{"id":"alj-H401589-2025-02-05","awcc_number":"H401589","decision_date":"2025-02-05","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Becky Keeter","employer_name":"Clay Maxey Chevroltet","title":"KEETER VS. CLAY MAXEY CHEVROLTET AWCC# H401589 February 05, 2025","outcome":"granted","outcome_keywords":["granted:1"],"injury_keywords":["back"],"pdf_url":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/KEETER_BECKY_H401589_20250205.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"KEETER_BECKY_H401589_20250205.pdf","text_length":25625,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \nCLAIM NO. H401589 \nBECKY L. KEETER, EMPLOYEE     CLAIMANT \n \nCLAY MAXEY CHEVROLTET, CADILLAC \nEMPLOYER         RESPONDENT  \n \nCENTRAL ARKANSAS AUTO DEALERS, CARRIER/   \nRISK MANAGEMENT RESOURCES, TPA    RESPONDENT \n \nOPINION FILED FEBRUARY 5, 2025 \nHearing before Administrative Law Judge, James D. Kennedy, on the 18\nth\n day of \nDecember 2024, in Mountain Home, Arkansas. \nClaimant is represented by Daniel Wren, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas. \nRespondents are represented by Melissa Wood, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas. \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE \n A hearing  was  conducted  on  the 18\nth\n day  of December 2024,  to  determine  the \nissue of temporary total  disability from January  19\nth\n, 2024, the  date when  the  claimant \nwas  terminated from  her  employment to  a  date  to  be  determined, which  will  be on  or \naround the currently approved date for the surgery and recovery thereafter, plus attorney \nfees. Prior  to  the  hearing, but  after  the  prehearing  telephone  conference,  the  issue  of \nadditional medical was resolved, and the requested surgery was in the process of being \nscheduled at the time of the hearing. A copy of the Pre-hearing Order dated July 22, 2024, \nwas marked “Commission Exhibit 1” and made part of the record without objection.  The \nOrder provided the parties stipulated as follows: \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction of the \nwithin claim. \n2.  An employer/employee relationship existed at all pertinent times. \n3.  Claimant suffered a compensable injury to her back.  \n\nKEETER – H401589 \n4. The claimant earned an  average  weekly  wage  of  $1322.91,  sufficient  for  a \nTTD/PPD rate of $835.00/$626.00 respectively. \n5. The claimant’s and respondent’s contentions were set out  in their  respective \nresponses  to  the  Pre-hearing  questionnaire and made  a  part  of  the  record \nalong with the Pre-hearing Order, without objection.   \nPrior to the hearing, but after the Prehearing Order, the claimant raised the issue \nof  collateral  estoppel  in  regard  to  the remaining issue  of TTD  and the  defense  of \ntermination of employment for cause.  After a phone conference prior to the hearing, the \nclaimant was allowed to make a record to raise the issue of collateral estoppel at the time \nof  the  hearing.  The  claimant  was aware  at  the time of the  phone conference, that  the \ndefense of termination of employment for cause was not collaterally estopped.  \n In  regard  to  the  issue  of  termination  of  employment,  the  respondents and the \nclaimant agreed  that  the  claimant suffered  a  compensable  work-related  injury  on \nSeptember  1,  2023,  and  was later terminated from  employment on  January 19,  2024, \nwith the respondents contending that the employment termination was due to cause.  Had \nshe  not  been terminated; the  respondents contend  that  the  claimant would  have \ncontinued to be provided light duty.  As such, they contend that she would not be entitled \nto temporary total disability benefits during the time frame and if temporary total disability \nis awarded, the respondents are entitled to an offset for the unemployment benefits she \nreceived. \nThe  claimant  objected to  the  issue  of  termination for  cause being raised by  the \nrespondents ten  days prior  to  the  hearing. They  argued  that  the hearing had  been \ncontinued once for the specific purpose of the claimant returning and being reevaluated \nby Dr. Bruffett. The claimant contended at the time of the hearing that raising the issue of \ntermination for cause approximately ten days prior to the actual hearing date left her the \n\nKEETER – H401589 \nchoice “between the devil and her brother.” The  claimant  admitted a  continuance  was \noffered, but that it was not fair to allow the respondents to raise the issue so close to the \nactual hearing date and then leave the claimant the option of going ahead with the hearing \nor in the alternative suffering through another continuance. The claimant contended the \nissue raised by the respondents should be prevented by collateral estoppel. \nIn regard to the assertions concerning timeliness and the issue of termination for \ncause, the respondents responded that at the time of the pre-hearing filing, discovery was \nstill on going. The focus of the main issue prior to today was whether or not respondents \nwould be authorizing surgery with Dr. Bruffett. The continuance was granted because Dr. \nBruffett, whom claimant now wants to have the surgery with, asked to see her again and \nthis was out of the respondent’s control. Dr. Bruffett wanted her back before responding \nto some questions asked by the respondents. Once Dr. Bruffett again saw the claimant, \nit   was confirmed “that  we  would  be  paying  for  the  surgery.”  The  respondents \nacknowledged  the  offer  of  a  continuance in  regard  to the hearing and  argued  that \ncollateral estoppel would not apply, due to the fact that the unemployment hearing took \nplace  before  the  Department  of  Workforce  Services  which was  a  different  entity, a \ndifferent jurisdiction, a different  finder  of  fact, with different issues. The Respondent’s \nrequested that the court move forward.   \nAt this point, the Commission confirmed that there had been a phone conference \nin  regard  to  the  issue  of  collateral  estoppel and it  was  determined  at the time  that the \nMotion by the claimant to prevent the raising of termination for cause by the respondents \nwas not prevented by collateral estoppel.    \n\nKEETER – H401589 \n   The  witnesses  consisted  of  the  claimant,  Ms.  Kirkland  Thompson  and  the \ntestimony of Ms. Cindi Lindenmeyer for the respondents. Claimant’s and respondent’s \nexhibits were admitted into the record without objection. From a review of the record as \na  whole, to  include medical  reports  and other  matters  properly  before  the Commission \nand having had an opportunity to observe the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, \nthe  following  findings  of  fact  and  conclusions  of  law  are  made  in  accordance  with \nArkansas Code Annotated 11-9-704. \nFINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \n1. That the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction over \n this claim. \n2.  An employer/employee relationship existed at all pertinent times. \n3.  Claimant suffered a compensable injury to her back.  \n4.  The  claimant earned an  average  weekly  wage  of  $1322.91,  sufficient  for  a   \nTTD/PPD rate of $835.00/$626.00 respectively. \n5.  That the issue of “termination for cause” was not barred by collateral estoppel. \n6.  That the claimant has failed to satisfy the required burden of proof to prove by \na  preponderance  of  the  evidence that  she  is  entitled  to temporary  total \ndisability.     \n7.  That all remaining issues are moot. \n8.    If  not  already  paid,  the  respondents  are  ordered  to  pay  for  the  cost  of  the \ntranscript forthwith. \nREVIEW OF TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE \nThe  Prehearing  Order,  along  with  the  prehearing  questionnaires  of  the  parties \nwere admitted  into  the  record  without  objection.  Additionally,  the  claimant’s  and \nrespondent’s exhibits were admitted into the record without objection. The first witness to \ntestify  was the  claimant Becky  Keeter, who testified that she  had  worked  as  a  service \nadvisor for Clay Maxey Chevrolet and the job consisted of meeting people in the lobby of \n\nKEETER – H401589 \nthe dealership who came in with an issue regarding their automobile, and then checking \ntheir vehicle in.  She would go out and hook up the scan tool to the car with the connection \nunder the dash.  She had worked for the Respondent for almost three and a half years.  \nShe was injured in September of 2023, and prior to that date, had never been written up \nfor  any  disciplinary  reason.  She  continued  working after  the  accident. After  her  injury, \nsome things in regard to her work were modified, but she was still required to bend over \nand connect the scanner under the dash. In regard to coupons for customers, she testified \nthe Respondent distributed them for discounted services and she thought the coupons \ncame from General Motors. (Tr. 13 – 15) \n In regard to the coupons, there were different coupons, some for an oil change, \nsome for battery maintenance, some for brakes, and some for varied services. She went \non to state that she would receive the coupons through an email, or sometimes through \nthe  mail,  and that the  other  service  advisor  also  received  the  coupons. Her  direct \nsupervisor, George Stallings, was aware of the coupons. “Some people would go home \nand get and bring them back and some people would email them to me or text them to \nme to where I could just print them off for them.” The coupons had never been an issue \nbefore. “In November, George talked to me about it, yes, he did.” “He told me that from \nthen on I needed to have authorization from him on every coupon.” She was not required \nto  sign  a  disciplinary  note. (Tr.  16 – 18) She  went  on  to state that  she  only  used  the \ncoupons  with  her  supervisor’s approval, and she was  terminated  by  Eric  Stewart,  the \ngeneral manager on January 19\nth\n. At that time, a new managing partner had been brought \non board who made “tremendous changes.” She was told by Eric Stewart that they were \ngoing to start with a clean state in the service department. At the time of her termination, \n\nKEETER – H401589 \nshe contacted someone about her workers’ compensation claim and her benefits which \nhad failed to arrive, and she then applied for unemployment benefits. She originally was \ndenied  but won an appeal for  the unemployment  benefits.  During the time  period after \nshe got hurt, she worked a second job at Beer Belly’s as a bartender and continued to \nwork there. She also admitted to cleaning houses for income during this time-period, with \nher best month earning between $250 to $300, and her worst month being $66, with these \nfigures prior to her paying for transportation or cleaning supplies. (Tr. 19 – 22) \n Under cross examination, the Claimant admitted her job duties for the respondent \nconsisted  of  checking  the  customer in,  doing  the  paperwork  on  the  computer,  and \nscanning the vehicle by hooking up the scan tool under the dash, and then getting the \nvehicle back to the technician. She would sometimes contact an insurance provider. She \nreported her injury to Cyndi Lindenmeyer after checking in a vehicle, and Cyndi had set \nher up an appointment at Lincoln Paden Clinic. She admitted being terminated on January \n19\nth\n. (Tr. 23-24) \n The claimant was then questioned about being written up on the date of November \nof 2023, and she responded that she was not written up but warned after a discussion \nwith her supervisor. She also admitted working at Beer Belly’s while employed by Clay \nMaxey, and still currently working there on Friday and Saturday nights, from five to nine \no’clock and being paid the same as prior to the injury. She additionally admitted that she \nhad received one unemployment check for the sum of $5412.00 or something like that.  \nIn regard to seeing Dr. Bruffett, she admitted seeing him in February, and being placed \non light duty. She went on to state “I made my job easier because I went and found what \n\nKEETER – H401589 \nI needed to make my job easier.” A co-worker would check in the cars for her. In regard \nto cleaning houses, she admitted cleaning up to eight houses. (Tr. 25 – 27) \n At this point, the claimant rested, and the respondents called their only witness, \nCyndi Lindenmeyer, the HR manager for all four of the Clay Maxy dealerships. She had \nworked in that capacity since October, performing payroll and handling human resource \nissues. Prior to that, she had worked as the office manager and controller at a single Clay \nMaxy Chevrolet dealership. She was familiar with the claimant and had worked with her \nsince probably in 2019. She testified that in regard to the coupons, General Motors mailed \nthem out, but she did  not  know  about  emails, and  the  coupons  offered discounts  on \nvarious services. There was no policy in the employee handbook in regard to coupons, \nbut there  were  policies  in  regard  to discounts  in  general. The  discounts  had  to  be \nauthorized and could not be just given out. (Tr. 28 -30) \n In regard to the claimant’s unemployment, Ms. Lindenmeyer testified that she \npersonally  filled  out  the  response for the state of Arkansas in regard to the claimant’s \nunemployment claim. The coupons were mailed to certain customers and if the coupons \nwere used by someone who was not issued a coupon, it was possible that General Motors \ncould decide not to reimburse the cost. In regard to light duty, Ms. Lindenmeyer was not \naware of a request for light duty. She went on to state that if the claimant had not been \nterminated for cause on January 19\nth\n, she would have continued to do the same work. \nLight duty would have been continued. (Tr. 31 – 34)  \n The following questioning then occurred: \nQ:  Have you had issues with honesty or dishonesty with Ms. Keeter, aside from \n      the coupon? \n\nKEETER – H401589 \nA:  There have been some instances where on some of her personal service \n      tickets, there were discounts that had been put on there that she had written, \n      and they were applied to her repair orders. \n \nQ.  Is that something that would have been authorized? \n \nA:  No.  We changed it to where - - what - - service advisors were not supposed \n     to write their own tickets and that had been addressed on more than one \n     occasion for that reason. And also they could not cashier their own tickets for  \n     that reason. \n \nQ.  Did you talk to her about that issue? \n \nA.  I sent emails about it to - - there have been - - there was - - there were a \n     couple of different times that emails were sent out that Becky would have \n     been there for both of those.  It was previous service advisors and then she \n     and Garrett too, I believe. \n \nShe went on to testify that they then changed the system. (Tr. 34) \nUnder cross examination, Ms. Lindenmeyer admitted that her office was down the \nhill adjacent to the dealership and she did not work in the service department but that she \ndid  go  to  the  dealership  on  occasion.  She  also  admitted  that  the  information  that  she \ntestified about today in regard to the claimant’s specific performance would have been \nreceived from others, but in regard to the tickets, she had questioned the claimant about \nhow a discount got on there. Ms. Lindenmeyer was not at the dealership on November \n13\nth\n, to know whether the claimant received a written or verbal admonishment. She went \non to testify that the claimant did in fact come to her, turn her clothing in, and tell her that \nEric had informed her that they were making a clean slate in the service department, and \nshe was fired, and Ms. Lindenmeyer agreed they were cleaning house. She also agreed \nthat  the  decision  by  the  appeals  committee  provided  that  the  handbook  called  for \nprogressive writeups. (Tr. 35 – 39) \n\nKEETER – H401589 \nOn  redirect,  Ms.  Lindenmeyer  testified  that  the  employment  handbook  was \nprovided to the employees and the claimant had in fact signed that she had received it.  \nThe appeals committee wanted to know if there was anything that pertained to the use of \nunauthorized use of the coupons and Ms. Lindenmeyer provided the handbook.  She also \ntestified that she was not consulted in regard to the claimant’s termination. (Tr. 40) \nOn  further  redirect,  Ms.  Lindenmeyer  was  asked  about  page  5  of  respondents \nexhibits and the employees warning notice that stated that the employee would not sign \nthe warning notice and that the document was initialed by G-S which would be Georges \ninitials. (Tr. 43) \nIn regard to the documentary evidence, the Claimant’s Exhibit one consisted of \nmedical  and  as  discussed  above,  the  respondents  agreeing to  surgery  by  Dr.  Bruffett, \nprior to the scheduled hearing. Consequently, additional medical was not an issue at the \ntime of the hearing. The claimant’s Exhibit 2, which consisted of eight pages of non-\nmedical  exhibits,  was  admitted  without  objection.  The  Form  AR-2  provided  that  the \nclaimant was injured on September 1, 2023.  (Cl. Ex. 2, P. 1) The First Report of Injury \nalso  provided  that  the claimant  was  injured  on  September 1,  2023,  and  this  document \nappeared to  be  filed  on  or  about  March  4,  2024.    (Cl.  Ex. 2,  P.  2)  A  decision  by  the \nArkansas Appeal Tribunal provided that a hearing was held on May 3, 2024. The decision \nprovided that the employer has the burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of \nthe evidence and referred to Grigsby v. Everett, 8 Ark. App. 188, 649 S.W.2d 404 (1983), \nand  that  the  employer  has  not  shown  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  the \nclaimant  willfully  disregarded  the  employers  interest  and  therefore  the  claimant  was \n\nKEETER – H401589 \ndischarged from her last work for reasons other than misconduct in connection with the \nwork. (Cl. Ex. 2, P. 6 – 8)    \nThe  respondents  exhibit  one  which  consisted  of  14  pages  of  non-medical \nrecords, was admitted without objection. The records from the Department of Workforce \nServices  provided  that  the  claimant  was  discharged  by  her  general  manager  due  to \nviolating  company policy  by  providing  discounts  to  customers  with no  proof  of  mailers.  \nThe documents provided that the claimant would make photocopies of the coupons and \ngive  them  to  the  customers  to  discount  work.  The  document  also  provided  that  the \nclaimant would not sign the warning notice.  (Resp. Ex. 1 P. 1-5) \nRespondents Exhibit 1 also included a surveillance report in regard to a video \nfrom  Meridian  Investigative  Group.  The  documents  provided  there  were  three  days  of \nsurveillance, Saturday, February 17, 2024, from 6:58 a.m. to 11:18 a.m.; Saturday March \n2, 2024, from 7:00 a.m. to 3:03 p.m.; and Saturday April 6, 2024, from 7:06a.m. – 3:07 \np.m. (Resp. Ex. 1, P. 6 – 14) \nRespondents Exhibit 2 consisted of the actual video observation of the claimant \ntotaling 21  minutes  and  37  seconds.  The  video  was in  fact  reviewed and  the  most \npertinent part of the video was taken primarily at a Dollar General which provided that the \nclaimant was walking and moving in a normal manner and gait without any ambulatory \naids. The video showed the claimant bending, twisting, and lifting, in a normal manner, \nwith no observable or apparent physical limitations. (Resp. Ex. 2) \n \n \n\nKEETER – H401589 \nDISCUSSION AND ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES \nIn  the  present  matter,  the  parties  stipulated that the  claimant  sustained  a \ncompensable work-related injury to her back.  In determining whether the claimant has \nsustained  her  required  burden  of  proof for  her  claimed  benefits,  the  Commission  shall \nweigh the evidence impartially, without giving the benefit of the doubt to either party.  Ark. \nCode Ann 11-9-704.  Wade v. Mr. Cavananugh’s, 298 Ark. 364, 768 S.W. 2d 521 (1989).  \nFurther,  the  Commission  has  the duty to  translate evidence on all  issues  before  it  into \nfindings  of  fact. Weldon  v.  Pierce  Brothers  Construction  Co.,  54  Ark.  App.  344,  925 \nS.W.2d 179 (1996). \nThe claimant bears the burden of proof in establishing entitlement to benefits under \nthe  Arkansas  Workers’  Compensation  Act  and  must  sustain  that  burden  by  a \npreponderance of the evidence. Dalton v. Allen Engineering Co., 66 Ark. App. 201, 635 \nS.W. 2d 823 (1982).  Preponderance of the evidence means the evidence having greater \nweight or convincing force. Metropolitan Nat’l Bank v. La Sher Oil Co., 81 Ark App. 263, \n101 S.W.3d 252 (2003).  Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses and the weight \nto  be given  to  their  testimony  are  within  the  exclusive  province  of  the  Commission.  \nPowers v. City of Fayetteville, 97 Ark. App. 251, 248 S.W.3d 516 (2007).  Where there \nare contradictions in the evidence, it is within the Commissions’ province to reconcile \nconflicting evidence and to determine the true facts.  Cedar Chem. Co. v. Knight, 99 Ark. \nApp. 162, 258 S.W.3d 394 (2007).   \nThe claimant raised collateral estoppel in regard to the issue involving termination \nfor  cause,  contending  the  issue  had  already  been  resolved  by  the  Arkansas  Appeals \nTribunal in a matter involving unemployment benefits which the claimant contended she \n\nKEETER – H401589 \nwas entitled to receive.  In its decision, the Appeals Tribunal relied on Grigsby v. Escort, \n8 Ark. App. 188, 649 S.W.2d 404 (1983), for the premise that the employer (respondent) \nhas the burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence, and held the \nemployee (claimant) was entitled to unemployment benefits.   \nCollateral  Estoppel  or  issue  preclusion, bars  litigation  of  issues  that  were \npreviously litigated.  Four requirements must be satisfied for collateral estoppel to apply, \nwith the first being the issue sought to be litigated must be the same as that involved in \nthe prior litigation. See Pine Bluff Warehouse v. Berry, 51 Ark. App. 139, 912 S.W.2d 11 \n(1995).  In the unemployment hearing before the Tribunal, the claimant and respondents \nwere litigating  the  issue  of  unemployment  benefits.  In  the  current  matter  before  the \nCommission, which has sole jurisdiction over workers’ compensation claims and benefits, \nthe claimant and respondents are litigating the issue of temporary total disability, clearly \na separate and different issue. It is also noted that the burden of proof in regard to showing \nmisconduct lies on the employer (respondent) in a hearing involving an unemployment \nclaim before the Tribunal, while the burden of proof regarding temporary total disability \nlies  on  the  employee  (claimant)  in  a  hearing  before  the  Commission.  Based  upon  the \nabove differences, there is no alternative but to find that collateral estoppel does not apply \nin regard to the hearing before the Commission. \nIn regard to the claimant’s claimed temporary total disability, the claimant suffered \na compensable injury to her back on September 1, 2023, and was not terminated until \nJanuary 19, 2024.  The claimant made the statement that they were cleaning house in \nthe  service  department,  the  area where she  worked, and  Ms.  Lindenmeyer,  whose \ntestimony was believable, and who testified that she was not involved with the termination \n\nKEETER – H401589 \nof the claimant, agreed with the claimant about the house cleaning. Ms. Lindenmeyer also \ntestified  that  she  recognized  the  initials  on  a  document being of  a  supervisor,  and  the \ndocument provided  that  the  claimant  would  not  sign  a  warning  notice  in regard  to  her \nwork.   \nA video  of  the  claimant was  entered  into  evidence that showed the  claimant \nshopping in a Dollar General Store where she was able to squat, reach out for items, and \nambulate. It is also noted that the claimant was receiving unemployment benefits during \nat least part of the time period for the requested temporary total disability benefits and \nthat to draw unemployment in the state of Arkansas, A.C.A. 11-10-507 (3) (A) requires \nthat  the  claimant  be  unemployed  but  mentally  and  physically  able  to  perform  suitable \nwork.   \nAdditionally, it is noted that the claimant admitted working as a bar tender at the \ntime  of  her  injury  and  still currently working  the same job, two  evenings  a  week.    The \nclaimant also admitted cleaning houses for a while during this period. \nTemporary total disability under the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act is the \nperiod within the healing period in which an employee suffers a total incapacity to earn \nwages.  Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department v. Brashears, 272 Ark. \nApp  244,  613  S.W.2d  (1981)   The Commission may consider the claimant’s physical \ncapabilities  and  evaluate  her ability  to  engage  in  any  gainful  employment.   It  is  the \nclaimant who bears  the  burden  of  proving she  remains  in her healing  period  and \nadditionally suffered a  total  incapacity  to  earn  pre-injury  wages  in  the  same  or other \nemployment.  Palazzolo v. Nelms, 46 Ark. App. 130, 877 S.W.2d 938 (1994). Temporary \ntotal disability is not only based on the claimant’s healing period, but is awarded where \n\nKEETER – H401589 \nthe claimant’s injury-caused incapacity prevents her from earning the wages that she was \nreceiving at the time of the injury. County Mkt. v. Thorton, 27 Ark. App. 235, 770 S.W.2d \n156 (1989).  \nThe claimant failed to show that an injury-caused incapacity prevented her from \nearning the wages she was receiving at the time of her work-related injuries. Based upon \nthe above evidence and the applicable law, and after weighing the evidence impartially, \nwithout giving the benefit of the doubt to either party, there is no alternative but to find \nthat  the  claimant has failed  to satisfy the  required  burden  of  proof  to  prove  by  a \npreponderance  of  the  evidence  that she  is  entitled  to  temporary  total  disability  for  the \nperiod of time requested. \nIT IS SO ORDERED. \n  \n      ___________________________ \n      JAMES D. KENNEDY  \n      Administrative Law Judge","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION CLAIM NO. H401589 BECKY L. KEETER, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT CLAY MAXEY CHEVROLTET, CADILLAC EMPLOYER RESPONDENT CENTRAL ARKANSAS AUTO DEALERS, CARRIER/ RISK MANAGEMENT RESOURCES, TPA RESPONDENT OPINION FILED FEBRUARY 5, 2025 Hearing before Administrative Law Judge, James D....","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T22:43:16.698Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H401589-2025-02-05","pdf":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/KEETER_BECKY_H401589_20250205.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}