{"id":"alj-H207642-2023-11-08","awcc_number":"H207642","decision_date":"2023-11-08","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Quinton Thomas","employer_name":"Hino Motors Mfg USA Inc","title":"THOMAS VS. HINO MOTORS MFG USA INC. AWCC# H207642 NOVEMBER 8, 2023","outcome":"granted","outcome_keywords":["granted:3"],"injury_keywords":["back","hip"],"pdf_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/Thomas_Quinton_H207642_20231108.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"Thomas_Quinton_H207642_20231108.pdf","text_length":20638,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \nWCC NO. H207642 \n \nQUINTON D. THOMAS, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT \n \nHINO MOTORS MFG USA INC., \nEMPLOYER RESPONDENT \n \nFIRST LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP.,  \nINSURANCE CARRIER                       RESPONDENT \n \n \nOPINION FILED NOVEMBER 8, 2023 \n \nHearing before Administrative Law Judge Steven Porch on October 6, 2023, in Marion, \nArkansas. \n \nClaimant was represented by Mr. Tanner Thomas, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas. \n \nRespondents  were  represented  by  Mr.  Michael  Ryburn,  Attorney  at  Law,  Little  Rock, \nArkansas. \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE \n \n A full  hearing  was  held  on  this  claim  on  October  6,  2023.    Claimant  was \nrepresented by Mr. Tanner Thomas, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas; Respondents \nwere represented by Mr. Michael Ryburn, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas. \nSTIPULATIONS \n By agreement of the parties, the stipulations applicable to this claim are as follows: \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction \nof the within claim. \n \n2. An   employer/employee/carrier   relationship   existed   among   the \nparties on October 18, 2022, when Claimant sustained compensable \ninjury to his lower back. \n \n3. The  parties  will  stipulate  to Claimant’s  average  weekly  wage  and \ncompensation rates on or before the hearing date. \n \n \n \n\nTHOMAS H207642 \n \n2 \n \nISSUES \n The parties have identified the following issues to be adjudicated: \n1.  Whether Claimant sustained compensable injuries to his groin, left testicle, left \nhip, and left leg by specific incident. \n \n2.  In the alternative, whether Claimant’s alleged injuries to his groin, left testicle, \nleft hip, and left leg are a compensable consequence of the lower back injury.\n1\n  \n \n3.  Whether Claimant is entitled to reasonable and  necessary medical treatment \nof his lower back and alleged groin, left testicle, left hip, and left leg injuries. \n \n4.  Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary total disability benefits for his alleged \ngroin, left testicle, left hip, and left leg injuries from October 18, 2022, to a date \nyet to be determined. \n \n5.  Whether Claimant is entitled to additional reasonable and necessary medical \ntreatment for his lower back injury. \n \n6.  Whether Claimant is entitled to additional temporary total disability benefits for \nhis compensable lower back injury. \n \n7.  Whether Claimant is entitled to a controverted attorney’s fee.  \n \nAll other issues are reserved. \n \nCONTENTIONS \n \nA.  Claimant Contentions. \n \nClaimant contends that on October 18, 2022, he was in the scope and course of \nemployment, unloading a cart of brakes, when the cart was knocked into him, causing \nhim pain in his back, groin, left hip and left leg. Claimant reported the injury immediately \nand filled out an accident report. \nAn  MRI of  the  Claimant’s  low  back  revealed  a  disc  extrusion  at  L5-S1;  but  the \nClaimant  has  also  been  referred  for  an  MRI  to  the  left  hip,  injections  for  the  low  back \n \n1\n This was argued briefly at the full-hearing and later argued by post-hearing brief by the \nClaimant. \n\nTHOMAS H207642 \n \n3 \n \ninjury,  and  to  a  urologist  for  the  pain  in  his  groin.  Respondents  have  denied  all  of  this \ntreatment. \nAdditionally, the Claimant’s employer cannot accommodate light duty restrictions, \nbut the Respondents refuse to pay temporary total disability. \nClaimant  contends that  he  is  entitled  to  additional  medical  treatment,  temporary \ntotal disability benefits, and that his attorney is entitled to an attorney’s fee.  \nB.  Respondent Contentions. \nThe Claimant was paid temporary total disability benefits up to February 21, 2023, \nwhen he was released to return to duty.   \nFINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \n After  reviewing  the  record  as  a  whole,  including  medical  reports,  non-medical \ndocuments,  and  other  matters  properly  before  the  Commission,  I  hereby  make  the \nfollowing findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-\n9-704 (Repl. 2012): \n1.  The  Arkansas  Workers’  Compensation  Commission  has  jurisdiction  over  this \nclaim. \n \n2.  The stipulations set forth above are reasonable and are hereby accepted.  \n3.  The  Claimant  has  not  proven  by  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  he \nsustained a compensable injury to his groin, left leg, left hip and left testicle on \nOctober 18, 2022. \n  \n4.  The Claimant did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his alleged \ngroin, left leg, left hip, and left testicle injuries are a compensable consequence \nof the lower back injury. \n \n5.  The  Claimant  has  proven  by  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that he  is \nentitled  to  reasonable  and  necessary  medical  treatment  for  his  lower  back, \nincluding injections and a L5-S1 decompression and fusion. \n \n\nTHOMAS H207642 \n \n4 \n \n6.  Claimant has proven by the preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled \nto additional TTD following his October 18, 2022, low back injury. \n \n7.  Claimant has proven by the preponderance of the evidence that his attorney is \nentitled to a controverted attorney’s fees. \n \nCASE IN CHIEF \nSummary of Evidence \n The record consisted of Claimant’s Exhibit 1 Medical Records, that consists of 32 \npages,  Commission  Exhibit  1,  Pre-Hearing  Order,  that  consists  of  5  pages, Claimant’s \nand Respondent’s post-hearing briefs. I also had the opportunity to hear the testimony \nand observe the demeanor of the Claimant, Quinton Thomas, who was the sole witness \nin the full hearing.  \nThe Claimant suffered an alleged compensable injury to his lower back, groin, left \ntesticle,  left  leg,  and  left  hip  during  the  course  and  scope  of  his  employment  with \nRespondent.  Claimant  worked  as  an  equipment  unloader  for  the  Respondent.  While \nunloading brakes, another employee hit a table where Claimant was working and pinned \nhim between the table and a cart of brakes. The Claimant was pinned between the table \nand  cart  of  brakes  by  his  hips.  The  force caused  Claimant’s  hips  to  squeeze  together \nallegedly  impacting Claimant’s lower  back,  groin,  left  testicle,  left  leg,  and  left  hip. \nClaimant stated that the squeezing produced a painful knot to the left  side of his groin. \nClaimant told the doctors about this knot, but the doctors did not see a need to treat or \nexamine  it.  However,  Claimant  did  suffer  a  small  left  disc  protrusion  which  abuts  the \nexiting left L4 nerve root within the left foraminal zone. \nThe Claimant was placed on light duty in February of 2023, but Respondents did \nnot provide any light duty work. Claimant alleges that he can only do an hour of activity \n\nTHOMAS H207642 \n \n5 \n \nthen he would have to sit down. Dr. John Brophy treated Claimant and recommended a \nnerve block but this treatment for his back was denied by Respondent. Dr. Brophy didn’t \ntreat  the  groin  and  testicular  pain  because  it  was  pre-existing  and  felt  that  private \ninsurance should be used. Essentially, the groin and testicular pain were different issues.  \nAdjudication \n A. Compensability of Groin, Left Testicle, Left Hip, and Left Leg. \n Arkansas Code Annotated § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Repl. 2012), which I find applies to \nthe analysis of Claimant’s alleged injuries, defines “compensable injury”: \n(i)   An accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body \n.  .  .  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  employment  and  which  requires \nmedical services or results in disability or death.  An injury is “accidental” \nonly if it is caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place \nof occurrence[.] \n \nA compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective \nfindings.  Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Repl. 2012).  “Objective findings” are those \nfindings that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient.  Id. § 11-9-102(16).  \nThe  element  “arising  out  of  .  .  .  [the]  employment”  relates  to  the  causal  connection \nbetween the claimant’s injury and his or her employment.  City of El Dorado v. Sartor, 21 \nArk. App. 143, 729 S.W.2d 430 (1987).  An injury arises out of a claimant’s employment \n“when  a  causal  connection  between  work  conditions  and  the  injury  is  apparent  to  the \nrational mind.”  Id. \n If  the  claimant  fails  to  establish  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  any  of  the \nrequirements  for  establishing  compensability,  compensation  must  be  denied.  Mikel  v. \nEngineered Specialty Plastics, 56 Ark. App. 126, 938 S.W.2d 876 (1997).  This standard \nmeans the evidence having greater weight or convincing force.  Barre v. Hoffman, 2009 \n\nTHOMAS H207642 \n \n6 \n \nArk. 373, 326 S.W.3d 415; Smith v. Magnet Cove Barium Corp., 212 Ark. 491, 206 S.W.2d \n442 (1947). \n A claimant’s testimony is never considered uncontroverted.  Nix v. Wilson World \nHotel,  46  Ark.  App.  303,  879  S.W.2d  457  (1994).    The  determination  of  a witness’ \ncredibility and how much weight to accord to that person’s testimony are solely up to the \nCommission.  White v. Gregg Agricultural Ent., 72 Ark. App. 309, 37 S.W.3d 649 (2001).  \nThe Commission must sort through conflicting evidence and determine the true facts.  Id.  \nIn so doing, the Commission is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant or \nany other witness but may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of \nthe testimony that it deems worthy of belief.  Id. \nThe Claimant has not produced any medical objective findings for Claimant’s left \nhip,  left  leg,  groin,  and  left  testicle.  For  that  reason,  Claimant  cannot  prove  that  he \nsustained  a  compensable  injury  to  these  body  parts  by  specific  incident.  However, \nClaimant  has  pled  in  the  alternative  that  these  alleged  injuries  are  compensable \nconsequences.  \nB. Are Claimant’s Injuries to His Left Testicle, Left Hip, and Left Leg the result of \na Compensable Consequence. \n \nIf  an  injury  is  compensable, every  natural  consequence of  that  injury  is  likewise \ncompensable.   Air  Compressor  Equip.  Co.  v.  Sword,  69  Ark.  App.  162,  11  S.W.3d  1 \n(2000); Hubley v. Best West. Governor’s Inn, 52 Ark. App. 226, 916 S.W.2d 143 (1996).  \nThe test is whether a causal connection between the two episodes exists.  Sword, supra; \nJeter  v.  McGinty  Mech.,  62  Ark. App.  53, 968  S.W.2d  645  (1998).   The existence  of  a \ncausal  connection  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  Commission.   Koster  v.  Custom  Pak  & \nTrissel,  2009  Ark.  App.  780,  2009  Ark.  App.  LEXIS  947.    It  is  generally  a  matter  of \n\nTHOMAS H207642 \n \n7 \n \ninference,  and  possibilities  may  play  a  proper  and  important  role  in  establishing  that \nrelationship.   Osmose  Wood  Preserving  v.  Jones,  40  Ark.  App.  190,  843  S.W.2d  875 \n(1992).  A finding of causation need not be expressed in terms of a reasonable medical \ncertainty where supplemental evidence supports the causal connection.  Koster, supra; \nHeptinstall v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 84 Ark. App. 215, 137 S.W.3d 421 (2003). \n Under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-705(a)(3) (Repl. 2012), a claimant has the burden of \nestablishing  the  existence  of  a  compensable  consequence  by  a  preponderance  of  the \nevidence.  This standard means the evidence having greater weight or convincing force.  \nBarre v. Hoffman, 2009 Ark. 373, 326 S.W.3d 415; Smith v. Magnet Cove Barium Corp., \n212 Ark. 491, 206 S.W.2d 442 (1947). \n As stated earlier, the determination of a witness’ credibility and how much weight \nto accord to that person’s testimony are solely up to the Commission.  White v. Gregg \nAgricultural Ent., 72 Ark. App. 309, 37 S.W.3d 649 (2001).  The Commission must sort \nthrough  conflicting  evidence  and  determine  the  true  facts.   Id.    In  so  doing,  the \nCommission is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant or any other witness \nbut may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony that \nit deems worthy of belief.  Id. \nThe  compensable  injury  here  is  to  the  lower  back.  No  evidence  was  presented \nshowing a causal connection between Claimant’s compensable low back injury and the \nalleged injuries to his left hip, left leg, groin, and left testicle. Thus, I find the Claimant has \nnot proven by the preponderance of the evidence that he sustained injuries to his left hip, \nleft leg, groin, and left testicle as a compensable consequence of his low back injury. Due \n\nTHOMAS H207642 \n \n8 \n \nto this finding, I further find that temporary total disability benefits and medical treatment \nfor these alleged injuries are moot. \nC.  Whether  Claimant  is  entitled  to  any  additional  reasonable  and  necessary \nmedical treatment for low back injury. \n \nArkansas  Code  Annotated  Section  11-9-508(a)  (Repl.  2012)  states  that  an \nemployer  shall  provide  for  an  injured  employee  such  medical  treatment  as  may be \nnecessary in connection with the injury received by the employee.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. \nv. Brown, 82 Ark. App. 600, 120 S.W.3d 153 (2003).  But employers are liable only for \nsuch treatment and services as are deemed necessary for the treatment of the claimant’s \ninjuries.  DeBoard v. Colson Co., 20 Ark. App. 166, 725 S.W.2d 857 (1987).  The claimant \nmust prove by a preponderance of the evidence that medical treatment is reasonable and \nnecessary for the treatment of a compensable injury.  Brown, supra; Geo Specialty Chem. \nv. Clingan, 69 Ark. App. 369, 13 S.W.3d 218 (2000).  What constitutes reasonable and \nnecessary   medical   treatment   is   a  question   of  fact  for   the   Commission.   White \nConsolidated  Indus.  v.  Galloway,  74  Ark.  App.  13,  45  S.W.3d  396  (2001); Wackenhut \nCorp. v. Jones, 73 Ark. App. 158, 40 S.W.3d 333 (2001). \n As the Arkansas Court of Appeals has held, a claimant may be entitled to additional \ntreatment  even  after  the  healing  period  has  ended,  if  said  treatment  is  geared  toward \nmanagement of the injury.  See Patchell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 86 Ark. App. 230, 184 \nS.W.3d 31 (2004); Artex Hydrophonics, Inc. v. Pippin, 8 Ark. App. 200, 649 S.W.2d 845 \n(1983).  Such services can include those for the purpose of diagnosing the nature and \nextent  of  the  compensable  injury;  reducing  or  alleviating  symptoms  resulting  from  the \ncompensable  injury;  maintaining  the  level  of  healing  achieved;  or  preventing  further \ndeterioration of the damage produced by the compensable injury.  Jordan v. Tyson Foods, \n\nTHOMAS H207642 \n \n9 \n \nInc., 51 Ark. App. 100, 911 S.W.2d 593 (1995); Artex, supra. \nDr. John Brophy recommends an injection for the lower back injury or the option \nof surgical intervention to include an L5-S1 decompression and fusion. Claimant Exhibit \n1,  p.  23.  The  purpose  of  these  treatments  is  to  alleviate  symptoms  of  the  Claimant’s \ncompensable  low  back  injury. I  hereby  credit  Dr.  John  Brophy’s  opinion  concerning \nClaimant’s treatment of his lower back injury. Thus, I find by the preponderance of the \nevidence  that  Claimant  is  entitled  to  reasonable  and  necessary  medical  treatment, \nincluding injections to his lower back and the L5-S1 decompression and fusion.  \nD.  Whether Claimant is entitled to additional temporary total disability benefits to \na date yet to be determined. \n \nClaimant’s compensable lower back injury is an unscheduled one. See Ark. Code \nAnn. § 11-9-521. An employee who suffers a compensable unscheduled injury is entitled \nto temporary total disability compensation for that period within the healing period in which \nhe suffered a total incapacity to earn wages. Ark. State Highway and Transportation Dept. \nv. Breshears, 272 Ark. 244, 613 S.W.2d 392 (1981). The healing period ends when the \nunderlying condition causing the disability has become stable and nothing further in the \nway of treatment will improve that condition. Mad Butcher, Inc. v. Parker, 4 Ark. App. 124, \n628 S.W.2d 582 (1982). Also, a claimant must demonstrate that the disability lasted more \nthan  seven  days.  Id.,  A.C.A. §  11-9-501(a)(1).  Claimant  must  prove  his  entitlement  to \ntemporary total disability benefits by a preponderance of the evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § \n11-9-705(a)(3) (Repl. 2002). This standard means the evidence having greater weight or \nconvincing  force. Barre  v.  Hoffman,  2009  Ark.  373,  326  S.W.3d  415; Smith  v.  Magnet \nCove Barium Corp., 212 Ark. 491, 206 S.W.2d 442 (1947).  \n\nTHOMAS H207642 \n \n10 \n \nThe  Claimant  was  released  to  light  duty;  however,  he  was  never  given  the \nopportunity to work. The Claimant expressed that he had a great deal of pain in his lower \nback  and  could  move  about  for  an  hour  where  he  then  would  have  to sit  down.  The \nCommission  was  not  presented  with  any  credible  evidence  that  demonstrated  that  the \nClaimant’s  healing  period  for  his  back  has  ended. The  Claimant  testified  that  he  was \nunsure whether he could perform light duty work. Nevertheless, despite his many phone \ncalls to the Respondent/Employer to acquire light duty work, the Respondent/Employer \ndid not accommodate this light duty work restriction. The Claimant, whose work history \ninvolved mainly manual labor, remained off from work. Thus, the evidence is insufficient \nto determine whether he did suffer a total incapacity to earn wages.  \nNonetheless,  a  claimant  who  has  been  released  to  light  duty  work  but  has  not \nreturned to work may be entitled to temporary total disability benefits where insufficient \nevidence  exists  that  the  claimant  has  the  capacity  to  earn  the  same  or  any part of  the \nwages  he  was  receiving  at  the  time  of  the  injury. Ark.  State  Hwy  &  Transp.  Dept.  v. \nBreshears, 272 Ark. 244, 613 S.W.2d 392 (1981); Sanyo Mfg. Corp. v. Leisure, 12 Ark. \nApp. 274, 675 S.W.2d 841 (1984). I credit Claimant’s testimony that he has made many \nefforts  to  return  to  work  with  restrictions  but  was  not  given  that  opportunity  by  the \nRespondent/Employer. I credit Claimant’s testimony that he wants to try to work. By the \nRespondent/Employer’s refusal to allow the Claimant to return to work with restrictions, \nit’s clear that Claimant did not have the capacity to earn wages. Moreover, no evidence \nwas  presented  pertaining  to  his  ability  to  earn  wages.  Therefore,  I  find  by  the \npreponderance  of  the  evidence  that  Claimant  has  proven  his  entitlement  to  additional \ntemporary total disability benefits from February 2, 2023, to a date to be determined.  \n\nTHOMAS H207642 \n \n11 \n \nATTORNEY FEES \nOne of the purposes of the attorney's fee statute is to put the economic burden of \nlitigation on the party who makes litigation necessary.  Brass v. Weller, 23 Ark. App. 193, \n745 S.W.2d 647 (1998).  Under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-715 (Repl. 2012): \n(B) Attorney’s fees shall be twenty-five percent (25%) of compensation for \nindemnity  benefits  payable  to  the  injured  employee  or  dependents  of  a \ndeceased employee . . . In all other cases whenever the commission finds \nthat a claim has been controverted, in whole or in part, the commission shall \ndirect that fees for legal services be paid to the attorney for the claimant as \nfollows:  One-half (½) by the employer or carrier in addition to compensation \nawarded;  and  one-half  (½)  by  the  injured  employee  or  dependents  of  a \ndeceased employee out of compensation payable to them. \n \n Discussion.    The  evidence  before  me  clearly  shows  that  Respondents  have \ncontroverted Claimant’s entitlement to additional indemnity benefits.  Thus, the evidence \npreponderates that his counsel, the Hon. Tanner Thomas, is entitled to the fee as set out \nabove. \nCONCLUSION AND AWARD \n Respondents  are  hereby  directed  to pay/furnish  benefits  in  accordance  with  the \nfindings of fact and conclusions of law set forth above. All accrued sums, minus any lawful \noffsets, shall be paid in a lump sum without discount, and this award shall earn interest \nat  the  legal  rate  until  paid,  pursuant  to  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11-9-809  (Repl.  2002).   See \nCouch v. First State Bank of Newport, 49 Ark. App. 102, 898 S.W.2d 57 (1995). \n IT IS SO ORDERED. \n       ________________________________ \n       Hon. Steven Porch \n                                                                           Administrative Law Judge","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION WCC NO. H207642 QUINTON D. THOMAS, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT HINO MOTORS MFG USA INC., EMPLOYER RESPONDENT FIRST LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP., INSURANCE CARRIER RESPONDENT OPINION FILED NOVEMBER 8, 2023 Hearing before Administrative Law Judge Steven Porch on October 6, 2023, in M...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T23:00:17.046Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H207642-2023-11-08","pdf":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/Thomas_Quinton_H207642_20231108.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}