{"id":"alj-H208633-2023-12-14","awcc_number":"H208633","decision_date":"2023-12-14","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Belinda Prichard","employer_name":"Shearers Foods LLC,","title":"PRICHARD VS. SHEARERS FOODS LLC, AWCC# H208633 DECEMBER 14, 2023","outcome":"denied","outcome_keywords":["modified:1","dismissed:1","denied:2"],"injury_keywords":["shoulder","rotator cuff","back"],"pdf_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/Prichard_Belinda_H208633_20231214.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"Prichard_Belinda_H208633_20231214.pdf","text_length":11840,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \nWCC NO. H208633 \n \nBELINDA PRICHARD, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT \n \nSHEARERS FOODS LLC, \nEMPLOYER RESPONDENT \n \nFARMINGTON CASUALTY CO.,  \nINSURANCE CARRIER                       RESPONDENT \n \n \nOPINION FILED DECEMBER 14, 2023 \n \nHearing  before  Administrative  Law  Judge  Steven  Porch  on  October  27,  2023,  in \nJonesboro, Arkansas. \n \nClaimant  was  represented  by  Mr.  Daniel A.  Webb,  Attorney  at  Law,  Little  Rock, \nArkansas. \n \nRespondents were represented by Ms. Amy C. Markham, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, \nArkansas. \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE \n \n A full  hearing  was  held  on  this  claim  on  October 27,  2023.    Claimant  was \nrepresented   by   Mr.   Daniel   A.   Webb,   Attorney   at   Law,   Little   Rock,   Arkansas; \nRespondents were represented by  Ms. Amy C. Markham, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, \nArkansas. \nSTIPULATIONS \n By  agreement  of  the  parties,  the  stipulations  applicable  to  this  claim are  as \nfollows: \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction \nof the within claim. \n \n2. An   employer/employee/carrier   relationship   existed   among   the \nparties on December 5, 2022, when Claimant alleges she sustained \na compensable injury to her left shoulder. \n \n\nPRICHARD H208633 \n \n2 \n \n3. Respondents have controverted this claim in its entirety. \n \n4. The  parties  will  stipulate  to  Claimants  average  weekly  wage  and \ncompensation rates on or before the hearing date.\n1\n \nISSUES \n The parties have identified the following issues to be adjudicated: \n1.  Whether  Claimant  sustained  a  compensable  injury  to  her  left  shoulder  by \nspecific incident. \n  \n2.  Whether  Claimant  is  entitled  to  any  reasonable  and  necessary  medical \ntreatment, including mileage and out-of-pocket expenses. \n \n3.  Whether   Claimant   is   entitled   to   temporary   total   disability   benefits   from \nDecember 6, 2022, to a date yet to be determined. \n \n4.  Whether Claimant is entitled to a controverted attorney’s fee.  \n \nAll other issues are reserved. \n \nCONTENTIONS \n \nClaimant’s Contentions:  The  Claimant  injured  her  left  shoulder  on  December  5, \n2022,  while  working  for  Respondent/Employer.  The  Claimant  should  receive  benefits \nrelated  to  the  injury  including  medical  expense  payments,  a  period  of  temporary  total \ndisability benefits, and an attorney’s fee. All other issues are reserved.  \nRespondent’s Contentions:  The  Claimant  did  not  receive  an  injury  per  statutory \ndefinition\n2\n. \n \n \n \n1\n The parties did not stipulate to the average weekly wage by the hearing date. As a \nresult, this stipulation was withdrawn. \n2\n During the full hearing, Respondents’ counsel moved to amend their contentions. \nRespondents now concede that Claimant’s left shoulder rotator cuff injury is an objective \nfinding. I have granted Respondents’ motion. Respondents still assert that Claimant’s injury did \nnot occur by a specific incident during the course and scope of employment. \n\nPRICHARD H208633 \n \n3 \n \nFINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \n After  reviewing  the  record  as  a  whole,  including  medical  reports,  non-medical \ndocuments,  and  other  matters  properly  before  the  Commission,   and  having  the \nopportunity  to  hear  the  testimony  of  Claimant  and  observe  her  demeanor,  I  hereby \nmake the following findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Ark. Code \nAnn. § 11-9-704 (Repl. 2012):  The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has \njurisdiction over this claim. \n1.  The stipulations set forth above are reasonable and are hereby accepted.  \n \n2.  The Claimant has not proven by the preponderance of the evidence that  she \nsustained  a  compensable  left  rotator  cuff  injury,  by  specific  incident,  during \nthe course and scope of employment on December 5, 2022. \n  \n3.  Based on my finding that Claimant did not sustain a compensable injury, the \nremaining issues of whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary \nmedical  treatment,  temporary  total  disability  benefits,  and  a  controverted \nattorney’s fee are moot and will not be addressed in this opinion. \n \n \nCASE IN CHIEF \nSummary of Evidence \n The  record  consisted  of Claimant’s Exhibit 1,  Medical  Records,  that  consists  of \n43   pages,   Respondents’   Exhibit   1,   Medical   Records,   that   consist   of   16   pages, \nRespondents’ Exhibit 2, Non-Medical Documents, consisting of 255 pages, Commission \nExhibit   1,   Pre-Hearing   Order, that   consists   of   5   pages, and Claimant’s  and \nRespondents’ blue-backed post-hearing briefs. The Claimant, Brenda Prichard, was the \nsole witness in the full hearing.  \nClaimant  was  a  processor  of  chips  for  the  Respondent/Employer.  She  went  to \nwork assigned to line six but was told to move to line two. The sheeter pans on line two \n\nPRICHARD H208633 \n \n4 \n \nwere  not  clean  and  were  full  of  masa.  Claimant  carried  the  pans  of  masa, weighing \napproximately  fifteen  pounds,  to  the  trash.  She  testified  that  she  almost dropped  the \npans  and  had  to  readjust  her  hands,  to  get  a  better  grip  on  the  pans.  Claimant  had \ntaken  about  15  minutes  to  clean  the  masa  pans.  Her  testimony  was  that  she  felt fine \nafter cleaning the masa pans. She added that she felt no strains or pains after cleaning \nthe pans.  \nPhilip  Weiss,  who  oversaw  line  one, asked Claimant to  watch  over  his  line  until \nhe came back from the restroom. The Claimant went to line one, grabbed the radio, and \nclimbed three or four steps that allowed her to watch over the line. After a few minutes, \nshe  walked  down  the  steps,  holding  the  handrail,  when  she  heard  a  pop  in  her  left \nshoulder.  She  had  walked  down  the  stairs  for  the  purpose  of  waiting  on  her  fellow \nemployee, Mr.  Weiss,  who  remained  gone  for  10  to  15  minutes.  The  Claimant  also \nstated  she  had  to  make  sure  line  one  had  corn  while  she  waited  on  her  co-worker. \nWhen her co-worker returned, Claimant then reported her injury to management.  \nAdjudication \nA. Whether Claimant sustained a compensable left shoulder injury. \n \nArkansas  Code  Annotated  §  11-9-102(4)(A)(i)  (Repl.  2012),  which  I  find  applies \nto the analysis of Claimant’s alleged injury, defines “compensable injury”: \n(i)  An  accidental  injury  causing  internal  or  external  physical  harm  to  the \nbody  .  .  .  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  employment  and  which \nrequires  medical  services  or  results  in  disability  or  death.    An  injury  is \n“accidental” only if it is caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by \ntime and place of occurrence[.] \n \nA compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective \nfindings.  Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Repl. 2012).  “Objective findings” are those \n\nPRICHARD H208633 \n \n5 \n \nfindings that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient.  Id. § 11-9-102(16).  \nThe element “arising out of . . . [the] employment” relates to the causal connection \nbetween the claimant’s injury and his or her employment.  City  of El  Dorado  v.  Sartor, \n21  Ark.  App.  143,  729  S.W.2d  430  (1987).    An  injury  arises  out  of  a  claimant’s \nemployment  “when  a  causal  connection  between  work  conditions  and  the injury  is \napparent to the rational mind.”  Id. \n If  the  claimant  fails  to  establish  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  any  of  the \nrequirements  for  establishing  compensability,  compensation  must  be  denied.  Mikel  v. \nEngineered Specialty Plastics, 56 Ark. App. 126, 938 S.W.2d 876 (1997).  This standard \nmeans the evidence having greater weight or convincing force.  Barre v. Hoffman, 2009 \nArk.  373,  326  S.W.3d  415;  Smith  v.  Magnet  Cove  Barium  Corp.,  212  Ark.  491,  206 \nS.W.2d 442 (1947). \n A claimant’s testimony is never considered uncontroverted.  Nix v. Wilson World \nHotel,  46  Ark.  App.  303,  879 S.W.2d  457 (1994).    The determination  of a witness’ \ncredibility and how much weight to accord to that person’s testimony are solely up to the \nCommission.  White v. Gregg Agricultural Ent., 72 Ark. App. 309, 37 S.W.3d 649 (2001).  \nThe  Commission  must  sort  through  conflicting  evidence  and  determine  the  true  facts.  \nId.  In so doing, the Commission is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant \nor  any  other  witness  but  may  accept  and  translate  into  findings  of  fact  only  those \nportions of the testimony that it deems worthy of belief.  Id. \nI  do  find,  as  Respondents  conceded  at  the  hearing,  that  the  Claimant  has \nobjective  findings  of  a  left  shoulder  rotator  cuff  injury.  I  further  find  that  this  shoulder \ninjury  manifested  itself  while  Claimant  was  at  her  place  of  employment  during  working \n\nPRICHARD H208633 \n \n6 \n \nhours.  However,  the  key  inquiry  here  is  whether  this  injury  occurred  by  a  specific \nincident during the course and scope of her employment. This is the Claimant’s burden. \nThe  Claimant  has  not  pointed  to  a  specific  work-related  incident  as  the reason  for her \nleft shoulder injury. Rather, her testimony has been inconsistent as to the cause of her \ninjury.  \nFor example, Claimant initially signed a team member statement on December 5, \n2022,  the date  of  her  injury,  stating that no work-related  condition  caused  the  injury  to \nher  left  shoulder,  nor  could  she  explain  it. See  Respondents’  Exhibit  2,  page  103.  I \ncredit this statement. She maintained that point of view until she was made aware that \nher claim was denied since her injury was not connected to her work. The Claimant later \nmodified her answer and now believes it was the weight of the masa pans from line two \nthat caused her injury.  When further pressed at the hearing about the masa  pans, she \ntestified that she felt fine after dumping the masa in the trash. She later admitted in her \ntestimony  that  she  was  using  deductive  reasoning  as  her  bases  for  believing the  near \ndrop of  the  masa  pans,  due  to  their  weight,  had  caused  her  injury.  The  Claimant  also \ntestified  that  she doesn’t believe walking down the stairs had anything to do with her \ninjury when she heard the pop.  \nIt is the Claimant’s burden to prove she was injured by a specific incident,  and \nshe has not satisfied that burden. I’m left with speculation and conjecture as to whether \nthe  dumping  of  the  masa  pans  was  the  specific  incident  that  caused  her  injury.  But \nspeculation  and  conjecture  cannot  serve  as  a  substitute  for  proof. Dena  Construction \nCo.  v.  Herdon,  264  Ark.  791,  796,  575  S.W.2d  155  (1979).  Thus,  I  find  that  Claimant \nhas  not  proven  by  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  she  has  sustained  a \n\nPRICHARD H208633 \n \n7 \n \ncompensable  left  shoulder  injury,  by  specific  incident,  during  the  course  and  scope  of \nher employment on December 5, 2022. \nB. Remaining Issues  \nDue  to  not  finding  the  left  shoulder  injury  compensable,  I  further  find  the \nremaining  issues  of  whether  Claimant  is  entitled  to  any  reasonable  and  necessary \nmedical treatment, temporary total disability benefits, and a controverted attorney’s fee \nare moot and will not be addressed in this opinion.  \nCONCLUSION \n In accordance with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth above, \nthis claim for initial benefits is hereby denied and dismissed.  \n IT IS SO ORDERED. \n \n       ________________________________ \n       Hon. Steven Porch \n                                                                           Administrative Law Judge","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION WCC NO. H208633 BELINDA PRICHARD, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT SHEARERS FOODS LLC, EMPLOYER RESPONDENT FARMINGTON CASUALTY CO., INSURANCE CARRIER RESPONDENT OPINION FILED DECEMBER 14, 2023 Hearing before Administrative Law Judge Steven Porch on October 27, 2023, in Jonesboro, A...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T22:59:32.448Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H208633-2023-12-14","pdf":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/Prichard_Belinda_H208633_20231214.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}