{"id":"alj-H203103-2025-12-15","awcc_number":"H203103","decision_date":"2025-12-15","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Jennifer Bricker","employer_name":"Dept. Of Correction","title":"BRICKER VS. DEPT. OF CORRECTION AWCC# H203103 December 15, 2025","outcome":"granted","outcome_keywords":["granted:6","denied:1"],"injury_keywords":["shoulder","rotator cuff","neck","wrist","back","cervical"],"pdf_url":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/Bricker_Jennifer_H203103_20251215.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"Bricker_Jennifer_H203103_20251215.pdf","text_length":38670,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \nCLAIM NO. H203103 \n \nJENNIFER BRICKER, EMPLOYEE   CLAIMANT \n \nDEPT. OF CORRECTION, EMPLOYER   RESPONDENT \n \nPUBLIC EMPLOYEE CLAIMS DIVISION, CARRIER/TPA  RESPONDENT \n \nOPINION FILED DECEMBER 15, 2025 \n \nHearing  before  Administrative  Law  Judge,  Steven  Porch,  on October 24,  2025,  in Jonesboro, \nCraighead County, Arkansas. \n \nClaimant was represented by Mr. Daniel E. Wren, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas. \n \nRespondents  were  represented  by  Mr. Robert  H.  Montgomery, Attorney  at  Law,  Little  Rock, \nArkansas. \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE \n \n A  full  hearing  was  held  on  this  claim  on October 24,  2025.  A  prehearing  telephone \nconference  took  place  on July 15,  2025.  A  prehearing  order  was  entered  on the  same  day, and \nsubsequently  entered  into  evidence  as  Commission  Exhibit  1,  with  amendments. The  parties \nconfirmed the stipulations and the issues at the hearing. The parties’ stipulations are set forth. \nSTIPULATIONS \n By agreement of the parties, the stipulations applicable to this claim are as follows: \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction of the \nwithin claim. \n \n2. An  employer/employee/carrier/tpa relationship  existed  on  February  17, \n2022, when Claimant sustained a compensable injury to her right shoulder. \n \n3. The Respondents accepted the claim and has paid some benefits. \n \n4. Claimant’s average weekly wage was $995.93, entitling her to temporary \ntotal disability (TTD) benefit rate of $664.00 weekly, and a permanent \npartial disability (PPD) benefit rate of $498 weekly.  \n \n \n\nBRICKER H203103 \n \n2 \n \nISSUES \n \nBy agreement of the parties, the issues to be presented at the hearing are as follows: \n1. Whether Claimant is entitled to additional reasonable and necessary medical treatment \nfor her stipulated compensable right shoulder injury. \n \n2. Whether Claimant is entitled to additional TTD benefits from September 12, 2024, until \na date to be determined. \n \n3. Whether Claimant is entitled to additional PTD benefits. \n \n4. Whether Claimant is entitled to wage loss disability benefits\n1\n. \n \n5. Whether Claimant’s attorney is entitled to a controverted attorney’s fee. \n \nAll other issues are reserved. \n \nCONTENTIONS \nClaimant contends: \nClaimant sustained an on-the-job injury to her right shoulder on February 17, 2022, when \nshe slipped and fell on the wet stairs. She has undergone three right shoulder surgeries:  the 1\nst\n \nsurgery being performed on August 23, 2022, by Dr. Guinn to repair a labral tear; and second \nsurgery on August 21, 2023, and the third surgery on April 1, 2024, were performed by Dr. Eric \nGordon for repairs of the same tear. \n On August 5, 2024, Claimant had a 3-phase bone scan that indicated an atypical \npresentation of complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS). On August 20, 2024, the Claimant was \nseen by Dr. Gordon who recommended that she be seen by the following medical providers: \n NEA Baptist Pain Management \n St. Bernard’s Physical Therapy \n NEA Rheumatology \n \n1\n The issue here is regarding wage loss benefits, not “lost wages” so this issue was re-written for clarity. \n\nBRICKER H203103 \n \n3 \n \n On August 30, 2024, Claimant received a message from Dr. Gordon’s nurse, Rhonda, \nstating that she does not need to do formal therapy.  Sometime later this order was changed, with \nthe explanation that it was a mistake, and that Claimant needs formal therapy. On September 12, \n2024, the Respondents discontinued temporary total disability benefits for the Claimant, alleging \nthat she had not been cooperative with physical therapy. \n Respondents have failed and refused to provide reasonable medical treatment for the \nClaimant and refused to make referrals to the medical providers as stated by Dr. Gordon. On \nOctober 9, 2024, Dr. Gordon released the Claimant at maximum medical improvement (MMI) \nbut, again, Dr. Gordon suggested that she see a rheumatologist, which had been denied by the \nRespondents. Although Dr. Gordon placed the Claimant at MMI on October 9, 2024, he stated \nthat she should see a rheumatologist and placed her on work restrictions until she saw a doctor \nfor CRPS. The Respondents forced the Claimant to come to Little Rock and see Dr. Carlos \nRoman instead of the pain management doctor in Northeast Arkansas to whom she had been \nreferred to by Dr. Gordon. \n Eventually, the Claimant sought treatment on her own with Dr. Justin Rabinowitz. Dr. \nRabinowitz indicated that the Claimant has signs of CRPS. He also noted that an MRI performed \nin April 2025 showed fraying of the interior inferior labrum and fraying of the adjoining \nchondral surface. The MRI also showed redundant suture material along the end, the inferior \naspect of the glenoid. Dr. Rabinowitz has stated that he is somewhat reluctant to do another \nsurgical procedure on the Claimant’s shoulder for fear of aggravating her CRPS. Dr. Rabinowitz \nhas referred the Claimant to Dr. Jianbin Zheung for ganglion blocks. \n \n \n\nBRICKER H203103 \n \n4 \n \n \nRespondents contend: \n \n The Claimant reported injuring her right shoulder on February 17, 2022.  The \nRespondents accepted the claim as compensable and have paid indemnity benefits to Claimant as \nwell as related medical expenses.  The Claimant came under the care of Dr. Spencer Guinn, and \nthe Claimant was found to be at MMI and released to return to work on May 12, 2023.  Dr. \nGuinn assigned a permanent impairment rating of three percent (3%) to the body as a whole, and \nRespondents paid appropriate PPD benefits towards this rating. \n The Claimant then came under the care of Dr. Gordon, who performed surgery on August \n21, 2023.  The Respondents paid TTD benefits through September 11, 2024, and discontinued \nTTD payments at that time due to the Claimant’s non-compliance with recommended medical \ntreatment. \n The Respondents contend that all appropriate indemnity benefits have been paid to the \nClaimant.  The Claimant is not entitled to additional TTD benefits.  The Claimant is not entitled \nto wage-loss disability benefits, and she is not permanently and totally disabled. \n \nFINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \n Therefore, after a thorough consideration of the facts, issues, the applicable law, and the \nevidentiary record, and having the opportunity to hear testimony of the Claimant and to observe \nher demeanor, I hereby make the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in accordance \nwith Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704 (Repl. 2012):   \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction over this claim. \n \n2. The stipulations set forth above are reasonable and are hereby accepted. \n \n3. The Claimant has failed to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that she is \nentitled to additional medical treatment for her compensable right shoulder injury. \n\nBRICKER H203103 \n \n5 \n \nMoreover,  the  treatment  the  Claimant  received  from Nurse Practitioner Wray, Dr. \nRabinowitz, Dr. Vecchiarelli, and Dr. Zheng, was  unauthorized  and  the  Respondents \nare not financially responsible for that treatment or associated expenses. \n \n4. The Claimant has proven by the preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to \nTTD benefits from September 12, 2024, to October 29, 2024, but has failed to prove \nby  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  she  is  entitled  to  additional  TTD  benefits \nafter October 29, 2024. \n \n5. The  Claimant  has  failed  to  prove  by  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  she  is \nentitled to PTD benefits. \n \n6. The  Claimant  has  failed  to  prove  by  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  she  is \nentitled to wage loss benefits. \n \n7. The Claimant’s attorney is entitled to a controverted attorney’s fee. \n \n \nCASE IN CHIEF \nSummary of Evidence \n The record is made up of Claimant’s Exhibit 1, medical records, consisting of 386 pages; \nClaimant’s Exhibit 2, correspondence and transcription, consisting of 13 pages; Claimant’s Exhibit \n3, photographs  of  Claimant’s  hands, consisting  of  3  pages; Respondents’  Exhibit  1, \ncorrespondence,  pleadings,  medical  reports,  consisting  of 33  pages; Respondents’  Exhibit  2, \nmedical records, consisting of 11 pages; Commission Exhibit 1, Pre-Hearing Order filed July 15, \n2025, with amendments, consisting of 8 pages. The Claimant was the only witness testifying at the \nfull hearing.  \nThe Claimant was employed as a sergeant for the Respondent Employer. The Claimant \ninjured her right shoulder on February 17, 2022, when she slipped on some wet stairs. This injury \nwas accepted as compensable by the Respondents. On February 18, 2022, the Claimant went to \nthe Paragould Urgent Care and was seen by Mr. Garrett Wray, Nurse Practitioner, for treatment of \nher right shoulder. CL Ex. 1, pp. 1-5. The Claimant underwent an x-ray that revealed no acute \n\nBRICKER H203103 \n \n6 \n \nfractures, that her bones maintained normal alignment, and that her soft tissues was unremarkable. \nId. Despite this, Mr. Wray discussed the possibility of a rotator cuff injury and referred Claimant \nto an orthopedic specialist. Id. The Claimant was also provided anti-inflammatory medication \nduring that visit. Id.  \nOn March 9, 2022, the Claimant saw Dr. Ron Schecter at the Northeast Arkansas Baptist \nClinic. CL Ex. 1, pp. 6-10. Dr. Schecter’s physical examination revealed no obvious swelling, \ndeformity, or atrophy noted to her right shoulder. Id. She did have tenderness to palpation anteriorly \nin the neck and over the shoulder. Id.  Dr. Schecter assessed Claimant with contusions of multiple \nareas of her right shoulder and acute pain of the right shoulder. Id. Dr. Schecter treated her shoulder \nwith a steroid injection since she did not want to go further into a diagnosis of a torn rotator cuff \nand possible surgery. Id. Dr. Schecter advised Claimant that if conservative measures were not \nhelping, an MRI and surgery might be considered for relief. Id. \nEventually, Claimant was found to have a rotator cuff tear and underwent a right shoulder \narthroscopy with anterior labral repair on August 23, 2022, by Dr. Guinn. Resp. Ex. 2, pp. 7-9. Dr. \nGuinn put Claimant on maximum medical improvement on April 24, 2023. Id. Dr. Gordon, an \northopedic surgeon, performed an arthroscopic surgery on Claimant’s right shoulder to repair a \nrecurrent labral tear on August 21, 2023; this was repeated on April 1, 2024. Id. and CL Ex. 1, pp. \n79-84. On August  20, 2024,  Claimant  had  a  follow-up  with  Dr.  Gordon complaining  about \ndifficulty with postoperative recovery and persistent pain. CL. Ex. 1, pp. 106-112. Prior to this \nvisit, Dr. Gordon ordered a bone scan, administered on August 5, 2024, due to concerns for possible \nCRPS. Id. The report, per the radiologist, indicated decreased uptake in the right hand and wrist \nduring the angiographic and blood pool phases of the exam. Id. This could, according to the report, \nrepresent atypical presentation of CRPS. Id. The report also noted an uptake in the right shoulder \n\nBRICKER H203103 \n \n7 \n \nthat was likely degenerative or post-surgical in nature. Id. Claimant reported persistent pain in \nevery joint in her body since the bone scan. Id.  \nDr. Gordan believed Claimants right upper extremity pain was likely multifactorial with \nsome contribution from CRPS or other yet-to-be-determined factors. Id. Dr. Gordon did not \nexclude  suspicion  for  possible  rheumatologic  disease  as  well. Id.  Therefore,  Dr.  Gordon \nrecommended an evaluation with a pain specialist, a rheumatologist, and physical therapist at the \nRespondents’ discretion. Id. While  waiting  on  Respondents’ approval  of  Dr.  Gordon’s \nrecommendation, the Claimant took it upon herself to return to her original treating professional, \nMr. Garrett Wray, nurse practitioner, on September 4, 2024, and again on October 2, 2024, for \nissues of pain. CL Ex. 1, pp. 113-123. On October 9, 2024, Claimant had a follow-up with Dr. \nGordon, a little more than five months after her surgery. CL Ex. 1, pp. 124-131. There, she \ncomplained about having some continued difficulty with pain and limited use of her shoulder. Id. \nClaimant had not seen a physical therapist, rheumatologist, or a pain management specialist during \nthe time of this visit. Id. However, since Claimant had basically achieved full shoulder range of \nmotion, Dr. Gordon believed that physical therapy would not be necessary. Id. Dr. Gordon still \nmaintained that  the  Claimant  should continue work  restrictions  until  she  completes  a  pain \nmanagement evaluation. Id. If the pain management specialist does not believe the Claimant has \nCRPS, Dr. Gordon further recommended a functional capacity evaluation. Id. \nOn October 9, 2024, Dr. Gordon opined that Claimant has reached MMI. CL Ex. 1, pp. \n124-127. In a letter dated November 6, 2024, he reiterated the Claimant has reached MMI and \nsustained a five percent (5%) impairment to the right upper extremity and three percent (3%) \nimpairment to the whole person. Resp. Ex. 2, p. 10. There was a miscommunication in dealing \nwith Dr. Gordon’s office and the need for physical therapy. See CL. Ex. 1, pp. 124-127. His nurse, \n\nBRICKER H203103 \n \n8 \n \nRhonda Newton, incorrectly told the Claimant that she did not need any additional physical \ntherapy. The Claimant did not attend physical therapy, which resulted in her losing her TTD \nbenefits on September 11, 2024, due to her failure to comply with medical treatment. Respondents \nconcede there may be a week or two of TTD benefits owed to the Claimant after September 12, \n2024. TR-63. They stated on record that they will endeavor to determine what is owed to Claimant. \nId.  \nDuring that October 9, 2024, clinic visit, Dr. Gordon was transparent and discussed seeing \npictures from a private investigator that portrayed her carrying objects with her right arm - \nspecifically, what appeared to be three 12-packs of soda and groceries. Id. Dr. Gordon did not note \nClaimant’s response. Dr. Gordon also stated, from an orthopedic standpoint, that he thinks “she \nhas reached basically the end of her treatment....” He added that he did not see “any other \nintervention” that he would perform on her. Id. Nevertheless, he concluded his visit with noting \nthat  seeing  a  rheumatologist  is  “not  specifically  related  to  her  work  injury  necessarily,  but \nsomething she could seek under her regular health care insurance.” Id. \nOn October 29, 2024, the Claimant visited Dr. Roman, a pain management specialist, for \nan Independent  Medical  Evaluation (IME); and he opined  that  she  is  at  maximal  medical \nimprovement and no further interventions or procedures need to be done. Resp. Ex. 2, pp. 7-9. He \nalso opined that looking at her bone scan that she does not have CRPS of the right upper extremity \nbut does have some ankylosis of the right shoulder and ongoing pain in the right shoulder. Id. Dr. \nRoman recommended home therapy and a regimen of meloxicam done daily for the next three to \nsix months. Id. Based on Claimant’s previous functional capacity test, Dr. Roman stated she is at \na medium duty classification and that she “definitely needs” to find her way back to work. Id.  \n\nBRICKER H203103 \n \n9 \n \nOn December 4, 2024, Claimant met with Cecilia A. Brunson, a vocational rehabilitation \nconsultant, at Systemedic, to work on getting Claimant employment. Resp. Ex. 1, pp. 24-32. Ms. \nBrunson opined that Claimant “will be able to return to the workforce in the future to a job that is \nwithin her work limitations.” Id. Ms. Brunson furnished Claimant a list of job openings that would \nsuit the Claimant. Id. But the Claimant, as of the date of the full hearing, testified that she has made \nno  efforts since  resigning  from  the  Respondent/Employer to  secure  employment, including \napplying for the job openings presented to her by Ms. Brunson. TR 45-46. Claimant admitted on \nthe record that she stated in a July 24, 2025, deposition that unless she could find a job in law \nenforcement, she would not be going back to work. Id. and TR-46. Claimant also admitted on the \nrecord that she stated during her deposition that she does not see a future in her working anywhere. \nId.   \nThe Claimant further testified that she had to drop out of nursing school on the advice of \nDr. Gordon. Id. However, there is no evidence confirming that Dr. Gordon stated the Claimant \ncould not complete nursing school. The Claimant later admitted that she tried to re-enroll in school \nbut could not because she did not have the funds to pay for the courses. TR-47-48. Nevertheless, \nClaimant still testified that she is willing to do any job. Id.  \nOn January 17, 2025, Claimant again decided to return to Mr. Wray without the approval \nof Respondents, due to continuous right shoulder pain.  CL Ex. 1, pp. 162-167. Mr. Wray made an \nambulatory referral for orthopedic surgery for Claimant. Id. On March 11, 2025, Claimant met \nwith Dr. Rabinowitz, an orthopedic surgeon, with complaints of shoulder pain. CL Ex. 1, pp. 168-\n233. Dr. Rabinowitz’s impression was that she was a “36-year-old female with concern for biceps \ntendinitis versus CRPS.” Id. Dr. Rabinowitz noted that the Claimant “does display signs of CRPS \nin the form of temperature changes, swelling, and reduced sensation when compared to the \n\nBRICKER H203103 \n \n10 \n \ncontralateral upper extremity.” Id. He ordered an MRI arthrogram of the right shoulder to evaluate \nlabral and biceps pathology. Id.  \nOn  March  18,  2025,  Claimant  met with  Dr.  Jonathan Vecchiarelli, a pain  specialist, \nconcerning muscle pain/myalgia and joint pain. CL Ex. 1, pp. 234-239. Dr. Vecchiarelli noted that \nhe believes that most of Claimant’s total body pain is due to myalgia, possibly from a bad reaction \nto the dye used along with the significant dose of radiation from the bone scan. Id. The doctor \nconcluded that her symptoms could be radiation-induced myalgia. Id. On April 16, 2025, Claimant \nhad a follow-up visit with Vecchiarelli with the same complaint of pain. CL Ex. 1, pp. 240-259. \nHe then diagnosed Claimant with CRPS of the right upper extremity based on the revised CRPS \nBudapest clinical diagnostic criteria. Id.  \nOn May 6, 2025, Claimant met with Dr. Rabinowitz via telephone visit to review her MRI \narthrogram. CL Ex. 1, pp.295-312. The doctor noted that he could not appreciate a significant re-\ntear. Id. He recommended that Claimant undergo further treatment for CRPS prior to considering \na repeat arthroscopic shoulder procedure. Id. Dr. Rabinowitz noted that he was worried the surgery \ncould make Claimant’s CRPS symptoms worse. Id. He recommended that Claimant go back to her \nlocal pain specialist and see about getting ganglion blocks. Id.  \nOn May 14, 2025, the Claimant met again with Dr. Vecchiarelli concerning her pain and \nwas scheduled for a ganglion block with Dr. Zheung for CRPS. Id. On May 21, 2025, and again \non June 4, 2025, Claimant met with Dr. Zheng, who performed a right C6 cervical symptomatic \nganglion block. CL Ex 1, pp. 319-334. On June 12, 2025, Claimant met with Dr. Vecchiarelli \nconcerning her CRPS type 1 of the right upper extremity. CL Ex. 1, pp. 335-342. The Claimant \nreported that her pain did not decrease with the ganglion block. Id. On July 10, 2025, she visited \nwith Dr. Vecchiarelli, complaining about CRPS of her right arm. CL Ex. 1, pp. 343-350. The \n\nBRICKER H203103 \n \n11 \n \nClaimant reported that the prescribed Narco medication reduces her pain from a 10 to a 9. Id. She \nalso reported that the drug improves her daily function and quality of life. Id. The Claimant denied \nany use of the medication that is not in accordance with the provider’s prescription or plan. Id. She \nstated that she was not interested in further injections for her pain. Id. Dr. Vecchiarelli wrote a \nletter, stating that the Claimant is not able to work due to her CRPS. CL Ex. 1, p. 351.  \nOn August 8, 2025, the Claimant returned to Dr. Vecchiarelli concerning her CRPS pain. \nCL Ex. 1, pp. 352-359. She reported that her pain was a 10 on NRS without the medication, but a \n5 with medication. Id. Claimant received acupuncture for her shoulder pain. Id. On August 21, \n2025, the Claimant had another follow-up visit with Dr. Vecchiarelli concerning her shoulder pain. \nCL Ex. 1, pp. 360-368. Despite all the treatment received for her pain, the Claimant testified that \nher condition has not improved. The medical treatment administered by Mr. Wray, Dr. Rabinowitz, \nDr. Zheng, and Dr. Vecchiarelli were not authorized, according to the Respondents. Moreover, the \nClaimant has not requested a change of physician for treatment by these medical providers. The \nClaimant signed a form AR-N on April 14, 2022. Resp. Ex. 1, pp. 1-2.    \nAdjudication \nA. Whether  Claimant  is  entitled  to  additional  reasonable  and  necessary  medical \ntreatment for her compensable right shoulder injury. \n \n Arkansas Code Annotated Section 11-9-508(a) (Repl. 2012) states that an employer shall \nprovide for an injured employee such medical treatment as may be necessary in connection with \nthe injury received by the employee.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Brown, 82 Ark. App. 600, 120 S.W.3d \n153 (2003).  But employers are liable only for such treatment and services as are deemed necessary \nfor the treatment of the claimant’s injuries.  DeBoard v. Colson Co., 20 Ark. App. 166, 725 S.W.2d \n857 (1987).  The claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that medical treatment \nis reasonable and necessary for the treatment of a compensable injury.  Brown, supra; Geo \n\nBRICKER H203103 \n \n12 \n \nSpecialty Chem. v. Clingan, 69 Ark. App. 369, 13 S.W.3d 218 (2000). The standard “preponderance \nof the evidence” means the evidence having greater weight or convincing force.  Barre v. Hoffman, \n2009 Ark. 373, 326 S.W.3d 415; Smith v. Magnet Cove Barium Corp., 212 Ark. 491, 206 S.W.2d \n442 (1947).  What constitutes reasonable and necessary medical treatment is a question of fact for \nthe Commission.  White Consolidated Indus. v. Galloway, 74 Ark. App. 13, 45 S.W.3d 396 (2001); \nWackenhut Corp. v. Jones, 73 Ark. App. 158, 40 S.W.3d 333 (2001). \n A claimant’s testimony is never considered uncontroverted.  Nix v. Wilson World Hotel, 46 \nArk. App. 303, 879 S.W.2d 457 (1994).  The determination of a witness’ credibility and how much \nweight to accord to that person’s testimony are solely up to the Commission.  White v. Gregg \nAgricultural Ent., 72 Ark. App. 309, 37 S.W.3d 649 (2001).  The Commission must sort through \nconflicting evidence and determine the true facts.  Id.  In so doing, the Commission is not required \nto believe the testimony of the claimant or any other witness but may accept and translate into \nfindings of fact only those portions of the testimony that it deems worthy of belief.  Id. \n Claimant has a compensable right shoulder injury in the form of a torn rotator cuff. She \nunderwent three shoulder surgeries, one performed by Dr. Guinn and the other two by Dr. Gordon \non August 21, 2023, and April 1, 2024. The Claimant also received pain treatment by Dr. Roman. \nThese treatments were paid for by the Respondents. Dr. Roman stated in his IME report that \nClaimant reached maximum medical improvement for her injury on October 29, 2024. Resp. Ex, \n2, pp. 7-9. I credit this report and find by the preponderance of the evidence that Claimant’s healing \nperiod ended on October 29, 2024. Poulan Weed Eater v. Marshall, 79 Ark. App. 129, 84 S.W.3d \n878 (2002). \n Despite having multiple surgeries, the Claimant continued to complain about pain in her \nright shoulder and subsequently visited Nurse Practitioner Wray, Dr. Rabinowitz, Dr. Vecchiarelli, \n\nBRICKER H203103 \n \n13 \n \nand Dr. Zheng, all without Respondents’ authorization, after being released by Dr. Roman. The \nClaimant did, however, visit with Wray before she was released by Dr. Roman; but it, too, was \nunauthorized by the Respondents.  \n Nevertheless, it must be considered that the Arkansas Court of Appeals has held that a \nclaimant may be entitled to additional treatment, even after the healing period has ended, if said \ntreatment is geared toward management of the injury.  See Patchell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 86 \nArk. App. 230, 184 S.W.3d 31 (2004); Artex Hydrophonics, Inc. v. Pippin, 8 Ark. App. 200, 649 \nS.W.2d 845 (1983).  Such services can include those for the purpose of diagnosing the nature and \nextent  of  the  compensable  injury;  reducing  or  alleviating  symptoms  resulting  from  the \ncompensable injury; maintaining the level of healing achieved; or preventing further deterioration \nof the damage produced by the compensable injury.  Jordan v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 51 Ark. App. \n100, 911 S.W.2d 593 (1995); Artex, supra.  A claimant is not required to furnish objective medical \nevidence of her continued need for medical treatment.  Castleberry v. Elite Lamp Co., 69 Ark. App. \n359, 13 S.W.3d 211 (2000). \n Without question, the Claimant was seeking relief from her right shoulder pain. However, \nRespondents have also argued that any treatment Claimant has undergone with Nurse Practitioner \nWray, Dr. Rabinowitz, Dr. Vecchiarelli, and Dr. Zheng were unauthorized, and that Respondents \nare not responsible for the costs associated with that treatment.  In Tempworks Mgmt. Servs. v. \nJaynes, 2023 Ark. App. 147, 662 S.W.3d 280, the Arkansas Court of Appeals wrote: \nBriefly, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-514(c)(1) requires an employer or insurance carrier \nto deliver a Commission-approved notice to the employee “which explains the \nemployee’s  rights  and  responsibilities  concerning  change  of  physician.”  \nUnauthorized medical expenses incurred after the employee has received the notice \nare not the employer’s responsibility.  Id. § 11-9-514(c)(3).  But if the employee is \nnot furnished a copy of the notice, the change-of-physician rules don’t apply. \n \n\nBRICKER H203103 \n \n14 \n \nThe change-of-physician rules do not apply absent proof that the claimant received a copy of the \nrules from the Respondents either in person or by certified registered mail.  Ark. Code Ann. § 11-\n9-514(c)(1)-(2) (Repl. 2012).  See also Jaynes, supra; Stephenson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 70 Ark. \nApp. 265, 19 S.W.3d 36 (2000). \n The preponderance of the evidence in this matter establishes that Claimant did receive a \ncopy of these rules.  Claimant, through her attorney, admitted at the full hearing that she was given \nand signed the two-sided Form AR-N, a copy of which is in evidence. TR-58-59; Resp. Ex. 1, pp. \n1-2. Thus, I find by the preponderance of the evidence that the treatment received by Claimant \nfrom Nurse Practitioner Wray, Dr. Rabinowitz, Dr. Vecchiarelli, and  Dr. Zheng, was in fact \nunauthorized; as a result, the Respondents are not responsible for the cost of those or any other \nunauthorized medical services.   \nB. Whether Claimant is entitled to additional Temporary Total Disability Benefits \nfrom September 12, 2024, until a date to be determined. \n \nIn  this  proceeding,  Claimant  has  also  claimed  entitlement  to additional temporary  total \ndisability benefits from September 12, 2022, until a date to be determined.  Respondents stipulated \nthat they did pay some benefits under the claim but maintained that Claimant was not entitled to \nadditional temporary total disability benefits. \n The injury to Claimant’s right shoulder is unscheduled.  See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-521 \n(Repl. 2012).  An employee who suffers a compensable unscheduled injury is entitled to temporary \ntotal disability compensation for that period within the healing period in which she has suffered a \ntotal incapacity to earn wages.  Ark. State Hwy. & Transp. Dept. v. Breshears, 272 Ark. 244, 613 \nS.W.2d 392 (1981).  The healing period ends when the underlying condition causing the disability \nhas become stable and nothing further in the way of treatment will improve that condition.  Mad \nButcher, Inc. v. Parker, 4 Ark. App. 124, 628 S.W.2d 582 (1982). \n\nBRICKER H203103 \n \n15 \n \n I have previously found that Claimant’s healing period ended on October 29, 2024. The \nRespondents admitted on the record that there was confusion regarding the need of physical \ntherapy and may have prematurely ended Claimant’s TTD benefits on September 11, 2024, instead \nof the end-date of the healing period. TR-63. Respondents further announced to the Commission \nthat they will review and make good on this error by paying any TTD benefits they owe. Id. The \nevidence preponderates that Claimant was not capable of working and was still in her healing \nperiod when Respondents prematurely ended her benefits on September 11, 2024. Therefore, I find \nby the preponderance of the evidence that Respondents owe the Claimant TTD benefits from \nSeptember 12, 2024, to October 29, 2024.  \nThe Claimant, however, argues that she is still unable to work and remains in her healing \nperiod beyond Dr. Roman’s MMI date of October 29, 2024. Thus, she claims she is entitled to \nadditional TTD  benefits  beyond  the  October  29,  2024,  healing  period  date  that  Dr.  Roman \nprescribed. The Claimant relies on a letter by Dr. Vecchiarelli dated August 5, 2025, that states the \nClaimant has been his patient since March 2025, and that in his professional opinion, she is unable \nto work due to CRPS. CL Ex. 1, p. 351. On August 8, 2025, Dr. Vecchiarelli further opined that \nmost of Claimant’s total body pain is due to myalgia, possibly from a bad reaction to a dye that \nwas used in conjunction with high radiation from the bone scan. CL Ex. 1, pp. 352-359.  \nAgain, I have credited Dr. Roman’s IME report in finding that the end of Claimant’s healing \nperiod was October 29, 2024. Nothing has occurred to re-open the Claimant’s healing period for \nher compensable right shoulder injury. Dr. Vecchiarelli stated that Claimant’s total body pain is a \nresult of myalgia. He also stated that the Claimant is unable to work due to her CRPS. However, \nthe Claimant has not asked the Commission to consider whether Claimant’s diagnosis of myalgia \nor CRPS is a compensable consequence of her compensable right shoulder injury. Thus, these \n\nBRICKER H203103 \n \n16 \n \nissues are reserved and shall not be considered in this opinion. Therefore, the Claimant has failed \nto show by the preponderance of the evidence that she has re-entered a new healing period or \nremained in her original healing period concerning her compensable right shoulder injury.  \nC. Whether Claimant is entitled to Permanent Total Disability benefits. \n \nClaimant has further contended that as a result of her compensable right shoulder injury, \nshe is permanently and totally disabled. Respondents have argued otherwise. \n The term “permanent total disability” is defined in the statute as “inability, because of \ncompensable injury or occupational disease, to earn any meaningful wages in the same or other \nemployment.”  Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-519(e)(1) (Repl. 2012).   \n Dr. Roman stated that Claimant reached the end of her healing period on October 29, 2024. \nThe Claimant has provided a statement from Dr. Vecchiarelli that states the Claimant is unable to \nwork due to pain from CRPS, not the compensable right shoulder torn rotator cuff. CL Ex 1, p. \n351. Again, the Claimant’s CRPS is not a stipulated compensable injury, nor was I asked to rule \non its compensability. As previously stated, the issues of myalgia and CRPS being compensable \nconsequence injuries are reserved. Also, as previously stated, during the full hearing Claimant \nadmitted that she stated in her deposition that she has no intention of finding a job unless it is in \nlaw enforcement. The Claimant testified that she has not sought out any meaningful employment \nof any nature. TR-46. After reaching MMI, the Claimant met with Ms. Brunson, a vocational \nrehabilitation consultant, to assist her in re-entering the workforce. Resp. Ex. 1, pp. 24-32. Ms. \nBrunson provided Claimant with multiple job leads, and Claimant refused to apply for any of the \nlisted jobs, all of which fit her skill set. Id. and TR-46. Claimant testified that she wants to work \nbut has made no effort to do so. Thus, Claimant has failed to prove by the preponderance of the \nevidence that she is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.    \n\nBRICKER H203103 \n \n17 \n \nD. Whether Claimant is entitled to wage loss benefits. \n \nThe Claimant has asserted in the alternative, that she is entitled to wage loss disability \nbenefits over and above her impairment rating.  Respondents have argued otherwise. Claimant’s \nentitlement to wage loss disability benefits is controlled by § 11-9-522(b)(1) (Repl. 2012), which \nstates: \nIn considering claims for permanent partial disability benefits in excess of the \nemployee’s  percentage  of  permanent  physical  impairment,  the  Workers’ \nCompensation Commission may take into account, in addition to the percentage of \npermanent physical impairment, such factors as the employee’s age, education, \nwork experience, and other matters reasonably expected to affect his or her future \nearning capacity. \n \nSee Curry v. Franklin Elec., 32 Ark. App. 168, 798 S.W.2d 130 (1990).  Such “other matters” \ninclude motivation, post-injury income, credibility, demeanor, and a multitude of other factors.  \nId.; Glass v. Edens, 233 Ark. 786, 346 S.W.2d 685 (1961).  As the Arkansas Court of Appeals noted \nin Hixon v. Baptist Health, 2010 Ark. App. 413, 375 S.W.3d 690, “there is no exact formula for \ndetermining wage loss . . . .”  Pursuant to § 11-9-522(b)(1), when a claimant has been assigned an \nimpairment rating to the body as a whole, the Commission possesses the authority to increase the \nrating, and it can find a claimant totally and permanently disabled based upon wage-loss factors.  \nCross v. Crawford County Memorial Hosp., 54 Ark. App. 130, 923 S.W.2d 886 (1996). \n To be entitled to any wage-loss disability in excess of an impairment rating, the claimant \nmust prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained permanent physical impairment \nas a result of a compensable injury.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Connell, 340 Ark. 475, 10 S.W.3d 727 \n(2000).  The wage loss factor is the extent to which a compensable injury has affected the \nclaimant’s ability to earn a livelihood.  Emerson Elec. v. Gaston, 75 Ark. App. 232, 58 S.W.3d 848 \n(2001).    In  considering  factors  that  may  impact  a  claimant’s  future  earning  capacity,  the \nCommission considers his motivation to return to work, because a lack of interest or a negative \n\nBRICKER H203103 \n \n18 \n \nattitude impedes the assessment of his loss of earning capacity.  Id.  The Commission may use its \nown superior knowledge of industrial demands, limitations, and requirements in conjunction with \nthe evidence to determine wage-loss disability.  Oller v. Champion Parts Rebuilders, 5 Ark. App. \n307, 635 S.W.2d 276 (1982).  Finally, as discussed above, § 11-9-102(4)(F)(ii) provides that \npermanent benefits can only be given to a claimant if the compensable injury was the major cause \nof the disability or impairment.  “Disability” is the “incapacity because of compensable injury to \nearn, in the same or any other employment, the wages which the employee was receiving at the \ntime of the compensable injury.”  Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(8) (Repl. 2012). \n Dr. Gordon assessed Claimant with a three percent (3%) impairment rating to the body as \na whole. Resp. Ex. 2, p. 10. I credit Dr. Gordon’s impairment assessment. Again, the Claimant \nreached the end of her healing period on October 29, 2024. Since then, she has made no effort to \ngain any meaningful employment even when provided with assistance by Ms. Brunson. Resp. Ex. \n1, pp. 24-32. Ms. Brunson did an analysis of her work history and transferrable skills along with \njob market research and provided Claimant with several job openings. Id. Claimant did inform Ms. \nBrunson that she does not feel she can do any work at this time. Id. Claimant stated that she would \neventually like to return to law enforcement or nursing. Id. When asked if she could not return to \neither one of those jobs “were there other jobs or industries she would like to work in,” she stated, \n“No, then I don’t want to work.” Id. However, at the full hearing, the Claimant testified, during \ndirect examination, that she is willing to work any job. TR-48. I believe, as previously stated, \nClaimants statement during the hearing that she is willing to work any job was subterfuge. She has \nadmitted on the record that she can write, work on a computer, drive a car, do laundry, load a \ndishwasher, cook meals, and operate a lawn mower. TR-55-57. Despite these transferable skills, \nthe Claimant has refused to seek out meaningful employment due to an apparent lack of motivation \n\nBRICKER H203103 \n \n19 \n \nto work. Therefore, the Claimant has failed to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that she \nis entitled to wage loss benefits beyond what Dr. Gordon has accessed.     \nE. Whether Claimant’s attorney is entitled to a controverted attorney’s fee. \n \n One of the purposes of the attorney's fee statute is to put the economic burden of litigation \non the party who makes litigation necessary.  Brass v. Weller, 23 Ark. App. 193, 745 S.W.2d 647 \n(1998).  Claimant has proven herein her entitlement to additional temporary total disability benefits \nfrom September 12, 2024, to October 29, 2024; and because Respondents have controverted this \nby not paying, she has shown that her attorney should be awarded a controverted fee at their \nexpense under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-715 (Repl. 2012) on the indemnity benefits awarded herein. \nCONCLUSION AND AWARD \n Respondents are directed to pay benefits in accordance with the findings of fact set forth \nabove.  All accrued sums shall be paid in a lump sum without discount, and this award shall earn \ninterest at the legal rate until paid, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-809 (Repl. 2002).  See Couch \nv. First State Bank of Newport, 49 Ark. App. 102, 898 S.W.2d 57 (1995). \n Claimant’s attorney is entitled to a twenty-five percent (25%) attorney’s fee awarded \nherein, one-half of which is to be paid by Claimant and one-half to be paid by Respondents in \naccordance  with Ark.  Code Ann.  §  11-9-715  (Repl.  2012).   See Death  &  Permanent  Total \nDisability Trust Fund v. Brewer, 76 Ark. App. 348, 65 S.W.3d 463 (2012). \n IT IS SO ORDERED. \n       ___________________________________  \n       Hon. Steven Porch \n                                                                                    Administrative Law Judge","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION CLAIM NO. H203103 JENNIFER BRICKER, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT DEPT. OF CORRECTION, EMPLOYER RESPONDENT PUBLIC EMPLOYEE CLAIMS DIVISION, CARRIER/TPA RESPONDENT OPINION FILED DECEMBER 15, 2025 Hearing before Administrative Law Judge, Steven Porch, on October 24, 2025, in Jones...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T22:33:39.028Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H203103-2025-12-15","pdf":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/Bricker_Jennifer_H203103_20251215.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}