{"id":"alj-H305020-2025-01-15","awcc_number":"H305020","decision_date":"2025-01-15","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Klaressa Thompson","employer_name":"Nidec Motor Corporation","title":"THOMPSON VS. NIDEC MOTOR CORPORATION AWCC# H305020 January 15, 2025","outcome":"granted","outcome_keywords":["granted:6","denied:1"],"injury_keywords":["shoulder","rotator cuff"],"pdf_url":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/THOMPSON_KLARESSA_H305020_20250115.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"THOMPSON_KLARESSA_H305020_20250115.pdf","text_length":21532,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \n   \n CLAIM NO.  H305020 \n \nKLARESSA D. THOMPSON, Employee                                                         CLAIMANT \n \nNIDEC MOTOR CORPORATION, Employer                                           RESPONDENT \n \nTRAVELERS INSURANCE CO., Carrier                                                  RESPONDENT                                                 \n \n \n \n OPINION FILED JANUARY 15, 2025 \n \nHearing before ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GREGORY K. STEWART in Fort Smith, \nSebastian County, Arkansas. \n \nClaimant represented by EDDIE H. WALKER, JR., Attorney, Fort Smith, Arkansas. \n \nRespondents represented by GUY ALTON WADE, Attorney, Little Rock, Arkansas. \n \n \n STATEMENT OF THE CASE \n  \n On December  2,  2024,  the  above  captioned  claim  came  on  for  hearing  at Fort \nSmith, Arkansas.  A pre-hearing conference was conducted on January 10, 2024 and a \npre-hearing order was filed on that same date.  A copy of the pre-hearing order has been \nmarked as Commission’s Exhibit #1 and made a part of the record without objection. \n At the pre-hearing conference the parties agreed to the following stipulations: \n 1.   The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction of the \nwithin claim. \n 2.   The employee/employer/carrier relationship existed among the parties on July \n24, 2023. \n Subsequent to the hearing, the parties agreed to stipulate that claimant earned an \naverage weekly wage of $727.00 which would entitle her to compensation at the rates of \n\nThompson – H305020 \n \n 2 \n$485.00 for total disability benefits and $364.00 for permanent partial disability benefits. \n At the pre-hearing conference the parties agreed to litigate the following issues: \n1.   Compensability of injury to claimant’s right shoulder on July 24, 2023. \n2.    Related medical. \n3.    Temporary total disability benefits from July 25, 2023 through a date yet to  \nbe determined. \n4.    Attorney’s fee. \n The claimant contends she sustained a compensable injury to her right shoulder \non July 24, 2023.  She contends she is entitled to temporary total disability benefits from \non or about July 25, 2023 until a date yet to be determined and reasonably necessary \nmedical  treatment.    Claimant  contends  that  her  attorney  is  entitled  to  an  appropriate \nattorney’s fee. \n The respondents contend that the claimant did not sustain a compensable injury \nwithin the course and scope of her employment. \n From a review of the record as a whole, to include medical reports, documents, \nand other matters properly before the Commission, and having had an opportunity to hear \nthe testimony of the witnesses and to observe their demeanor, the following findings of \nfact and conclusions of law are made in accordance with A.C.A. §11-9-704: \n \n  FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \n \n 1.   The stipulations agreed to by the parties at a pre-hearing conference conducted \non January 10, 2024 and contained in a pre-hearing order filed that same date are hereby \naccepted as fact. \n\nThompson – H305020 \n \n3 \n \n 2.       The parties’ stipulation that claimant earned an average weekly wage of \n$727.00 which would entitle her to compensation at the rates of $485.00 for total disability \nbenefits and $364.00 for permanent partial disability benefits is also hereby accepted as \nfact. \n 3.    Claimant has met her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence \nthat she suffered a compensable injury to her right shoulder on July 24, 2023.   \n 4.      Respondent  is  liable  for  payment  of  all  reasonable  and  necessary  medical \ntreatment provided in connection with claimant’s compensable injury.   \n 4.   Claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she is \nentitled to temporary total disability benefits as a result of her compensable injury. \n \n \n FACTUAL BACKGROUND \n At  the  time  of  the  hearing  the  claimant  was  a  31-year-old  woman  who  began \nworking  for  respondent  in  September  2020.    She  worked  at  a  job  that  required  her  to \nremove motor coils that had been wound in a machine.  Claimant testified that on July 24, \n2023, she was lifting a very large coil off of a machine when she felt a sharp pain in her \nright  shoulder.    Claimant  testified  that  she  was  unable  to  continue  lifting  the  coils  and \nreported this incident.   \n After  reporting  the  injury,  claimant  was  sent  by  Samuel  Norman,  Safey  and  IT \nManager  for  respondent,  to  see  James  McWilliams,  ANP.    Claimant  was  seen  by \nMcWilliams that day and he initially noted that claimant was six to eight weeks pregnant.  \nHe  diagnosed claimant’s  right  shoulder  condition  as  impingement  syndrome  and \n\nThompson – H305020 \n \n4 \n \nrecommended an MRI scan.  In addition, he also prescribed medications; the use of a \nsling;  ice/cold  packs;  and  rest.    McWilliams  also  indicated  that  claimant  should  refrain \nfrom working for ten days.   \n McWilliams’ note contains an addendum dated July 25, 2023, in which he indicates \nthat he was informed by respondent that it would be able to accommodate claimant with \nlight duty work without the use of her injured right arm.  McWilliams indicated that he was \nconsenting  to  that  change  as  long as  claimant  rests  the  right  arm  in  a  sling.   Claimant \ntestified that she did return to work for respondent and was placed in a job using her left \nhand  to  clean  hand  railings  and machinery.   Claimant testified  that  she was  physically \nable to perform this job for only five days before she was terminated by the respondent.  \nInitially,  claimant  testified  that  she  was  not  physically  able  to  perform  this  job,  but \nsubsequently  indicated  that  she  became  sick  from  the  smell  of  the  cleaning  solution.  \nClaimant has not worked for respondent or any other employer since that time. \n Claimant returned to McWilliams on August 1, 2023 and he noted that claimant’s \npregnancy limited her diagnostic and treatment options.  He again diagnosed claimant’s \ncondition as right shoulder impingement syndrome and recommended an MRI scan.  In \na  letter  dated  October  12,  2023,  McWilliams  indicated  that  claimant’s  symptoms  of \nshoulder impingement could be caused by a variety of conditions.  He again noted that \nher pregnancy was complicating further evaluation and that without the benefit of imaging \nthe only recourse would be an empirical diagnosis by a specialist or by waiting out the \npregnancy until imaging was determined to be safe.   \n On November 15, 2023, claimant was evaluated by Dr. Steven Forest, her primary \ncare  physician.    Dr.  Forest  assessed  claimant’s  condition  as  right  supraspinatus \n\nThompson – H305020 \n \n5 \n \ntenosynovitis  and  right  shoulder  pain.    He  referred  claimant  to  Dr.  Kari  Cordell,  an \northopedic surgeon in Hot Springs, whose initial evaluation occurred on January 11, 2024.  \nDr. Cordell assessed claimant’s condition as right shoulder pain and adhesive capsulitis \nof the right shoulder.  She recommended that claimant discontinue the use of her sling \nand referred claimant to physical therapy for adhesive capsulitis. \n Claimant’s initial physical therapy examination occurred on May 20, 2024, and she \ncontinued  to  receive  physical  therapy  for  a  period  of  time.    On  June  7,  2024,  claimant \nfinally under an MRI scan of her right shoulder.  The MRI report contains the following \nnotation: \n  IMPRESSION: \n  Tendinosis of the supraspinatus tendon, without evidence \n  of definite rotator cuff tear. \n \n \n The physical therapist’s note of August 13, 2024, indicates that claimant had \nreached a plateau with respect to physical therapy progress.  The report indicates that \nclaimant  had  not  made  any  functional  improvements  and  it  was  recommended  that \nclaimant be discharged to home exercises with a follow-up to the referring provider. \n Claimant returned to Dr. Cordell on August 20, 2024, who indicated that claimant \nhad  been  diagnosed  with  right  shoulder  adhesive  capsulitis  and  that  the  MRI  scan \nshowed tendinosis.  Dr. Cordell’s report indicates that claimant elected to proceed with \nan injection, continue therapy, and return as needed.  Claimant has not received medical \ntreatment since that evaluation. \n Claimant has filed this claim contending that she suffered a compensable injury to \nher right shoulder on July 24, 2023.  She requests payment of related medical, temporary \n\nThompson – H305020 \n \n6 \n \ntotal disability benefits, and a controverted attorney fee. \n \nADJUDICATION \n Claimant  contends  that  she  suffered  a  compensable  injury  to  her  right  shoulder \nwhile lifting a coil on July 24, 2023.  Claimant’s claim is for a specific injury identifiable by \ntime and place of occurrence.   In order to prove a compensable injury as the result of \na specific incident that is identifiable by time and place of occurrence, a claimant must \nestablish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) an injury arising out of and in the course \nof employment; (2) the injury caused internal or external harm to the body which required \nmedical  services  or  resulted  in  disability  or  death;  (3)  medical  evidence  supported  by \nobjective  findings  establishing  an  injury;  and  (4)  the  injury  was  caused  by  a  specific \nincident identifiable by time and place of occurrence.  Odd Jobs and More v. Reid, 2011 \nArk. App. 450, 384 S.W. 3d 630. \n After reviewing the evidence in this case impartially, without giving the benefit of \nthe  doubt  to either  party,  I  find  that  claimant has met her  burden of  proof.    First, I  find \nbased on claimant’s testimony as well as the remaining evidence presented that claimant \nhas proven that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment and that the \ninjury  was  caused  by  a  specific  incident  identifiable  by  time  and  place  of  occurrence.  \nClaimant testified about her injury and indicated that she reported the injury to respondent \nwho sent her to McWilliams for medical treatment that same day.  McWilliams’ medical \nreport contains a history of injury consistent with claimant’s testimony. \n I also find that claimant’s injury caused internal or external harm to her body that \nrequired medical services or resulted in disability.  As a result of claimant’s shoulder \n\nThompson – H305020 \n \n7 \n \ncomplaints, she has been treated with medication, the use of a sling, physical therapy, \nand an injection. \n The  primary  issue  in  this  case  involves  whether  claimant  has  offered  medical \nevidence supported by objective findings establishing an injury.  A.C.A. §11-9-102(4)(D) \nstates: \n  A compensable injury must be established by medical \n  evidence supported by objective findings as defined in \n  subdivision (16) of this section. \n \n \n Subsection (16) of A.C.A. §11-9-102(16)(A)(i) defines “objective findings” as those \nfindings  which  cannot  come  under  the  voluntary  control  of  the  patient.    Respondent \ncontends that in this particular case there are no objective findings establishing an injury.  \nOn the other hand, claimant contends that the physical therapy records show that passive \nand  active  range  of  motion  studies  were  done  and  that  the  passive  range  of  motion \nfindings  constitute  an  objective  finding.    Respondent  counters  that  passive  and active \nrange of motion is relevant to permanency, not compensability. \n The  issue  of  objective  findings  and  passive  versus  active  range  of  motion was \ndiscussed by the Arkansas Court of Appeals in Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 71 Ark. App. \n207, 29 S.W. 3d 751 (2000).  In that particular case, the Court of Appeals determined that \npassive range of motion evaluations performed by an examiner did not come under the \nvoluntary control of the patient; therefore, they constituted objective findings pursuant to \nA.C.A. §11-9-102(16)(A)(i).  Specifically, the Court stated: \n  [T]he conclusion is inescapable that the tests performed \n  on appellant were passive range-of-motion evaluations \n  performed by the examiner and not under the  \n  voluntary control of the appellant.  Under these \n\nThompson – H305020 \n \n8 \n \n  circumstances, we hold that the Commission’s \n  opinion displays no rational basis for its finding \n  that the range-of-motion tests performed on \n  appellant did not constitute objective findings \n  under Ark. Code Ann. §11-9-102(16)(A)(i). \n \n \n While  respondent  contends  that  these  objective  findings  are  only  relevant  with \nrespect to permanency, I note that the Arkansas Court of Appeals specifically found that \npassive  range  of  motion  testing  constituted  an  objective  finding  under  A.C.A.  §11-9-\n102(16)(A)(i).  No distinction was made as to compensability versus permanency.   Given \nthe decision in Hayes that a passive range of motion evaluation constitutes an objective \nfinding,  I  find  that  claimant  has  satisfied  the  remaining  element  of  compensability.  \nTherefore, I find that the passive range of motion evaluation performed by the physical \ntherapist on the claimant constitutes an objective finding. \n Accordingly, I find that claimant has met her burden of proving by a preponderance \nof the evidence that she suffered a compensable injury to her right shoulder on July 24, \n2023.   \n Having found that claimant suffered a compensable injury to her right shoulder, I \nfind  that  respondent  is  liable  for  payment  of  all  reasonable  and  necessary  medical \ntreatment provided in connection with claimant’s right shoulder injury. \n The next issue for consideration involves claimant’s request for temporary total \ndisability  benefits.    Claimant  contends  that  she  is  entitled  to  temporary  total  disability \nbenefits  beginning  July  25,  2023,  and  continuing  through  a date  yet  to be  determined.  \nClaimant’s injury to her right shoulder is a non-scheduled injury.  In order to be entitled to \ncompensation benefits for temporary total disability benefits, claimant has the burden of \n\nThompson – H305020 \n \n9 \n \nproving by a preponderance of the evidence that she remains within her healing period \nand  that  she  suffers  a  total  incapacity  to  earn  wages.  Arkansas  State  Highway  & \nTransportation Dept. v. Breshears, 272 Ark. 244, 613 S.W. 2d 392 (1981).   Even if I were \nto find that claimant has remained within her healing period since the date of her injury, I \ndo not find that claimant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she has \nsuffered a total incapacity to earn wages.   \n As previously noted, when claimant initially saw McWilliams on July 24, 2023, he \ntook claimant off work for 10 days.  However, two days later he authored an addendum \nindicating  that  he  had  been  informed  by  respondent  that  it  had  work  available  which \nclaimant  could  perform  without  using  her  injured  right  arm.    McWilliams  agreed  to  this \nlight-duty work and claimant did return to work for respondent for approximately five days.  \nAs  previously  noted,  claimant  initially  indicated  that  she  was  not  physically  capable  of \nperforming this work, and subsequently indicated that she could no longer perform the \nwork  due  to  becoming sick  as  a  result of the  cleaning  solution.   According to  Norman, \nclaimant was terminated after that date because she broke safety protocols with respect \nto the lifting of the coil as well as failing to report getting sick from the cleaning solution \nwhich claimant had previously used on a daily basis. \n Irregardless, McWilliams initially took claimant off work for 10 days before agreeing \nto allow her to return to work at a one-handed job.  There is no evidence that McWilliams \nor any other treating physician has taken the claimant off work since that date or placed \nany work restriction on her ability to return to work.  According to claimant’s testimony, \nshe obtained a high school diploma in 2011.  She is self-taught with respect to computer \ntraining and has taken an online course through a school in Washington state for medical \n\nThompson – H305020 \n \n10 \n \ntranscription  and  coding.    Claimant  also  performed  some  self-employment  work  as  a \nphotographer  and  artist.    Claimant  testified  that  she  previously  worked  at  an  oil  field \nconstruction  company  working  in  quality  control  handling  paperwork,  book  work,  data \nentry, and computer work.  Claimant testified that she performed this job for four years \nand  used  a  laptop  and  traveled  to  various  construction  sites  to  perform  her  work.  \nClaimant acknowledged that she had not been taken off work by any employer and that \nshe did not have any problem reading or writing.  She also acknowledged that she has \nrebranded her photography website in hopes of trying to obtain business.  Specifically, \nclaimant testified as follows: \n  Q What types of things have you looked to doing \n  from home? \n \n  A Data entry. \n \n  Q Okay.  And is that something you could do? \n \n  A Yes, sir, it would be. \n \n  Q Okay.  Now, I believe you indicated in some \n  questioning to your attorney that you didn’t believe \n  you were physically able to work since this event on \n  July the 24\nth\n of ’23? \n \n  A That is correct. \n \n  Q Okay.  But you are not wearing a sling or any \n  kind of brace at the present time? \n \n  A That is correct. \n \n  Q And you’ve already told us just a minute ago  \n  you could do data entry and computer entry and that \n  kind of thing? \n \n  A That is not physical work. \n \n\nThompson – H305020 \n \n11 \n \n  Q Sure.  But it’s work and it’s employment that you \n  could do; correct? \n \n  A Yes, sir. \n \n \n Thus, by claimant’s own admission she is capable of performing data entry work \nand according to her own testimony she has previously performed data entry work for an \noil field construction company for four years.   \n While not working, claimant is currently taking care of four children with the ages \nof 10, 8, 3, and nine months.  In addition, claimant’s husband travels for his work, and as \na result, she is responsible for taking care of her children, her home, and also takes care \nof various farm animals including goats, rabbits, and chickens.  While claimant testified \nthat the older children do most of the work involving the farm animals, physical therapist \nnotes indicate that claimant was also performing these duties. \n  July 17, 2024  physical therapist note: \n \n  Pt states she has to take care of farm animals, and \n  4 kids at home currently. \n \n  July 23, 2024 physical therapy note:  \n \n  Pt reports she is doing fair today.  Pt states she had \n  to do a lot of laundry yesterday and had to take care \n  of her goats. \n \n  August 13, 2024 physical therapy note: \n \n  Pt states she has daily “farm” chores including \n  chickens/goats/rabbits, and keeping up with her \n  baby, toddler, and older kids throughout her day, \n  while her husband works out of state. \n \n \n Based  upon  the  foregoing  evidence,  I  find  that  claimant  has  failed  to  meet  her \n\nThompson – H305020 \n \n12 \n \nburden  of  proving  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  she  has  suffered  a  total \nincapacity to earn wages for a sufficient time to entitle her to compensation.  As previously \nnoted,  McWilliams  initially  took  claimant  off  work  for  ten  days  before  permitting  her  to \nreturn to  work  at one-handed  duty for the  respondent.  Claimant  apparently performed \nthis job for five days before she failed to show up for work and was terminated.  No treating \nphysician has taken claimant off work since that time.   \n Furthermore,  claimant  has  performed  office  work  in  the  form  of  data  entry  and \nadmitted that she was capable of performing that type of employment.  However, claimant \nis  currently  staying  at  home  taking  care  of  her  four  children  and  various  farm  animals \nwhile her husband travels for work. \n Based upon the evidence presented, I find that claimant has failed to prove by a \npreponderance of the evidence that she has suffered a total incapacity to earn wages for \na period of time which would entitle her to payment for temporary total disability benefits. \nPursuant to A.C.A. §11-9-715(a)(1)(B)(ii), attorney fees are awarded “only on the \namount of compensation for indemnity benefits controverted and awarded.”   Here, no \nindemnity benefits were awarded; therefore, no attorney fee has been awarded.   Instead, \nclaimant’s attorney is free to voluntarily contract with the medical providers pursuant to \nA.C.A. §11-9-715(a)(4). \n \nAWARD \n Claimant has met her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that \nshe suffered a compensable injury to her right shoulder on July 24, 2023.  Respondent is \nliable  for  payment  of  all  reasonable  and  necessary  medical  treatment  provided  in \n\nThompson – H305020 \n \n13 \n \nconnection  with  claimant’s  compensable  injury.    Claimant  has  failed  to  prove  by  a \npreponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to temporary total disability benefits.  \nPursuant to A.C.A. §11-9-715(a)(1)(B)(ii), no attorney fee has been awarded. \n Respondent  is  responsible  for  payment  of  the  court  reporter’s  charges  for \npreparation of the hearing transcript in the amount of $687.75. \n IT IS SO ORDERED. \n \n       ________________________________ \n        GREGORY K. STEWART \n        ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION CLAIM NO. H305020 KLARESSA D. THOMPSON, Employee CLAIMANT NIDEC MOTOR CORPORATION, Employer RESPONDENT TRAVELERS INSURANCE CO., Carrier RESPONDENT OPINION FILED JANUARY 15, 2025 Hearing before ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE GREGORY K. STEWART in Fort Smith, Sebastian Count...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T22:44:24.081Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H305020-2025-01-15","pdf":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/THOMPSON_KLARESSA_H305020_20250115.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}