{"id":"alj-H400938-2024-04-14","awcc_number":"H400938","decision_date":"2024-04-14","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Jonathan Davis","employer_name":"Central Maloney, Inc","title":"DAVIS VS. CENTRAL MALONEY, INC. AWCC# H400938 April 14, 2025","outcome":"denied","outcome_keywords":["affirmed:2","dismissed:1","denied:3"],"injury_keywords":["knee","back"],"pdf_url":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/DAVIS_JONATHAN_H400938_20240414.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"DAVIS_JONATHAN_H400938_20240414.pdf","text_length":12840,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \n \nCLAIM No H400938 \n \nJONATHAN DAVIS, EMPLOYEE       CLAIMANT \n \nvs. \n \nCENTRAL MALONEY, INC., SELF-INSURED EMPLOYER,       RESPONDENT \n                           \n \nRISK MANAGEMENT RESOURCES,  \nTHIRD PARTY ADMINISTRATOR                     RESPONDENT \n \n \n \nOPINION & ORDER FILED 14 APRIL 2025 \n \n \nThis claim was heard before Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission Administrative \nLaw Judge JayO. Howe on 29 January 2025 in Little Rock, Arkansas. \n \nThe claimant was represented by Mr. Mark Alan Peoples. \n \nThe respondents were represented by Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, Mr. Guy Alton Wade. \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE \n \n A Prehearing Order was entered on 18 September 2024 and admitted to the hearing \nrecord without objection as Commission’s Exhibit No 1. As outlined in that Order, the \nparties agreed to the following: \nSTIPULATIONS \n \n 1. The Commission has jurisdiction over this claim. \n \n2.  The self-insured employer/employee/third party administrator relationship \nexisted at all relevant times, including on 26 January 2024, when the \nclaimant allegedly sustained a compensable injury. \n  \n3. At the time relevant to this matter, the claimant earned an average weekly \nwage of $1,107.24, which would entitle him to compensation rates of $738 \nand $554 per week for temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and \npermanent partial disability (PPD) benefits, respectively. \n \n 4. The respondents have denied this claim in its entirety. \n\nJ. DAVIS- H400938 \n2 \n \n \nISSUES \n \n1. Whether the claimant suffered a compensable injury to his left lower \nextremity by specific incident. \n \n2. Whether the claimant is entitled to TTD benefits. \n \n3. Whether the claimant is entitled to medical benefits. \n \n 4. Whether the claimant is entitled to an attorney’s fee. \n \n All other issues are reserved. \n \nCONTENTIONS \n \n The parties’ contentions were incorporated by reference into the Prehearing Order \nfrom their prehearing filings. According to those filings, the claimant contends (1) that he \nsustained a work-related injury to his left knee on or about 26 January 2024; (2) that he is \nentitled to TTD from the date of injury until 25 May 2024; (3) that he is entitled to medical \ntreatment related to his work injury; and (4) that he is entitled to an attorney’s fee on \ncontroverted benefits. \n The respondents contend that the claimant did not sustain a compensable work \ninjury within the course and scope of his employment or while performing employment \nservices. \nFINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \nHaving reviewed the record as a whole, including the evidence summarized below, \nand having heard testimony from the witness, observing his demeanor, I make the \nfollowing findings of fact and conclusions of law under A.C.A. § 11-9-704: \n1. The Commission has jurisdiction over this claim. \n2. The stipulations as set forth above are accepted. \n3. The claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he \nsuffered a compensable injury by specific incident to his left lower extremity. \n \n\nJ. DAVIS- H400938 \n3 \n \n4. Because the claimant failed to meet his burden on his claim of a compensable \ninjury, the remaining issues are moot and will not be addressed in this \nopinion. \n \nSUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE \n \n As noted above, the Prehearing Order was admitted to the record as Commission’s \nExhibit No 1. The claimant was the only witness at the hearing. He submitted an exhibit \nthat consisted of one index page and twenty-one pages of medical records. That exhibit was \nentered into the record without objection as Claimant’s Exhibit No 1. The evidentiary record \nconsists of the claimant’s testimony and these two exhibits. \n Claimant Jonathan Davis \n \n The claimant testified that he has worked for the respondent-employer for 32 years.  \nHe was working as a warehouseman at the time of his injury. According to his testimony, \nhis job duties included loading and unloading trucks and moving inventory and materials \naround the warehouse facilities with a forklift. \n On the day of his injury, the claimant was moving a load of empty boxes from the \nwarehouse to the facility’s box crusher. It was towards the end of his shift on a Friday, and \nhauling discarded boxes out to be crushed was part of the usual cleanup work around that \ntime. He described having to pass through a high-traffic area (with other forklifts coming \nand going) on the way out to the box crusher. Instead of moving on through the area or just \nwaiting for the other forklifts to clear the area, the claimant backed his forklift out of the \nway and parked it in a side area. He then left the vehicle and walked away to ask a \ncoworker, Lisa McFarland, about her plans for the weekend. On the walk back to the \nforklift, he struck his left knee against a metal object and fell. He was subsequently \ndiagnosed with a left quadriceps tendon rupture and underwent surgical repair. \n\nJ. DAVIS- H400938 \n4 \n \n On cross-examination, the claimant confirmed that he was not making a delivery to \nhis coworker’s department, that her department was outside of the warehouse, and that she \ndid not work at the box crusher. He testified: \nQ:  Okay. Now, the conversation you had with Ms. McFarland was not \nrelated to your job as a warehouseman, was it? \n \nA:  Correct. \n \nQ:  It had nothing to do with your job that day, did it? \n \nA:  Correct. \n \nQ:  And after you talked to her, you turned around and walked away, and \nthat’s when you ended up striking your knee, is that right? \n \nA:  Correct. \n \nQ:  You didn’t hurt anything else, did you? \n \nA:  No. \n \nQ:  Now, if you had not gotten off your forklift, you had just sat there and \nwaited for whatever to clear, you wouldn’t have gotten hurt that day, would \nyou? \n \nA:  Possibly not. \n \nQ:  Okay. It only happened whenever you got off and went to visit with Ms. \nMcFarland, correct? \n \nA:  Correct. \n \nQ:  Now, after this event, you’re on your way back, you ended up falling \ndown. You ended up having to get help to get back on your fork truck, \ncorrect? \n \nA:  Correct. \n \nQ:  And instead of driving to the box crusher, you ended up driving back to \nthe warehouse, didn’t you? \n \nA:  Correct. \n \nQ:  So, you didn’t even make the delivery you had intended to make at the \ntime? \n \n\nJ. DAVIS- H400938 \n5 \n \nA:  Correct. \n \n[TR at 24-25.] The claimant also acknowledged that he was not supposed to be off the \nforklift and on the floor of Ms. McFarland’s work area at the time that he hurt himself.  \nAfter returning to the warehouse, the claimant reported his injury and was taken for \nan initial medical evaluation. Shortly thereafter, he learned that his claim was being \ndenied. The claimant continued to seek treatment on his own, utilizing his employee group \nhealth insurance. He seeks TTD benefits from the date of his injury until 25 May 2024. \nADJUDICATION \nA compensable injury is defined, in part, as an accidental injury which arises out of \nand in the course of employment. A.C.A. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i). However, a compensable injury \ndoes not include an injury “inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services \nwere not being performed.” Id. §11-9-102(4)(B)(iii). \nIn Haynes v. Ozark Guidance Ctr., Inc., 2011 Ark. App. 396, 384 S.W.3d 570, the \nCourt of Appeals, citing Texarkana Sch. Dist. v. Conner, 373 Ark. 372, 284 S.W.3d 57 \n(2008), explained: \nOur supreme court has held that an employee is performing \"employment \nservices\" when he or she \"is doing something that is generally required by his \nor her employer.\" [...] The critical inquiry is whether the interests of the \nemployer were being directly or indirectly advanced by the employee at the \ntime of the injury. Id. at 377, 284 S.W.3d at 61. Moreover, the issue of \nwhether an employee was performing employment services within the course \nof employment depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each \ncase.  \n The facts in this claim are not in dispute. The question is whether the claimant was \nperforming employment services at the time that he was injured. The Court of Appeals just \nrecently affirmed the denial of benefits in a case where a school district employee had been \ndriving his personal vehicle to and from an out-of-town meeting. He stopped on the side of \nthe highway to render aid at the scene of an accident. A second accident then occurred at \n\nJ. DAVIS- H400938 \n6 \n \nthe same scene, and he was struck and killed by projectile debris. The Court found that “he \nwas not performing any activity inherently necessary for the performance of his job, nor \nwas he directly or indirectly advancing his employer’s interest.” Williams v. Malvern Sch. \nDist. Ark. Sch. Bds. Ass’n., 2025 Ark. App. 208. \n The claimant in the instant claim argues that his injury should be compensable \nbecause he was on the clock at the time of his injury and because his conversation with Ms. \nMcFarland only lasted for about a minute. He suggests that White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., \n339 Ark. 474, 6 S.Wd.3d 98 (1999) instructs a finding in his favor. In White our Supreme \nCourt found an injury was compensable when an employee was injured during a smoke \nbreak. But even during his break, that employee was required to monitor his work area \ncontinually and to be immediately available as needed. The employer was found to have \nstill benefited from the employee’s attention while he was standing by.  \nThe Court in Haynes distinguished that scenario from a number of others where \nemployees were not found to be performing employment services at the time of their \ninjuries: \nHill v. LDA Leasing, Inc., 2010 Ark. App. 271, 374 S.W.3d 268 (holding that a \ntruck driver, who left his truck at the loading dock and was injured while \noperating a vending machine, was not performing employment services; the \ntruck driver at the time of his fall in the break room was not in a position to \nperform any of the duties required of him by his employer); McKinney v. \nTrane Co., 84 Ark. App. 424, 143 S.W.3d 581 (2004) (affirming the \nCommission's finding that an employee who was injured when he jumped \nover tube-sheet buckets to get a soda on his way to a smoke break was not \nperforming employment services; holding that the employer gleaned no \nbenefit from the employee's activities on break); Smith v. City of Fort Smith, \n84 Ark. App. 430, 143 S.W.3d 593 (2004) (affirming the Commission's finding \nthat a dump-truck driver, who hauled gravel waste, was not performing \nemployment services when, while still on the clock, he injured himself loading \ngravel into his personal dump truck—a permitted activity; we rejected the \nemployee's argument that his actions directly benefited his employer, holding \nthat the activity must also be inherently necessary for the performance of his \nprimary job); and Harding v. City of Texarkana, 62 Ark. App. 137, 970 \nS.W.2d 303 (1998) (holding that a 911 operator, who was injured on her way \n\nJ. DAVIS- H400938 \n7 \n \nto a smoke break when she tripped over a rolled-up carpet, was not \nperforming employment services because the break was not inherently \nnecessary for the performance of the job she was hired to do). \n \n Here, despite the fact that the claimant was injured during the time and space \nboundaries of his employment, I do not find the employer’s interests to have been advanced \nby the claimant’s deviation from his job duties. He testified that he was tasked at the time \nwith delivering a load of boxes from the warehouse out to a box crushing machine. That \ndelivery was not completed, though, because the claimant stopped his forklift near a busy \nintersection, parked it somewhere out of the way and off the route between his warehouse \nand the box crushing machine, and then walked over to another department for a purely \npersonal conversation with a coworker. He was hurt making his way back to the forklift.  \nA lark and a tarry, a frolic and a detour—however one might describe his walking \naway from a job duty to talk with a friend— it was certainly not required work activity. The \nrespondent-employer derived no direct or indirect benefit from the claimant’s off-task \nactivities that resulted in his injury. Accordingly, I find that he has failed to prove by a \npreponderance of the evidence that he was performing employment services at the time of \nhis injury. He, therefore, he has not shown that he suffered a compensable injury. Because \nhe has failed to meet his burden on compensability, his claimed entitlement to associated \nbenefits are moot and will not be addressed in this opinion. \nCONCLUSION \nConsistent with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth above, this \nclaim for initial benefits is DENIED and DISMISSED. \n IT IS SO ORDERED.    \n______________________________________ \n       JayO. Howe \n       Administrative Law Judge","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION CLAIM No H400938 JONATHAN DAVIS, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT vs. CENTRAL MALONEY, INC., SELF-INSURED EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT RISK MANAGEMENT RESOURCES, THIRD PARTY ADMINISTRATOR RESPONDENT OPINION & ORDER FILED 14 APRIL 2025 This claim was heard before Arkansas Workers’ Compensat...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T22:41:38.732Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H400938-2024-04-14","pdf":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/DAVIS_JONATHAN_H400938_20240414.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}