{"id":"alj-H500803-2026-04-01","awcc_number":"H500803","decision_date":"2026-04-01","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Verlencia Gatewood","employer_name":"Trinity Rail Maintenance Svcs","title":"GATEWOOD VS. TRINITY RAIL MAINTENANCE SVCS. AWCC# H500803 April 01, 2026","outcome":"granted","outcome_keywords":["granted:1","denied:1"],"injury_keywords":["back","knee","ankle","neck","shoulder"],"pdf_url":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/Gatewood_Verlencia_H500803_04012026.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"Gatewood_Verlencia_H500803_04012026.pdf","text_length":31710,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \nWCC NO. H500803 \n \n \nVERLENCIA D. GATEWOOD, \n EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT \n \nTRINITY RAIL MAINTENANCE SVCS., \n EMPLOYER RESPONDENT \n \nACE AMERICAN INS. CO., \n CARRIER RESPONDENT \n \n \nOPINION FILED APRIL 1, 2026 \n \nHearing before Chief Administrative Law Judge O. Milton Fine II on February 20, 2026, \nin Jonesboro, Craighead County, Arkansas. \n \nClaimant pro se. \n \nRespondents  represented  by  Mr. Jason  M.  Ryburn,  Attorney  at  Law,  Little  Rock, \nArkansas. \n \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE \n On February  20,  2026,  the  above-captioned  claim  was  heard  in Jonesboro, \nArkansas.    A  prehearing  conference  took  place  on December  1,  2025.    A  prehearing \norder entered on that date pursuant to the conference was admitted without objection as \nCommission  Exhibit  1.    At  the  hearing,  the  parties  confirmed  that  the  stipulations, \nissues, and respective contentions, as amended, were properly set forth in the order. \nStipulations \n The parties discussed the stipulations set forth in Commission Exhibit 1.  After an \namendment of the second and fourth at the hearing, they read as follows: \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction over \nthis claim. \n\nGATEWOOD – H500803 \n \n2 \n2. The  employee/employer/carrier relationship  existed  among  the  parties \nfrom June 28, 2023, to June 4, 2024. \n3. Respondents have controverted this claim in its entirety. \n4. The  parties  will  stipulate  to  Claimant’s  average  weekly  wage  and \ncompensation rates within 14 days after the hearing.  In the event they are \nnot able to do so, the issue concerning the valuation of these items will be \nconsidered reserved.\n1\n \nIssues \n At  the  hearing,  the parties  discussed the  issues  set forth  in  Commission  Exhibit \n1.  The following were litigated: \n1. Whether  Claimant sustained a compensable  occupational  disease  in  the \nform of a fungal infection that has affected her lower extremities. \n2. Whether   Claimant   is   entitled   to   reasonable   and   necessary   medical \ntreatment of her alleged compensable injuries. \n3. Whether  Claimant  is  entitled  to  temporary  total  disability  benefits  from \nJune 3, 2023, to January 3, 2024. \n All other issues have been reserved. \n \n \n1\nThe  parties  did  not  submit  such  a  proposed  stipulation  to  me  within  the  time \nallotted.    Thus,  pursuant  to  the  stipulation  as  written,  the  issue  of  the  valuation  of \nClaimant’s average weekly wage will be considered reserved. \n \n\nGATEWOOD – H500803 \n \n3 \nContentions \n The respective contentions of the parties read: \n Claimant: \n1. Claimant contends that she sustained a compensable injury in the form of \na fungal infection that started at the bottom of her feet and began to move \nup to her knees.  The cause of this infection was her working conditions \nfor  Respondent employer,  where  she  had to  stand  in  rainwater  that  was \ncontaminated by tobacco juice/saliva and animal feces. \n2. Claimant further contends that she is entitled to reasonable and necessary \ntreatment  of  her  alleged  injuries,  along  with  temporary  total  disability \nbenefits from June 3, 2023, to January 3, 2024. \nRespondents: \n1. Claimant  did  not  suffer  a  compensable  injury  or  occupational  disease.  \nShe has  not  been  taken off  work  by any medical  professional,  and  is  not \nentitled to temporary total disability benefits.  It is unclear when the alleged \nrash  developed;  and,  therefore,  Respondents  reserve  the  right  to  raise \nnotice and statute of limitations as defenses. \nFINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \n After reviewing the record as a whole, including medical reports, documents, and \nother  matters  properly  before  the  Commission,  and  having  had  an  opportunity  to  hear \nthe  testimony  of Claimant and  to  observe  her  demeanor,  I  hereby  make  the  following \n\nGATEWOOD – H500803 \n \n4 \nfindings  of  fact  and  conclusions  of  law  in  accordance  with  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11-9-704 \n(Repl. 2012): \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction over \nthis claim. \n2. The stipulations set forth above are reasonable and are hereby accepted. \n3. Respondents’ motion to add an issue and contention concerning whether \nthis claim is barred by the Doctrine of Laches is hereby denied. \n4. Claimant’s motion to amend Issue No. 3 to remove the date parameters \nset forth therein is hereby granted. \n5. Claimant has  proven  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that that  she \nsustained  a  compensable  occupational  disease  under  Ark.  Code  Ann.  § \n11-9-601 (Repl. 2012) in the form of a fungal infection, tinea corporis, that \nhas affected her lower extremities. \n6. Claimant  has  proven  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that she  is \nentitled    to    reasonable    and    necessary medical treatment   of    her \ncompensable occupational  disease.    Moreover, she  has  proven  by  a \npreponderance of the evidence that all of her treatment therefor that is in \nevidence was reasonable and necessary. \n7. Claimant  has not proven  by a  preponderance  of  the evidence  that  she  is \nentitled to temporary total disability benefits for any period. \n\nGATEWOOD – H500803 \n \n5 \nPRELIMINARY RULINGS \n Addition of Laches Issue and Contention \n At the outset of the hearing, Respondents moved to add an issue and contention \nconcerning whether the Doctrine of Laches bars this claim.  Claimant objected, stating \nthat she was just learning of this at the hearing.  I took the objection under advisement. \n As the Court of Appeals wrote in Sapp v. Tyson Foods, 2010 Ark. App. 517, 2010 \nArk.   App.   LEXIS   549, “elementary  principles  of  fair  play”  apply  in  Commission \nproceedings.  I find that such an addition at that stage in the proceedings would unfairly \nprejudice Claimant; and it would violate “elementary principles of fair play.”  After due \nconsideration, Respondents’ motion is hereby denied. \n Amendment of Temporary Total Disability Issue \n In light of the parties’ amendment of Stipulation No. 2, I pointed out that the dates \nfor  which  Claimant  is  seeking  temporary  total  disability  benefits  do  not  completely  line \nup  with  her  tenure  of  employment  with  Respondent  Trinity  Rail  Maintenance  Services \n(“Trinity”).  I suggested that date parameters be removed from the issue as stated, and \nthat  the  issue  be  simply  worded,  “Whether  Claimant  is  entitled  to  temporary  total \ndisability benefits.”  The  resolution  of  that  amended  issue  would  be  simply  whether \nClaimant proved that she was entitled to such benefits as a consequence of her alleged \ncompensable  injuries,  and  for  what  period(s).    Claimant  agreed  to  this  proposal,  and \nmoved for such an amendment.  Respondents objected, claiming unfair surprise similar \nto  that  cited  by  Claimant  in  response  to  the  Doctrine  of  Laches  issue.    I  took  the \nobjection under advisement. \n\nGATEWOOD – H500803 \n \n6 \n After  due  consideration  of  this  matter,  I  find  that Claimant’s motion  is  well-\nfounded.   It  is  hereby  granted.   Respondents  came  to  the  hearing  prepared  to  defend \nagainst  Claimant’s  claim  for  temporary  total  disability  benefits.    It  would  not  violate \n“elementary principles of fair play” under Sapp, supra, to allow the amendment of Issue \nNo. 3 as set forth above.  Respondents’ objection is thus overruled. \nCASE IN CHIEF \nSummary of Evidence \n Claimant was the sole witness. \n In  addition  to  the Prehearing Order  discussed  above,  the  exhibits  admitted  into \nevidence  in  this  case were Claimant’s Exhibit 1, a  compilation  of  her  medical  records, \nconsisting  of  five numbered  pages; Claimant’s Exhibit 2, a  color photograph of  her  left \nlower  extremity; Claimant’s Exhibit 3, a  color  photograph  of  her  right  lower  extremity; \nRespondents’ Exhibit 1, non-medical  records,  consisting  of one index  page  and 15 \nnumbered pages thereafter; and Respondents’ Exhibit 2, a thumb drive containing video \nfootage. \n In addition, the transcript of the October 17, 2025, hearing on this claim has been \nincorporated herein in its entirety by reference. \n\nGATEWOOD – H500803 \n \n7 \nAdjudication \nA. Compensability \n Introduction.    Claimant   has   alleged   that she contracted   a   compensable \noccupational  disease as  a  result  of  her exposure  to  contaminated  rainwater  at her  job \nfor  Respondent Trinity,  and  that  this  disease  has  affected  her  lower  extremities.  \nRespondents dispute this. \n Standards.  In defining this cause of action, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-601(e)(1)(A) \n(Repl. 2012) provides: \n(A) “Occupational disease”, as used in this chapter, unless the context \notherwise  requires,  means  any  disease  that  results  in  disability  or  death \nand arises out of and in the course of the occupation or employment of the \nemployee or naturally follows or unavoidably results from an injury as that \nterm is defined in this chapter. \n \nA causal connection between Claimant’s job and the disease must be established by a \npreponderance  of  the  evidence.   Id.  §  11-9-601(e)(1)(B).  This  standard  means  the \nevidence having greater weight or convincing force.  Barre v. Hoffman, 2009 Ark. 373, \n326  S.W.3d  415; Smith  v.  Magnet  Cove  Barium  Corp.,  212  Ark. 491,  206  S.W.2d  442 \n(1947).   \n Evidence.  Claimant is 41 years old, and a high school graduate.  She also has a \ndegree in painting and collision repair from a vocational technical school.  Her testimony \nwas  that  she  went  to  work  for  Respondent  Trinity  in  June  2023.    The  company \nmaintains rail cars.  That can consist of refurbishing old ones, and finishing new ones.  \nShe described her jobs there as follows: \n\nGATEWOOD – H500803 \n \n8 \nAnd  what  I  did,  I  started  off  prepping,  like—yeah,  prepping.    So  when \nsomeone  would  finish  painting  a  car,  I  would  then  go  over  it  and  see \nanything  that  needed  to  be  done  or  corrected.    And  so  by  the  end  of  my \ncareer at Trinity Rail, I started painting the railcars.  I would get in a lift and \npaint the  top  of  a  railcar,  get  on  the  top  of  it,  paint  the  top  of  it,  and  get \nback on the side and go all the way down a 50-foot railcar. \n \nThe  first  part  of  her  tenure  there,  which  consisted  of  prepping  the  retouching,  lasted \nfrom June 2023 until January 2024.  At that point, she transitioned to actual painting of \nthe  railcars.   Throughout  the  time  that  she  worked  at  Trinity,  she  wore  steel-toe work \nboots.    This  footwear  was  not  water-repellant.    During  the  11  months  that  she  worked \nthere,  Claimant  had  three  pairs  of boots;  Trinity  paid  for two pairs,  and  she  purchased \none pair. \n The testimony of Claimant was that during the time that she worked the touch-up \njob,  she  worked  in  an  area  of  the  Trinity  building  that  had  standing  water.    She  gave \ninconsistent  testimony  in  estimating  the  depth  of  this  water;  but  she  was adamant  that \non two occasions following a rain, it covered the toes of her boots.  As a result, during \nthis  and  other  instances, her  boots  became  soaked.   Claimant  related  that  her  boots \nwould become wet even when she switched to working in the dry paint booths because \nshe  still had  to  walk  through  the  water  in  order  to  reach  her  station.   She  testified  that \nwhen she got home each day, she placed the boots on a dryer.  But while she was at \nwork  on  a  given  day,  once  her  boots  became  wet,  she continued  to  wear them \nthroughout her shift. \n\nGATEWOOD – H500803 \n \n9 \n This  problem  with  wet  footwear  was  known  among  Claimant’s  co-workers  at \nTrinity.  To combat any effects on her feet from it, they advised her to soak her feet in \nEpsom saltwater before putting her boots back on. \n In  describing  the  source  of  the  water,  Claimant  attributed  it  to  rain.    She \ndescribed seeing water run down the walls of the building.  But this water, according to \nher,  did  not  remain  pure.    She  stated  that  it  contained,  inter  alia,  rodent  droppings, \ntobacco spit from her co-workers, and chemicals used in the painting of the railcars. \n Shown  the  photographs  that  comprise  her  Exhibits  2  and  3,  Claimant  testified \nthat  they  were  taken  on  June  4,  2024.    This  was  the  same  day  that  she  first  sought \ntreatment  for  her  alleged  skin  condition.    The  photographs  are  of  her  legs  below  the \nknee, and appear to depict a rash of some sort on each leg.  Asked when this rash first \nappeared, Claimant responded that it was in January 2024, when she noticed it on the \nbottoms of her feet.  At that point, it presented as small red bumps. \n The following exchange occurred: \nQ. Let  me  ask  you  this,  Ms.  Gatewood.    Why  do  you  think  that  this \ncondition on your legs has anything to do with your job at Trinity? \n \nA. Because I never had anything like that on my leg.  Like I haven’t—I \nnever had any skin problems or anything.  Even painting, like, I’ve \nalways painted.  I never had any skin problems with painting.  And \nlike I said, it started on my feet. \n \n. . . \n \nQ. Why  do  you  think  if  you  never  got  those  body  parts  [her  legs]  wet \nthat your body would be affected there? \n \n\nGATEWOOD – H500803 \n \n10 \nA. Because  the  same  thing  that  was  on  my—the  bottom  of  my  feet, \nand how the bottom of my feet were feeling.  It wasn’t an itch.  It felt \nlike I needed to go on the inside of my skin.  The feeling, it was the \nsame.    They  looked  the  same  and  they  felt  the  same.    And  they \nwere on my feet and they—it came to my legs.  So I just figured it \nwas the same thing. \n \nQ. I mean, I’m looking here and I don’t know what you were covered \nwith.  I’m show you the photographs [Claimant’s Exhibits 2 and 3].  \nYou’ve not testified that your pants were wet.  You’ve not testified \nthat  the—that your socks were wet up that high.  So I’m trying to \nfigure  out  why  you  subjectively  believe  that  these  spots  that  are \ndepicted  in  these photographs  are  caused from  being  in the  water \nat Trinity. \n \nA. Oh.  Because the same spots that were on my leg were on my feet \nat first.  They just wasn’t—it just wasn’t as much on my feet.  They \nwere  just  like  little—small,  little  blotches  on  the  bottom  of  my  feet.  \nAnd  they  were  itching  really  bad.    And  when  I  started  doing  the \nEpsom salt, they would relieve, but the spots didn’t go away.  And \nthen  I  started  scratching my  ankles.   And  then  I  started  scratching \nmy  legs  and  I  was  seeing  that  it  was  moving.    It  seemed  like  the \nrash was just like in different—but it was still on my feet at the time, \nbut it was just—it’s like it was, I don’t know.  It was like growing or \nsomething.  And it was—yeah, worse. \n \n Shown  a  letter  that  was  filed  with  the  Commission  on  September  30,  2024, \nClaimant  identified  it  as  one  she  wrote.    It  describes,  inter  alia,  her  having  a  fungal \ninfection due to her being in water at work.  The following exchange took place: \nQ. When  did  you  first  tell  Trinity  that  you  had  this  rash  and  that  you \nbelieved it was related to work? \n \nA. I’m  not  sure.    I  talked  with  the  manager  first.    We  just  had  the \nsupervisor,  a  conversation    We  had  a  conversation.    I  was  just \ntelling him about—and the first time we had the conversation, I was \ntelling  him  about  my  feet.    My  feet  were  messed  up.    And  it \nprogressed  to  my  legs  and  I  told  him  about  that.    And  then  I  told \n\nGATEWOOD – H500803 \n \n11 \nhim that it was like I couldn’t barely stand it.  And that’s when I was \ntold to see Mr. Brad. \n \nQ. Do you know when any of that happened? \n \nA. No, sir.  I don’t know the dates.  I’m not sure about which date I \napproached him. \n \nLater, Claimant stated that the above conversation would have taken place after March \n2024. \n Respondents cited to Claimant Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-603(a)(2)(A) (Repl. 2012), \nand asked her if she was aware that she was required by the Act to give her employer \nwritten notice of her alleged occupational disease within 90 days after its “first distinct \nmanifestation.”  She testified that she was not aware of this requirement.\n2\n \n According  to  Claimant,  she  first  treated  for  her  leg  condition  when  she  saw \nBernice  Brown,  APRN,  at  Compliance  &  Screening  Services,  LLC,  on  June  4,  2024.  \nBrown  prescribed  her  a  topical  cream  of  Clotrimazole  1%.    Claimant  obtained  the \nmedication and used it.  Asked whether it helped, she replied in the affirmative. \n The  medical  records  in  evidence include Claimant’s  visit  to APRN  Berniece \nBrown detailed above.  The history portion of that report reads: \n[Claimant]  also  reports  that  she  has  developed  a  rash  to  her  lower \nextremities, and believes it was a result of rainwater that had accumulated \nin  her  boots.    She  has  a  red,  scaly  rash  to  her  anterior  lower  legs.    She \n \n \n2\nWhether  Claimant’s  claim  is  barred  under  this  provision  is  not  before  me, \nbecause Respondents did not raise it as an issue.  I do not have the authority to raise \nsuch an issue sua sponte.  Moreover, I note that the Arkansas Supreme Court has held \nthat such a defense is waived if not raised at or before the first hearing.  See Peerless \nCoal Co. v. Gordon, 237 Ark. 152, 372 S.W.2d 240 (1963). \n \n\nGATEWOOD – H500803 \n \n12 \nreports that it itches terribly and appears to be spreading as it had started \non her feet and now has moved up her legs. \n \nBrown examined Claimant and noted:  “There is rash on the legs.”  Thereafter, Brown \nassessed Claimant as having “Tinea corporis (B35.4)” and prescribed her Clotrimazole \n1% topical cream. \n On  February  11,  2026,  Claimant  went  to  the  Skin  Dermatology  Practitioner,  a \nclinic in Jonesboro.  Treating personnel assessed her as having Dermatitis Unspecified, \nand prescribed her Triamcinolone Acetonide 0.1% to apply to her legs.\n3\n \n Discussion.  Claimant was diagnosed by APRN Brown as having tinea corporis.  \nI credit this finding.  The Commission is authorized to accept or reject a medical opinion \nand  is  authorized  to  determine  its  medical  soundness  and  probative  value.   Poulan \nWeed Eater v. Marshall, 79 Ark. App. 129, 84 S.W.3d 878 (2002); Green Bay Packing v. \nBartlett, 67 Ark. App. 332, 999 S.W.2d 692 (1999). \n Per   DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1913   (30\nth\n ed.   2003) \n(hereinafter  “DORLAND’S”),  “tinea corporis”  is  also  known  by  the  popular  name \n“ringworm.”  It is a dermatophytosis usually caused by Microsporum canis, Trichophyton \nrubrum, or T. mentagrophytes—all of which are varieties of fungi.  Fungi thrive in dark, \ndamp conditions—such as, for example, a foot/ankle encased in a wet boot. \n \n \n3\nThis record provides in that Claimant is to apply the medication to “the affected \nareas  on  the  neck.”    However, the  word  “neck”  is  stricken  in  one  of  these  two \ninstructions, and the word “leg” is handwritten in its place.  Claimant’s testimony was \nthat she did not do this edit.  She surmised that the reason for this is that she has also \nhad  a  shoulder  injury.    But  this  makes  no  sense;  her  shoulder  injury  was  not \ndermatological in nature. \n\nGATEWOOD – H500803 \n \n13 \n For Claimant’s tinea corporis to constitute an occupational disease under the \nArkansas Workers’ Compensation Act, it must be a disease that resulted in disability or \ndeath and  arose out of and in the course of Claimant’s employment.  The evidence at \nbar establishes these elements.  Claimant’s testimony, which I credit, was that her work \nconditions  included  her  boots—which  were  a  part  of  her  work attire, and  which \nRespondent  Trinity largely provided funding  for—becoming wet  at  work  due  to  their \nbeing  submerged  in  standing  water.    The  water  accumulated  due  to  rainwater  leaking \ninto  the  building  where  she  worked.    Claimant  has  shown  by  a  preponderance  of  the \nevidence  that  there  is  a  causal  connection  between  her  job  at  Trinity  and  her  tinea \ncorporis. \n However,  Claimant  has  one  more  hurdle  to  clear.    In  setting  parameters \nconcerning such a claim as the one at hand, the statute further reads: \nAn employer shall not be liable for any compensation for an occupational \ndisease unless . . . [t]he disease is due to the nature of an employment in \nwhich  the  hazards  of  the  disease  actually  exist  and  are  characteristic \nthereof and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment and \nis  actually  incurred  in  his  or  her  employment.    This  includes  any  disease \ndue  to  or  attributable  to  exposure  to  or  contact  with  any  radioactive \nmaterial by an employee in the course of his or her employment[.] \n \nArk.   Code   Ann. §   11-9-601(g)(1)(A)   (Repl.   2012).      An   occupational   disease   is \ncharacteristic  of  an  occupation,  process  or  employment  where  there  is  a  recognizable \nlink  between  the  nature  of  the  job  performed  and  an  increased  risk  in  contracting  the \noccupational disease in question.  Sanyo Mfg. Corp. v. Leisure, 12 Ark. App. 274, 675 \nS.W.2d 841 (1984).  Such diseases are generally gradual rather than sudden in onset.  \nHancock v. Modern Indus. Laundry, 46 Ark. App. 186, 878 S.W.2d 416 (1994). \n\nGATEWOOD – H500803 \n \n14 \n Is  tinea  corporis,  or  ringworm,  characteristic  of  the  job  that  Claimant  held  at \nRespondent Trinity?  In a word, yes.  It was recognized that there was a problem among \nthe  employees  in  the  vicinity  of  Claimant’s workstation having  wet  footwear  and  its \nattendant  problems  due  to  the  standing  water.    This  is  illustrated  by  Claimant’s \ntestimony—which, again, I credit—that co-workers advised her to deal with the problem \nby treating her feet with a solution of Epsom salts before re-donning her boots “[s]o that \nshe would dry them [her feet] out.” \n The   fact   that the   general   public   might   contract   tinea   corporis   does   not \nautomatically  bar  it  as  an  occupational  disease  under  §  11-9-601(e)(3).   Instead,  the \ntest is whether the nature of Claimant’s employment exposed her to a greater risk of the \ndisease than the risk posed to the general public or to workers in other jobs.  See Sanyo \nMfg.  Corp.,  supra.  Clearly, Claimant’s risk of getting this particular type of ringworm \nwas greater than those other groups.  Thus, this particular provision in the Act does not \nprevent her from prevailing here. \n The evidence establishes that Claimant developed tinea corporis from her job at \nRespondent  Trinity,  and  it—due  to  the  condition  of  her  work  boots  made  wet  by \nworkplace conditions—spread to her legs.  In sum, she has proven by a preponderance \nof the evidence that she sustained a compensable occupational disease in the form of a \nfungal infection that has affected her lower extremities. \n\nGATEWOOD – H500803 \n \n15 \n B. Reasonable and Necessary Treatment \n Introduction.    Claimant  has  alleged  that  she  is  entitled  to  reasonable  and \nnecessary medical treatment in connection with compensable lower extremity injuries. \n Standards.    Arkansas  Code  Annotated  Section  11-9-508(a)  (Repl.  2012)  states \nthat an employer shall provide for an injured employee such medical treatment as may \nbe necessary in connection with the injury received by the employee.  Wal-Mart Stores, \nInc. v. Brown, 82 Ark. App. 600, 120 S.W.3d 153 (2003).  But employers are liable only \nfor  such  treatment  and  services  as  are  deemed  necessary  for  the  treatment  of  the \nclaimant’s injuries.  DeBoard v. Colson Co., 20 Ark. App. 166, 725 S.W.2d 857 (1987).  \nThe claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that medical treatment is \nreasonable  and  necessary  for  the  treatment  of  a  compensable  injury.   Brown, supra; \nGeo  Specialty  Chem.  v.  Clingan,  69  Ark.  App.  369,  13  S.W.3d  218  (2000).    What \nconstitutes  reasonable  and  necessary  medical  treatment  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the \nCommission.  White Consolidated Indus. v. Galloway, 74 Ark. App. 13, 45 S.W.3d 396 \n(2001); Wackenhut Corp. v. Jones, 73 Ark. App. 158, 40 S.W.3d 333 (2001). \n As  the  Arkansas  Court  of  Appeals  has  held,  a  claimant  may  be  entitled  to \nadditional treatment even after the healing period has ended, if said treatment is geared \ntoward management of  the  injury.  See Patchell  v.  Wal-Mart  Stores,  Inc., 86  Ark.  App. \n230,  184  S.W.3d  31  (2004); Artex  Hydrophonics,  Inc.  v.  Pippin,  8  Ark.  App.  200,  649 \nS.W.2d 845 (1983).  Such services can include those for the purpose of diagnosing the \nnature and extent of the compensable injury; reducing or alleviating symptoms resulting \nfrom  the  compensable  injury;  maintaining  the  level  of  healing  achieved;  or  preventing \n\nGATEWOOD – H500803 \n \n16 \nfurther  deterioration  of  the  damage  produced  by  the  compensable  injury.   Jordan  v. \nTyson Foods, Inc., 51 Ark. App. 100, 911 S.W.2d 593 (1995); Artex, supra. \n Discussion.  I find that Claimant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence \nthat she is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical treatment of her compensable \noccupational  disease.  Moreover,  I  have  reviewed  her  treatment  records  that  are  in \nevidence, and I find that she has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that all of \nthe treatment of it that is in evidence was reasonable and necessary. \nC. Temporary Total Disability \n Introduction.    Claimant  has  also  alleged  that  she  is  entitled  to  temporary  total \ndisability benefits as a result of her compensable occupational disease. \n Standards.    The disease  has  affected Claimant’s lower extremities,  and  is  thus \nscheduled in nature.  See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-521(a)(4) (Repl. 2012).  An employee \nwho has  sustained a  compensable  scheduled  injury is  entitled  to  temporary  total \ndisability compensation “during the healing period or until the employee returns to work, \nwhichever occurs first . . . .”  Id. § 11-9-521(a).  See Wheeler Const. Co. v. Armstrong, \n73 Ark. App. 146, 41 S.W.3d 822 (2001).  The healing period ends when the underlying \ncondition  causing  the  disability  has  become  stable  and  nothing  further  in  the  way  of \ntreatment will improve that condition.  Mad Butcher, Inc. v. Parker, 4 Ark. App. 124, 628 \nS.W.2d 582 (1982). \n Claimant  must  prove  his  entitlement  to  temporary  total  disability  benefits  by  a \npreponderance of the evidence.  Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-705(a)(3) (Repl. 2012).  Also, a \n\nGATEWOOD – H500803 \n \n17 \nclaimant must demonstrate that the disability lasted more than seven days.  Id. § 11-9-\n501(a)(1). \n Evidence.  The following exchange occurred while Claimant was on the witness \nstand: \nQ. Let  me  switch  gears  here  and  talk  to  you  about  your  claim  for \ntemporary  total  disability  benefits.    Ms.  Gatewood,  in  order  to \nqualify  for  what  are  called  temporary  total  disability  benefits—and \nthat’s  provided  that  I  find  that  you  suffered  what’s  called  a \n“compensable  injury,”  and  that’s  an  injury  that  entitles  you  to \nworkers’ compensation benefits.  The body parts you’re claim injury \nto are to your legs. \n \nA. Yes, sir. \n \nQ. Your  left  and  right  lower  extremities  [are]  what  we  call  [them].  \nThat’s what’s called a scheduled injury.  And what that means is \nthey’re actually body parts that are listed in our statute.  But the \nlegal standard that entitles you to workers’ compensation benefits is \nthat you had to have been off work due to these injuries you’re \nclaiming and you didn’t go back to work.  My question to you [is] \nthis.  Were you off work because of this condition you’re claim you \nhad on your legs? \n \nA. I was off work at Trinity Rail, but not at—I could go to any job and \nwork. \n \nQ. You could go to any job? \n \nA. Yes, sir. \n \nQ. Okay.  Was the time period that you were working at Trinity, which \nagain,  it  was  from  June  28  of  2023  to  June  4  of  2024,  were  you \never off work because of your legs? \n \nA. Just call in.  Just being out from work, just from— \n \nQ. How much time are we talking about?  You got to give me dates. \n \n\nGATEWOOD – H500803 \n \n18 \nA. Oh.  I don’t have the dates.  I don’t—but every day that I called in, it \nwas for my legs.  It was for— \n \nQ. Do you have any idea how much you were off for? \n \nA. We have ten points and I used all my points on that.  So then days, \nmore than ten days. \n \nQ. But you don’t have dates or anything? \n \nA. No, sir. \n \nQ. Okay.  You were terminated, you said, on June 4 of 2024? \n \nA. Yes, sir. \n \nQ. Were you still going to work? \n \nA. Yes, sir. \n \n Claimant  acknowledged  that  her  medical  records  do  not  reflect  that  she  was \ntaken off work.  After her termination, she was able to obtain a position at Wal-Mart. \n Later, on cross-examination, she agreed that when she went for treatment for her \nlegs  on  June  4,  2024,  the  person  who  treated  her  wrote  that  she  could  “work  as \ntolerated  without  any  restrictions.”    However,  it  was  Claimant’s  belief  that  this \nreferenced the shoulder injury that was also being treated at that appointment. \n It  was  Claimant's  testimony that her  skin  condition  rendered  her  unable  to  work \nbetween  June  and  August  of  2024  because  she  could  not  wear  jeans.    She  added:  \n“Like, that’s the reason why I couldn’t work at Trinity no more because I had to wear \njeans.”    However,  she  ultimately  acknowledged  that  she  was  terminated  from  her \nposition  there  on  June  4, 2024, due  to  the  excessive  number  of  points  she  had \n\nGATEWOOD – H500803 \n \n19 \naccumulated.   She  denied  that  her  termination  was  due  to  a  positive  drug  test,  even \nthough she admitted that her drug screen was positive for marijuana. \n Discussion.    While  Claimant  claims  that  she  had  sporadic  absences  from  her \nposition  at  Trinity  due  to  her  compensable  skin  condition,  she  was  not  taken  off  work.  \nThis  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  she  did  not  seek  treatment  until  the  date  of  her \ntermination, June 4, 2024.  Moreover, while she numbers these absences as being ten \nor more, she cannot identify when they occurred.  Finally, as she admitted, her medical \nrecords do not show that she was in fact taken off work because of the condition of the \nskin on her legs; and she further admitted that on the date of her termination, she was \ncapable  of  working  elsewhere.  Based  on  the  foregoing,  I  am  unable  to  find  that \nClaimant has met her burden of proving that she is entitled to temporary total disability \nbenefits for any period. \nCONCLUSION AND AWARD \n Respondents  are  hereby  directed  to pay/furnish  benefits  in  accordance  with  the \nfindings of fact and conclusions of law set forth above.  All accrued sums shall be paid \nin a lump sum without discount, and this award shall earn interest at the legal rate until \npaid,  pursuant  to  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11-9-809  (Repl.  2012).   See Couch  v.  First  State \nBank of Newport, 49 Ark. App. 102, 898 S.W.2d 57 (1995). \n IT IS SO ORDERED. \n       ________________________________ \n       Hon. O. Milton Fine II \n       Chief Administrative Law Judge","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION WCC NO. H500803 VERLENCIA D. GATEWOOD, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT TRINITY RAIL MAINTENANCE SVCS., EMPLOYER RESPONDENT ACE AMERICAN INS. CO., CARRIER RESPONDENT OPINION FILED APRIL 1, 2026 Hearing before Chief Administrative Law Judge O. Milton Fine II on February 20, 2026, in...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T22:29:50.895Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H500803-2026-04-01","pdf":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/Gatewood_Verlencia_H500803_04012026.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}