{"id":"alj-H301091-2024-03-20","awcc_number":"H301091","decision_date":"2024-03-20","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Diana Watkins","employer_name":"Smith House, Inc","title":"WATKINS VS. SMITH HOUSE, INC. AWCC# H301091 MARCH 20, 2024","outcome":"denied","outcome_keywords":["dismissed:1","granted:1","denied:2"],"injury_keywords":["ankle"],"pdf_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/Watkins_Diana_H301091_20240320.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"Watkins_Diana_H301091_20240320.pdf","text_length":9751,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \nWCC NO. H301091 \n \n \nDIANA L. WATKINS, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT \n \nSMITH HOUSE, INC., EMPLOYER RESPONDENT \n \nTECHNOLOGY INS. CO., CARRIER RESPONDENT \n \n \nOPINION FILED MARCH 20, 2024 \n \nHearing  before  Administrative  Law  O.  Milton  Fine  II  on March  15, 2024, in Jonesboro, \nCraighead County, Arkansas. \n \nClaimant pro se. \n \nRespondents  represented  by  Mr. William  C.  Frye,  Attorney  at  Law, North Little  Rock, \nArkansas. \n \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE \n \n On March 15, 2024, the above-captioned claim was heard in Jonesboro, Arkansas.  \nA pre-hearing conference took place on January 23, 2024.  The Prehearing Order entered \non that date pursuant to the conference was admitted without objection as Commission \nExhibit  1.    At  the  hearing,  the  parties  confirmed  that  the  stipulations,  issues,  and \nrespective contentions, as amended, were properly set forth in the order. \nStipulations \n At  the  hearing,  the  parties  discussed  the  stipulations  set  forth  in  Commission \nExhibit 1.  Following an amendment of the fourth,\n1\n they read: \n \n1\nStipulation  No.  4 originally read:  “The parties will  stipulate  at  the  hearing  to \nClaimant’s average weekly wage and compensation rates.” \n \n\nWATKINS – H301091 \n2 \n \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction over \nthis claim. \n2. The employee/employer/carrier relationship existed on February 22, 2021, \nand at all other relevant times. \n3. Respondents have controverted this claim in its entirety. \n4. Claimant’s average weekly wage of $122.02 entitles her to compensation \nrates of $81.00/$61.00. \nIssues \n At the hearing, the parties discussed the issues set forth in Commission Exhibit 1.  \nThe following were litigated: \n1. Whether Claimant  sustained a compensable left  ankle injury  by specific \nincident. \n2. Whether   Claimant   is   entitled   to   reasonable   and   necessary   medical \ntreatment. \n3. Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary total disability benefits. \n All other issues have been reserved. \nContentions \n The respective contentions of the parties are as follows: \nClaimant: \n1. Claimant contends that she sustained a compensable left ankle injury when \nshe fell on ice in the parking lot of her workplace when she stepped out of \nher  vehicle.  She is  entitled  to medical  and temporary  total  disability \nbenefits. \n\nWATKINS – H301091 \n3 \n \nRespondents: \n1. Respondents contend that Claimant left the premises to go buy cigarettes \nand  failed  to  clock  out.    She  was  returning  to  the  facility  and  fell  in  the \nparking lot.  Claimant was not performing any employment services at the \ntime of her injury. \nFINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \n After reviewing the record as a whole, and having had an opportunity to hear the \ntestimony of the witnesses and to observe their demeanor, I hereby make the following \nfindings  of  fact  and  conclusions  of  law  in  accordance  with  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11-9-704 \n(Repl. 2012): \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction over \nthis claim. \n2. The stipulations set forth above are reasonable and are hereby accepted. \n4. Claimant  has  not  proven  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that she \nsustained a compensable injury to her left ankle by specific incident. \n5. Because of Finding of Fact/Conclusion of Law No. 4, supra, the remaining \nissues—whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical \ntreatment and to temporary total disability benefits—are moot and will not \nbe addressed. \nCASE IN CHIEF \nSummary of Evidence \n The witnesses at the hearing were Claimant, Daniel Henry, and Linda Lloyd.  The \nPrehearing Order was the only document admitted into evidence. \n\nWATKINS – H301091 \n4 \n \nAdjudication \nA. Compensability \n In this action, Claimant has alleged that she suffered a compensable injury to her \nleft ankle by specific incident on February 22, 2021, when she slipped on ice and fell onto \nthe  parking  lot  of  her  place  of  employment,  Comfort  Inn.   This  happened,  per  her \ntestimony,  as  she  was  exiting  her  vehicle.    She  had  begun  her  shift that  day for \nRespondent employer, where her job duties included tending the breakfast bar that was \nmade available to the customers of the hotel.  Claimant related that she returned to her \nvehicle that  morning to  retrieve  her  Yeti  cup.   Respondents,  in  turn,  have denied  that \nClaimant suffered a compensable injury of any type.  They have asserted, inter alia, that \nClaimant was not performing employment services at the time of her fall. \n Arkansas Code Annotated § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Repl. 2012), which I find applies to \nthe analysis of Claimant’s alleged injury, defines “compensable injury”: \n(i) An accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the \nbody . . . arising out of and in the course of employment and which \nrequires medical services or results in disability or death.  An injury \nis  “accidental”  only  if  it  is  caused  by  a  specific  incident  and  is \nidentifiable by time and place of occurrence[.] \n \nA compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective \nfindings.  Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Repl. 2012).  “Objective findings” are those \nfindings that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient.  Id. § 11-9-102(16).  \nThe element “arising out of . . . [the] employment” relates to the causal connection \nbetween the claimant’s injury and his or her employment.  City of El Dorado v. Sartor, 21 \nArk. App. 143, 729 S.W.2d 430 (1987).  An injury arises out of a claimant’s employment \n\nWATKINS – H301091 \n5 \n \n“when a causal connection between work conditions and the injury is apparent to the \nrational mind.”  Id. \n In Hudak-Lee  v.  Baxter  County  Reg.  Hosp.,  2011  Ark.  31,  378  S.W.3d  77,  the \nArkansas Supreme Court stated: \nIn order for an accidental injury to be compensable, it must arise out of and \nin  the  course of  employment.    Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11-9-102(4)(A)(i)  (Supp. \n2009).  A compensable injury does not include an injury that is inflicted upon \nthe employee at a time when employment services are not being performed. \nArk.  Code  Ann.  §  11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2009).  The phrase “in the \ncourse of employment” and the term “employment services” are not defined \nin  the Workers'  Compensation Act.  Texarkana Sch.  Dist.  v.  Conner, 373 \nArk. 372, 284 S.W.3d 57 (2008).  Thus, it falls to the court to define these \nterms in a manner that neither broadens nor narrows the scope of the Act.  \nId. \n \nAn employee is performing employment services when he or she is doing \nsomething  that  is  generally  required  by  his  or  her  employer.   Id.; Pifer  v. \nSingle  Source  Transp.,  347  Ark.  851,  69  S.W.3d  1  (2002).    We  use  the \nsame  test  to  determine  whether  an  employee  is  performing  employment \nservices as we do when determining whether an employee is acting within \nthe course and scope of employment.  Jivan v. Econ. Inn & Suites, 370 Ark. \n414, 260 S.W.3d 281 (2007).  The test is whether the injury occurred within \nthe time and space boundaries of the employment, when the employee was \ncarrying out the employer's purpose or advancing the employer's interest, \ndirectly or indirectly.  Id.  In Conner, 373 Ark. 372, 284 S.W.3d 57, we stated \nthat where it was clear that the injury occurred outside the time and space \nboundaries of employment, the critical inquiry is whether the interests of the \nemployer were being directly or indirectly advanced by the employee at the \ntime  of  the  injury.    Moreover,  the  issue  of  whether  an  employee was \nperforming employment services within the course of employment depends \non the particular facts and circumstances of each case.  Id. \n \n If  the  claimant  fails  to  establish  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence any of  the \nrequirements  for  establishing  compensability,  compensation  must  be  denied.   Mikel  v. \nEngineered Specialty Plastics, 56 Ark. App. 126, 938 S.W.2d 876 (1997).  This standard \nmeans the evidence having greater weight or convincing force.  Barre v. Hoffman, 2009 \n\nWATKINS – H301091 \n6 \n \nArk. 373, 326 S.W.3d 415; Smith v. Magnet Cove Barium Corp., 212 Ark. 491, 206 S.W.2d \n442 (1947). \n The determination of a witness’ credibility and how much weight to accord to that \nperson’s testimony are solely up to the Commission.  White v. Gregg Agricultural Ent., 72 \nArk.  App.  309,  37  S.W.3d  649  (2001).    The  Commission  must  sort  through  conflicting \nevidence and determine the true facts.  Id.  In so doing, the Commission is not required \nto believe the testimony of the claimant or any other witness, but may accept and translate \ninto findings of fact only those portions of the testimony that it deems worthy of belief.  Id. \n No medical  records were  offered into evidence.    Consequently,  the  evidentiary \nrecord is devoid of objective findings of an injury to Claimant’s left ankle.  She thus cannot \nshow that she sustained a compensable injury; her claim must fail at the outset.  Claimant \nhas not proven compensability by a preponderance of the evidence. \nB. Remaining Issues \n Because of the foregoing, the remaining issues—whether Claimant is entitled to \nreasonable and necessary medical treatment and temporary total disability benefits—are \nmoot and will not be addressed. \nCONCLUSION \n In accordance with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth above, \nthis claim for initial benefits is hereby denied and dismissed. \n IT IS SO ORDERED. \n       ________________________________ \n       Hon. O. Milton Fine II \n       Chief Administrative Law Judge","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION WCC NO. H301091 DIANA L. WATKINS, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT SMITH HOUSE, INC., EMPLOYER RESPONDENT TECHNOLOGY INS. CO., CARRIER RESPONDENT OPINION FILED MARCH 20, 2024 Hearing before Administrative Law O. Milton Fine II on March 15, 2024, in Jonesboro, Craighead County, Arka...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T22:56:45.232Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H301091-2024-03-20","pdf":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/Watkins_Diana_H301091_20240320.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}