{"id":"alj-H204393-2024-07-10","awcc_number":"H204393","decision_date":"2024-07-10","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Shirley Sanford","employer_name":null,"title":"SANFORD VS. ARKANSAS BLDG. SRVS., LLCAWCC# H204393July 10, 2024","outcome":"denied","outcome_keywords":["denied:1"],"injury_keywords":["knee","hip","shoulder"],"pdf_url":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/Sanford_Shirley_H204393_20240710.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"Sanford_Shirley_H204393_20240710.pdf","text_length":17501,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \nWCC NO. H204393 \n \nSHIRLEY A. SANFORD, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT \n \nARKANSAS BLDG. SRVS., LLC \nEMPLOYER RESPONDENT \n \nACCIDENT FUND INSURANCE CO., \nCARRIER/THIRD-PARTY ADMINISTRATOR RESPONDENT \n \nOPINION FILED JULY 10, 2024 \n \nHearing  before  Administrative  Law  Judge,  Steven  Porch,  on  June 12,  2024,  in  Little  Rock, \nArkansas. \n \nClaimant was represented by Mr. Gary Davis, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas. \n \nRespondents were represented by Ms. Karen McKinney, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas. \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE \n \n A full hearing was held on this claim on June 12, 2024.  A prehearing telephone conference \ntook  place  on March 19,  2024.  A  prehearing  order  was  entered  on  that  date  and  subsequently \nentered  into  evidence,  with  amendments  by  the  parties,  as  Commission  Exhibit  1.  The parties’ \nstipulations are set forth. \nSTIPULATIONS \n By agreement of the parties, the stipulations applicable to this claim are as follows: \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction of the \nwithin claim. \n \n2. The Claimant allegedly sustained a compensable injury to her left leg, knee, \nhip, shoulder, and spine on August 4, 2020. \n \n3. Respondents have controverted this claim in its entirety. \n \n\nSANFORD H204393 \n \n \n2 \n \n \n4. Claimant’s  average  weekly  wage  of  $127.77, entitles  her to a  temporary \ntotal  disability  rate  of  $85.00,  and  a  permanent  partial disability  rate  of \n$85.00.\n1\n \nISSUES \n The parties have identified the following issues to be adjudicated: \n1. Whether the claim is barred by the Statute of Limitations. \n \n2. Whether Claimant sustained compensable injuries to her left leg, knee, hip, shoulder, \nand spine by specific incident. \n  \n3. Whether Claimant is entitled to any reasonable and necessary medical treatment.\n2\n \n \n4. Whether Claimant is entitled to temporary total disability benefits from August 5, 2020, \nto a date yet to be determined. \n \n5.  Whether Claimant is entitled to a controverted attorney’s fee.  \n \nAll other issues are reserved. \n \nCONTENTIONS \n \nClaimant’s  Contentions:  The  Claimant  contends  that she  has sustained  compensable \ninjuries to  her  left  leg,  hips, spine,  and  shoulders  on  August  4,  2020.  Claimant  contends  she  is \nentitled to payment of temporary disability benefits. Claimant further claims entitlement to medical \ntreatment. These matters are controverted for purposes of an attorney fee.  \nClaimant’s attorney respectfully request that any attorney’s fee owed by Claimant on \ncontroverted benefits, paid by award or otherwise, be deducted from Claimant’s benefits and paid \ndirectly to Claimant’s attorney by separate check; and that any Commission Order direct  the \n \n1\n The parties stipulated and the Commission approved Claimant’s average weekly wage, \ntemporary total disability benefits, and permanent partial disability benefits on the hearing date. \n2\n Claimant, at the hearing, wanted to request medical treatment and it was made an issue. \nThe original issue listed as number three in the March 19, 2024, Prehearing Order, “What \nCompensable injury/injuries were sustained?” is properly merged under issue number two since \nthat is where that determination would be made. \n\nSANFORD H204393 \n \n \n3 \n \n \nrespondent to make payment of any attorney’s fee in this manner.  \nRespondents’ Contentions: Respondents  contend  that  the  Claimant  only  worked  for \nRespondent Employer for three weeks from May 14, 2020, through June 5, 2020. The Claimant \nlast  worked  for  Respondent/Employer  on  June  5,  2020.  The  Claimant  was  assigned  by \nRespondent/Employer  to clean  at  the  Tyson  plant  in  Maumelle.  The  Claimant  was  upset  with \nTyson due to an outbreak of Covid 19 at the plant while she worked there. The Claimant and her \ngranddaughter  made  threats  against  Tyson.  On  June  5,  2020,  Tyson  insisted  the  Claimant  be \nremoved from their property. Claimant refused a position with Respondent/Employer at another \nfacility. The Claimant was terminated for insubordination and gross misconduct. The Claimant left \nthreatening voicemails with Respondent/Employer since being removed from the Tyson facility. \nThe   Claimant did   not make   a   credible   report   of   injury   while   employed   by \nRespondent/Employer.  The  AR-C  filed  by  the  Claimant  was  not  accepted  until  June  17,  2022, \nmore than two years after her last date of employment and thus more than the two years after any \nwork-related  injury  could  have  occurred.  Accordingly,  the  claim  is  barred  by  the  statute  of \nlimitations.  \nFINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \n Therefore, after a thorough consideration of the facts, issues, the applicable law, and the \nevidentiary record, I hereby make the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in accordance \nwith Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704 (Repl. 2012):   \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction over this claim. \n \n2. The stipulations set forth above are reasonable and are hereby accepted. \n \n3. The Claimant has not proven by the preponderance of the evidence that her claim was \nfiled within the statute of limitations. Therefore, her claim is barred by the statute of \nlimitations. \n \n\nSANFORD H204393 \n \n \n4 \n \n \n4. Moreover, the Claimant has also not proven by the preponderance of the evidence that \nshe  sustained  a  compensable  injury arising  out  of  and  through  the  course  of \nemployment. \n \n5. Based on my finding that 1.) the statute of limitations has passed before the filing of \nher claim, and 2.) that her alleged injuries did not arise out of and through the course \nof employment, the remaining issues of reasonable and necessary medical treatment, \ntemporary total disability benefits, and a controverted attorney’s fee are moot and will \nnot be addressed in this opinion. \n \n \nCASE IN CHIEF \nSummary of Evidence \n The record is made up of Claimant’s Exhibit 1, Medical Records, that consists of twenty-\nsix pages, Claimant’s  Exhibit  2,  documents  from  Commission’s  file,  pleadings,  and \ncorrespondence, consisting of five pages, Respondents’ Exhibit 1, Medical Records, that consist \nof twenty-five pages, Respondents’ Exhibit 2, Non-Medical  Documents,  consisting  of eleven \npages, and Commission  Exhibit  1,  Pre-Hearing  Order,  that  consists  of five pages. Forms  AR-C \nand AR-1 blue-backed and made a part of this record. The Claimant, Shirley Sanford, and Michael \nChristopher Fairfield, the Chief Executive Officer for Respondent/Employer, were the only two \nwitnesses testifying in the full hearing.  \nClaimant was a traveling custodian for the Respondent/Employer. Respondent/Employer \nwould send the Claimant out on different cleaning assignments for different business/companies. \nThe Claimant testified that on August 4, 2020, while performing assigned cleaning duties at the \nTyson plant located in Maumelle, Arkansas, she slipped and fell injuring her left leg, knee, hip, \nshoulder, and spine. The Claimant testified that she reported her injury to Tyson management but \nnot to the Respondent/Employer. The Claimant testified that Tyson made a report of her injury. \nThe  Claimant  further  testified that she  believed  that  Tyson  would  report  the  incident  to \n\nSANFORD H204393 \n \n \n5 \n \n \nRespondent/Employer. No evidence was presented showing that such a communication was ever \nmade to Respondent/Employer regarding Claimant’s August 4, 2020, alleged injuries.  \nDespite Claimant’s testimony, the Respondents argue that the Claimant did not work for \nRespondent    Employer    on    August    4,    2020. According    to    Mr. Fairfield,    CEO    for \nRespondent/Employer, the Claimant was hired by Respondent/Employer on May 5, 2020, and was \nterminated on June 6, 2020, for insubordination. Claimant’s last day of actual work was on June \n3, 2020.  Claimant denied being terminated on that date and insisted that she was still employed \nby the Respondent/Employer on August 4, 2020, despite presenting no documentary evidence to \ncounter Respondent/Employer’s business records, i.e. Claimant’s personnel file.  \nClaimant’s filings are all consistent with her alleged injury date of August 4, 2020. For \nexample, Claimant filed her Form AR-C on June 10, 2022, but it was rejected by the Commission \nfor  not  including  an  incident  date.  The  Form  AR-C  was  finally  accepted  and  filed  by  the \nCommission on June 17, 2022. According to the accepted and filed Form AR-C, Claimant stated \nthat  the  date  of  injury  was  August  4,  2020.  A Form  AR-1 was  filed on  June  27,  2022, also \npurporting the date of injury as August 4, 2020. Despite this, Claimant has not produced any pay \nstubs  or  other  affirming  documentation  that  demonstrated  that  she  was  still  working  for \nRespondent/Employer on August 4, 2020, the date of her injury.  \nAdjudication \nA. Whether the Claim is barred by the Statute of Limitations. \n Standards.    Under the  pertinent  part  of Ark.  Code  Ann.  §11-9-702(a)(1)  (Repl.  2012) it \nreads: \n“A claim for compensation for disability on account of an injury, other than an \noccupational disease and occupational infection, shall be barred unless filed with \nthe Workers’ Compensation Commission within two years from the date of the \ncompensable injury...”.  \n\nSANFORD H204393 \n \n \n6 \n \n \n \n The  burden  rests  on  Claimant  to  prove  that  her claim  was  timely  filed.   Stewart  v.  Ark. \nGlass Container, 2010 Ark. 198, 366 S.W.3d 358; Kent v. Single Source Transp., 103 Ark. App. \n151,  287  S.W.3d  619  (2008).    Under  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11-9-705(a)(3)  (Repl.  2012), she  must \nprove this by a preponderance of the evidence. The standard “preponderance of the evidence” \nmeans the evidence having greater weight or convincing force.  Barre v. Hoffman, 2009 Ark. 373, \n326 S.W.3d 415; Smith v. Magnet Cove Barium Corp., 212 Ark. 491, 206 S.W.2d 442 (1947). \n Discussion.   I  find  by  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  the  Claimant  has  failed  to \nprove that her claim was timely filed. According to the testimony of Mr. Fairfield, Claimant’s last \nday   of   employment was June   6,   2020. Mr.   Fairfield,   as   Chief   Executive   Officer   for \nRespondent/Employer, relied on business records, i.e. Claimant’s personnel file, that listed her \nstart date as May 5, 2020, and her termination date as June 6, 2020. See Respondents’ Exhibit 2, \np. 4-5. Respondent/Employer’s time keeping report shows Claimant’s last day of actual work as \nJune 3, 2020. See Respondents’ Exhibit 2, p. 8. \nDespite Respondents’ documentary evidence and aside from Claimant’s testimony, she did \nnot present any evidence that demonstrated she was working for Respondent/Employer on August \n4,  2020. For  Example, Claimant did  not produce any pay  stubs demonstrating  she  was  still \nreceiving remuneration from Respondent/Employer for services on August 4, 2020, despite being \nasked in a June 13, 2023, deposition, by Respondents’ counsel, to make copies of her pay stubs. \nSee Transcript p. 54, line 7 – p. 55, line 25. The Claimant after being reminded at the hearing of \nthe pay stub request, via deposition, denied that  she was  ever asked to bring her pay stubs. See \nTranscript  p.  55,  lines  16 - 25. I don’t find her testimony credible. Respondents  made  a clear \ncontention, months before the full hearing, that Claimant did not work for Respondent/Employer \non August 4, 2020. Claimant has the burden to prove she was employed at the time of her injuries. \n\nSANFORD H204393 \n \n \n7 \n \n \nMikel v. Engineered Specialty Plastics, 56 Ark. App. 126, 938 S.W.2d 876 (1997). The Claimant \nhas not met her burden of proof. Thus, I find by the preponderance of the evidence that Claimant’s \nlast day of employment with Respondent/Employer was on June 6, 2020.  \nFor  clarity,  this finding means any  injuries sustained  by Claimant while  working  for \nRespondent/Employer could not have occurred after June 6, 2020. Accepting Claimant’s alleged \ninjuries,  at  best, as  occurring no  later  than June  6,  2020, means  she  has  failed  to  file  her  claim \nwithin  the  two-year  statute  of  limitations. Claimant’s Form AR-C  was  filed  on  June  17,  2022, \neleven  days past the  statute  of  limitations  deadline. See  Respondents  Exhibit  2,  p.  9.  Even  if  I \naccepted the date the Form AR-C was rejected, June 10, 2022, it still would be past the two-year \nstatute of limitations deadline by four days. Thus, I find that Claimant has failed to prove by the \npreponderance of the evidence that she filed her claim within the two-year statute of limitations.  \nHowever, in  the  alternative,  taking  what  the  Claimant  said as  true  that  she  was employed  with \nRespondent/Employer on August 4, 2020, then there would not be a statute of limitations violation. \nThus, I feel the analysis should go further into compensability. \nB. Whether Claimant sustained compensable injuries to her left leg, knee, hip, \nshoulder, and spine by specific incident. \nTo determine compensability, I find Arkansas Code Annotated § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Repl. \n2012), applies to the analysis of Claimant’s alleged injuries, and it defines “compensable injury” \nas: \n(i) An accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body . . . \narising out of and in the course of employment and which requires medical services \nor results in disability or death.  An injury is “accidental” only if it is caused by a \nspecific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence[.] \n \nA compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings.  \nArk.  Code  Ann.  §  11-9-102(4)(D) (Repl. 2012).  “Objective findings” are those findings that \n\nSANFORD H204393 \n \n \n8 \n \n \ncannot come under the voluntary control of the patient.  Id. § 11-9-102(16).  The element “arising \nout of . . . [the] employment” relates to the causal connection between the claimant’s injury and \nhis or her employment.  City of El Dorado v. Sartor, 21 Ark. App. 143, 729 S.W.2d 430 (1987).  \nAn  injury arises  out  of a  claimant’s  employment  “when  a  causal  connection  between  work \nconditions and the injury is apparent to the rational mind.”  Id. \nIf the claimant fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence any of the requirements \nfor  establishing  compensability,  compensation  must  be  denied.   Mikel  v.  Engineered  Specialty \nPlastics,  56  Ark.  App.  126,  938  S.W.2d  876  (1997). Again,  this  standard  means  the  evidence \nhaving greater weight or convincing force.  Barre v. Hoffman, 2009 Ark. 373, 326 S.W.3d 415; \nSmith v. Magnet Cove Barium Corp., 212 Ark. 491, 206 S.W.2d 442 (1947). \n A claimant’s testimony is never considered uncontroverted.  Nix v. Wilson World Hotel, 46 \nArk. App. 303, 879 S.W.2d 457 (1994).  The determination of a witness’ credibility and how much \nweight to accord to that person’s testimony are solely up to the Commission.  White  v.  Gregg \nAgricultural Ent., 72 Ark. App. 309, 37 S.W.3d 649 (2001).  The Commission must sort through \nconflicting evidence and determine the true facts.  Id.  In so doing, the Commission is not required \nto  believe  the  testimony  of  the  claimant  or  any  other  witness  but  may  accept  and  translate  into \nfindings of fact only those portions of the testimony that it deems worthy of belief.  Id. \nDiscussion.  I find the Claimant has not proven by the preponderance of the evidence that \nshe  sustained  a  compensable  injury arising  out  of  and  through  the  course  of  employment. As \nmentioned  above,  the Claimant  has  the burden to  prove  she  was  employed  at  the  time  of  her \ninjuries. Mikel  v.  Engineered  Specialty  Plastics,  56  Ark.  App.  126,  938  S.W.2d  876  (1997). \nRespondent/Employer’s  business records make clear that Claimant was hired May 5, 2020,  and \nwas  terminated  due  to  insubordination  on  June  6,  2020. See  Respondents  Ex.  2,  p.  4-5.  The \n\nSANFORD H204393 \n \n \n9 \n \n \nRespondent/Employer’s timekeeping report reveals Claimant’s last actual day of work was June \n3, 2020. See Respondents’ Ex. 2, p. 8. The Claimant maintains that she was injured on August 4, \n2020. However, Claimant has produced  no  pay  stubs  or  bank  records  showing  she  was  still \nreceiving payment for services rendered by Respondent/Employer. Thus, Claimant has not proven \nby the preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a compensable injury arising out of and \nthrough the course of employment. Therefore, her claim must fail. \nMISCELLANEOUS ISSUES \n Based on my previous findings that 1.) the statute of limitations has passed before the filing \nof her claim, and 2.) no compensability since the alleged injuries did not arise out of and through \nthe course of her employment, the remaining issues regarding reasonable and necessary medical \ntreatment, temporary total disability benefits, and a controverted attorney’s fee are moot and will \nnot be addressed in this opinion.  \nCONCLUSION \n In accordance with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth above, the parties \nshall act consistent with this opinion.  \n IT IS SO ORDERED. \n \n       ________________________________ \n       Hon. Steven Porch \n                                                                                    Administrative Law Judge","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION WCC NO. H204393 SHIRLEY A. SANFORD, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT ARKANSAS BLDG. SRVS., LLC EMPLOYER RESPONDENT ACCIDENT FUND INSURANCE CO., CARRIER/THIRD-PARTY ADMINISTRATOR RESPONDENT OPINION FILED JULY 10, 2024 Hearing before Administrative Law Judge, Steven Porch, on June 12...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T22:51:05.698Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H204393-2024-07-10","pdf":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/Sanford_Shirley_H204393_20240710.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}