{"id":"alj-H308141-2025-04-29","awcc_number":"H308141","decision_date":"2025-04-29","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Rachel Boyce","employer_name":"Bald Knob School District","title":"BOYCE VS. BALD KNOB SCHOOL DISTRICT AWCC# H308141 April 29, 2025","outcome":"granted","outcome_keywords":["granted:2"],"injury_keywords":["fracture","knee"],"pdf_url":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/BOYCE_RACHEL_H308141_20250429.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"BOYCE_RACHEL_H308141_20250429.pdf","text_length":19732,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \nCLAIM NO. H308141 \n \nRACHEL BOYCE, EMPLOYEE      CLAIMANT \nBALD KNOB SCHOOL DISTRICT, EMPLOYER   RESPONDENT  \nARKANSAS SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION,     \nINSURANCE CARRIER/TPA      RESPONDENT  \n \nAMENDED OPINION FILED APRIL 29, 2025  \nHearing before Administrative Law Judge, James D. Kennedy, on the 11\nTH\n day of \nFebruary 2025, in Little Rock, Arkansas. \nClaimant is represented by C. Michael White, Attorney at Law, North Little Rock, \nArkansas. \nRespondents are represented by Melissa Wood, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas. \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE \n A hearing was conducted on the 11th day of February 2025, where the claimant \ncontended that she suffered a work-related injury to her right foot on December 18, 2023, \nwhen  she  broke  her  5\nth\n metatarsal  while  in  the  process  of  turning  on  the  lights  to  the \nbuilding.    She  further  contended  that  she  was  entitled  to  reasonable  and  necessary \nmedical treatment for her injuries on that date, plus temporary total disability from the day \nfollowing the injury up to the date of March 6, 2024, and attorney fees. The respondents \ncontend  that  the  injury was  not  work  related and that  the claimant  was not  performing \nemployment services at the time of her fall on December 18, 2023.  The parties stipulated \nthat the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction of the matter, that \nan employer/employee relationship existed on December 18, 2023, and that the claimant \nearned   an average weekly   wage of   $666.48   sufficient for TTD/PPD   rates of \n\nRACHEL BOYCE – H308141 \n2 \n \n$444.00/$333.00.  A copy of the Pre-hearing Order was marked “Commission Exhibit 1” \nand made part of the record without objection.        \n The sole witness to testify was Rachel Boyce, the claimant.  From a review of the \nrecord  as  a  whole,  to  include  medical  reports  and  other  matters  properly  before  the \nCommission, and having had an opportunity to observe the testimony and demeanor of \nthe witness, the following findings of fact and conclusions of law are made in accordance \nwith Ark. Code Ann. 11-9-704. \nFINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSSIONS OF LAW \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction over this \nclaim. \n2. The stipulations set out above are reasonable and are hereby accepted.   \n3. That  the  claimant  satisfied the  required  burden  of  proof  to  prove  by  a \npreponderance of the evidence that she suffered a compensable injury to her \nright foot by specific incident. \n4. That the claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical benefits in \nregard to her compensable right foot injury. \n5. That the claimant is entitled to Temporary Total Disability benefits from the day \nfollowing her injury up to the day of March 6, 2024. \n6. That the claimant is entitled to attorney fees. \n7. If  not  already  paid,  the  respondents are ordered  to  pay  for  the  cost  of  the \ntranscript forthwith. \n \n\nRACHEL BOYCE – H308141 \n3 \n \nREVIEW OF TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE \n The  Pre-hearing  Order  along  with  the  Pre-hearing  questionnaires of the parties \nwere admitted into the record without objection.  The clamant submitted one exhibit that \nwas admitted into the record without objection consisting of 24 pages along with an index.\n The claimant, Rachel Boyce, was the sole witness to testify and was 36 years old \nat the time of the hearing.  She testified that she had earned an associate’s degree, would \nbe awarded her bachelor’s degree in May, and worked for the Bald Knob School District \nas a lead preschool teacher, working under another teacher.  She had a paraprofessional \nteacher that worked for her.  Her job requirements required her to perform assessments \non  her  students  and  teach  from  a  curriculum, in  an  attempt  to get  them  ready  for \nkindergarten.    She  was  responsible  for  education  activities  in  the  classroom  and \nsupervising the paraprofessional who worked with her.  She had worked as a lead teacher \nin the classroom since 2020. (Tr. 6, 7) \n She sustained her injury on December 18, 2023.  “I was walking in the building.  \nThe lights were off and, as I walked in the building, the rug rolled up and I tripped and fell \nand broke my fifth metatarsal.”  She testified that she normally arrived early at 6:30 a.m. \nwhich  was  at  least  15  minutes  before  the  other  teachers  arrived.    She  immediately \nreported the injury to her supervisor. After the fall, she proceeded to her classroom and \nprepared  for  the  day.   Normally,  she would start  unstacking  the  chairs from  the  tables \nbecause  they were  stacked onto  the  tables  the  afternoon  before,  when  the custodian \nmopped the  floors  in  the  afternoon.    She also would set  up learning  centers  for  the \nchildren and  prepare for  the  day.    She  stated  that  it  was  standard practice for  her  to \nprepare for the day when arriving at her classroom every morning.  She additionally stated \n\nRACHEL BOYCE – H308141 \n4 \n \nthat the lights were not on when she entered the building and they were never on, so she \nturned them on every morning. (Tr. 8, 9)  There was no one else in the building so she \nwas  the  one  that  turned  the  lights  on.    Her  foot  was  hurting  and  felt  swollen and her \ndirector instructed that she seek medical care and she consequently went to ARCare in \nBald Knob, where they x-rayed her foot which appeared to be broken and referred her to \nDr. Franz in Searcy, an orthopedic surgeon. (Tr. 10)  Dr. Franz determined that she had \nbroken her fifth metatarsal and placed her in a boot and off work, until Dr. Franz returned \nher to full duty work on March 6, 2024.  She was not fully released until April 26.  She still \nworks for the Bald Knob School District in the same job and still gets to work at 6:30. (Tr. \n11)  She has never been told not to get to work at 6:30, either before or after the accident.  \nAlthough her scheduled eight-hour day is between 7:30 to 4:00 to get her eight hours in, \nthe school district has never told her that she could not come in early or stay late.  She \nadmitted that she was not required to stay late at work but at times it was necessary. (Tr. \n12) \n In  regard  to  entering  the  building  in  the  morning,  she  testified  she  had  to  step \nacross a four-foot hall to turn the light on.  She then would walk straight to her classroom.  \nShe felt that she would not be prepared for her children to teach them if she did not get \nto school early.  The staff children started arriving at 7:15 and all the others started arriving \nat 7:30.  Her supervisor was aware that she arrived early every morning and had never \nsaid anything about it.  She was not required to clock in but did have a badge which she \nscanned in.  She would not have been able to perform her preparation for her children if \nshe arrived at 7:30. (Tr. 13 - 14) \n\nRACHEL BOYCE – H308141 \n5 \n \n Under cross examination, the claimant stated that she had about 20 preschool kids \nat a time, and taught them the basics, such as ABC’s, letters, number, colors, and things \nlike that.  She had five children at the time of the accident.  She also admitted she didn’t \nhave any drop-off or pick-up duties.  When the parents dropped their kids off at school, \nthey  signed  the children in  before  leaving them.    After  the  children  were  dropped  off, \nsomeone  would  bring  the  children  to  her  classroom  or  on  a  nice  day,  they  would  be \ndropped off at the playground.  At the time of the accident, she admitted that she had not \ndone anything that morning except turn on the lights, with no students, teachers, or aides \npresent, and she had not performed any lesson planning that morning. (Tr. 17 – 19)  \n The claimant’s medical exhibits provided that the claimant presented to Dr. Kiihnl \nat Unity Health on December 19, 2023, due to a foot fracture and injury that occurred the \nday before when she walked into work at Bald Knob School.  She was diagnosed with a \nnondisplaced fracture at the 5\nth\n metatarsal and was placed in a boot walker and it was \nrecommended that she be non-weight bearing with crutches/walker.  She should elevate \nher foot and use ice for her pain and suffering. (Cl. Ex. 1, P. 1, 2)  The claimant returned \nto  Dr.  Kiihnl  on  January  9,  2024.    The  report  provided  that  since  the  claimant  was \nstruggling to be non-weight bearing, outpatient surgery was recommended.  Even with \nconservative treatment, the fracture might not completely heal. (Cl. Ex. 1, P. 3 – 5)   \n On  January  12,  2024,  the  claimant  was  seen  by  Dr.  Jason  Franz,  also  of  Unity \nHealth.  The report provided there was no change in symptoms, and she was currently \nusing a short boot walker and ambulating with a limp.  He recommended the placement \nof an intramedullary screw for the 5\nth\n metatarsal fracture. (Cl. Ex. 1, P. 6 – 8)  The claimant \nthen returned to Dr. Kiihnl on January 25, 2024, for a review of the open reduction of the \n\nRACHEL BOYCE – H308141 \n6 \n \ninternal  fixation  of  her  right  5\nth\n metatarsal  fracture  with  an  intramedullary  screw  on \nJanuary 16, 2024.  She was instructed to remain non–weight bearing using crutches or a \nknee scooter. (Cl. Ex. 1, P. 9 – 11)  The claimant returned again to Dr. Kiihnl on February \n13, 2024.  The radiology interpretation provided for a stable screw fixation and healing of \na Jones Fracture.  She was to remain non– weight bearing. (Cl. Ex. 1, P 12 – 14)  On \nMarch  5,  2024,  the  claimant  was  again  seen  by  Dr.  Kiihnl  who  examined her  foot  and \ninjury and opined that she could begin weight bearing on the right foot with a boot walker \nand could advance as long as not suffering from increased pain. (Cl. Ex. 1, P. 15 – 17)  \nThe claimant  again  returned to  Dr.  Kiihnl  on  March  26,  2024, and the  radiology \ninterpretation provided for a stable intramedullary screw fixation, which was healing well, \nand he stated that she could progress to full weight bearing with regular shoes. (Cl. Ex. \n1,  P.  18 – 20)    The  final  visit  of  record  to  Dr.  Kiihnl  occurred  on  April  7,  2024, and  he \nopined that she could resume normal activity as tolerated. (Cl. Ex. 1, P. 21 – 23)   \nDISCUSSION AND ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES \nThe claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that \nshe  is  entitled  to  compensation  benefits for her injury under the Arkansas Workers’ \nCompensation Law.   In  determining  whether  the  claimant has  sustained her burden  of \nproof, the Commission shall weigh the evidence impartially, without giving the benefit of \nthe doubt to either party.  A.C.A. 11-9-704.  Wade v. Mr. Cavananugh’s, 298 Ark. 364, \n768 S.W. 2d 521 (1989).  Further, the Commission has the duty to translate evidence on \nall issues before it into findings of fact.  Weldon v. Pierce Brothers Construction Co., 54 \nArk. App. 344, 925 S.W.2d 179 (1996). \n\nRACHEL BOYCE – H308141 \n7 \n \nIn the present matter, there appears to be no significant issue as to the facts of the \nmatter  or  the  actions  of  the  claimant.    The  claimant came  to  work  at  6:30 a.m. in  the \nmorning, just as she always did, walked approximately four feet down a hallway to turn \non the lights, and with the rug rolled up, tripped and fell, breaking the fifth metatarsal of \nher  right  foot  on  December  18,  2023,  while  employed  as  a  teacher  of  prekindergarten \nchildren for the respondent.  She eventually had surgery on her right foot, which required \nher to be non-weight bearing from the day following the injury, until she returned to the \nsame job for the respondent on March 6, 2024, where she continued to arrive for work at \n6:30 a.m.  It appears that it was not a secret that she arrived for work at that time, and no \none  ever  instructed her to arrive later.  The  official  work  hours  were 7:30  a.m.  to  4:00 \np.m., but  staff  children  started  arriving  at  7:15  a.m., with  non-staff  children  starting  to \narrive  at 7:30 a.m.  Other  teachers  started arriving  at 6:45.  The  claimant  testified  that \nbesides coming early, she at times stayed after 4:00 p.m., if needed.  She was always \nthe first teacher present and felt she needed to get there early to prepare for what she \nwas going to do that day in regard to her students.  She admitted that on the day of the \naccident, she did not prepare a presentation that morning and there were no students or \nteachers present when the injury occurred.  She also admitted she never had pick up or \ndrop off duty.  \nThe  critical issue here  is  whether  the  claimant  was  performing  employment \nservices when the injury occurred.   See Parker v. Comcast Cable Corp, 100 Ark. App. \n400,  269  S.W.3d  268  (2010).    The  Commission  is  bound  to  examine  the  activity  the \nclaimant was engaged in at the time of the accident in determining whether or not she \nwas  performing  employment  services.   Hill  v.  LDA  Leasing,  2010  Ark.  App.  271,  374 \n\nRACHEL BOYCE – H308141 \n8 \n \nS.W.3d 268 (2010).  In order for an accidental injury to be compensable, it must arise out \nof and in the course of employment.  Ark. Code Ann. 11-9-102 (4) (A) (i).  A compensable \ninjury  does  not  include  an  injury  inflicted  on  an  employee  at  a  time  when  employment \nservices were not being performed.  Ark. Code Ann. 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii).  An employee is \nperforming  employment  services  when  he  or  she  is  doing  something  that  is  generally \nrequired by  his  or  her employer. Cont’l Constr. Co.  v.  Nabors,  2015  Ark.  App.  60, 454 \nS.W.3d  762.  We  use  the  same  test  to  determine  whether  an  employee  is  performing \nemployment services as we do when determining whether an employee is acting within \nthe  course  and  scope of  employment.   Pifer v. Single  Source  Transportation, 347  Ark. \n851,  69  S.W.3d  1  (2002).   The  test  is  whether  the  injury  occurred  within  the  time  and \nspace boundaries of the employment when the employee was carrying out the employer’s \npurpose  or  advancing  the  employer’s  interest,  either  directly  or  indirectly.  Even  if  the \nalleged injury took place outside the time or space boundaries of employment, “the critical \ninquiry is whether the interests of the employer were being directly or indirectly advanced \nby the employee at the time of the injury. Hudak-Lee v. Baxter County Reg. Hosp., 2011 \nArk. 31, 378 S.W.3d 77. Moreover, whether an employee was performing employment \nservices depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Ctrs. For Youth \n& Families v. Wood, 2015 Ark. App. 380, 466 S.W.3d 422. \nHere, with no real dispute as to the facts, we are faced with the application of the \napplicable  law and  the  facts to  determine if the  injury  occurred  while  performing  work-\nrelated services.  The claimant always arrived early, both before and after her injury date, \narriving at 6:30 a.m., turning on the lights, which would be beneficial for the students and \nemployees of the respondent, either directly or indirectly, in the middle of December when \n\nRACHEL BOYCE – H308141 \n9 \n \nthe days were the shortest, and then going to her classroom to prepare for the day.  The \nofficial start time for the school is 7:30 a.m.  With that said, it is clear students of the school \nstaff  start arriving  by  7:15 a.m. and  other  staff members  start arriving as  early  as 6:45 \na.m.  It was the claimant’s normal practice to come early and prepare for the day.  She \nwould come in, turn on the lights to the school or at least to the hallway, and prepare for \na day with preschoolers, which was clearly a benefit to the respondent, her co-workers, \nand the students.  This dedication of the claimant and her actions were clearly carrying \nout  the  respondent employer’s purposes and  advancing the  respondent  employer’s \ninterests for preparing a safe learning environment for the children and employees of the \nschool.  It is  apparent that  the  respondent employer, as  well  as  the  students, clearly \nbenefitted from the dedication of the claimant.  Additionally, there is clearly no question \nthat  someone  had  to  turn  on  the  lights. See Williams  v.  Malvern  School  District  and \nArkansas School Boards Association, 2025 Ark. App. 208,__ S.W.3d ___.  Based upon \nthe facts of record, the preponderance of the evidence in the present matter demonstrates \nthat  the  claimant  was  directly  or  indirectly advancing the interests  of  the respondent \nemployer  when  she  came  in  and  turned  on  the  lights that  dark  December  morning on \nDecember 18, 2022, at about 6:30 a.m.  Thus, while the claimant may have been outside \nthe time boundaries of her employment, this is not fatal to her claim under Hudak-Lee, \nsupra.  Consequently,  the  claimant suffered  a  compensable  work-related  injury.  The \nevidence  shows  that  the  injury  is  identifiable  by  time  and  place  of  occurrence,  that  its \nexistence is supported by objective medical findings, and that it caused internal physical \nharm to the claimant’s body which required medical services.   \n\nRACHEL BOYCE – H308141 \n10 \n \nSince  the  injury  was  in  fact  compensable,  the  claimant  is  entitled  to reasonable \nand  necessary medical treatment  and temporary  disability.  A.C.A.  11-9-102  (4)  (F)  (i).  \nThe  law  is  clear  that  employers  must  promptly  provide  medical  services  which  are \nreasonably necessary for treatment of compensable injuries. A.C.A 11-9-508 (a).  All of \nthe  treatment  of  her  compensable  foot  injury  that  is  in  evidence  is  reasonable  and \nnecessary.  \nIn  regard  to  temporary  total  disability,  an  employee  who  suffers  a  compensable \nscheduled injury is entitled to temporary total disability compensation “during the healing \nperiod or until the employee returned to work, whichever occurs first ....” A.C.A. 11-9-\n521(a).  Conspicuously absent from the statute is any indication that the injured employee \nshow an incapacity to earn wages as a requirement for receiving temporary benefits.  See \nWheeler  Const.  Co.  v.  Armstrong, 73  Ark.  App.146, 41  S.W.3d  822  (2001).   Here,  the \nclaimant suffered a scheduled injury when she broke the fifth metatarsal of her right foot, \nwhich required surgery and the placement of a screw for its repair.  The healing period \nends when the underlying condition causing the disability has become stable and nothing \nfurther in the way of treatment will improve the condition.  Mad Butcher Inc. v. Parker, 4 \nArk. App. 124, 628 S.W.2d 582 (1982).  Because of her foot condition, the claimant did \nnot  return  to  work  during  this  period  and  consequently,  the  claimant  is  entitled  to \ntemporary total disability from the day after the injury until the day of March 6, 2024.    \nAfter reviewing the evidence impartially, and without giving the benefit of the doubt \nto either party, it is found that the claimant has satisfied the required burden of proof to \nprove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was performing employment services \nat  the  time  of  the  injury  and  consequently  the  claim  is  compensable.   In  addition, the \n\nRACHEL BOYCE – H308141 \n11 \n \nclaimant is found to be entitled to reasonable and necessary medical and temporary total \ndisability from the date following the injury up to March 6, 2024, and attorney fees.  If not \nalready paid, the respondents are ordered to pay for the cost of the transcript forthwith. \nIT IS SO ORDERED. \n           ___________________________ \n      JAMES D. KENNEDY \n      Administrative Law Judge","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION CLAIM NO. H308141 RACHEL BOYCE, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT BALD KNOB SCHOOL DISTRICT, EMPLOYER RESPONDENT ARKANSAS SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION, INSURANCE CARRIER/TPA RESPONDENT AMENDED OPINION FILED APRIL 29, 2025 Hearing before Administrative Law Judge, James D. Kennedy, on th...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T22:42:05.750Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H308141-2025-04-29","pdf":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/BOYCE_RACHEL_H308141_20250429.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}