{"id":"alj-H301483-2023-11-29","awcc_number":"H301483","decision_date":"2023-11-29","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Elias Chavez","employer_name":"Thompson Construction Group, Inc","title":"CHAVEZ VS. THOMPSON CONSTRUCTION GROUP, INC. AWCC# H301483 NOVEMBER 29, 2023","outcome":"granted","outcome_keywords":["granted:4","denied:1"],"injury_keywords":["hip","back","fracture"],"pdf_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads//Chavez_Elias_H301483_20231129.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"Chavez_Elias_H301483_20231129.pdf","text_length":25144,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \nWCC NO. H301483 \n \nELIAS CHAVEZ, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT \n \nTHOMPSON CONSTRUCTION GROUP, INC., \nEMPLOYER RESPONDENT \n \nZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE CO.,  \nCARRIER                       RESPONDENT \n \n \nOPINION FILED NOVEMBER 29, 2023 \n \nHearing before Administrative Law Judge Steven Porch on October 6, 2023, in Marion, \nArkansas. \n \nClaimant was represented by Mr. Tanner Thomas, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas. \n \nRespondents  were  represented  by  Mr.  Jarrod  Parrish,  Attorney  at  Law,  Little  Rock, \nArkansas. \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE \n \n A full  hearing  was  held  on  this  claim  on  October  6,  2023.    Claimant  was \nrepresented by Mr. Tanner Thomas, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas; Respondents \nwere represented by Mr. Jarrod Parrish, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas. \nSTIPULATIONS \n By agreement of the parties, the stipulations applicable to this claim are as follows: \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction \nof the within claim. \n \n2. An   employer/employee/carrier   relationship   existed   among   the \nparties on September  9,  2022,  when  Claimant  allegedly  sustained \ncompensable injuries to his left hip. \n \n3. Respondents  initially accepted  this  claim  as  medical-only  and  paid \nsome benefits\n1\n.  \n \n1\n Respondents denied compensability of the hip by letter dated September 29, 2023. This \nis  in evidence as Respondents Exhibit 3. \n\nCHAVEZ H301483 \n \n2 \n \n \n 4.  The parties  will  stipulate  to  Claimant’s  average  weekly  wage  and \ncompensation rates on or before the hearing date.\n2\n \n \nISSUES \n The parties have identified the following issues to be adjudicated: \n1.  Whether Claimant sustained a compensable injury to his left hip. \n  \n2.  Whether  Claimant  is  entitled  to  any  additional  reasonable  and  necessary \nmedical treatment rendered after January of 2023. \n \n3.  Whether  Claimant  is  entitled  to  additional  temporary  total  disability  benefits \nfrom September 9, 2022, to a date yet to be determined. \n \n4.  Whether  Claimant  is  entitled  to  an  impairment  rating  and  permanent  partial \ndisability benefits. \n \n5.  Whether Claimant is entitled to a controverted attorney’s fee.  \n \nAll other issues are reserved. \n \nCONTENTIONS \n \nClaimant’s Contentions: On September 9, 2022, Claimant, in the course and scope \nof employment with the respondent-employer, was carrying a rail  when he fell from an \nelevated section of the construction site, sustaining a left hip injury.  \nThe Respondent took two months of the Claimant complaining about pain to send \nhim to a doctor, but initially accepted the injury as compensable. Claimant initially was \nprovided treatment from Dr. Sherita Willis, where his complaints were of left hip and low \nback  pain.  Claimant  was  allowed  to  return  to  Dr.  Willis  in  January  of  2023,  where  she \ncited  that  the  Claimant’s  complaints  of  pain  were  chronic  in  nature.  Respondents  then \n \n2\n The Claimant and the Respondent did not stipulate to the average weekly wage and \ncompensation rates at the full hearing. Both parties verbally assured the Commission that they \ncan stipulate to the compensation rates should an award for indemnity benefits be granted. \n\nCHAVEZ H301483 \n \n3 \n \ndenied his claim. \nClaimant was then forced to treat on his own and went to Dr. Rickey Carson, where \nhe complained of low back and left hip pain and was referred to Dr. John Rocco Rodney. \nClaimant underwent an MRI which revealed tears of his bilateral hamstring tendons, the \nleft gluteus minimus and medius tendons, and at the right insertion of the gluteus medius \ntendons. \nClaimant contends that he suffered a compensable injury at work, that he is entitled \nto temporary total disability and medical benefits, and that his attorney is entitled to an \nattorney’s fee. All other issues are reserved. \nRespondent’s  Contentions:  Respondents  contend  that  they  had  accepted  this \nclaim as medical-only. The Claimant continued to work for Respondent/Employer through \nMarch  19,  2023,  when  he  was  terminated,  as  is  evidenced  by  the  attached  wage \ninformation. The medical documentation does not support an off-work status beyond that. \nIn  light  of  this,  it  is  Respondents’  position  Claimant  is  not  entitled  to  temporary  total \ndisability benefits. Additionally, the medical records indicate the Claimant does not have \nany acute objective findings to support an injury on September 9, 2022. The Claimant has \nreceived unauthorized medical treatment with Drs. Rodney and Carson.  \nFINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \n After  reviewing  the  record  as  a  whole,  including  medical  reports,  non-medical \ndocuments,  post hearing briefs from  the  parties,  and  other matters  properly  before  the \nCommission,  I  hereby  make  the  following  findings  of  fact  and  conclusions  of  law  in \naccordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704 (Repl. 2012):   \n1.  The Arkansas  Workers’  Compensation  Commission  has  jurisdiction  over  this \nclaim.  \n\nCHAVEZ H301483 \n \n4 \n \n \n2.  The stipulations set forth above are reasonable and are hereby accepted.  \n3.  The  Claimant  has  proven  by  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that he \nsustained a compensable injury to his left hip on September 9, 2022.  \n \n4.   The  Claimant has  proven  by  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  he  is \nentitled to additional reasonable and necessary medical treatment. \n \n5.   The Claimant has not proven by the preponderance of the evidence that he is \nentitled to temporary total disability benefits following his September 9, 2022, \ninjury. \n \n6.   The Claimant has not proven by the preponderance of the evidence that he is \nentitled to an impairment rating and permanent partial disability benefits. \n \n7.  Claimant has not proven by the preponderance of the evidence that his attorney \nis entitled to a controverted attorney’s fee. \n \nCASE IN CHIEF \nSummary of Evidence \n The sole witness at the hearing was the Claimant, Elias Chavez. The witness had \nthe  benefit  of  an  interpreter  to  translate  the  proceedings  from  English  to  Spanish.  In \naddition to admitting the pre-hearing order and Claimant’s and Respondents’ post-hearing \nbriefs regarding this matter, I also have admitted the following into evidence in this case: \nClaimant’s Exhibit 1, a comprehensive exhibit containing  67 pages of  medical records, \nRespondents’ Exhibit 1, a 51-page compilation of medical records; Respondents’ Exhibit \n2, a 16 page non-medical document; and Respondents’ Exhibit 3, a 1 page letter dated \nSeptember 29, 2023. \nClaimant was a rod buster for the Respondent/Employer. A rod buster is one who \nconstructs concrete foundations at construction sites. Claimant slipped on some mud on \nthe ground and fell while carrying rebar, injuring the left side of his hip on September 9, \n2022.  This  occurred  during  the  course  and  scope  of  his  employment.  The  Claimant \n\nCHAVEZ H301483 \n \n5 \n \nreported  this  incident  the  same day  and  was  sent home.  The  Claimant did not  receive \nmedical treatment for his injury until November 22, 2022, 74 days after the incident.  Dr. \nSherita  Willis  noted  that  the  Claimant  had  left  hip  tenderness,  limited  range  of  motion, \nand prescribed him Tylenol and Ibuprofen for his injury. The Claimant was later ordered \nan MRI by Dr. John Rocco Rodney. The Claimant received an MRI on March 27, 2023, \nin  Baltimore,  Maryland.  The  physicians  at  Community  Radiology  Associates  found  a \n“...2.) Low-grade partial- thickness tears at the origins of bilateral hamstring tendons, 3.) \nLow- grade partial- thickness tears at the insertions of the left gluteus minimus and medius \ntendons,  4.)  Low-grade  partial-  thickness  tears  at  insertion  of  the  right  gluteus  medius \ntendon.” CL Post Hearing Brief Ex. 4.  \nThe Respondents initially accepted this claim as a medical-only one and paid some \nbenefits.  The  Claimant,  while  receiving  these  benefits,  continued  to  work  for  the \nRespondent/Employer until March 21, 2023. Claimant performed light duty work such as \nworking with equipment that bends rods, cut rods, or manually wrap bands around rods. \nWhen  these  jobs  became  difficult  the  Claimant  was  allowed  to  pick  up  scrap.  The \nClaimant continued to get paid his regular wage. The Claimant quit his job on March 21, \n2023, because he had unbearable pain. The Claimant moved to Silver Springs, Maryland \nand was not getting any rehabilitation treatment for his work-related hip injury. The reason \nfor not getting continued rehab treatment for his hip was a lack of insurance. The Claimant \nwas  questioned  as  to  why  he  did  not  request  workers  compensation  to  pay  for  his \nrehabilitation.  Claimant  stated  he  signed  some  papers  and  returned  them  to  the \nRespondent or Commission. Since then, he has not heard anything from the Respondent \n\nCHAVEZ H301483 \n \n6 \n \nor the Commission about continued treatment on his hip. Moreover, the Claimant could \nnot state what papers he signed nor when they were sent.  \nOn June 2, 2023, the Claimant, while walking, was struck on the left side of his hip \nby an automobile and went to the hospital. Claimant suffered a left leg femur fracture and \nlater  needed  rehab  for  his  left  hip  resulting  from  the  vehicle  incident.  Claimant  further \ntestified that he received Maryland state health insurance six weeks before the vehicle \nincident. No proof was provided proving that Claimant acquired insurance in Maryland. \nWhen testifying about his rehabilitation  Claimant stated he was getting treatment down \nthe outer side of his left leg for the work-related injury. On the other hand, Claimant stated \nhe  was  getting  rehab  treatment  down  the  front  of  his  left  leg  due  to  the  motor  vehicle \nincident. The Claimant testified that he was getting rehab treatment for his hip a month \nand  a  half  before  the  motor  vehicle  injury.  The  Claimant  testified  he  was  getting \nrehabilitation treatment for the left hip due to both the work injury and the motor vehicle \ninjury. However, the focus of treatment for each incident were allegedly in different areas \nof the left hip.  \nAdjudication \nA. Whether Claimant sustained a compensable left hip injury. \n \nArkansas Code Annotated § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Repl. 2012), which I find applies to \nthe analysis of Claimant’s alleged injuries, defines “compensable injury”: \n(i) An accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body \n.  .  .  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  employment  and  which  requires \nmedical services or results in disability or death.  An injury is “accidental” \nonly if it is caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place \nof occurrence[.] \n \n\nCHAVEZ H301483 \n \n7 \n \nA compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective \nfindings.  Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Repl. 2012).  “Objective findings” are those \nfindings that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient.  Id. § 11-9-102(16).  \nThe  element  “arising  out  of  .  .  .  [the]  employment”  relates  to  the  causal  connection \nbetween the claimant’s injury and his or her employment.  City of El Dorado v. Sartor, 21 \nArk. App. 143, 729 S.W.2d 430 (1987).  An injury arises out of a claimant’s employment \n“when  a  causal  connection  between  work  conditions  and  the  injury  is  apparent  to  the \nrational mind.”  Id. \n If  the  claimant  fails  to  establish  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  any  of  the \nrequirements  for  establishing  compensability,  compensation  must  be  denied.  Mikel  v. \nEngineered Specialty Plastics, 56 Ark. App. 126, 938 S.W.2d 876 (1997).  This standard \nmeans the evidence having greater weight or convincing force.  Barre v. Hoffman, 2009 \nArk. 373, 326 S.W.3d 415; Smith v. Magnet Cove Barium Corp., 212 Ark. 491, 206 S.W.2d \n442 (1947). \n A claimant’s testimony is never considered uncontroverted.  Nix v. Wilson World \nHotel,  46  Ark.  App.  303,  879  S.W.2d  457  (1994).    The  determination  of  a witness’ \ncredibility and how much weight to accord to that person’s testimony are solely up to the \nCommission.  White v. Gregg Agricultural Ent., 72 Ark. App. 309, 37 S.W.3d 649 (2001).  \nThe Commission must sort through conflicting evidence and determine the true facts.  Id.  \nIn so doing, the Commission is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant or \nany other witness but may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of \nthe testimony that it deems worthy of belief.  Id. \n\nCHAVEZ H301483 \n \n8 \n \nThe Claimant has satisfied his burden with objective findings as to his work-related \nleft hip injury on September 9, 2022. The Claimant sustained internal harm to his body. \nClaimant had an MRI of his left hip in Baltimore, Maryland. The physicians at Community \nRadiology Associates found a “...2.) Low-grade partial- thickness tears at the origins of \nbilateral hamstring tendons, 3.) Low- grade partial- thickness tears at the insertions of the \nleft  gluteus  minimus  and  medius  tendons,  4.)  Low-grade  partial-  thickness  tears  at \ninsertion of the right gluteus medius tendon.” CL Post Hearing Brief Ex. 4. I credit the MRI \nreport for Claimant’s March 27, 2023, exam date created by the Community Radiology \nAssociates. This  injury  occurred  by  specific  incident  during  the  scope  and  course  of \nClaimant’s employment when he slipped on some mud on the ground while carrying rebar \nfor the Respondent/Employer. The Claimant also needed medical treatment and received \nan MRI. Thus, I find by the preponderance of the evidence that the Claimant sustained a \ncompensable left hip injury during the course and scope of his employment on September \n9, 2022.  \n \nB. Whether Claimant is entitled to any additional reasonable and necessary \nmedical treatment rendered after January of 2023. \n \nArkansas  Code  Annotated  Section  11-9-508(a)  (Repl.  2012)  states  that  an \nemployer  shall  provide  for  an  injured  employee  such  medical  treatment  as  may be \nnecessary in connection with the injury received by the employee.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. \nv. Brown, 82 Ark. App. 600, 120 S.W.3d 153 (2003).  But employers are liable only for \nsuch treatment and services as are deemed necessary for the treatment of the claimant’s \ninjuries.  DeBoard v. Colson Co., 20 Ark. App. 166, 725 S.W.2d 857 (1987).  The claimant \nmust prove by a preponderance of the evidence that medical treatment is reasonable and \n\nCHAVEZ H301483 \n \n9 \n \nnecessary for the treatment of a compensable injury.  Brown, supra; Geo Specialty Chem. \nv. Clingan, 69 Ark. App. 369, 13 S.W.3d 218 (2000).  What constitutes reasonable and \nnecessary   medical   treatment   is   a  question   of  fact  for   the   Commission.   White \nConsolidated  Indus.  v.  Galloway,  74  Ark.  App.  13,  45  S.W.3d  396  (2001); Wackenhut \nCorp. v. Jones, 73 Ark. App. 158, 40 S.W.3d 333 (2001). \n As the Arkansas Court of Appeals has held, a claimant may be entitled to additional \ntreatment  even  after  the  healing  period  has  ended,  if  said  treatment  is  geared  toward \nmanagement of the injury.  See Patchell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 86 Ark. App. 230, 184 \nS.W.3d 31 (2004); Artex Hydrophonics, Inc. v. Pippin, 8 Ark. App. 200, 649 S.W.2d 845 \n(1983).  Such services can include those for the purpose of diagnosing the nature and \nextent  of  the  compensable  injury;  reducing  or  alleviating  symptoms  resulting  from  the \ncompensable  injury;  maintaining  the  level  of  healing  achieved;  or  preventing  further \ndeterioration of the damage produced by the compensable injury.  Jordan v. Tyson Foods, \nInc., 51 Ark. App. 100, 911 S.W.2d 593 (1995); Artex, supra. \nThe  Claimant  is  entitled  to  reasonable  and  necessary  medical  treatment  for  his \ncompensable  left  hip  injury.  No  evidence  was  presented that  shows  that  Claimant  had \ncompleted  his  healing  period.  I  find  by  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  all  the \nmedical  treatment  paid  for  by  the  Respondents  for  the  treatment  of  Claimant’s  work-\nrelated left hip injury were reasonable and necessary, including the x-rays and an MRI. \nClaimant testified that he received physical rehabilitation services for his work-related left \nhip  injury  in  Maryland  approximately  six  weeks  before his  June  2, 2023,  motor  vehicle \nincident. I don’t credit this testimony. I don’t have any physical therapy records verifying \nthe purpose of this treatment or that the treatment had actually taken place. There is no \n\nCHAVEZ H301483 \n \n10 \n \nreason, and no reason was given why the physical therapy records were not provided to \nthe  Respondents  and  the  Commission  given  this  full  hearing  had  taken  place  months \nafter the alleged treatment. Therefore, I cannot find by the preponderance of the evidence \nthat this treatment was reasonable and necessary. The Claimant has mentioned no other \ntreatment for his left hip work-related injury. \nHowever,  regarding  additional  medical  treatment,  Respondents  have  taken  the \nposition  that  Claimant  was  injured  in  a  subsequent  non-work-related  motor  vehicle \nincident  that  occurred  on  June  2,  2023,  and  that  incident  constituted  an  independent \nintervening cause, relieving Respondents from further responsibility for the September 9, \n2022, incident.  In this regard, the pertinent section of the Act provides: \nUnder this subdivision (4)(F), benefits shall not be payable for a condition \nwhich   results   for   a   nonwork-related   independent   intervening   cause \nfollowing  a  compensable  injury  which  causes  or  prolongs  disability  or  a \nneed for treatment.  A nonwork-related independent intervening cause does \nnot require negligence or recklessness on the part of a claimant. \n \nArk. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(f)(F)(iii) (Supp. 2011).  The test for determining if a subsequent \nepisode  is  an  aggravation  or  a  recurrence  is  whether  the  subsequent  episode was \nprecipitated by an independent intervening cause or was a natural and probable result of \nthe first injury.  Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Carter, 62 Ark. App. 162, 167-68, 969 S.W.2d \n677  (1998).    The  initial  question  is  whether  a  causal  connection  between the  primary \ninjury and the subsequent disability exists; and provided such a connection is established, \nthere is no independent intervening cause unless the subsequent disability is triggered \nby activity by the claimant that is unreasonable under the circumstances.  Guidry v. J&R \nEads Const. Co., 11 Ark. App. 219, 223, 669 S.W.2d 483 (1984).  Respondents bear the \nburden of proving an independent intervening cause by a preponderance of the evidence \n\nCHAVEZ H301483 \n \n11 \n \nunder Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-705(a)(3) (Supp. 2011). \n As previously stated, a claimant’s testimony is never considered uncontroverted.  \nNix v. Wilson World Hotel, 46 Ark. App. 303, 879 S.W.2d 457 (1994).  The determination \nof  a  witness’  credibility  and  how  much  weight  to  accord  to  that  person’s  testimony are \nsolely  up  to  the  Commission.   White  v.  Gregg  Agricultural  Ent.,  72  Ark.  App.  309,  37 \nS.W.3d  649  (2001).    The  Commission  must  sort  through  conflicting  evidence  and \ndetermine the true facts.  Id.  In so doing, the Commission is not required to believe the \ntestimony of the claimant or any other witness but may accept and translate into findings \nof fact only those portions of the testimony that it deems worthy of belief.  Id. \nThe Claimant’s motor vehicle incident was unrelated to his work. The motor vehicle \nincident took place a few months after Claimant had  voluntarily ended  his employment \nwith  Respondent/Employer.  The  motor  vehicle  incident  also  occurred  in  a  completely \ndifferent  state,  Maryland,  than  where  his  work-related  injury  occurred,  Arkansas.  The \nevidence preponderates that Claimant was crossing the street in Maryland and a motorist \nstruck him on the left side of his hip where he previously sustained his compensable left \nhip  work-related  injury. This  incident  resulted  in  a  fracture  to  Claimant’s  left  femur.  It’s \nclear  there  is  no causal  connection  between  the  Claimant’s  work  injury  and  the \nsubsequent  motor  vehicle  incident.  Thus,  I  find  Claimant’s  June  2,  2023,  automobile \nincident as wholly independent of his work-related injury. Based on this finding, I further \nfind  by  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  the  Respondents  have proven  an \nindependent  intervening  cause  and  are  no  longer  responsible for  the  Claimant’s \ncompensable left hip injury after June 2, 2023. \n \n\nCHAVEZ H301483 \n \n12 \n \nC. Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary total benefits from September 9, \n2022, to a date yet to be determined. \n \nTemporary total disability for unscheduled injuries is that period within the healing \nperiod in which the Claimant suffers total incapacity to earn wages. Ark. State Highway \nand Transportation Dept. v. Breshears, 272 Ark. 244, 613 S.W.2d 392 (1981). The healing \nperiod ends when the underlying condition causing the disability has become stable and \nnothing further in the way of treatment will improve that condition. Mad Butcher, Inc. v. \nParker, 4 Ark. App. 124, 628 S.W.2d 582 (1982). The Claimant continued to work for the \nRespondent/Employer until March 21, 2023. The Claimant’s attorney stated in his post-\nhearing brief that Claimant quit his job due to unbearable pain. The Claimant was on light \nduty when he quit working for the Respondent/Employer and moved to his home state of \nMaryland. Claimant  quit  his  job  voluntarily  and  without  a  doctor’s  orders.  I  don’t  credit \nClaimant’s reason for quitting his job due to unbearable pain. This was never brought out \nin his sworn testimony. Though I find he did voluntarily quit his job, I find that he did so to \nmove to his home state of Maryland.  Claimant has the responsibility of proving that he \nsuffered a total incapacity to earn wages. No credible evidence was presented showing \nthat the Claimant had indeed suffered a total incapacity to earn wages due to his work-\nrelated injury. Thus, I find that the Claimant did not prove by the preponderance of the \nevidence that he is entitled to temporary total disability benefits. \nD. Whether Claimant is entitled to an impairment rating and permanent partial \ndisability benefits. \nI  find  the  same  for  Claimant’s  request  for  permanent  partial  disability  benefits. \nPermanent  impairment,  generally  a  medical  condition,  is  any  permanent functional  or \nanatomical loss remaining after the healing period has been reached.  Ouachita Marine  \n  \n\nCHAVEZ H301483 \n \n13 \n \nv. Morrison, 246 Ark. 882, 440 S.W.2d 216 (1969).  Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-\n522(g) (Repl. 2002), the Commission adopted the Fourth Edition of the AMA Guides as \nan impairment rating guide.  See AWCC R. 099.34.  A determination of the existence or \nextent of physical impairment must be supported by objective and measurable physical \nor mental findings.  Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704(c)(1)(B) (Repl. 2012).  Permanent benefits \nare to be awarded only following a determination that the compensable injury is the major \ncause of the disability or impairment.  Id. § 11-9-102(F)(ii).  “Major cause” is defined as \n“more  than  fifty  percent  (50%)  of  the  cause,”  and  a  finding  of  major  cause  must  be \nestablished by a preponderance of the evidence.  Id. § 11-9-102(14).  Any medical opinion \nmust be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.  Id. § 11-9-102(16). \nClaimant  has  the  responsibility  to  present  to  the  Commission  evidence  that \nClaimant has reached the end  of his healing period on his compensable left hip injury. \nThe Claimant has not presented any evidence that Claimant has reached the end of his \nhealing  period.  Moreover,  the  Claimant  must  further  present objective  and  measurable \nevidence  of  any  permanent  functional  or  anatomical  loss  remaining  after  the  healing \nperiod has been reached. The Claimant has presented no such evidence concerning his \nleft  hip  compensable  injury.  Thus,  I  find  that  the  Claimant  did  not  prove  by  the \npreponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to permanent partial disability benefits. \nBased  on  the  findings  of  this opinion,  I am not awarding  any  indemnity  benefits  in this \nmatter thus rendering the issue of an attorney’s fee moot. \n \n \n \n\nCHAVEZ H301483 \n \n14 \n \n \n \nCONCLUSION AND AWARD \n Respondents are hereby directed to act in accordance with the findings of fact and \nconclusions of law set forth above.  \n IT IS SO ORDERED. \n       ________________________________ \n       Hon. Steven Porch \n                                                                           Administrative Law Judge","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION WCC NO. H301483 ELIAS CHAVEZ, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT THOMPSON CONSTRUCTION GROUP, INC., EMPLOYER RESPONDENT ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE CO., CARRIER RESPONDENT OPINION FILED NOVEMBER 29, 2023 Hearing before Administrative Law Judge Steven Porch on October 6, 2023, in Marion...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T23:00:54.759Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H301483-2023-11-29","pdf":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads//Chavez_Elias_H301483_20231129.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}