{"id":"alj-H204394-2026-03-04","awcc_number":"H204394","decision_date":"2026-03-04","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Johnny Wright","employer_name":"Central Maloney, Inc","title":"WRIGHT VS. CENTRAL MALONEY, INC. AWCC# H204394 March 04, 2026","outcome":"denied","outcome_keywords":["dismissed:1","granted:6","denied:7"],"injury_keywords":[],"pdf_url":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/WRIGHT_JOHNNY_H204394_20260304.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"WRIGHT_JOHNNY_H204394_20260304.pdf","text_length":17834,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \n \nCLAIM NO. H204394 \n \nJOHNNY WRIGHT, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT \n \nvs \n \nCENTRAL MALONEY, INC., SELF-INSURED EMPLOYER RESPONDENT \n \nRISK MANAGEMENT RESOURCES, TPA RESPONDENT \n  \n \nOPINION FILED 4 MARCH 2026 \n \n \nHeard before Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission Administrative Law Judge \nJayO. Howe on 11 December 2025 in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. \n \nMr. Gary Davis, The Gary Davis Law Firm, appeared for the claimant. \n \nMr. Guy Alton Wade, Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, appeared for the respondents. \n \nI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE \n \n A Prehearing Order was filed on 30 September 2025 and admitted to the record as \nCommission’s Exhibit No 1. The parties agreed to the following Stipulations at the hearing: \nSTIPULATIONS \n \n 1. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission (the Commission) has \n  jurisdiction over this claim. \n \n 2. Employee/self-insured employer/TPA relationship existed at all relevant  \n  times, including on or about 8 June 2022, when the claimant sustained  \n  compensable injuries to his right hand and fingers. \n \nISSUES TO BE LITIGATED \n \n 1. Whether the claimant is entitled to vocational rehabilitation.  \n \n 2. Whether the claimant is entitled to additional medical treatment. \n \n 3.  Whether the claimant is entitled to an attorney’s fee. \n \n All other issues are reserved. \n \n\nJ. WRIGHT- H204394 \n2 \n \nCONTENTIONS \n \n The parties’ Contentions are set out in their respective Prehearing Questionnaire \nresponses: \nClaimant \n \nClaimant contends that he sustained admitted compensable injuries 8 \nJune 2022. Claimant contends entitlement to a vocational \nrehabilitation evaluation. Claimant further contends that he is entitled \nto ongoing medical treatment. These matters are controverted. \nClaimant’s attorney respectfully requests that any attorney’s fees owed \nby Claimant on controverted benefits paid by award or otherwise be \ndeducted Claimant’s benefits and paid directly to Claimant’s attorney \nby separate check, and that any Commission Order direct the \nrespondent to make payment of attorney’s fees in this matter.  \n \nRespondent \n \nRespondents accepted the claim and paid applicable benefits, including \na 22% PPD rating to the claimant’s hand. Claimant was released on 13 \nMay 2023, with no restrictions. Claimant was in a work release at the \ntime of his injury and that program no longer exists.  \n \nII. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \n \nHaving reviewed the record as a whole, including the evidence summarized below, \nand having heard testimony from the claimant, observing his demeanor, I make the \nfollowing findings of fact and conclusions of law under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704: \n1. The Commission has jurisdiction over this claim. \n \n2. The Stipulations as set forth above are reasonable and are hereby accepted. \n \n3. The claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he  \n  is entitled to vocational rehabilitation. \n \n4. The claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he  \n  is entitled to additional medical benefits. \n \n5. Because the claimant has failed to prove that he is entitled to any additional  \n  indemnity benefits, he is not entitled to an attorney’s fee. \n \n \n \n \n\nJ. WRIGHT- H204394 \n3 \n \nIII. ADJUDICATION \nThe stipulated facts as outlined above are reasonable and accepted. It is settled that \nthe Commission, with the benefit of being in the presence of a witness and observing their \ndemeanor, determines a witness’ credibility and the appropriate weight to accord their \nstatements. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. VanWagner, 337 Ark. 443, 990 S.W.2d 522 (1999). A \nclaimant's testimony is never considered uncontroverted. Nix v. Wilson World Hotel, 46 \nArk. App. 303, 879 S.W.2d 457 (1994). The determination of a witness' credibility and how \nmuch weight to accord to that person's testimony are solely up to the Commission. White v. \nGregg Agricultural Ent., 72 Ark. App. 309, 37 S.W.3d 649 (2001). The Commission must \nsort through conflicting evidence and determine the true facts. Id. In so doing, the \nCommission is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant or any other witness \nbut may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony that \nit deems worthy of belief. Id. \nSUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE \n The claimant was the only witness at the hearing. The record consists of the hearing \ntranscript and the following exhibits: Commission’s Exhibit No 1 (the 30 September 2025 \nPrehearing Order); Claimant’s Exhibit No 1 (Respondents’ Exhibit No 1 (one index page and \n36 pages of medical records); and Respondents’ Exhibit No 2 (one index page and 14 pages of \nnon-medical records). \n Claimant’s Testimony \n The claimant is a sixty-six-year-old man with a High School Diploma, a General \nEducation Development (GED) certificate, and various college credits. He was working for \nthe respondent-employer through an Arkansas Department of Correction work-release \nprogram on the date of his injury. On 8 June 2022 a table saw accident caused the partial \namputation of the index and middle fingers on his right hand. The respondents provided \n\nJ. WRIGHT- H204394 \n4 \n \ncontemporaneous treatment. According to the claimant, the Department of Correction \nended the work-release program’s contract that placed inmates at the respondent-\nemployer’s facility sometime shortly after his injury. \n On 13 May 2023, the claimant’s treating physician placed him at maximum medical \nimprovement (MMI) with no restrictions. He was released from prison about a year later. \n The claimant stated that, in addition to having his High School Diploma and GED, \nhe had previously completed a community college program for radiology technicians and \nthat he had recently obtained a commercial driver's license (CDL). His CDL is valid until 24 \nApril 2031. He also has a valid Medical Examiner Certificate. He has worked with \nComputer Numerical Control (CNC) machines and has worked running a lathe for \nLockheed. He also testified about having scrapped materials in a junkyard, working as a \njanitor, and working in fast food restaurant(s). He knows how to drive a tractor and a \nforklift and has worked in lawn care and construction. Additionally, he has a certificate in \nSubstance Abuse Counseling and is a certified nurse aid (CNA).  \n After his injury, but before his release from prison, the claimant worked at a café \nthrough the prison’s work-release program. His duties ranged from unloading groceries and \ncleaning to cooking and running the grill. After his release from prison, the claimant \nworked for a time at a factory that manufactured pepper spray and worked another job \nunloading trucks. Yet he testified, “to tell you the truth, this hand is really just... it’s just I \ncan’t do nothing.” [TR at 33-34.] \n Since obtaining his CDL, he has been looking for a truck driving job, specifically \ndriving no-touch freight. He stated that he has sought this employment through the state’s \nArkansas Workforce offices and that he has completed several job applications online. But \nhe explained that, “after they find out I don’t have a year or two years, ‘cause some places \nwant a year experience, and some places want two-years’ experience. After they find out I \n\nJ. WRIGHT- H204394 \n5 \n \ndon’t have neither one, they will tell me, well, they gonna hold my application for about six \nmonths.” [TR at 32.] \n Regarding his claim for additional medical treatment, the claimant said that he \nbelieves that his therapy was “cut short.” [TR at 45.] He went on to testify that despite his \nMMI placement without restrictions, he still has some difficulty with his injured hand. He \nsaid that he had some trouble operating the grip on a spray gun, for example, when he \nworked cleaning tanks at the pepper spray factory. He also suggested that it would be \ndifficult to work again as a machinist or CNA. While he denied being offered any assistance \nfrom the respondents with finding another job, he also denied seeking re-employment with \nthe respondent-employer since being released from prison and moving to another part of \nthe state. \n Medical Records \n The claimant presented to Dr. David Black for an independent medical evaluation \non 26 October 2022. He complained of ongoing issues related to his compensable index and \nmiddle finger injuries. Dr. Black recommended additional surgical intervention and \nanticipated an eventual MMI placement about four months post-surgically. On 16 \nNovember 2022, Dr. Black performed the following: right index finger extensor tenolysis; \nright long finger extensor tenolysis; right index finger proximal interphalangeal (PIP) \nfusion; right long finger deep hardware removal; right long finger malunion correction with \nosteotomy. The claimant tolerated the surgery well and followed-up accordingly. A \nsubsequent procedure was then scheduled for 5 January 2023, with right index finger deep \nhardware removal and irrigation and debridement of osteomyelitis in the same finger. That \nprocedure, too, was tolerated well. He was returned to work with restrictions on 16 January \n2023 and referred for occupational therapy. [Cl. Ex. No 1.] \n \n\nJ. WRIGHT- H204394 \n6 \n \n The claimant continued to follow-up with Dr. Black until 8 May 2023. At that visit, \nDr. Black noted: \nI have reviewed the patient’s exams and x-rays with him today. \nPatient has reached maximal medical improvement as of today. \nPatient has no restrictions for use of his right hand. \nFinal impairment rating will be dictated separately. \nPatient will follow-up with me as needed. \n \n[Id.] A return-to-work note consistent with the same was written the same day. In a \nseparate letter dated 15 May 2023, Dr. Black assigned an impairment rating that equated \nto 12% of the whole person. \nDISCUSSION \n The two primary issues presented for litigation are whether the claimant is entitled \nto vocational rehabilitation and whether the claimant is entitled to additional medical \ntreatment. Those questions are addressed, in turn, below. \n A. THE CLAIMANT HAS FAILED TO PROVE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF  \n  THE EVIDENCE THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO VOCATIONAL    \n  REHABILITATION. \n \n The purpose of vocational rehabilitation \"is to place an emphasis on returning an \ninjured worker to work, while still allowing for vocational rehabilitation programs\" when \nthe Commission determines them to be \"appropriate.\" Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-505(d). \nRegarding a claimant’s entitlement to vocational rehabilitation, Ark. Code Ann § 11-9-\n505(b)(1) states: \nIn addition to benefits otherwise provided for by this chapter, an employee \nwho is entitled to receive compensation benefits for permanent disability and \nhas not been offered an opportunity to return to work or re-employment \nassistance shall be paid reasonable expenses of travel and maintenance and \nother necessary costs of vocational rehabilitation if the commission finds that \nthe program is reasonable in relation to the disability sustained by the \nemployee. (Emphasis added.) \n \nThe claimant must prove his entitlement to vocational rehabilitation by a preponderance of \nthe evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-705(a)(3). Preponderance of the evidence means the \n\nJ. WRIGHT- H204394 \n7 \n \nevidence having greater weight or convincing force. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank v. La Sher Oil \nCo., 81 Ark. App. 269, 101 S.W.3d 252 (2003). \n There is no question that the claimant sustained a permanent disability. The factual \ncircumstances here are unique though in that the claimant was working for the respondent-\nemployer at the time of his accident through a Department of Correction work-release \nprogram placement. He acknowledges that the Department’s contract with the respondent-\nemployer was either cancelled or not renewed sometime shortly after his injury. And the \nrespondent-employer acknowledges that it did not offer re-employment for that reason. The \nclaimant’s subsequent job placement was decided by the Department of Correction; and he \nagreed that he has not sought re-employment with the respondent-employer since he was \nreleased from prison and moved to a different part of the state. The question of the \nclaimant’s entitlement, then, turns on whether vocational rehabilitation is reasonable.  \n The claimant has not identified any specific vocational rehabilitation program that \nhe believes would be of benefit to him. Instead, he argues generally that the respondents \nhave the resources to help him find a no-touch freight job (like he would prefer) or to \nprovide him with some additional education so that he may be otherwise employable in \nsome new, unspecific field. I do not find this request for vocational rehabilitation to be \nreasonable in relation to his disability. \n First, as detailed above, the claimant has a wide range of career experience that he \ncould pursue for new work. He has a High School Diploma and a GED, and he \nacknowledged in his testimony that he had “four different certificates or training or degrees \nfrom community colleges.” He failed to provide credible testimony as to how his disability \nprevented him from securing employment across any of those different areas of career \nexperience. His testimony that working again as a machinist or in construction might be too \ndifficult was only speculative. Next, he was released at MMI without any permanent \n\nJ. WRIGHT- H204394 \n8 \n \nrestrictions. While his injuries did result in a permanent impairment, I find his statement \nthat his right hand “can’t do nothing” to be inconsistent with the objective medical findings \nrelating to his hand post-recovery. Finally, the claimant has been able to work in at least \nthree different jobs since he injured his hand. While he has not been able to find work in his \nnewly-credentialed career of preference (no-touch freight driving), he has failed to show \nthat he cannot find employment relative to his education and experience and that such an \ninability to find employment is related to his disability.  \n  In short, the claimant has a broad range of work experience and professional \neducation that he could utilize in finding employment. He has chosen, instead, to seek to \nhold the respondents liable for placing him into a very specific new field for which he just \nreceived licensure and which he acknowledges generally carries one-to-two years’ worth of \nrequired experience. I commend him for making the effort to obtain his CDL. But I do not \nfind it reasonable to hold the respondents liable for jump-starting his career in this new \nendeavor or otherwise supporting an educational pivot into yet another new career field. \nBecause the claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a \nvocational rehabilitation program is reasonable in relation to his disability, his claim for \nthe same is denied. \n B. THE CLAIMANT HAS FAILED TO PROVE BY A PREPONDERANCE FO  \n  THE EVIDENCE THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL MEDICAL  \n  TREATMENT. \n \n Employers must promptly provide medical services which are reasonably necessary \nin connection with compensable injuries. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-508(a). However, injured \nemployees have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that medical \ntreatment is reasonably necessary. Patchell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 86 Ark. App. 230, 184 \nS.W.3d 31 (2004). What constitutes reasonable and necessary medical treatment is a fact \nquestion for the Commission, and the resolution of this issue depends upon the sufficiency \n\nJ. WRIGHT- H204394 \n9 \n \nof the evidence. Gansky v. Hi-Tech Engineering, 325 Ark. 163, 924 S.W.2d 790 (1996). A \nclaimant may be entitled to additional treatment even after her healing period is ended, if \nthat treatment is geared towards management of a compensable injury. Patchell, supra. An \nemployee who has sustained a compensable injury is not required to offer objective medical \nevidence in order to prove that he is entitled to additional treatment. Ark. Health Ctr. v. \nBurnett, 2018 Ark. App. 427, 558 S.W.3d 408.  \n The claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is \nentitled to additional medical treatment. Besides vaguely stating that he occasionally \nexperiences some swelling in his hand, the claimant offered no credible testimony about \nongoing problems related to his compensable injuries that might require additional medical \nmanagement. When pressed for some further explanation on the issue, the claimant only \nsaid that he believed his occupational therapy (in 2023) was “cut short.” The Commission is \nauthorized to accept or reject a medical opinion and is authorized to determine its medical \nsoundness and probative value. Poulan Weed Eater v. Marshall, 79 Ark. App. 129, 84 \nS.W.3d 878 (2002). Dr. Black, whose treatment records and opinion I find to be credible, \nmade no indication that any additional therapy was warranted at the time of the claimant’s \nrelease from care and placement at MMI. And the claimant has presented no contrary \nmedical evidence since his release from Dr. Black’s care to suggest that ongoing or \nadditional treatment is necessary. The claimant has simply failed to present any credible, \npersuasive evidence that additional medical treatment is reasonable or necessary. His \nclaim for additional medical treatment must, therefore, fail. \n C. THE CLAIMANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN ATTORNEY’S FEE. \n Because the claimant has failed to prove that he is entitled to any benefit that might \nprovide for an attorney’s fee, his claim for the same must also be denied. \n \n\nJ. WRIGHT- H204394 \n10 \n \nIV.  CONCLUSION  \n Consistent with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this claim for \nadditional benefits is DENIED and DISMISSED. \nSO ORDERED. \n      ________________________________ \n       JAYO. HOWE \n       ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION CLAIM NO. H204394 JOHNNY WRIGHT, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT vs CENTRAL MALONEY, INC., SELF-INSURED EMPLOYER RESPONDENT RISK MANAGEMENT RESOURCES, TPA RESPONDENT OPINION FILED 4 MARCH 2026 Heard before Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission Administrative Law Judge JayO. Ho...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T22:30:34.768Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H204394-2026-03-04","pdf":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/WRIGHT_JOHNNY_H204394_20260304.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}