{"id":"alj-H208573-2026-01-05","awcc_number":"H208573","decision_date":"2026-01-05","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Donna Jackson","employer_name":"Stagehands LLC","title":"JACKSON VS. STAGEHANDS LLC AWCC# H208573 January 05, 2026","outcome":"dismissed","outcome_keywords":["dismissed:1","denied:1"],"injury_keywords":["shoulder","neck","back"],"pdf_url":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/Jackson_Donna_H208573_20260105.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"Jackson_Donna_H208573_20260105.pdf","text_length":26119,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \nAWCC NO. H208573 \n \n \nDONNA MARIE JACKSON, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT \n \nSTAGEHANDS LLC, \n EMPLOYER RESPONDENT \n \nOHIO SECURITY INS. CO., \n CARRIER RESPONDENT \n \n \nOPINION FILED JANUARY 5, 2026 \n \nHearing before Chief Administrative Law Judge O. Milton Fine II on October 9, 2025, in \nLittle Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas. \n \nClaimant pro se. \n \nRespondents  represented  by  Mr. Jason  M.  Ryburn,  Attorney  at  Law,  Little Rock, \nArkansas. \n \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE \n On October  9,  2025,  the  above-captioned  claim  was  heard  in Little  Rock, \nArkansas.    A  prehearing  conference  took  place  on August  4,  2025.   The Prehearing \nOrder entered that same day pursuant to the conference was admitted without objection \nas  Commission  Exhibit  1.    At  the  hearing,  the  parties  confirmed  that  the  stipulations, \nissues, and respective contentions, as amended, were properly set forth in the order. \nStipulations \n The parties discussed the stipulations set forth in Commission Exhibit 1.  With a \nfifth reached at the hearing, they are the following, which I accept: \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction over \nthis claim. \n\nJACKSON – H208573 \n2 \n \n2. The  employee/employer/carrier  relationship  existed  on  November  25, \n2022, when Claimant sustained a compensable injury to her left shoulder. \n3. Respondents accepted the above injury as compensable and paid medical \nand temporary total disability benefits pursuant thereto. \n4. Claimant’s  average  weekly  wage entitles  her  to compensation  rates of \n$429.00/$322.00. \n5. Respondents ceased paying Claimant temporary total disability benefits in \nOctober 2024. \nIssues \n At  the  hearing,  the parties  discussed the  issues  set forth  in  Commission  Exhibit \n1.  After the amendment of Issue No. 1, the following were litigated: \n1. Whether  Claimant’s  claim  for  an  alleged  neck  injury  is  barred  by  the \nstatute of limitations. \n2. Whether Claimant sustained compensable injuries to her neck and upper \nback by specific incident. \n3. Whether   Claimant   is   entitled   to   reasonable   and   necessary   medical \ntreatment of her alleged compensable neck and upper back injuries. \n4. Whether Claimant sustained a compensable mental injury. \n5. Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary treatment of her \nalleged compensable mental injury. \n6. Whether   Claimant   is   entitled   to   additional   temporary   total   disability \nbenefits. \n All other issues have been reserved. \n\nJACKSON – H208573 \n3 \n \nContentions \n The  respective  contentions  of  the  parties,  following  amendment  at  the  hearing, \nare as follows: \n Claimant: \n1. Claimant    contends   that   on    November    25,   2022,    she    sustained \ncompensable injuries to her neck, back, and left shoulder when she was \nstruck by a falling pipe. \n2. Claimant  further  contends  that  she  suffered a  compensable mental  injury \nin  the  form  of  post-traumatic  stress  disorder  as  a  result  of  the  above \nincident. \n3. Finally, Claimant contends that she is not only entitled to reasonable and \nnecessary treatment of her alleged compensable injuries, but to additional \ntemporary total disability benefits as well. \nRespondents: \n1. All appropriate benefits have been paid. \n2. Claimant did not sustain a compensable neck, back, or mental injury. \n3. The applicable  statute  of  limitations  bars  the claim for  an  alleged  neck \ninjury. \nFINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \n After reviewing the record as a whole, including medical reports, documents, and \nother  matters  properly  before  the  Commission,  and  having  had  an  opportunity  to  hear \nthe  testimony  of Claimant and  to  observe her demeanor,  I  hereby  make  the  following \n\nJACKSON – H208573 \n4 \n \nfindings  of  fact  and  conclusions  of  law  in  accordance  with  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11-9-704 \n(Repl. 2012): \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction over \nthis claim. \n2. The stipulations set forth above are reasonable and are hereby accepted. \n3. Claimant  has  not  proven  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  her \nclaim   for   an   alleged   neck   injury   was   timely   filed.  Instead,   the \npreponderance of the evidence establishes that this portion of Claimant’s \nclaim is time-barred under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702(a)(1) (Repl. 2012). \n4. Claimant  has  not  proven  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that she \nsustained a compensable injury to her upper back by specific incident. \n5. Because  of  Findings/Conclusions Nos.  3 and  4, supra, Claimant  has  not \nproven  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  she  is  entitled  to \nreasonable and necessary medical treatment of her alleged compensable \nneck and upper back injuries. \n6. Claimant  has  not  proven  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  she \nsustained a compensable mental injury under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-113 \n(Repl. 2012). \n7. Because of Finding/Conclusion No. 6, supra, Claimant has not proven by \na  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  she  is  entitled  to reasonable  and \nnecessary treatment of her alleged compensable mental injury. \n6. Claimant  has not proven  by a  preponderance  of  the evidence  that  she  is \nentitled to additional temporary total disability benefits for any period. \n\nJACKSON – H208573 \n5 \n \nCASE IN CHIEF \n Summary of Evidence \n Claimant was the sole witness. \n In  addition  to  the Prehearing Order  discussed  above,  the  exhibits  admitted  into \nevidence  in  this  case were Claimant’s Exhibit 1, a compilation of her medical  records, \nconsisting  of one abstract/index  page  and 11  numbered pages  thereafter; Claimant’s \nExhibit  2,  another  compilation  of  her  medical  records,  consisting  of  one  page  of \nnarrative and nine numbered pages thereafter; Claimant’s Exhibit 3, another compilation \nof her medical records, consisting of one abstract/index page and 13 numbered pages \nthereafter; Claimant’s Exhibit 4, another compilation of her medical records, consisting \nof one abstract/index page and seven numbered pages thereafter; Claimant’s Exhibit 5, \nanother  compilation  of  her  medical  records,  consisting  of  one  page  of  narrative  and \nthree  numbered  pages  thereafter; Respondents’  Exhibit  1,  another  compilation  of \nClaimant’s  medical  records,  consisting  of  one  index  page  and 12 numbered  pages \nthereafter; and Respondents’ Exhibit 2, non-medical records, consisting of four pages. \nADJUDICATION \nA. Statute of Limitations \n Introduction.  As the parties have stipulated, Claimant sustained a compensable \ninjury to her left shoulder on November 25, 2022.  Her testimony was that on that day, \nfrom  a  great  height,  a  co-worker  dropped  a  metal  object\n1\n that  struck  her.    In  this \nproceeding, she has alleged that as a result of that same accident, her neck was injured \n \n1\nThe object was repeatedly termed a “pipe” in her medical records that are in \nevidence  and  in  Claimant’s  testimony.    However,  near  the  end  of  her  testimony, \nClaimant stated that the object was not hollow.  Moreover, she estimated its dimensions \n\nJACKSON – H208573 \n6 \n \nas well.  At the outset, Respondents have raised the affirmative defense that the statute \nof limitations bars this claim insofar as it relates to the alleged neck injury. \n Standards.  Respondents have controverted this claim to the extent that it is one \nfor  benefits  in  connection  with  an  alleged  neck  injury.   See  supra.   Arkansas  Code \nAnnotated  §  11-9-702(a)(1)  (Repl.  2012)  sets  out  the  applicable  statute  of  limitations \nconcerning a claim for initial benefits: \nA claim for compensation for disability on account of an injury, other than \nan occupational disease and occupational infection, shall be barred unless \nfiled with the Workers’ Compensation Commission within two (2) years \nfrom  the  date  of  the  compensable  injury.    If  during  the  two-year  period \nfollowing  the  filing  of  the  claim  the  claimant  receives  no  weekly  benefit \ncompensation  and  receives  no  medical  treatment  resulting  from  the \nalleged  injury,  the  claim  shall  be  barred  thereafter.    For  purposes  of  this \nsection, the date of the compensable injury shall be defined as the date an \ninjury is caused by an accident as set forth in § 11-9-102(4). \n \nThe burden rests on Claimant to prove that her claim was timely filed.  Stewart v. Ark. \nGlass  Container,  2010  Ark.  198,  366  S.W.3d  358; Kent  v.  Single  Source  Transp.,  103 \nArk. App. 151, 287 S.W.3d 619 (2008).  Under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-705(a)(3) (Repl. \n2012), she   must   do   so   by   a   preponderance   of   the   evidence.    The   standard \n“preponderance  of  the  evidence”  means  the  evidence  having  greater  weight  or \nconvincing force.  Barre v. Hoffman, 2009 Ark. 373, 326 S.W.3d 415; Smith v. Magnet \nCove Barium Corp., 212 Ark. 491, 206 S.W.2d 442 (1947). \n A claimant’s testimony is never considered uncontroverted.  Nix v. Wilson World \nHotel, 46 Ark. App. 303, 879 S.W.2d 457 (1994).  The determination of a witness’s \ncredibility and how much weight to accord to that person’s testimony are solely up to the \nCommission.  White v. Gregg Agricultural Ent., 72 Ark. App. 309, 37 S.W.3d 649 (2001).  \n \nto be 2 to 2.5 inches in diameter and 2 to 2.5 feet long. \n\nJACKSON – H208573 \n7 \n \nThe  Commission  must  sort  through  conflicting  evidence  and  determine  the  true  facts.  \nId.  In so doing, the Commission is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant \nor  any  other  witness,  but  may  accept  and  translate  into  findings  of  fact  only  those \nportions of the testimony that it deems worthy of belief.  Id. \n Discussion.  None of the three Forms AR-C that were filed in this matter—which \nare contained on Respondents’ Exhibit 2 and bear filing dates of December 21, 2022, \nJuly 10, 2023, and September 22, 2025—makes any mention of a neck injury.  Because \nof this, their filing does not toll the running of the aforementioned statute of limitations.  \nSee Wynne v. Liberty Trailer, 2022 Ark. 65, 641 S.W.3d 621.  The following exchange \ntook place during Claimant’s cross-examination: \nQ. Speaking  of  Form  Cs,  none  of  the  Form  Cs  in  the  record  list  your \nneck, correct? \n \nA. I  guess  not.    I  though  the  neck  was  already  in  from  the  very \nbeginning, but apparently y’all say—I  mean,  I  have  some  medical \nrecord—I’m not sure if I gave him enough—that when Dr. Casey is \nlooking at the neck, too, but I’m not sure what she sent off to them.  \nNow I thought the neck was in play. \n \nThe  evidence  shows  that  the  first  time  that  Claimant  brought  to  the  attention  of  the \nCommission  that  she  was  claiming  an  alleged  neck  injury  as  a  result  of  the  stipulated \nNovember  25,  2022,  work-related  incident  was  during  the  August  4,  2025,  prehearing \ntelephone   conference.      Pursuant   to   that   conference,   as   referenced   above,   the \ncompensability  of  her  alleged  neck  injury  was  made  an  issue.   Assuming  only  for  the \nsake of argument that the August 4, 2025, Prehearing Order constitutes a “claim” for \npurposes of determining when the running of statute of limitations began to be tolled—\nsee Bryant  Sch.  Dist. v.  Aylor,  2011  Ark.  App. 173, 381  S.W.3d  895  (prehearing  order \nconstituted  a  claim  for  additional  benefits); Cook  v.  Southwestern  Bell  Telephone \n\nJACKSON – H208573 \n8 \n \nCompany,  21  Ark.  App.  29,  727  S.W.2d  862  (1987)—this  came  more  than  two  years \nafter the incident at issue.  Claimant has thus failed to prove by a preponderance of the \nevidence  that  her  claim  for  an  alleged  neck  injury  was  timely  filed.    Instead,  the \nevidence  preponderates  that  this  portion  of  her  claim  is  time-barred  under §  11-9-\n702(a)(1). \nB. Compensability \n Introduction.    Claimant  has also alleged  that  as  a  result  of the stipulated  work-\nrelated specific incident on November 25, 2022 , she also sustained   a   compensable \ninjury to her upper back.  Respondents deny that this alleged injury is compensable. \n Standards.   Arkansas Code  Annotated  § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i)  (Repl.  2012),  which  I \nfind applies here, defines “compensable injury”: \n(i)  An  accidental  injury  causing  internal  or  external  physical  harm  to  the \nbody  .  .  .  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  employment  and  which \nrequires  medical  services  or  results  in  disability  or  death.    An  injury  is \n“accidental” only if it is caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by \ntime and place of occurrence[.] \n \nA compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective \nfindings.  Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Repl. 2012).  “Objective findings” are those \nfindings that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient.  Id. § 11-9-102(16).  \nThe  element “arising  out  of  .  .  .  [the]  employment” relates  to  the  causal  connection \nbetween the claimant’s injury and his or her employment.  City  of El  Dorado  v.  Sartor, \n21 Ark. App. 143, 729 S.W.2d 430 (1987). \n If  the  claimant  fails  to  establish  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  any  of  the \nrequirements  for  establishing  compensability,  compensation  must  be  denied.   Mikel  v. \nEngineered Specialty Plastics, 56 Ark. App. 126, 938 S.W.2d 876 (1997).  This standard \n\nJACKSON – H208573 \n9 \n \nmeans the evidence having greater weight or convincing force.  Barre v. Hoffman, 2009 \nArk.  373,  326  S.W.3d  415; Smith  v.  Magnet  Cove  Barium  Corp.,  212  Ark.  491,  206 \nS.W.2d 442 (1947). \n Discussion.   I  have  closely  reviewed  Claimant’s  medical  records  that  are  in \nevidence.  They are devoid of objective findings of a back injury.  For that reason, she \ncannot  prove  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  she  sustained  a  compensable \nupper back injury.  This portion of her claim must fail at the outset. \nC. Medical Treatment \n Introduction.    Claimant  has  alleged  that  she  is  entitled  to  reasonable  and \nnecessary medical treatment of her alleged neck and back injuries. \n Standards.    Arkansas  Code  Annotated  Section  11-9-508(a)  (Repl.  2012)  states \nthat an employer shall provide for an injured employee such medical treatment as may \nbe necessary in connection with the injury received by the employee.  Wal-Mart Stores, \nInc. v. Brown, 82 Ark. App. 600, 120 S.W.3d 153 (2003).  But employers are liable only \nfor  such  treatment  and  services  as  are  deemed  necessary  for  the  treatment  of  the \nclaimant’s injuries.  DeBoard v. Colson Co., 20 Ark. App. 166, 725 S.W.2d 857 (1987).  \nThe claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that medical treatment is \nreasonable  and  necessary  for  the  treatment  of  a  compensable  injury.   Brown, supra; \nGeo  Specialty  Chem.  v.  Clingan,  69  Ark.  App.  369,  13  S.W.3d  218  (2000).    What \nconstitutes  reasonable  and  necessary  medical  treatment  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the \nCommission.  White Consolidated Indus. v. Galloway, 74 Ark. App. 13, 45 S.W.3d 396 \n(2001); Wackenhut Corp. v. Jones, 73 Ark. App. 158, 40 S.W.3d 333 (2001). \n\nJACKSON – H208573 \n10 \n \n As  the  Arkansas  Court  of  Appeals  has  held,  a  claimant  may  be  entitled  to \nadditional treatment even after the healing period has ended, if said treatment is geared \ntoward management of  the  injury.  See Patchell  v.  Wal-Mart  Stores,  Inc., 86  Ark.  App. \n230,  184  S.W.3d  31  (2004); Artex  Hydrophonics,  Inc.  v.  Pippin,  8  Ark.  App.  200,  649 \nS.W.2d 845 (1983).  Such services can include those for the purpose of diagnosing the \nnature and extent of the compensable injury; reducing or alleviating symptoms resulting \nfrom  the  compensable  injury;  maintaining  the  level  of  healing  achieved;  or  preventing \nfurther  deterioration  of  the  damage  produced  by  the  compensable  injury.   Jordan  v. \nTyson Foods, Inc., 51 Ark. App. 100, 911 S.W.2d 593 (1995); Artex, supra. \n Discussion.  As shown above, Claimant’s claim for an alleged neck injury is time-\nbarred,  while  her  alleged upper back  injury  has  not  been  established.    Therefore,  she \nhas not proven by a preponderance of the evidence her entitlement to reasonable and \nnecessary treatment of these alleged injuries. \nD. Mental Injury \n Introduction.  Claimant has also asserted that the stipulated work-related incident \nof  November  25,  2022,  caused  her  to  suffer  a  mental  injury as  well.    Respondents \ndispute this. \n Standards.  Arkansas Code Annotated § 11-9-113(a) (Repl. 2012) provides: \n(a)(1)  A  mental  injury  or  illness  is  not  a  compensable  injury  unless  it  is \ncaused  by  physical  injury  to  the  employee’s  body,  and  shall  not  be \nconsidered  an  injury  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  employment  or \ncompensable   unless  it   is   demonstrated   by   a  preponderance  of   the \nevidence;  provided,  however,  that  this  physical  injury  limitation  shall  not \napply to any victim of a crime of violence. \n \n(2)  No  mental  injury  or  illness  under  this  section  shall  be  compensable \nunless  it  is  also  diagnosed  by  a  licensed  psychiatrist  or  psychologist  and \nunless the diagnostic of the condition meets the criteria established in the \n\nJACKSON – H208573 \n11 \n \nmost  current  issue  of  the  Diagnostic  and  Statistical  Manual  of  Mental \nDisorders [“DSM”]. \n \n Discussion.   The  version  of  the  DSM  that  was  in  effect  at  the  time  of  the \nNovember  25,  2022,  incident  was  the DSM-5-TR (5\nth\n ed. Text  Revision), which  was \nreleased by the American Psychiatric Association in March 2022. \n In considering whether Claimant was a “victim of a crime of violence,” and thus is \nrelieved from the requirement that she show that her alleged mental injury was caused \nby her physical injury, I note that she testified that a co-worker, whom she identified as \nRustin Braxton or Rustin Baxter (she was unsure of his last name), threatened her prior \nto  the  incident  at  issue.    Her  testimony  was  that  while  they  were  working  on  the \nAnastasia  concert  at  Reynolds  Hall  at  the  University  of  Central  Arkansas,  he  told  her \nthat he was going to drop a pipe on her; supposedly, he warned her to “[w]ear a hard \nhat.”  But  she  admitted  that  she  never  reported  to  law  enforcement  either  the  alleged \nthreat  at  Reynolds  Hall  or  the  alleged  battery\n2\n at  Robinson  Center  on November  25, \n2022,  where  she  suffered  a  stipulated  compensable  left  shoulder  injury  after  being \nstruck  by  a  falling  object.  After  considering  her  bare,  unsupported  testimony  on  this \nmatter,  and  having  had  a  chance  to  assess  her  credibility,  I  find  that  I  am  unable  to \ncredit  her  account.    Therefore,  in  order  to  prove  that  she  sustained  a  compensable \nmental  injury,  Claimant must establish,  inter  alia,  that  such  was  caused  by  her \ncompensable physical injury—namely, the one that the parties agree that she suffered \nto her left shoulder. \n At  the  hearing,  Claimant  testified  that  she  included  some,  but  not  all,  of  her \nmental health treatment records in her exhibit.  When she was seen at the University of \n\nJACKSON – H208573 \n12 \n \nArkansas  for  Medical Sciences (“UAMS”) on  January  17, 2023, a  report  was prepared \nthat reads in pertinent part: \nShe continues  to  suffer  with  ongoing  anger  and  anxiety  with  ongoing \nauditory hallucinations.  She states feeling “bad about the children” who \nare being targeted by sexual predators and upset that men are not being \nheld  accountable  for  their  behavior  .  .  .  Patient  with  known  history  of \nBipolar Disorder. \n \nAs a result of this visit to UAMS, Claimant was diagnosed as having a “Mood disorder” \nand was given an “Ambulatory Referral to Psychiatry/Mental Health.”  The  referral  in \nquestion  was  to  RPI  Behavioral  Health.    Nothing  in  the  above  report  points  to  her \nstipulated  compensable  left  shoulder  injury  as  being  the  cause  of  any  mental  health \nissue,  whether  it be her  bipolar disorder—which,  as  she acknowledged  at the  hearing, \nthis record shows was pre-existing—or the “mood disorder.” \n Included in  the  documentary  evidence are  letters  dated  August  26,  2024,  and \nOctober 3, 2024, from Kelsey McClellan, M.D., who identifies herself as board-certified \nas a general psychiatrist and as a child and adolescent psychiatrist.  Both letters reads \nin pertinent part: \nDonna  is  currently  a  patient  at  RPI,  and  I  am  the  treating  psychiatrist.    Donna \nwas  first  seen  in  our  clinic  on  04.30.2024  by  therapist  Melissa  Ingram,  and  last \nseen in my clinic on 08.26.2024 by myself, Dr. Kelsey McClellan.  They carry the \nfollowing diagnoses: \n \nDiagnoses: \n(309.81 / F43.10) Posttraumatic stress disorder \n(300.00 / F41.9) Unspecified anxiety disorder \n(780.59 / G47.8) Other specified sleep-wake disorder \n \n But, assuming only for the sake of argument that Claimant’s records support the \nPTSD  diagnosis  that  she  has  been  given, the evidence does  not  establish that it  was \n \n \n2\nSee Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-13-201 et seq. (Repl. 2013). \n\nJACKSON – H208573 \n13 \n \ncaused  by  her  stipulated  compensable  left  shoulder  injury.   This  is  shown  by  the \nfollowing citation under the “Review of Systems” segment of Claimant’s RPI treatment \nrecords: \nTrauma:    Reports  physical,  emotional,  and  sexual  abuse  as  a  child; \nreports  co-workers  purposefully  dropped  a  pipe  on  her  at  work  after  she \nturned  them  in  for  suspected child  pornography;  reports  that  ex-husband \nvideo-taped her without her knowledge. \n \nTwo  of  these matters  are  clearly  unrelated to  the  claim  at bar.   For  that  reason  alone, \nonly  through  speculation  and  conjecture  could  I  causally  relate  her  PTSD  diagnosis  to \nher being struck by the metal object at work on November 25, 2022.  But this I am not \npermitted  to  do.   See  Dena  Construction  Co.  v.  Herndon,  264  Ark.  791,  796,  575 \nS.W.2d  155  (1979).   In  sum, Claimant  has  not  proven  by  a  preponderance  of  the \nevidence that she sustained a compensable mental injury. \nE. Mental Health Treatment \n Claimant has asserted that she is entitled to reasonable and necessary treatment \nof  her  alleged  PTSD.    But  because  she  has  not  established  that  she  suffered  a \ncompensable mental injury, she cannot show entitlement to this treatment, \nF. Temporary Total Disability \n Introduction.    Claimant  has  also  contended  that  she  is  entitled  to  additional \ntemporary total disability benefits.  Respondents deny that this is the case. \n Standards.  The compensable injury to Claimant’s left  shoulder is  unscheduled.  \nSee Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-521 (Repl. 2012).  An employee who suffers a compensable \nunscheduled  injury  is  entitled  to  temporary  total  disability  compensation  for  that  period \nwithin  the  healing  period  in  which  she  has  suffered  a  total  incapacity  to  earn  wages.  \nArk.  State  Hwy.  &  Transp.  Dept.  v.  Breshears,  272  Ark.  244,  613  S.W.2d  392  (1981).  \n\nJACKSON – H208573 \n14 \n \nThe  healing  period  ends  when  the  underlying  condition  causing  the  disability  has \nbecome  stable  and  nothing  further  in  the  way  of  treatment  will  improve  that  condition.  \nMad Butcher, Inc. v. Parker, 4 Ark. App. 124, 628 S.W.2d 582 (1982).  Also, a claimant \nmust demonstrate that the disability lasted more than seven days.  Id. § 11-9-501(a)(1). \n Discussion.  As the parties have stipulated, Claimant related in her testimony that \nas  a  result  of  her shoulder injury,  she  was  paid  temporary  total  disability  benefits  for \nnearly  two  years—until  October  2024.   She  is  seeking  additional  benefits  of  this  type \nfrom the date they were ended until she went to work for her father in January 2025—a \nperiod of approximately three months.  Even though she testified that her left shoulder \nwas continuing to bother her during this period, preventing her from going back to work \nalong  the  lines  that  she  performed  for  Respondent  Stagehands  LLC, this  changed  in \nJanuary when her father offered her work that she could do from a computer. \n The   above   notwithstanding,  the   evidence   before  me   shows   that   Claimant \nunderwent  a  functional  capacity  evaluation on  September  13,  2024, that  reflected  that \nshe  gave  an  unreliable  effort.    For  that  reason,  Dr.  Barry  Baskin wrote  on  September \n19, 2024: \nShe   is   released   from  my   f/u   [follow-up]   care.     She  has   (0%)   PPI \n[permanent   partial   impairment].      She   is   at   MMI   [maximum   medical \nimprovement] 9/19/24[.] \n \nThe Commission is authorized to accept or reject a medical opinion and is authorized to \ndetermine its medical soundness and probative value.  Poulan Weed Eater v. Marshall, \n79  Ark.  App.  129,  84  S.W.3d  878  (2002); Green  Bay  Packing  v.  Bartlett,  67  Ark.  App. \n332,  999  S.W.2d  692  (1999).    I  credit  the  opinion  of  Dr.  Baskin  regarding  this  matter, \nand find that the preponderance of the evidence establishes that Claimant reached the \n\nJACKSON – H208573 \n15 \n \nend of her healing period on September 19, 2024.  Since that was, per Stipulation No. \n5, prior to the cessation of her temporary total disability benefits, she has not proven her \nentitlement to additional such benefits for any period of time. \nCONCLUSION \n In accordance with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth above, \nthis claim is hereby denied and dismissed. \n IT IS SO ORDERED. \n       ________________________________ \n       Hon. O. Milton Fine II \n       Chief Administrative Law Judge","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION AWCC NO. H208573 DONNA MARIE JACKSON, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT STAGEHANDS LLC, EMPLOYER RESPONDENT OHIO SECURITY INS. CO., CARRIER RESPONDENT OPINION FILED JANUARY 5, 2026 Hearing before Chief Administrative Law Judge O. Milton Fine II on October 9, 2025, in Little Rock, Pu...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T22:32:25.977Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H208573-2026-01-05","pdf":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/Jackson_Donna_H208573_20260105.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}