{"id":"alj-H303648-2025-01-29","awcc_number":"H303648","decision_date":"2025-01-29","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Contessa Allison","employer_name":"S.E. Ark. Human Dev. Ctr","title":"ALLISON VS. S.E. ARK. HUMAN DEV. CTR. AWCC# H303648 January 29, 2025","outcome":"denied","outcome_keywords":["affirmed:1","dismissed:1","denied:2"],"injury_keywords":["shoulder","repetitive","ankle","fracture"],"pdf_url":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/ALLISON_CONTESSA_H303648_20250129.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"ALLISON_CONTESSA_H303648_20250129.pdf","text_length":23844,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \nCLAIM NO. H303648 \n \n \n \nCONTESSA L. ALLISON,  \nEMPLOYEE                                                   CLAIMANT \n \nS.E. ARK. HUMAN DEV. CTR.,  \nEMPLOYER                                                     RESPONDENT \n \nSTATE OF ARKANSAS/ \nPUBLIC EMPLOYEE CLAIMS DIVISION,                      \nINSURANCE CARRIER/TPA                                                                 RESPONDENT     \n                          \n \n \nOPINION FILED JANUARY 29, 2025 \n \nHearing  conducted  on  October  31,  2024,  before  the  Arkansas  Workers’  Compensation \nCommission  (the  Commission),  Administrative  Law  Judge  (ALJ)  Mike  Pickens,  in  Monticello, \nDrew County, Arkansas. \n \nThe claimant, Ms. Contessa L. Allison, of Warren, Bradley County, Arkansas, appeared pro se. \n  \nThe  respondents were represented  by  the  Honorable Charles  L.  McLemore, Public  Employee \nClaims Division (PECD), Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.  \n \n \nINTRODUCTION \n     In the prehearing order filed September 20, 2024, the parties agreed to the following \nstipulations, which they affirmed on the record at the hearing: \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission (the Commission) has \njurisdiction over this claim. \n2. The  employer/employee/carrier-TPA  relationship  existed at  all  relevant  times \nincluding August  26,  2021,  when  the  claimant  alleges  she  became  disabled as  a \ndirect result of alleged “compensable” gradual onset injuries to both her right and \nleft shoulders. \n \n3. The claimant’s average weekly wage (AWW) is $453.10, which is sufficient to \nentitle her to weekly compensation rates of $302.00 for temporary total disability \n(TTD), and $227.00 for permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits if the claim is \n\nContessa L. Allison, AWCC No. H303648 \n \n \n \n2 \ndeemed compensable.  \n \n4. The respondents controvert this claim in its entirety. \n \n5. The parties specifically reserve any and all other issues for future litigation and/or \ndetermination. \n \n(Commission’s Exhibit 1 at 1; Hearing Transcript at 6-7). Pursuant to the parties’ mutual \n \nagreement the issues litigated at the hearing were:  \n \n1. Whether this claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations (S/L). \n \n2. If  the claim  is  not  barred  by  the  applicable  S/L,  whether  the  claimant  sustained \n“compensable”  gradual  onset  injuries  within  the  meaning  of  the  Arkansas’ \nWorkers’ Compensation Act (the Act) to her  right  and/or left  shoulder(s) that \nculminated in disability on or about August 26, 2021. \n \n3. If the claimant’s alleged injury(ies)  is (are) deemed  compensable,  the  extent  to \nwhich she is entitled to medical and indemnity benefits. \n \n4. If the claimant retains an attorney in this matter, whether her attorney is entitled to \na controverted fee on these facts. \n \n5. The parties specifically reserve any and all other issues for future litigation and/or \ndetermination. \n \n(Comms’n Ex. 1 at 2; T. 6-7). \n     The  claimant contends  her  claim  is  not  barred  by  the  applicable  S/L.  Furthermore, she \ncontends she has sustained gradual onset “compensable” injuries to either or both her right and \nleft shoulder(s); that she is entitled to both medical and indemnity benefits; and, if she retains one, \nher attorney is entitled to a controverted fee. (Comms’n Ex. 1 at 3; T. 6-7; 18; T. 114-121; 123-\n25). \n     The  respondents contend that  on  June  8,  2023, the  claimant reported having allegedly \n\nContessa L. Allison, AWCC No. H303648 \n \n \n \n3 \nsustained a gradual  onset injury(ies) to  her right  and/or  left shoulder(s) that  she  further  alleged \nresulted in her inability to work as of August 26, 2021. The respondent contends the claimant did \nnot timely file this claim and, therefore, the applicable S/L now bars her claim for benefits. The \nrespondent contends further the claimant cannot establish she sustained either a specific incident \nor a gradual onset injury to either or both her right and/or left shoulder(s) on or before August 26, \n2021; or that she sustained any gradual onset injury whatsoever arising out of an in the course of \nher employment caused by both rapid and repetitive motion. The respondent contends the claimant \ncannot meet her burden of proof pursuant to the Act in establishing her alleged injury(ies) is (are) \nwere the result of rapid-repetitive motion and were the “major cause” of any disability or need for \ntreatment. Alternatively, the respondent contends that if the claimant’s alleged injury(ies) is (are) \ndeemed compensable they cannot be held liable for the payment of any medical and/or indemnity \nbenefits prior to the date the claimant reported her alleged injury(ies) to her employer. Finally, the \nrespondents  reserve  the  right  to  raise  additional  contentions,  or  to  modify  those  stated  herein, \npending  the  completion  of any  and  all  appropriate  and  necessary  investigation  and discovery. \n(Comms’n Ex. 1 at 3-4; T. 6-7; T. 121-22). \n     The  record  includes  the  hearing  transcript  and  any  and  all  exhibits  contained  therein  and \nattached  thereto. The  hearing  record  does not include Claimant’s Proffered Exhibit 1 since  the \nclaimant failed and/or refused to comply with the clear and specific terms of the subject prehearing \norder which required her to provide copies of this exhibit to opposing counsel at least seven (7) \ndays before the hearing date. (T. 7-13; CPX1 at 1-13).  \n \n\nContessa L. Allison, AWCC No. H303648 \n \n \n \n4 \nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE \n     The relevant facts in this case are straight-forward. The claimant, Ms. Contessa A. Allison \n(the  claimant), is 54 years  old. She  began  working  as  a  residential  assistant  with  the  Southeast \nArkansas Human Development Center (HDC) on March 3, 2020. The claimant’s regular shift \nhours  were  from  10  p.m.  to  6  a.m.,  although there  were  times  when  she  was  required  to  work \novertime to substitute for other employees who did not come into work for one reason or another. \nThe claimant’s job  duties  consisted  of,  among  other  things, working  in  the  kitchen,  as  well  as \nwashing clothes for 15 male HDC residents. (T. 18-24). In summary, the claimant attributed the \nright and left shoulder problems which are the subject of this claim to her job duties of working in \nthe  kitchen, mopping, wiping  the  counters  and,  most  notably,  to  the  physical  movements  she \nperformed  while  washing  loads  of  laundry  for  the  15  male  HDC  residents  while  loading  and \nunloading  the  washing machine  and  dryer,  folding  the  clothes,  and  related  activities.  (T.  38-45; \n52-63).      \n     The claimant initially testified she first started having problems with her shoulders in March \nof  2021  while  she  was  working  light-duty  for  a  leg  injury,  which  she  described  as  a  pulled \nhamstring.  (T.25-32; Respondents’ Exhibit 1 at 1-22). She  later  clarified  that,  specifically  with \nrespect to her shoulder(s), she began having problems around April or May of 2021. (T. 32-33). A \nmedical report dated May 28, 2021, from a clinic visit with Dr. Joe Wharton notes the claimant \nadvised him of some problems with her right shoulder which she told Dr. Wharton were from a \nprevious injury she sustained years ago. (T. 35; RX1 at 17-22). The claimant explained she did not \nrecall  Dr.  Wharton asking her  about any prior injuries. She testified she did not have  a specific \n\nContessa L. Allison, AWCC No. H303648 \n \n \n \n5 \nprior injury to her shoulder, but that she did have some “soreness” in her shoulder in 2015 which \nshe attributed to her prior job duties of “a lot of repetition, stirring, stirring” working in the cafeteria \nat the University of Arkansas at Monticello (UAM). (T. 34-38). \n     While the claimant testified her employer was aware of her alleged work-related shoulder \nproblems, the respondents offered the written statements of two (2) HDC witnesses, Ms. Sandra \nHarris  (statement  dated  June  14,  2023)  and  Ms.  Casondra  Jones,  the  HDC  assistant  personnel \nmanager (statement dated June 15, 2023), contradicting the claimant’s testimony in this  regard. \n(T.  67-72; Respondents’ Exhibit 2 at 10-11). The  claimant  was  terminated  from  HDC  effective \nSeptember 26, 2021, for refusal to “float” (rotate job duties) and other reasons which are set forth \nin a Department of Human Services (DHS) Notice of Disciplinary Action form dated September \n26,  2021.  (RX2  at  7-8). This disciplinary form states the claimant had “displayed a consistent \npattern of failure to comply with workplace policies...”; had “received multiple verbal warnings, \nhas been on Probation...”; and had been given “multiple policy re-trainings  by  her  supervisor \nregarding the same policy violations.” (RX2 at 7). The claimant did not file her Form  AR-C \nalleging  the  subject  gradual  onset  right  and  left  shoulder  injuries  until  June  7,  2023,  almost  21 \nmonths after the date HDC terminated her on September 26, 2021. (RX2 at 9).    \n     The claimant did not introduce any medical records into evidence in support of her alleged \nright and left shoulder gradual onset  compensable injury claim. The respondents introduced the \nabove-cited  medical  exhibit,  RX1.  These  medical  records  reflect  the  claimant  first  mentioned \nproblems with her right shoulder on May 28, 2021, which she attributed to a previous injury. (RX1 \nat  17-22).  X-rays  taken  of  the  claimant’s  right  shoulder  on  May  28,  2021,  revealed  mild \n\nContessa L. Allison, AWCC No. H303648 \n \n \n \n6 \ndegenerative  spurring  at  the  acromioclavicular  (AC)  joint  and  acromion,  and  no  acute  osseous \nabnormality.  (RX1  at  23). Dr. Wharton’s clinic/progress note of October 11, 2021, notes the \nclaimant’s complaints of right shoulder pain of “unspecified chronicity.” (RX1 at 24-26). X-rays \ntaken on the same date revealed no acute findings, and mild degenerative changes of the AC joint. \n(RX1 at 27). The claimant underwent a steroid injection into her right shoulder on December 9, \n2021. (RX1 at 28-31). \n     The  first  mention  of  left  shoulder  pain  in  the  medical  records  is  reflected  in  a  clinic  note \ndated July 21, 2022, which goes on to reveal the claimant had been experiencing these symptoms \nfor  seven  (7)  to  eight  (8)  months.  (RX1  at  32-25).  The  last  medical  record  in  RX1 is an  X-ray \nreport of the claimant’s right ankle which notes some swelling and no acute fracture; and X-ray of \nthe claimant’s left shoulder which the radiologist interpreted as, “Unremarkable...No acute osseus \nabnormality.” (RX1 at 36-37).              \nDISCUSSION \nThe Burden of Proof, Generally \n      When deciding any issue, the ALJ and the Commission shall determine, on the basis of the \nrecord  as  a  whole,  whether  the  party  having  the  burden  of  proof  has  established  it  by  a \npreponderance of the evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704(c)(2) (2025 Lexis Replacement). The \nclaimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence he is entitled to benefits. \nStone v. Patel, 26 Ark. App. 54, 759 S.W.2d 579 (Ark. App. 1998). Ark. Code Ann. Section 11-\n9-704(c)(3) (2025 Lexis Repl.) states that the ALJ, the Commission, and the courts “shall strictly \n\nContessa L. Allison, AWCC No. H303648 \n \n \n \n7 \nconstrue” the Act, which also requires them to read and construe the Act in its entirety, and to \nharmonize its provisions when necessary. Farmers Coop. v. Biles, 77 Ark. App. 1, 69 S.W.2d 899 \n(Ark.  App.  2002).  In  determining  whether  the  claimant  has  met  her burden  of  proof,  the \nCommission is required to weigh the evidence impartially without giving the benefit of the doubt \nto either party. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704(c)(4) (2025 Lexis Repl.); Gencorp Polymer Products \nv. Landers, 36 Ark. App. 190, 820 S.W.2d 475 (Ark. App. 1991); Fowler v. McHenry, 22 Ark. \nApp. 196, 737 S.W.2d 633 (Ark. App. 1987). \n      All claims for workers’ compensation benefits must be based on proof. Speculation and \nconjecture, even if plausible, cannot take the place of proof. Ark. Dep’t of Corrections v. Glover, \n35 Ark. App. 32, 812 S.W.2d 692 (Ark. App. 1991); Deana Constr. Co. v. Herndon, 264 Ark. 791, \n595 S.W.2d 155 (1979). It is the Commission’s exclusive responsibility to determine the credibility \nof the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony. Whaley v. Hardees, 51 Ark. App. 116, 912 \nS.W.2d 14 (Ark. App. 1995). The Commission is not required to believe either a claimant’s or any \nother witness’s testimony, but may accept and translate into findings of fact those portions of the \ntestimony it deems believable. McClain v. Texaco, Inc., 29 Ark. App. 218, 780 S.W.2d 34 (Ark. \nApp. 1989); Farmers Coop. v. Biles, supra. \n      The  Commission  has  the  duty  to  weigh  the  medical  evidence  just  as  it  does  any  other \nevidence,  and  its  resolution  of  the  medical  evidence  has  the  force  and  effect  of  a  jury  verdict. \nWilliams v. Pro Staff Temps., 336 Ark. 510, 988 S.W.2d 1 (1999). It is within the Commission’s \nprovince  to  weigh  the  totality  of  the  medical  evidence  and  to  determine  what  evidence  is  most \ncredible given  the  totality  of  the  credible  evidence  of  record. Minnesota Mining & Mfg’ing v. \n\nContessa L. Allison, AWCC No. H303648 \n \n \n \n8 \nBaker, 337 Ark. 94, 989 S.W.2d 151 (1999). \n     In  a  case  such  as  this  one  where  the  claimant  is  pro  se, the law  requires  both  the ALJ  and \nCommission to hold pro se claimants to the same standards as those represented by counsel. Moon \nv.  Holloway,  353  Ark.  520,  110  S.W.3d  250  (2003). Moreover,  ALJ,  the  Commission,  and  the \ncourts must strictly construe Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702. Sykes v. Williams, 373 Ark. 236, 283 \nS.W.3d 209 (2008).  \n \nStatute of Limitations (S/L) \n       The controlling statute of limitations (S/L) is set forth in Ark. Code Ann. §11-9-702(a)(1) \n(2025 Lexis Repl.) which mandates: \nA  claim  for  compensation  for  disability  on  account  of  an  injury, \nother than an occupational disease and occupational infection, shall \nbe barred unless filed with the Workers’ Compensation Commission \nwithin (2) years from the date of the compensable injury. If during \nthe  two-year  period  following  the  filing  of  the  claim  the  claimant \nreceives  no  weekly  benefit  compensation  and  receives  no  medical \ntreatment resulting from the alleged injury, the claim shall be barred \nthereafter. \n \n     In Minnesota Mining & Mfg’ing v. Baker, 337 Ark. 94, 982 S.W.2d 11 (1999) and Pina v. \nWal-Mart Stores, Inc., 91 Ark. App 77, 208 S.W.3d 236 (Ark. App. 2005), our state supreme court \nand court of appeals, respectively, held the S/L for gradual onset, scheduled injuries begin to run \nwhen the injury first becomes apparent to the claimant. But in this case the claimant is alleging \nwork-related injuries to both her right and left shoulders and, of course, a shoulder injury is not a \nscheduled injury, it is an injury to the body-as-a-whole (BAW). Consequently, in the case at bar \nthe general S/L rule relating to an Arkansas workers’ compensation injury applies: i.e.,  the  S/L \n\nContessa L. Allison, AWCC No. H303648 \n \n \n \n9 \ndoes not begin to run until the true extent of the injury manifests itself and results in an incapacity \nto earn wages sufficient to give rise to a claim for compensation. Hall’s Cleaners v. Wortham, 311 \nArk. 103, 842 S.W.2d 7 (1992). \n     Based on the aforementioned law as applied to the facts of this case, I find this claim is not \nbarred by the applicable S/L. The preponderance  of the credible evidence  of record reveals that \nwhile the claimant’s shoulder problems manifested in April and May of 2021, and that she \napparently attributed her shoulder symptoms to her job duties at HDC at that time, the shoulder \nproblems did not result in disability until August 26 (or 28), 2021. (See, T. 125-26). The claimant \nsigned the Form AR-C alleging the subject gradual onset right and left shoulder injuries on June \n6,  2023,  which  the  Commission  received  on  June  7,  2023. (RX 2  at 9). Of  course,  it  is  readily \napparent the Form AR-C was prepared, signed, and filed within the two (2)-year S/L applicable to \nthe facts of this case.       \n   \nGradual Onset Compensable Injuries \n     In order meet the Act’s requirements of a gradual onset compensable injury a claimant must \nprove by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury: (1) arose out of and in the course of her \nemployment;  (2)  caused  internal  or  external  physical  harm  to  the  body  that  required  medical \nservices or resulted in disability or death; (3) was caused by rapid-repetitive motion; and (4) was \nthe  “major  cause”  of  the  disability  or  need  for  treatment. Ark.  Code  Ann. Section  11-9-\n102(4)(A)(ii)(a) (2025 Lexis Repl.); Lay v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 58 Ark. App. 35, 40, 944 \nS.W.2d 867, 870 (Ark. App. 1997); Carlat v. Ark. Hwy. & Trans. Dep’t, 2018 Ark. App. 157, 546 \n\nContessa L. Allison, AWCC No. H303648 \n \n \n \n10 \nS.W.3d 514 (Ark. App. 2018). An alleged gradual onset injury caused by rapid repetitive motion \nis compensable only if the alleged compensable injury is the “major cause” of the disability or need \nfor treatment. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(E)(ii); Medlin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 64 Ark. App. \n17, 977 S.W.2d 239 (1998). “Major cause” means greater than fifty percent (50%) of the cause. \nArk. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(E)(ii); Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc. v. Pope, 2019 Ark. App. 24, 482 \nS.W.3d 723 (Ark. App. 2016). \n     The test for determining whether an injury is caused by rapid repetitive motion is two (2)-\npronged: (1) the task must be repetitive, and (2) the repetitive motion must be rapid. Malone v. \nTexarkana  Public  Schools,  333  Ark.  343,  969  S.W.2d  644  (1998).  Multiple  tasks  involving \ndifferent  movements  can  be  considered  together to  satisfy  the  “repetitive  element”  of  rapid \nrepetitive motion. Id. \n     Just as in the case of any other  compensable injury, an  alleged gradual onset compensable \ninjury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings.   Ark. Code Ann. \n§ 11-9-102(4)(D); Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16). “Objective findings” are defined as findings \nwhich cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(A); \nLong v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 98 Ark. App. 70, at 80 250 S.W.3d 263, at 272 (Ark. App. 2007). \nObjective  findings  specifically  exclude  such  subjective  complaints  or  findings  as  pain,  straight-\nleg-raising  tests,  and  range-of-motion  (ROM)  tests  since  they  all  are  subjective  in  nature  and \nsubject to the claimant’s voluntary control or manipulation. See, Burks  v.  RIC,  Inc.,  2010  Ark. \nApp. 862 (Ark. App. 2010).  \n     Both our state supreme court and court of appeals have held that even where a claimant had \n\nContessa L. Allison, AWCC No. H303648 \n \n \n \n11 \nseveral  job  duties  which  required various rapid  motions  repeated  at  differing  time  intervals  and \nseparated  by  periods  of  several  minutes, this does not meet the Act’s rapid-repetitive  motion \nrequirement. See, Lay v. UPS, supra, (UPS driver who briefly performed several different rapid \nmotions repeated  at  differing  intervals  separated  by  several  minutes failed  to  meet  the  rapid-\nrepetitive motion requirement); Pulaski County Special School District (PCSSD), v. Stewart, 2010 \nArk. App. 487, 375 S.W.3d 758 (Ark. App. 2010) (the court reversed the Commission and found \nthat a school bus driver who opened and closed the bus door an average of five (5) times per hour \ndid  not  meet  the  rapid-repetitive  motion  requirement);  and Carlat,  supra, (claimant’s use of a \nweed-eater as part of his job duties did not constitute rapid-repetitive motion). \n     The overwhelming preponderance of the totality of the credible evidence of record in this \nclaim (see, the “Statement of the Case”, supra) conclusively reveals the claimant has failed to meet \nher  burden  of proof  in  demonstrating  that  her  HDC  job  duties were  either  rapid  or  repetitive  in \nnature. Indeed, there is no other reasonable conclusion that may be reached on these facts. There \nsimply exists no evidence in the record with respect to the claimant’s job duties – and specifically \nrelating to her job duties of working in the HDC kitchen, mopping, and washing clothes, etc. – that \nmay  reasonably  be  characterized  as  either  rapid  or  repetitive  as  defined  by  the  Act  and  as \ninterpreted by the applicable case law. (T. 18-113; RX1 at 1-37; RX2 at 1-13).  \n     Likewise, the medical evidence in this case is particularly revealing and demonstrates by the \noverwhelming preponderance of the evidence that, even if the claimant had met the Act’s rapid-\nrepetitive requirement, it cannot be reasonably held that her HDC job duties were the “major \ncause” of her shoulder problems. The X-rays of both the claimant’s right and left shoulders were \n\nContessa L. Allison, AWCC No. H303648 \n \n \n \n12 \nunremarkable and revealed only mild degenerative changes at most, degenerative changes that are \nnot consistent with a work-related injury, either specific or gradual onset. The objective medical \nfindings  the  X-rays  reveal is not  only – in  the  words  of  the  interpreting  radiologists – \n“unremarkable” and/or represent only “mild degenerative” changes, they are consistent with the \nnormal aging process  and lack any evidence of an injury, work-related or otherwise, gradual or \nspecific. (RX2 at 1-37).   \n     Finally,  it  must  be  noted  that  it  is  rather  incredible, inexplicable,  troublesome  and \ndisappointing the claimant would wait almost two (2) years after she was fired from HDC to file a \nworkers’ compensation claim alleging she had sustained work-related injuries. The very late filing \nof the claim; the unrebutted credible facts contained in the HDC termination report relating to the \nclaimant’s history of poor performance/poor attitude and disciplinary problems that were resistant \nto all apparent attempts at correction and/or rehabilitation; as well as the claimant’s demeanor and \nother relevant communication factors while testifying on both direct and cross-examination at the \nhearing are, indeed, troublesome and disappointing, and do not reflect well on her credibility. (T. \n18-113; RX2 at 1-13).  \n     Therefore, for all the aforementioned reasons, I hereby make the following: \nFINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \n1. The Commission has jurisdiction of this claim.  \n2. The  stipulations  contained  in  the  prehearing  order  filed  September  20,  2024, \nwhich  the  parties  affirmed  on  the  record  at  the  hearing,  hereby  are  accepted  as \nfacts.  \n \n\nContessa L. Allison, AWCC No. H303648 \n \n \n \n13 \n3. This claim is not barred by the applicable S/L. \n \n4. The  claimant  has failed  to  meet  her burden  of  proof  pursuant  to  the  Act  in \ndemonstrating she sustained compensable gradual onset injuries to either her left \nand/or right shoulder(s).  \n \n5. The claimant has failed to meet her burden of proof in demonstrating her job duties \nat HDC constitute either rapid-repetitive motion, and/or that they were the “major \ncause” of her right and left shoulder pain/problems. See, e.g., Lay, PCSSD, and \nCarlat, supra.    \n \n     WHEREFORE,  for  all  the  aforementioned  reasons, this  claim  hereby  is  denied  and \ndismissed subject to the claimant’s statutory appeal rights. \n     IT IS SO ORDERED. \n                           \n \nMike Pickens \nAdministrative Law Judge \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMP/mp","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION CLAIM NO. H303648 CONTESSA L. ALLISON, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT S.E. ARK. HUMAN DEV. CTR., EMPLOYER RESPONDENT STATE OF ARKANSAS/ PUBLIC EMPLOYEE CLAIMS DIVISION, INSURANCE CARRIER/TPA RESPONDENT OPINION FILED JANUARY 29, 2025 Hearing conducted on October 31, 2024, before t...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T22:44:51.257Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H303648-2025-01-29","pdf":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/ALLISON_CONTESSA_H303648_20250129.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}