{"id":"alj-H208823-2025-11-18","awcc_number":"H208823","decision_date":"2025-11-18","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"John Baker","employer_name":"Rigid Industrial Services, LLC","title":"BAKER VS. RIGID INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, LLC AWCC# H208823 November 18, 2025","outcome":"unknown","outcome_keywords":[],"injury_keywords":["back","wrist","shoulder","neck"],"pdf_url":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/BAKER_JOHN_H208823_20251118.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"BAKER_JOHN_H208823_20251118.pdf","text_length":32521,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \n \n                                                             WCC NO.: H208823 \n  \nJOHN BAKER, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT \n \nRIGID INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, LLC,   \nEMPLOYER                                                                                                            RESPONDENT    \n                                        \nSIRIUSPOINT AMERICA INSURANCE/ \nSIRIUSPOINT AMERICA INSURANCE CO.,  \nCARRIER/TPA                                                                                                          RESPONDENT  \n \n \nOPINION FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2025 \n             \nHearing held before Administrative Law Judge Chandra L. Black, in Texarkana, Miller County, \nArkansas. \n \nClaimant represented by the Honorable Gregory R. Giles, Attorney at Law, Texarkana, Arkansas. \n \nRespondents represented  by the  Honorable Lee  J.  Muldrow, Attorney at  Law,  Little  Rock, \nArkansas. \n \n \n          STATEMENT OF THE CASE \nOn August 20,  2025, the  above-captioned  claim  came  on  for a hearing in  Texarkana, \nArkansas.  Previously,  a pre-hearing  telephone  conference  was  held in  this  matter on June 18, \n2025.  A Pre-hearing Order was entered that same day pursuant to the telephone conference.  Said \norder was admitted into evidence along with the parties’ pre-hearing information filings without \nobjection as Commission’s Exhibit 1. \nStipulations \nDuring the pre-hearing telephone conference, and/or at the hearing, the parties agreed to \nthe following stipulations: \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction of the within \n         claim. \n\nBaker – H208823 \n2 \n \n 2. That Rigid had a company policy that if the job was over 40 miles from the Alanta \n shop, employees would be paid for one hour of drive time per round trip in a day.  \n Employees  would  still  clock  in  upon  commencing  their  work  at  the  jobsite  and \n clock out when they left the jobsite at the end of the day.  Drive time would then be \n added by the payroll department at the end of the week based on the job locations.  \n All employees were paid the same policy whether they drove or did not drive to get \n to the jobsite.     \n 3. That  travel  pay  was  not  based  on  computation  of  actual  travel  time  or  actual \n expenses incurred.  \n 4. That Mr. Baker’s [the claimant] hourly rate of pay on October 7, 2022, was $26.00 \n an hour.  \n5.        Therefore, all other issues not litigated are reserved under the Arkansas Workers’  \n \n           Compensation Act.  \nIssue(s) \n The  parties  agreed  to  litigate  the  following  issue: Jurisdiction: Whether  the “going and \ncoming rule” precludes the claimant  from being  a covered employee, thereby making  an  action \nunder workers’ compensation law the exclusive remedy.  In other words, whether the claimant was \nwithin the course and scope of his employment.   \nContentions \n \n The claimants’ contentions and respondents’ contentions are set out in their respective \nresponse to the Pre-hearing Questionnaire.  Said contentions are as follows: \nClaimant: Jurisdiction: The Claimant contends in this case that his injuries occurred when \nhe was not within the course and scope of his employment when he was off the clock and asleep \nin the passenger seat at the time the accident occurred.  The “coming and going rule” in Arkansas \n\nBaker – H208823 \n3 \n \nprecludes workers’ compensation for injuries sustained while an employee is traveling to and from \nwork.  In this case, Mr. Baker contends he was not paid to travel to the job site, and Mr. Baker was \nnot  doing anything directly  or  indirectly to advance his employer’s at the time of his accident. \n Claimant contends that he was not within the course and scope of his employment when \nhe suffered his injuries on October 7, 2022, and given the circumstances the claimant contends the \nWorkers’ Compensation Commission is not the proper jurisdiction for him to pursue remedy for \nthe injuries sustained. \n Respondents: Respondents contend that at the time of his accident, the claimant was “in \nthe course of his employment” and by virtue of traveling from one work site to another, he was \nfurthering the interest of his employer. \n At the beginning of the hearing, the respondents further contend that the issue is whether \nor not this accident falls within the ruling in Ambetter v. Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act.   \n    FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \nAfter  reviewing  the record  as  a  whole, including  the  medical  reports, the documentary \nevidence, and other matters properly before the Commission, and after having had an opportunity \nto listen to the testimony of the witnesses and observe their demeanor, I hereby make the following \nfindings  of  fact  and  conclusions  of  law in  accordance  with  Ark.  Code  Ann. §11-9-704  (Repl. \n2012): \n1.     The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction over this claim. \n \n2.     The proposed stipulations set forth above are reasonable and hereby accepted. \n \n          3.         The claimant was performing employment services at the time of his motor vehicle  \n           accident of October 7, 2022, because he was required by Rigid to travel from one  \n  \n           work site to another.         \n \n\nBaker – H208823 \n4 \n \n          4.         All issues not litigated herein or addressed in this Opinion are reserved under the Act.    \n                \nSummary of Evidence \nThe witnesses were the claimant, Rodney Ammons, Laurie Walker, Josh Turner, and Mike \nHanner. \n            The  record  consists  of  the  hearing  transcript  of August 20, 2025, and the exhibits held \ntherein.  In addition to the Pre-hearing Order discussed above, the exhibits admitted into evidence \nin  this  case  were Claimant’s Exhibit 1 include the claimant’s wage records  consisting  of  nine \npages;  Joint  Exhibit  1  consists  of  one  page  of    Additional  Proposed  Stipulations;  Respondents’ \nExhibit  1 consists of two pages entitled Texas Workers’ Compensation Work Status Report; \nRespondents’ Exhibit No. 2 includes the Form AR-C; Respondents’ Exhibit No. 3 encompasses \nthree pages of paystubs; Respondents’ Exhibit No. 4 includes one page, a medical record; and  the \nparties filed Post-Hearing Trial Briefs, these have been blue-backed and made a part of the record \nas Commission’s Exhibit 2.    \nTestimony \n The claimant, aged 61, worked for the respondent employer on October 7, 2022.  He lives \nin Queen City, Cass County, Texas.  The claimant has his GED and some college.  He confirmed \nthat the rest of his training has basically been by on-the-job-training.  The claimant has obtained, \non his own, the skills and training on how to perform the employment duties of a millwright.  He \nis also self-taught on how to do maintenance work on equipment through working various jobs.  \nAs of the date of the hearing, the claimant worked for Dusty Reeves, pouring concrete, and doing \nthe forming and finishing.   \n On October 7, 2022, the claimant was employed by Rigid Industrial Services, LLC.  The \ncompany’s office is in Atlanta, Cass County, Texas.  He confirmed that he worked out of the site \n\nBaker – H208823 \n5 \n \nlocated in Atlanta, Texas.  According to the claimant, he had worked for the company, this most \nrecent  time  for  a  year  or  two.   The  claimant confirmed  that  Randy  Ammons  was  his  contact  at \nRigid, and he was his supervisor on October 7, 2022.  At that time, the claimant agreed that his \nhourly rate of pay was $26.00.   \n The following exchange took place: \n  Q. What type of business is Rigid?  Give us just an idea so that the Judge  \n   understands what Rigid does. \n \n  A. Well, they’re a fabrication company, slash, kind of multi-craft company, \n    also.  Do other jobs like sandblasting, painting, alignment, leveling and  \n                                     stuff like that on machinery. \n \n  Q.         That particular week, what was the purpose of the job?  Where was the job \n    that you had been working or assigned for Rigid that week? \n \n  A.          I was assigned at the Holsum\n1\n Mill in Prescott, Arkansas. \n \n According to the claimant, Rigid is based in Atlanta, Texas.  The claimant testified that the \nbest way he could describe the job site is that it is an old Ford Motor Company car lot that used to \nbe there; but now the garage part is what Rigid uses for its central office.  He further explained \nthat they have a shop and office for the supervisors and equipment that they store at the location.   \nThe claimant testified that they had been working in Prescott, Nevada County, Arkansas during \nthe entire week of October 7.  According to the claimant, there were two (the claimant and a helper) \nof them assigned to work in Prescott, Arkansas.  He testified that they were sent there to cut the \nrubber off the rolls and save as much of it as possible.  However, if they could get the rubber back \nin the rack, they would run it through.  Per the claimant, most of the rubber had to be cut down to \nthe metal on the reel and put back on or they would dispose of the rubber.   \n \n \n1\n Per the Respondents’ Post-Trial Brief, the correct spelling for the name of the mill in Prescott, Arkansas \nis Holcim, rather than Holsum.  \n\nBaker – H208823 \n6 \n \n In  October  2022,  the  claimant  was  living  in  Queen  City,  Texas.    He  drove  from  Queen \nCity, Texas to Prescot, Arkansas.  The claimant testified that Rodney told him he had the choice \nto catch a ride from the shop with one of the guys and that would save him on the cost of fuel.  Per \nthe claimant, Rodney further informed him that he was going to be paid for his time, after he signed \nin at the building that he was going to be working at each day.  The claimant confirmed that upon \narrival at the job site in Prescott, he had to sign in on a timesheet.  According to the claimant, he \nwould go to the guard shack, and they had a sign-in-sheet for him.  He would sign in there and get \na badge before entering the mill.  Typically, the claimant signed in around 7:00 a.m. for that week.  \nThe  claimant  testified  that  they  put  in  eight  hours,  and  would  leave  around  4:00  p.m.,  unless \nHolcim wanted them to stay over and finish something. \n He  confirmed  that  he  also  had  the  option  of  going  from  his  home  to  the  job  site,  in  his \npersonal vehicle.  However, that week, the claimant went to the Rigid plant in Atlanta, Texas first.  \nThen, he rode with a coworker from the Rigid plant, in Atlanta, Texas to Prescott, Arkansas.  The \nclaimant’s helper, Wes  George  was  assigned a  company  truck for  the  commute  to  the Prescott \nmill.  Once the claimant arrived at the plant in Atlanta, Texas, everything was loaded on the truck \nand ready for them to take off.   As best the claimant could recall, they would leave the job site \nfrom Atlanta, Texas to go to Prescott, Arkansas around 5:30 a.m.  The claimant testified that they \nwere given travel pay for one hour, even though it was two hours roundtrip.  He confirmed that he \nwas paid $26.00 for each day he traveled to Prescott.  The claimant agreed that they had a company \npolicy wherein they would pay him an hour if he had to travel more than 40 miles from Rigid’s \ncentral office in Atlanta, Texas.  He agreed that the company policy reads that upon commencing \nto drive to the mill in Prescott is when the time would start for the one hour of travel pay.   \n\nBaker – H208823 \n7 \n \n      The claimant agreed that the driver was Wes George.  He admitted that he was not on the \napproved drive list at that time because he had an accident one time prior to that in a company \ntruck.  The claimant denied that upon his arrival at the plant, he had to do anything, other than get \nin the truck and ride with Mr. George to Prescott, Arkansas.  He denied he had any assigned job \ntasks to perform while riding in the truck on the way from Atlanta to Prescott.   Once the claimant \ngot in the truck on the morning of October 7, 2022, to travel from Atlanta to Prescott, he slept.   \n Under further questioning, the claimant explained: \n       Q. What happened as you were sleeping? \n \n  A. We were, I guess ....  As far as the accident is concerned? I’m going to say \n   about the 41 or 42 mile marker, I woke up to spinning and crashing  \n   and rolling, and Mr. George ......  I don’t know.  I’m just assuming but, I  \n   guess, he dozed off and had rear-ended a eighteen wheeler, and we wound  \n   up in a ditch. \n \n  Q. So, we’re here today because you have a legal action for negligence against \n   Rigid that you’re attempting to pursue, is that right?   \n \n  A. Yes, sir. \n \n  Q.  And the insurance carrier for Rigod is objecting to that.  You’re contending \n   that the, what’s called the coming and going law would preclude you from \n   being characterized as an employee even though you were in the company  \n   truck at that time, is that what we’re saying here today? \n \n  A. Yes, sir.   \n \n On cross-examination, the claimant confirmed that the respondents took his deposition in \nJanuary.  He agreed that on the morning of October 7, 2022, he drove from his home in Queen \nCity, Texas to Atlanta,  Texas, where the Rigid shop is found.  He met  Mr. George  at the shop.  \nThere was a piece of equipment that they had to carry in the truck with them to the plant to do the \njob they were doing, which included stripping the mandrels.  The claimant traveled in the company \ntruck with Mr. George that morning with the equipment needed to do the job.  He confirmed that \n\nBaker – H208823 \n8 \n \nin his deposition, he testified that he had his personal tools that he had to take with him to do the \njob because he was sort of the lead person on the job and Mr. George was kind of his helper.  The \nclaimant confirmed that when he arrived at the Prescott facility each day, he signed in, and when \nhe left the mill, he signed out.  He confirmed that he began getting his hourly pay until he signed \nout at the end of the day.        \n The claimant confirmed that during his deposition, he testified that he did not get anything \nfor his travel time, but he subsequently found out when they gave him his pay records, he was    \nmistaken about the travel pay.  He confirmed that he did get some travel pay, but not the hourly \npay that he would get if he were working on the site, but he got some travel pay.  In other words.  \nThe claimant received one hour travel pay as opposed to pay for two hours to travel to the location.  \nHe confirmed that this was the travel policy as he now understands it.  The claimant confirmed \nthat he was just mistaken when he said he did not get any travel pay.   He admitted that the purpose \nof their trip from the Atlanta, Texas to Prescott, Arkansas was to fulfill a contract that Rigid had \nwith the mill at Prescott.  He confirmed that it was necessary for him to travel to the mill at Prescott \nin order for him to do what needed to be done.   \n The following exchange took place: \n  Q. So, your job, although you weren’t compensated fully for it, your job really \n   has two elements to it.  One, you’ve got to get there, travel from either home \n   or from the mill to Prescott and, two, you’ve got to do your job stripping  \n   the mandrels or the rubber using the equipment you brought from the mill, \n   is that right?  \n \n  A. Yes, sir. \n \n The claimant confirmed that after the accident, he initially thought he could go to the mill \nand he would be okay, but when he got there, he realized that he needed to get checked out.  The \nclaimant  confirmed  that  he  went  back  to Texarkana,  Texas and  got  checked  out  at  HealthCare \n\nBaker – H208823 \n9 \n \nExpress.   There,  the  claimant  was  evaluated because  he  was  complaining  of  a  right wrist,  left \nshoulder and a headache.   He was given a follow-up appointment for October 31.  The claimant \nconfirmed that he returned for the follow-up appointment.  He was off work the next day and the \nweekend and returned to work the following Monday.  The claimant confirmed he continued to \nwork at the Prescott mill from that date until the job was done in December of that year (2022).   \n He specifically confirmed that he filed a workers’ compensation claim on December 19, \n2022.  The claimant confirmed that he contacted the Rainwater Law Firm because he just wanted \nhis wrist and neck fixed.  Although in the Form AR-C it is alleged that the claimant was in the \nscope and course of employment and sustained injuries to both shoulders, his neck, right wrist and \nwhole body, the claimant denied his injuries involved the whole body.         \n The claimant returned to work for Rigid in March 2023.  The claimant confirmed that the \nclaim filed by the Rainwater Firm was withdrawn.  He basically testified that he received a letter \nfrom the firm stating that they were withdrawing as counsel, and that claim was no longer being \npursued.  The claimant admitted that he continued to work for Rigid until the job played out on \nMarch 24, 2023.  He confirmed that once the Rainwater Firm withdrew, his current attorney filed \nanother workers’ compensation claim in October of last year in Arkansas.  The claimant agreed \nthat the current claim said he was not in the course and scope of employment, and it was filed for \nthe purpose of establishing that this accident did not happen in a compensable way.  He  agreed \nthat he filed a civil lawsuit in Hempstead County against his employer, and the driver, Mr. George.  \nThe  claimant  agreed  that  he  filed a civil action and the reason that the workers’ compensation \nclaim needs to be established as not being compensable is to allow him to pursue the civil action.   \nHe  agreed  that  if  it is a workers’ compensation matter, the  exclusive  remedy  doctrine  would \n\nBaker – H208823 \n10 \n \nprevent him from filing a claim against his employer, but he would still be entitled to appropriate \nworkers’ compensation benefits.  \n On redirect examination, the claimant confirmed that whether he drove from his home in \nQueen City, Texas or he drove in the company vehicle from the plant in Atlanta, he was not doing \nanything as a passenger in the vehicle to benefit his company until he got to the job site and clocked \nin and started getting paid.  He denied he had any specific instructions or directions to do anything \nwhile riding in the company truck. \n However,  the  claimant  confirmed  on  recross  examination  that  he  had  a  job  to  do  at  the \nPrescott mill, which was a contract between Rigid and the Prescott mill to get a certain job done \nupon his arrival at the mill.  He admitted that he could not have done that job had he not driven \nthere (to Prescott, Arkansas).  The claimant confirmed that doing the job that day involved two \nthings.  First, it involved traveling to the mill and then working at the mill.  He agreed that if he \nfailed to do either one of these two things, then he could not have done his job.  \n He  confirmed  on  further cross-examination,  when  he  was  driving  from  his  home  to  the \nshop in Atlanta, he was not paid anything for that commute.    \nRodney Ammons \n Mr. Ammons was called as a witness to testify on behalf of the claimant.  He testified that \nhe is employed through 3D Industrial Services as a mechanical manager.  His job title on October \n7, 2022, when he was employed with Rigid, and was VP of Operations.  Mr. Ammons worked for \nRigid for seven years.  He confirmed that he was the claimant’s supervisor.  He testified that the \nnature of Rigid’s business was contractor for fabrication and mechanical services.  According to \nMr. Ammons, Rigid typically had in their Atlanta office anywhere from five to 25 employees.  He \n\nBaker – H208823 \n11 \n \nconfirmed that hourly employees had to sign a time sheet.  Mr. Ammons explained that process in \ndetail.  (Tr. at 42-43)  \n He confirmed that it was company policy to pay employees an hour for their travel time \nthat day.  Mr. Ammons confirmed that it was not company policy for them to have to check in at \nthe shop before they went to the job site.  He testified that they were allowed to come to the shop \nif they wanted a ride to the job site in a company vehicle or they could just go to the assigned site \nin their own vehicle and punch in there when they started working.  He confirmed that as far as \ntravel pay, whether a person decided to drive his or her own vehicle or whether the employee rode \nas a passenger, however the employee got to the job site at Prescott, he or she received travel pay \nof one hour, which was at the employee’s hourly rate.       \n He  denied  that  during  the  week  of  October  7,  2022,  the  claimant  was  assigned  any \nresponsibilities  that  he  had  to  perform  other  than  the  job  he  was  assigned  to  work  in  Prescott, \nArkansas.  Mr. Ammons denied that the claimant had any duties or responsibilities as an employee \nof the company while in the vehicle traveling from the head office in Atlanta, Texas to the job site \nin Prescott, Arkansas.   \n On cross-examination, Mr. Ammons confirmed that he would bid contracts and things of \nthat  nature  for  Rigid.    He  confirmed  that  he  negotiated  the  contract  that  the  claimant  and  Mr. \nGeorge were doing at the mill in Prescott.  Mr. Ammons confirmed that he assigned them to do \nthis job.   \n He confirmed that there are two things that had to be done to get the job done.  They had \nto get there by driving from Atlanta, Texas to Prescott, Arkansas; and then they had to do the for \nwork for job at the Prescott mill.    \n \n\nBaker – H208823 \n12 \n \n \nLaurie Walker \n The respondents called Ms. Walker as a witness.  In October of 2022, Ms. Walker was the \nassistant to the controller for Rigid.   She confirmed that she had access to the pay records for all \nof Rigid employees.  Ms. Walker admitted that she brought the pay records of another employee \njust to have examples.  She confirmed that employees who had to travel more than 40 miles from \nthe  shop  in  order  to  do  the  job, are  paid  travel  time.    Ms.  Walker  confirmed  that  it  is  company \npolicy for an employee to be paid travel time in the above instance.  She testified that they are paid \nwhile  traveling from  one  work  site  to  another.    Ms.  Walker  was  shown  the  pay  sheet  for  the \nclaimant for the week of the accident, October 3 through October 9.  She testified that the claimant \nworked 36 ½ hours regular time and had four days of driving/traveling time, for which he would \nhave been paid one hour for each day.  Ms. Walker confirmed that this was the company’s travel \npolicy which was issued on January 9, 2018.  It is Respondents’ Exhibit 4.   She confirmed that \nthe claimant rode in the company truck from the shop in Atlanta, Texas to the work site in Prescott, \nArkansas.  Ms. Walker confirmed that she made out the pay slips and arranged for the pay of the \nhourly employees for this and followed the rules in doing so.   She agreed that the prior testimony \nis correct, that the claimant was paid his full pay when he arrived at the Prescott mill, and he got \nthe lesser rate of pay while he was traveling more than 40 miles from the home office, which is \nconsistent  with  their company  policy.      She admitted that  when  an  employee  is  traveling  to  the \nassigned work site, they are traveling advancing the employer’s interests.      \nJosh Turner \n Mr. Turner testified on behalf of the respondents.  He works for Rigid Industrial Services, \nLLC.  He confirmed that he travels in connection with his work.  Mr. Turner confirms that he does \n\nBaker – H208823 \n13 \n \nsimilar work that the claimant handled for the company.  He confirmed that if the claimant was \nrequired to travel from the facility at Atlanta, Texas to a job that was more than 40 miles away, he \nwas paid for his travel time.  Mr. Turner confirmed that the claimant was paid one hour of travel \npay, at his hourly rate for travel time, which is consistent with the pay policy.  Per Mr. Turner, the \nclaimant received one hour of pay per day for his travel time.  He denied that the claimant was \ncompensated for driving his private vehicle from his home, in Queen City, Texas, to the shop in \nAtlanta, Texas.          \nMike Hanner \n Mr. Hanner was called as a witness on behalf of the respondents.  He is the owner of the \ncompany Rigid Industrial Services LLC.  Mr. Hanner testified that he has both hourly and salaried \nemployees.  According to Mr. Hanner, the claimant was an hourly employee, and Ms. Walker is a \nsalaried employee.  Mr. Hanner confirmed that he was aware of the accident that the claimant was \ninvolved in on October 7, 2022.  He was told about the two workers’ compensation claims being \nfiled, with one of them being withdrawn. \n He  confirmed  that  when  employees commute  from their home, to  or  from  the  shop,  in \nAtlanta,  Texas, they  are  not  paid.    Per  Mr. Hanner,  travel  pay  is  consistent  with the company \npolicy for a commute of more than 40 miles from his shop in Atlanta, Texas.  He confirmed that \nthis would be the case for all hourly workers. \n On cross-examination,  Mr. Hanner agreed that  it is  essential for the  operation  of  his \nbusiness that his employees travel from their home to his business every day and report for work \non time.  He testified that they do not pay employees when they travel from their home to the Rigid \nshop, in Atlanta, Texas. \n   \n\nBaker – H208823 \n14 \n \n                        Adjudication \n Here,  the  facts  are  undisputed.    On  October  7,  2022,  the  claimant  was employed  as a \nmillwright for Rigid  Industrial  Services, LLC.   The  evidence  shows  that  it  is Rigid’s written \ncompany policy that employees are paid travel pay of one hour roundtrip if he or she must travel \nmore than 40 miles from his or her home or Rigid’s head shop, which is located in Atlanta, Texas.  \nAt  the  time  of  his  accident,  the  claimant  was  assigned  to  work  at  the  mill  in  Prescott, Nevada \nCounty, Arkansas, which is more than 40 miles from Atlanta, Cass County, Texas.  The claimant \nlived in  Queen  City, Cass  County, Texas on  October  7, 2022, and  continues  to live there.  \nAccording  to company policy, the claimant had the option of driving from his home to Rigid’s \nhome office in Atlanta, Texas, and riding in the company truck to Prescott, Arkansas.  Employees \nwere given this choice to save on the cost of fuel.  Whether the employee drove his or her own \nvehicle or rode in the company truck to the assigned job location, employees received one hour of \npay for his or her travel time.  In this instance, on the morning of his accidental injury, the claimant \ndrove from his home to Rigid’s shop in Atlanta, Texas and rode as a passenger in the company \ntruck to Prescott, Arkansas.  The claimant was paid for his time traveling of one hour for his drive \nfrom the head office in Atlanta, Texas to the mill in Prescott, Arkansas because he had to travel \nmore than 40 miles from the shop.  He was paid for one hour of travel at his hourly rate of $26.00.    \nOn the morning of the motor vehicle incident, the claimant was riding as a passenger in the \ncompany truck, with his helper, Wes George.  The claimant was asleep in the truck and had no \nassigned  tasks  to  perform  for  Rigid,  except  to  arrive  at  the  mill  in  Prescott.   It  is  unclear  what \ncaused the accident; but the claimant surmised that Mr. George fell asleep and rear-ended an 18-\nwheeler, causing the truck to land in a ditch.  The claimant sought medical attention that day for \nhis injuries. \n\nBaker – H208823 \n15 \n \n    In Hudak-Lee v. Baxter County Reg. Hosp., 2011 Ark. 31, 378 S.W.3d 77, the Arkansas \nSupreme Court stated: \nIn order for an accidental injury to be compensable, it must arise out of and in the \ncourse  of  employment.    Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11-9-102(4)(A)(i)  (Supp.  2009).    A \ncompensable injury does not include an injury that is inflicted upon the employee \nat a time when employment services are not being performed.  Ark. Code Ann. § \n11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2009).  The phrase “in the course of employment” and \nthe term “employment services” are not defined in the Workers' Compensation \nAct.  Texarkana Sch. Dist. v. Conner, 373 Ark. 372, 284 S.W.3d 57 (2008).  Thus, \nit  falls  to  the  court  to  define  these  terms  in  a  manner  that  neither  broadens  nor \nnarrows the scope of the Act.  Id. \nAn  employee  is  performing  employment  services  when  he  or  she  is  doing \nsomething that is generally required by his or her employer.  Id.; Pifer v. Single \nSource  Transp.,  347  Ark.  851,  69  S.W.3d  1  (2002).    We  use  the  same  test  to \ndetermine  whether  an  employee  is  performing  employment  services  as  we  do \nwhen determining whether an employee is acting within the course and scope of \nemployment.  Jivan v. Econ.  Inn & Suites, 370 Ark. 414, 260 S.W.3d 281 (2007).  \nThe test is whether the injury occurred  within the time and space boundaries of \nthe employment, when the employee was carrying out the employer's purpose or \nadvancing the employer's interest, directly or indirectly.  Id.  In Conner, 373 Ark. \n372,  284  S.W.3d  57,  we  stated  that  where  it  was  clear  that  the  injury  occurred \noutside  the  time  and  space  boundaries  of  employment,  the  critical  inquiry  is \nwhether the interests of the employer were being directly or indirectly advanced \nby  the  employee  at  the  time  of  the  injury.    Moreover,  the  issue  of  whether  an \nemployee was performing employment services within the course of employment \ndepends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.  Id. \n I am unable to find that the “going and coming rule” applies to these facts.  The claimant \nwas not commuting between his home and work.  Therefore, I am unable to find that the “going \nand coming rule” has any application to the facts surrounding this claim.  Here, the claimant was \ntraveling from Rigid’s home office in Atlanta, Texas, to  his  assigned  work  site,  in  Prescott, \nArkansas,  when  his accidental  motor  vehicle  injury occurred.   The claimant’s work  with  Rigid \nentailed traveling to an assigned remote location, which was the mill located in Prescott, Arkansas.  \nThe  evidence  shows  that  the  claimant  was  following  the  instructions  he  had  been  given  by  his \nsupervisor, which was to travel to Prescott, Arkansas, and do his assigned duties there at the mill.  \n\nBaker – H208823 \n16 \n \nWhile carrying out these instructions, the claimant was injured in a motor vehicle accident while \nenroute from Rigid’s head office in Atlanta, Texas to his assigned job site, which was located in \nPrescott, Arkansas.     \n At the time of his accident, the claimant was “in the course of his employment” by virtue \nof his traveling from one work site to another.  Here, the claimant was carrying out the express \ndirections  of  his  employer  at  the  time  of the accident, even  though  he  was not engaged  in  the \nactivity for which he was primarily employed to perform at the mill in Prescott, Arkansas.    \n Therefore, I find that the claimant was furthering the interest of his employer by traveling \nfrom Rigid’s home office in Alanta, Texas to his assigned work site in Prescott, Arkansas, despite \nthe fact that he might have been dozing and was not working on any assigned duties while riding \nas a passenger in the company truck.  Hence, the evidence preponderates that claimant was acting \nwithin the course and scope of his employment with Rigid when he suffered injuries in a motor \nvehicle accident on October 7, 2022.   Under these circumstances, I must find that the claimant’s \nproper and exclusive remedy for any of his injuries arising out of October 7, 2022, motor vehicle \naccident falls under the jurisdiction of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act. \n                                                      ORDER \n Based on the foregoing findings of facts, the exclusive remedy for this claim falls under \nthe jurisdiction of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act.  \n      IT IS SO ORDERED. \n \n                                                                            ______________________                       \n                         CHANDRA L. BLACK \n                                Administrative Law Judge \n \n \n\nBaker – H208823 \n17","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION WCC NO.: H208823 JOHN BAKER, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT RIGID INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, LLC, EMPLOYER RESPONDENT SIRIUSPOINT AMERICA INSURANCE/ SIRIUSPOINT AMERICA INSURANCE CO., CARRIER/TPA RESPONDENT OPINION FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2025 Hearing held before Administrative Law Judge Ch...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T22:34:35.454Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H208823-2025-11-18","pdf":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/BAKER_JOHN_H208823_20251118.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}