{"id":"alj-H204207-2024-02-01","awcc_number":"H204207","decision_date":"2024-02-01","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Bj Wallace","employer_name":"Garland County Habitat For Humanity","title":"WALLACE VS. GARLAND COUNTY HABITAT FOR HUMANITY AWCC# H204207 FEBRUARY 1, 2024","outcome":"denied","outcome_keywords":["affirmed:1","dismissed:1","granted:1","denied:4"],"injury_keywords":["neck","cervical","back","lumbar","rotator cuff","shoulder","sprain","fracture"],"pdf_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/WALLACE_BJ_H204207_20240201.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"WALLACE_BJ_H204207_20240201.pdf","text_length":27645,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \nCLAIM NO. H204207 \n \nB. J. WALLACE,   \nEMPLOYEE                                          CLAIMANT \n \nGARLAND COUNTY \nHABITAT FOR HUMANITY,   \nEMPLOYER                                                RESPONDENT \n \nBANKERS STANDARD INS. CO./ \nESIS, INC.,   \nINS. CARRIER/TPA                                RESPONDENT \n \n \nOPINION FILED FEBRUARY 1, 2024 \n \nHearing  before  the  Arkansas  Workers’  Compensation  Commission  (the  Commission), \nAdministrative Law Judge (ALJ) Mike Pickens, on November 3, 2023, at Hot Springs, Garland \nCounty, Arkansas. \n \nThe claimant was represented by the Honorable Laura Beth York, Rainwater Holt & Sexton, Little \nRock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.   \n \nThe respondents were represented by the Honorable Eric Newkirk, Newkirk & Jones, Little Rock, \nPulaski County, Arkansas. \n \nINTRODUCTION \n     In the prehearing order filed July 26, 2023, the parties agreed to the following stipulations, \nwhich they affirmed on the record at the hearing: \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission (the Commission) has \njurisdiction over this claim. \n \n2. The  employer/employee/carrier-TPA  relationship  existed  with  the  claimant  at  all \nrelevant times, including March 8, 2022, when the claimant alleges he sustained a \nwork-related injuries to  his neck/cervical spine,  both his right and left shoulders, \nand his lower back/lumbar spine. \n                                                     \n3.   The claimant’s average weekly wage  (AWW)  is  $378.79,  which  is  sufficient  to \nentitle him to weekly compensation rates of $252.00 for temporary total disability \n(TTD),  and $190.00 for  permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits subject if his \n\nB.J. Wallace, AWCC No. H204207   \n \n \n \n2 \nalleged injuries are deemed compensable. \n \n4. The respondents have paid some medical benefits, but they controvert any and all \nadditional  medical  and/or  indemnity  benefits  other  than  those  they  have  paid  to \ndate. \n \n5. All parties specifically reserve any and all other issues for future determination \n            and/or hearing.     \n(Commission Exhibit 1 at 1-2; Reporter’s Transcript at 73-74; 5-6). Pursuant to the parties’ mutual \nagreement, the issues litigated at the hearing were: \n1. Whether the claimant sustained “compensable injuries” within the meaning of the \nArkansas’ Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) to his neck, both his right and left \nshoulders, and his lower back/lumbar spine on March 8, 2022. \n \n2. If the claimant’s alleged injuries are deemed compensable, the extent to which he \nis entitled to additional medical treatment. \n \n3. Whether the claimant’s attorney is entitled to a controverted fee on these facts. \n \n4. The parties specifically reserve any and all other issues for future litigation and/or \ndetermination. \n \n(Comms’n Ex. 1 at 2; T. 74). \n \nThe claimant contends that on March 8, 2022, he was loading a washing machine into a \nvan with a co-worker, when the co-worker dropped his end of the load causing the claimant to \nsustain an injury to his neck, both his right and left shoulders, and his lower back. The respondents \ninitially  accepted  the  claim  as  compensable  and  paid  some  medical  benefits.  The  claimant \ncontends that on March 16, 2022, he received treatment from Dr. Mark Larey, who ordered twelve \n(12) sessions of physical therapy (PT), and placed the claimant on light duty work restrictions. \nOn March 16, 2022, Dr. Larey halted the PT and ordered MRIs of the claimant’s left and right \nshoulders. The claimant contends that June 14, 2022, MRIs revealed evidence of rotator cuff and \n\nB.J. Wallace, AWCC No. H204207   \n \n \n \n3 \nlabral pathology, as well as chondromalacia along the glenohumeral joint of both the claimant’s \nleft  and  right  shoulders.  The  claimant  contends  that,  thereafter,  on  June  16,  2022,  Dr.  Larey \nopined he should continue PT, and he ordered  an EMG/NCS study, noting the claimant would \neventually need to be placed on permanent restrictions.  The claimant contends at this point the \nrespondents denied the claim and stopped paying for all medical treatment. Therefore, for all the \nreasons set forth above the claimant contends he sustained compensable injuries as set forth above \nwithin  the  course  and  scope  of  his  employment,  and  that  he  is  entitled  to  additional  medical \ntreatment, and TTD benefits, and that his attorney is entitled to a controverted attorney’s fee. The \nclaimant specifically reserves any and all other issues for future determination and/or litigation. \n(Comms’n Ex. 1 at 2-3; T. 75).   \n The respondents contend the claimant was involved in an admitted work incident/event on \nMarch 8, 2022, while he was assisting another employee load a washing machine into a van. The \nrespondents  contend  they  initially  accepted  the  claim  as  compensable,  and  paid  some  medical \nbenefits; however, relevant medical records and diagnostic studies conducted after the date of the \nalleged injury(ies) failed to reveal any acute or other \"trauma-related\" objective medical findings \nof  any  injury(ies)  as  the  Act  defines a “compensable injury”(ies).  Instead,  the  only  medical \nfindings were degenerative in nature, and not causally connected or related to the work incident. \nConsequently, the respondents contend all the subject conditions were and are clearly preexisting \nand not work-related or “compensable” within the Act’s meaning.  Accordingly, the respondents \ncontend the alleged injuries to the claimant's neck, both his right and his left shoulders, and lower \nback/lumbar spine are not compensable since there are no objective medical findings which are \ncausally  connected  or  related  to  the  subject  March  8,  2022,  work  incident.  Alternatively,  in  the \nevent  the  Commission  deems  this  claim compensable,  the  respondents  contend  the  claimant \nsustained  nothing  more  than  a  temporary  aggravation(s)  of  his  clearly  and  demonstrably \n\nB.J. Wallace, AWCC No. H204207   \n \n \n \n4 \npreexisting conditions for which they have paid all appropriate medical benefits, and the claimant \nis entitled to no additional medical treatment or other benefits pursuant to the Act. Furthermore, \nthe  respondents  contend  that  if  the  respondents  have  and  continue  to  employ  the  claimant  on  a \nfull-time  basis, this claim is a “medical only” claim.  Therefore,  if  the  Commission  deems  the \nclaimant is entitled to any additional medical benefits, the respondents contend he is not entitled \nto TTD benefits since he continued to work on a full-time basis without any lost time or wages. \nFinally,  and  alternatively,  the  respondents  contend  that  if  the  Commission  awards  additional \nmedical or indemnity benefits to the claimant, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. Section 11-9-411 (Lexis \nReplacement 2023) they are entitled to a dollar-for-dollar credit/offset for any such benefits paid \nto the claimant by any and all third-party payor(s), including but not limited to, health insurance, \nshort- and/or long-term disability (STD or LTD) benefits, as well as unemployment benefits. The \nrespondents specifically reserve any and all other issues for future litigation and/or determination. \n(Comms’n Ex. 1 at 3-4; T. 75-76; 67-68). \nAt the beginning of the hearing the parties presented an evidentiary dispute to the ALJ for \nresolution prior to the taking of testimony. The dispute related to certain medical records of CHI \nSt. Vincent (St. Vincent) Hospital. The respondents had received the medical records late due to \nissues with a third-party vendor St. Vincent apparently uses to obtain and transmit medical records \nto  anyone  requesting  them.  Because  the  vendor  was  dilatory  in  obtaining  and/or  providing  the \nmedical records to the respondents, the respondents were unable to and admittedly did not provide \nthe records to the claimant within seven (7) days before the hearing date as the prehearing order \nrequires.  (It  appears  the respondents’  attorney  provided  the  records  to the claimant’s attorney \napproximately  30  minutes  before  the  start  of  the  Friday,  November  3,  2023,  hearing.  (T.  12)). \nConsequently, the ALJ resolved the dispute by sustaining the claimant’s attorney’s objection to \n\nB.J. Wallace, AWCC No. H204207   \n \n \n \n5 \nthe introduction of the subject medical records, thereby denying the respondents’ request to \nintroduce  the  medical  records  into  the  hearing  record.  However,  the  respondents’  attorney \nrequested and the ALJ permitted the respondents to proffer the subject St. Vincent medical records \nas Respondents’ Proffered Exhibit 1. (T. 7-16; RPX 1 at 1-55). Also, since the medical records \nrelated to questions respondents’ counsel already had asked the claimant under oath in his sworn \ndeposition,  the  respondents’  attorney  was  allowed  to  utilize  any  such  relevant  information \ncontained in RPX 1 in his cross-examination of the claimant. (T. 12; 15; 36-53; 57-60).   \nConsequently,  the  record  herein  on  which  the  ALJ  based  his  decision  consists  of  the \nhearing transcript and any and all exhibits contained therein and attached thereto, except RPX 1 \nfor the reasons set forth and explained in detail, supra. \n   STATEMENT OF THE CASE \nThe facts of this case are simple, straight-forward, and not subject to reasonable dispute. \nThe  claimant,  Mr.  B.J.  Wallace  (the  claimant),  is  69  years  old  and  a  resident  of  Hot  Springs \nVillage. In his professional career he worked for Weyerhaeuser, and also as a licensed property \nand casualty and life insurance agent. He worked with his wife at her Farmers insurance agency, \nand he also was appointed as an agent with Reliable Life in Little Rock. The claimant has kept his \nArkansas insurance agent’s license active, so he is still licensed to sell insurance in Arkansas. He \nstarted working with Habitat for Humanity (Habitat) around October of 2021, at which time he \nwould have been 68 years old. He testified his job at Habitat entailed him working primarily as a \nrepairman on small appliances, and he now continues working for them performing various other \nunnamed job duties which do not require him to lift anything heavy. (T. 18-19). \n\nB.J. Wallace, AWCC No. H204207   \n \n \n \n6 \nOn March 8, 2022, the claimant and two (2) other men were loading a washing machine \ninto a van through the van’s sliding side door. One (1) of the men was in the van, and the claimant \nand another man were lifting the washing machine into the van when the other man lost his grip \nand dropped his end of the washing machine just inside the van, while the claimant maintained his \ngrip on it. The claimant estimated the washing machine weighed approximately 100 pounds. He \ntestified the other man did not drop his end of the washing machine to the ground, but was able to \nget  it  just  inside  the  van  before  he  lost  his  grip,  which  left  the  claimant  holding  one  end  of  the \nwashing machine while the other two (2) men were trying to lift and pull it all the way inside the \nvan. The claimant testified he experienced pain in the area of both his left and right scapula, and \nthe left side of his neck. He said he reported the incident to someone but he could not remember \nhis name. (T. 19-24).   \nThe medical records reveal the claimant did not seek to obtain medical treatment until some \neight  (8)  days  later,  when  on  March  16,  2022,  he  went  to  see  Dr.  Mark  Larey.  At  that  time  the \nclaimant  told  Dr.  Larey  his  chief  complaint  was  bilateral  shoulder  pain  which  had  developed, \n“mostly in the shoulder blade area, burning, stinging and interferes with sleep laying on R shoulder, \ntried  salonpas  [sic], no prior shoulder issues.” (Claimant’s Exhibit 1 at 1; T. 81)  (Bracketed \nmaterial added). The claimant told Dr. Larey his pain had started as a result of the washing machine \nincident on March 8, 2022, and had gotten worse since then. Dr. Larey’s clinic note of 3/16/2022 \nreflects his physical examination of the claimant’s left and right shoulders revealed no evidence of \nswelling, bruising or a wound of any kind, and although X-rays did show  evidence of AC joint \narthritis in both shoulders, and the claimant had limited ROM (range of motion). (CX1 at 1; T. 81). \n\nB.J. Wallace, AWCC No. H204207   \n \n \n \n7 \nDr. Larey’s physical examination of the claimant’s cervical spine revealed no evidence of swelling, \nbruising or a wound, and the clinic note states, “No palpable spasm noted.” Dr. Larey diagnosed \nthe claimant with a, “Sprain of other specified parts of” both his left and right shoulder girdle. \n(CX1 at 1; T. 81). Dr. Larey released the claimant to return to light duty work, and the Habitat has \naccommodated and continues to accommodate the claimant with light duty work. (CX1 at 2; T. \n82).  The  claimant  has  not  missed  any  time  from  work,  and  Habitat  has  not  required  him  to  lift \nanything  heavy,  and  has  paid  his  regular  salary  from  March  8,  2022,  through  the  date  of  the \nhearing. (T. 19).   \nThe claimant followed up with Dr. Larey on March 23, 2022, at which time he reported his \nshoulder  condition  had  not  improved.  (CX1  at  6-7;  T.  86-87).  Consequently,  on  6/14/2022,  Dr. \nLarey ordered an MRIs of the claimant’s right and left shoulders which showed, no evidence of a \nrotator  cuff  tear  or  labral  pathology,  and  merely  naturally-occurring,  age-related  degenerative \nchanges. (CX1 at 8-11; T. 88-91). A CT scan of the claimant’s head and cervical spine performed \non 7/4/2022 showed no acute intracranial abnormality; and no traumatic fracture or malalignment \nof the cervical spine. (CX1 at 12-16; T. 92-96). \nOn cross-examination the claimant admitted that in June 19 or 20 of 2019 he was involved \nin  a  motor  vehicle  accident  (MVA)  which  resulted  in  him  having  neck  and  shoulder  pain  and \ndiscomfort, The claimant went on to testify he did not have any neck or shoulder pain before the \n2019 June MVA. Although he had denied any previous issues with his shoulder when he first saw \nDr. Larey on 3/16/2022 (CX1 at 1, 1-5) – some eight (8) days after the washing machine lifting \nincident at Habitat – further cross-examination and testimony revealed the claimant complained of \n\nB.J. Wallace, AWCC No. H204207   \n \n \n \n8 \nneck, bilateral shoulder, and lower back pain after the June 2019 MVA. (T. 36-60). Finally, the \nrecord is unclear what outstanding medical bills, if any, the claimant has at this time. (T. 67).         \n      DISCUSSION \nThe Burden of Proof \n When deciding any issue, the ALJ and the Commission shall determine, on the basis of the \nrecord  as  a  whole,  whether  the  party  having  the  burden  of  proof  has  established  it  by  a \npreponderance of the evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704(c)(2) (2023 Lexis Replacement). The \nclaimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence he is entitled to benefits. \nStone v. Patel, 26 Ark. App. 54, 759 S.W.2d 579 (Ark. App. 1998). Ark. Code Ann. Section 11-\n9-704(c)(3) (2023 Lexis Repl.) states that the ALJ, the Commission, and the courts “shall strictly \nconstrue” the Act, which also requires them to read and construe the Act in its entirety, and to \nharmonize its provisions when necessary. Farmers Coop. v. Biles, 77 Ark. App. 1, 69 S.W.2d 899 \n(Ark.  App.  2002).  In  determining  whether  the  claimant  has  met  his  burden  of  proof,  the \nCommission is required to weigh the evidence impartially without giving the benefit of the doubt \nto either party. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704(c)(4) (2023 Lexis Repl.); Gencorp Polymer Products \nv. Landers, 36 Ark. App. 190, 820 S.W.2d 475 (Ark. App. 1991); Fowler v. McHenry, 22 Ark. \nApp. 196, 737 S.W.2d 633 (Ark. App. 1987). \nAll claims for workers’ compensation benefits must be based on proof. Speculation and \nconjecture, even if plausible, cannot take the place of proof. Ark. Dep’t of Corrections v. Glover, \n35 Ark. App. 32, 812 S.W.2d 692 (Ark. App. 1991); Deana Constr. Co. v. Herndon, 264 Ark. 791, \n\nB.J. Wallace, AWCC No. H204207   \n \n \n \n9 \n595 S.W.2d 155 (1979). It is the Commission’s exclusive responsibility to determine the credibility \nof the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony. Whaley v. Hardees, 51 Ark. App. 116, 912 \nS.W.2d 14 (Ark. App. 1995). The Commission is not required to believe either a claimant’s or any \nother witness’s testimony, but may accept and translate into findings of fact those portions of the \ntestimony it deems believable. McClain v. Texaco, Inc., 29 Ark. App. 218, 780 S.W.2d 34 (Ark. \nApp. 1989); Farmers Coop. v. Biles, supra.  \nThe  Commission  has  the  duty  to  weigh  the  medical  evidence  just  as  it  does  any  other \nevidence,  and  its  resolution  of  the  medical  evidence  has  the  force  and  effect  of  a  jury  verdict. \nWilliams v. Pro Staff Temps., 336 Ark. 510, 988 S.W.2d 1 (1999). It is within the Commission’s \nprovince  to  weigh  the  totality  of  the  medical  evidence  and  to  determine  what  evidence  is  most \ncredible  given  the  totality  of  the  credible  evidence  of  record. Minnesota  Mining  &  Mfg’ing  v. \nBaker, 337 Ark. 94, 989 S.W.2d 151 (1999). \nThe Act’s Definition of a Specific-Incident Compensable Injury \nFor  any  specific-incident  injury  to  be  compensable,  the  claimant  must  prove  by  a \npreponderance of the evidence that his injury: (1) arose out of and in course of his employment; \n(2) caused internal or external harm to his body that required medical services; (3) is supported   \nby objective findings, medical evidence, establishing the alleged injury; and (4) was caused by a \nspecific  incident  identifiable  by  time  and  place  of  occurrence. Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11-9-102(4); \nCossey v. Gary A. Thomas Racing Stable, 2009 Ark. App. 666, at 5, 344 S.W.3d 684, 687 (Ark. \nApp.  2009).  Of  course,  the  claimant  bears  the  burden  of  proving  the  compensable  injury  by  a \npreponderance of the credible evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(E)(i); and Cossey, supra.   \n\nB.J. Wallace, AWCC No. H204207   \n \n \n \n10 \n“Objective findings” are those findings which cannot come under the voluntary control of \nthe patient. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(A); Long v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 98 Ark. App. 70, \nat  80  250  S.W.3d  263,  at  272  (Ark.  App.  2007).  Objective  findings, “specifically exclude such \nsubjective complaints or findings such pain, straight-leg-raising tests, and range-of-motion tests.” \nBurks  v.  RIC,  Inc.,  2010  Ark.  App.  862  (Ark.  App.  2010).  Objective  medical  evidence  is  not \nessential to establish a causal relationship between the work-related accident and the alleged injury \nwhere objective medical evidence exists to prove the existence and extent of the underlying injury, \nand a preponderance of other nonmedical evidence establishes a causal relationship between the \nobjective  injury  and  the  work-related  incident(s)  in  question. Flynn  v.  Southwest  Catering  Co., \n2010  Ark.  App.  766,  379  S.W.3d  670  (Ark.  App.  2010).  Moreover,  the  claimant  must  prove  a \ncausal relationship exists between her employment and the alleged injury. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., \nv. Westbrook, 77 Ark. App. 167, 171, 72 S.W.3d 889, 892 (Ark. App. 2002) (citing McMillan v. \nU.S. Motors, 59 Ark. App. 85, 90, 953 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Ark. App. 1997)).   \nConcerning the proof required to demonstrate the aggravation of a preexisting condition, \nour appellate courts have consistently held that since an aggravation is a new injury, a claimant \nmust prove it by new objective evidence of a new injury different than the preexisting condition. \nVaughn  v.  Midland  School  Dist.,  2012  Ark.  App.  344  (Ark.  App.  2012)  (citing Barber  v.  Pork \nGrp., Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 138 (Ark. App. 2012); Grothaus v. Vista Health, LLC, 2011 Ark. App. \n130, 382 S.W.3d 1 (Ark. App. 2011); Mooney v. AT & T, 2010 Ark. App. 600, 378 S.W.3d 162 \n(Ark.  App.  2010)  (Emphases  added.).  Where  the  only  objective  findings  present  are  consistent \nwith prior objective findings or consistent with a long-term degenerative condition rather than an \n\nB.J. Wallace, AWCC No. H204207   \n \n \n \n11 \nacute  injury,  this  does  not  satisfy  the  objective  findings  requirement  for  the  compensable \naggravation  of  a  preexisting  condition  injury. Vaughn,  2012  Ark.  App.  344,  at  6  (holding  that \nArkansas courts have interpreted the Act to require “new objective medical findings to establish a \nnew injury when the claimant seeks benefits for the aggravation of a preexisting condition”); \nBarber,  supra (affirming the Commission’s denial of an aggravation of a preexisting condition \nclaim where the MRI findings revealed a degenerative condition, with no evidence of, and which \ncould not be explained by, an acute injury) (Emphases added.). In Mooney, 2010 Ark. App. 600 at \n4-6,  378  S.W.3d  at  165-66 (Ark. App. 2010), the court affirmed the Commission’s decision \ndenying a back injury claim where the objective evidence of an injury - including muscle spasms, \npositive EMG test results, and spinal stenosis revealed on an MRI - were all present both before \nand after the date of the alleged aggravation injury. (Emphasis added). \nBased  on  the  aforementioned  law  as  applied  to  the  facts  of  this  case,  I  am  compelled  to \nfind the claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof in demonstrating he has objective evidence \nof an accidental injury related to the relatively minor 3/8/2022 work incident as the Act requires, \nfor the following reasons. (And I refer to the 3/8/2022 work incident as “minor” and/or “relatively \nminor” based not only on the claimant’s description of the work incident, but also on the facts he \ndid not require medical attention until some eight (8) days after the incident, and he has continued \nto work at Habitat and has received his regular salary, since the incident.) \nFirst, the fact the claimant denied to Dr. Larey he ever had any shoulder pain before the \nrelatively minor work incident of March 8, 2022, then admitted on cross-examination he had been \ninvolved in an MVA on June 19 or 20, 2019, after which he complained of and  was treated for \n\nB.J. Wallace, AWCC No. H204207   \n \n \n \n12 \nessentially the same pain complaints in his shoulders, neck, and lower back for which he now is \nseeking workers’ compensation benefits,  is  troublesome.  It  is  also  troublesome,  and  somewhat \nrevealing, the claimant apparently never even told Dr. Larey anything about the June 2019 MVA, \nand the pain complaints he had experienced as a result of the MVA. Why would the claimant keep \nthis obviously relevant and significant medical history from Dr. Larey? \nSecond, the June 2019 MVA is at least as likely – if not more likely – to have caused the \nclaimant  continuing  pain  complaints  in  both  his  shoulders,  his  neck,  and  lower  back  than  the \nrelatively minor 3/8/2022 work incident. If anything, the totality of the evidence of record clearly \npreponderates in favor of the conclusion that while the minor 3/8/2022 work incident may have \nexacerbated the claimant’s preexisting pain which apparently first manifested after the 2019 June \nMVA. It most certainly demonstrates there exists no objective evidence whatsoever – or at least \ngrossly insufficient evidence with respect to the Act’s required burden of proof – the claimant the \nclaimant sustained an accidental injury as a result of the minor 3/8/2022 work incident. On these \nfacts, it would constitute clear speculation and conjecture for a fact-finder to find the claimant’s \nalleged  injuries  compensable  in  light  of  the  June  2019  MVA,  and  the  claimant’s  resulting \nsymptoms and pain complaints which, again, are essentially identical to his current subjective and \nself-serving complaints of pain, tingling, and numbness, etc. Of course, it is well-settled Arkansas \nworkers’ compensation law that speculation and conjecture do not support a claim for benefits. \nSee, Deana, supra.   \nWhich brings us squarely to the third and most significant reason the claimant has failed to \nmeet his burden of proof pursuant to the Act: the record is devoid of sufficient objective evidence \n\nB.J. Wallace, AWCC No. H204207   \n \n \n \n13 \nthe claimant sustained an accidental work injury as a result of the minor 3/8/2022 work incident at \nHabitat  for  Humanity.  The  aforementioned  X-rays,  MRIs,  and  CT  scan  all  reveal  nothing  more \nthan  evidence  of  degenerative  changes  which  are  the  result  of  the  natural  process  of  aging,  and \nwhich are entirely consistent with a man who is 69 years of age. As the Vaughn, Grothaus, and \nMoody  decisions  cited supra explain  in  detail,  these  type  of  degenerative,  naturally-occurring \nobjective  findings  are  the  result  of  the  aging  process,  and  precisely  the  type  of  findings  the \nlegislature intended to exclude as evidence of an accidental injury that occurred within the course \nand scope of employment when it passed Act 796 of 1993. The claimant’s underlying degenerative \nconditions  simply  do  not  constitute  objective  (medical)  evidence  of  an  accidental  work-related \ninjury and, again, are entirely consistent with someone of his age. Such naturally-occurring, age-\nrelated  conditions  clearly  are  not  the  type  of  conditions  the  workers’ compensation system was \nand is designed to cover, as the Act, and the aforementioned precedents – among others – make   \nabundantly clear. \nTherefore, for the aforementioned reasons, I hereby make the following: \nFINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \n1. The stipulations contained in the prehearing order filed July 26, 2023,  which the \nparties affirmed on the record at the hearing, hereby are accepted as facts.   \n \n2. The  claimant  has  failed  to  meet  his  burden  of  proof  pursuant  to  the  Act  in \ndemonstrating he sustained a “compensable injury”(ies) within the Act’s meaning \nto his neck/cervical spine, and/or to both his right and left shoulders, and/or to his \nneck/cervical  spine,  and/or  to  his  lower  back/lumbar  spine  as  a  result  of  the \nrelatively minor March 8, 2022, incident at Habitat for Humanity.   \n \n3. Specifically, the claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof as the Act requires \n\nB.J. Wallace, AWCC No. H204207   \n \n \n \n14 \nin demonstrating he has any objective evidence of an accidental injury to any of the \nsubject body parts set forth above. Indeed, the claimant had no objective medical \nevidence of an accidental injury when he first saw Dr. Larey on March 16, 2022, \nsome  eight  (8)  days  after  the  incident;  and  none  on  the  thorough  and  extensive \ndiagnostic testing conducted thereafter revealed any objective medical evidence of \nan  accidental  injury,  but  merely  showed  objective  findings  that  are  entirely \ndegenerative in nature, consistent with the claimant’s age and the natural aging \nprocess. Therefore, pursuant to the Vaughn, Grothaus, and Moody precedents cited \nsupra, the claimant has failed to meet the burden of proof the Act requires.     \n \n4. The claimant’s attorney is not entitled to a fee on these facts.   \n \nFor all these reasons, this claim is denied and dismissed subject to the parties’ statutory \nappeal rights. \nIT IS SO ORDERED.   \n \n                                              \n \nMike Pickens \nAdministrative Law Judge \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMP/mp","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION CLAIM NO. H204207 B. J. WALLACE, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT GARLAND COUNTY HABITAT FOR HUMANITY, EMPLOYER RESPONDENT BANKERS STANDARD INS. CO./ ESIS, INC., INS. CARRIER/TPA RESPONDENT OPINION FILED FEBRUARY 1, 2024 Hearing before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission ...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T22:57:06.168Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H204207-2024-02-01","pdf":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/WALLACE_BJ_H204207_20240201.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}