  test  to  determine  whether  an  employee  is  performing \nemployment services as it does when determining whether an employee is acting within the course \nand scope of employment. Pifer v. Single Source Transp., 347 Ark. 851, 69 S.W.3d 1 (2002). The test is \nwhether  the  injury  occurred  within  the  time  and  space  boundaries  of  the  employment,  when  the \nemployee was carrying out the employer's purpose directly or indirectly. Id. \nThe events of May 23, 2024, are not in dispute.  Claimant is legally blind. Her mother drove \nher to work that morning; claimant entered her place of employment and went up a flight of stairs to \n\nTaracena-Lopez-H500958 \n9 \n \n \nher work area when her mother called to tell her that she left her bag in the car.\n2\n  Claimant left her \nwork area to retrieve the bag and somehow fell down the stairs as she did so.  Mr. Lyon, claimant’s \ndirect supervisor, arrived after claimant fell and assisted her back into the building.  Mr. Lyon recalled \nclaimant said her purpose of going to the parking lot was to get her lunch.  Claimant’s statement as \nrecorded  by  respondents’ claims adjuster was “I had just gotten to work; I was going downstairs \nbecause I had left my food in the car and fell. I want to say I was clocked in already.” (R. Ex #2, page \n77) \nHaving reviewed all the evidence, I find claimant failed to establish she was engaged in services \nrequired by her employer when she was returning to her mother’s vehicle to retrieve a bag containing \nher  lunch  and  a  magnifier.   The  equipment  respondent  My  HR  Employment  Benefits  provided  to \nclaimant due to her vision disability would have permitted claimant to do her work that day without \nher personal magnifier; she testified that she did not know whether she used it on the day of the injury, \nwhich shows it was not a necessity for carrying out her work tasks.  I believe the preponderance of \nthe evidence supports the conclusion that claimant went downstairs to get her bag because her lunch \nwas in it, and that activity was not carrying out her employer’s purpose at the time she fell down the \nflight of stairs.  \n As I found claimant did not prove she suffered a compensable injury, her claim for medical \ntreatment for her right shoulder is moot. \nORDER \n \nFor  the  reasons  set  out  above,  claimant  has  failed  to  meet  her burden  of  proving  by  a \npreponderance of the evidence that she suffered a compensable injury on May 23, 2024. Therefore, \n \n2\n Claimant’s mother testified that she specifically mentioned the magnifier was in the bag.  While I’m a bit dubious \nthat was what was said, it is ultimately irrelevant because telling claimant she forgot her bag would have been \nsufficient to alert claimant that the magnifier she carried in it was also in the car with her lunch.  \n\nTaracena-Lopez-H500958 \n10 \n \n \nher claim for compensation benefits is hereby denied and dismissed. \nRespondent is responsible for paying the court reporter her charges of $ 750.00 for preparation \nof the hearing transcript. \n IT IS SO ORDERED. \n                                                                                              \n_______     \n JOSEPH C. SELF \nADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION CLAIM NO. H500958 GENESIS TARACENA-LOPEZ, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT MY HR PROFESSIONAL BENEFITS, EMPLOYER RESPONDENT CCMSI, CARRIER/TPA RESPONDENT OPINION FILED MAY 14, 2026 Hearing before ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE JOSEPH C. SELF in Fort Smith, Sebastian County, Arkansas. Cla...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T22:29:46.726Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H500958-2026-05-14","pdf":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/TARACENA-LOPEZ_GENESIS_H500958_20260514.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}