{"id":"alj-H105195-2024-10-31","awcc_number":"H105195","decision_date":"2024-10-31","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Taylor Bruning","employer_name":"City Of Decatur","title":"BRUNING VS. CITY OF DECATUR AWCC# H105195 October 31, 2024","outcome":"granted","outcome_keywords":["granted:4"],"injury_keywords":["hip","ankle","knee","back"],"pdf_url":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/BRUNING_TAYLOR_H105195_20241031.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"BRUNING_TAYLOR_H105195_20241031.pdf","text_length":27405,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \n   \n CLAIM NO. H105195 \nTAYLOR C. BRUNING, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT \n \nCITY OF DECATUR, EMPLOYER RESPONDENT \n \nARKANSAS MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, CARRIER RESPONDENT \n \n \n \n OPINION FILED OCTOBER 31, 2024 \n \n \nHearing before ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE JOSEPH C. SELF in Springdale, Washington \nCounty, Arkansas. \n \nClaimant represented by JASON M. HATFIELD, Attorney, Springdale, Arkansas. \n \nRespondents represented by MARY K. EDWARDS, Attorney, North Little Rock, Arkansas. \n \n \n STATEMENT OF THE CASE \n  \n On August 8, 2024, the above captioned claim came on for a hearing at Springdale, Arkansas. \nA pre-hearing conference was conducted on March 14, 2024, and a pre-hearing order was filed on \nthat same date. A copy of the pre-hearing order has been marked as Commission’s Exhibit #1 and \nmade a part of the record without objection. \n At the pre-hearing conference the parties agreed to the following stipulations: \n 1.   The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction of this claim.  \n            2.   The employee/employer/carrier relationship existed on June 23, 2021. \n            3.   Claimant sustained a compensable injury on June 23, 2021. \n            4.   The compensation rates are $440.00 for temporary total disability, and $330.00 for  \n       permanent partial disability. \n By agreement of the parties, the issues to be litigated and resolved at the forthcoming hearing \n\nBruning-H105195 \n2 \n \nwere limited to the following: \n           1.   Whether claimant is entitled to the impairment rating assessed on November 8, 2023, by \n                 Dr. Steven Cherney. \n           2.   Whether claimant is entitled to permanent and total disability. \n           3.   Whether claimant is entitled to wage loss disability. \n           4.   Whether claimant is entitled to benefits under Ark. Code Ann. §11-9-505. \n           5.   Attorney’s fees.  \n All other issues are reserved by the parties. \n The claimant contends that “He sustained a compensable injury while working for respondent \non or about June 23, 2021. At that time, claimant was in the course and scope of his employment with \nrespondent when he was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sustained injuries to his left hip, \nleft lower extremity, left ankle, left foot, right lower extremity, left and right upper extremities, facial \nlacerations,  and  stomach  lacerations.  Claimant  was  first  airlifted  to  Joplin,  Missouri  for  medical \ntreatment and then transferred to Springfield, Missouri for further medical treatment. Claimant had \ncompound fractures in his left lower extremity and had to have multiple surgeries, including skin grafts \nfor  his  injuries.  Claimant  stayed  in  the  hospital  for  several months  and  was released  for  outpatient \ncare.  On  August  16,  2023,  claimant  underwent  a  functional  capacity  evaluation.  On  November  8, \n2023, Dr. Steven Cherney issued impairment ratings for claimant’s left thigh and knee, for a combined \nimpairment  rating  of 40% to claimant’s lower extremity and 16% whole-body  impairment.  Dr. \nCherney also considered claimant’s gait derangement and issued a 15% whole-body impairment, for a \ncombined 29% impairment rating to the whole body. Respondents dispute that claimant is entitled to \na  whole-body  impairment  rating  and  have controverted  claimant’s  right to  wage  loss  disability \nbenefits.” \n\nBruning-H105195 \n3 \n \n The respondents contend that “Claimant is not entitled to a whole-person impairment rating. \nClaimant received an impairment rating from Dr. Steven Cherney for his left lower leg on November \n8, 2023. See Exhibit “A.” Respondents had the rating reviewed by Rick Byrd of Functional Testing \nCenters. Rick Byrd authored a report on the rating using the Guides and Dr. Cherney’s measurements \nconcluding that claimant was entitled to 16% to the left lower extremity. See Exhibit “B.” Respondents \ncontend  that  Dr.  Cherney’s rating was not assigned correctly pursuant to the Guides.  Specifically, \nclaimant  is  not  entitled  to  a  whole-person  impairment  rating  for  his  left  lower  extremity.  This  is  a \nscheduled injury, and scheduled injuries do not allow for wage-loss disability. Respondents reserve the \nright to file an Amended Response to the Prehearing Questionnaire or other appropriate pleading and \nto allege any further affirmative defense(s) that might be available upon further discovery.” \n From a review of the entire record including medical reports, documents, and other matters \nproperly  before  the  Commission,  and  having  had  an  opportunity  to  hear  the  testimony  of  the \nwitnesses and to observe their demeanor, the following findings of fact and conclusions of law are \nmade in accordance with A.C.A. §11-9-704: \n \n  FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \n \n 1.   The stipulations agreed to by the parties at a pre-hearing conference conducted on March \n14, 2024, and contained in a pre-hearing order filed that same date are hereby accepted as fact. \n 2. Claimant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he is permanently and totally \ndisabled. \n 3. Claimant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to a controverted \nattorney’s fee under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-715 on the permanent and total disability benefits awarded \nherein. \n \n\nBruning-H105195 \n4 \n \n \n FACTUAL BACKGROUND \n Prior to the hearing of this matter on the merits, claimant filed a motion to exclude the results \nof a functional capacity evaluation (FCE) that was conducted by Mr. Rick Byrd of Functional Testing \nCenters. His motion was based on §11-9-705(d), which provides:  \nExpert testimony shall not be allowed unless it satisfies the requirements of \nFederal  Rule  of  Evidence  702  with  annotations  and  amendments,  that  is, \nDaubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Kumbo Tire \nCo. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.137 (1999). \n \n Claimant alleged several reasons why Mr. Byrd should not be permitted to testify as an expert \nwitness  in  this  matter,  including  but  not  limited  to, his  lack  of  educational  credentials  and  state \ncertifications, his methodology of conducting the FCE in this case, his bias in favor of the entity that \nretains him, and his improper use of another person’s medical provider number in billing for his work.  \n In response to the motion to exclude, respondents denied Mr. Byrd was being offered as an \nexpert  in  this  matter and  confirmed  that the  FCE  report  was  neither testimony nor a  document \nprepared under oath. Respondents urged that since Mr. Byrd conducted FCEs as a regular part of his \nbusiness and that his work had previously been accepted by the Workers’ Compensation Commission, \nI should err on the side of admitting the evidence opposed by claimant. \nI denied claimant’s challenge to the introduction of the evidence because §11-9-705(d) applies \nonly to expert testimony, and respondents conceded that Mr. Byrd was not to be considered an expert \nin this matter.\n1\n   \nPrior to taking testimony at the hearing, we first took up claimant’s objection to the portion \n \n1\n In his post-trial brief, claimant urged me to reconsider this ruling, asserting that §11-9-705(d) applies not to specific \nwitnesses, but rather “opinions from witnesses which were offered to provide expert scientific or technical information \nto the triers of fact,” and that the Daubert rule is intended to “exclude unreliable expert testimony...”  (Claimant’s \nTrial Brief, page 6). I decline to revisit that decision for two reasons. First, the parties submitted simultaneous briefs, \nand respondent did not know that motion was going to be raised again. Second, expert testimony can only be provided \nby an expert, and I did not rely on Mr. Byrd’s testimony or report as anything other than that of a lay witness.  \n\nBruning-H105195 \n5 \n \n \nof the medical records exhibit offered by respondents that included the aforementioned FCE (R.X. \n67-84  and  87-88).  This objection  had  three  parts:  (1) that  it  was  irrelevant  because  respondent \nconceded it was not the report of an expert, (2) that it was hearsay and (3) that it was more prejudicial \nthan  probative,  citing  Arkansas  Rules  of  Evidence  403  as  persuasive  authority. I  overruled  the \nobjections, because (1) the FCE report involved the injuries that were the subject of this litigation and \nthus was relevant to whatever extent it was worth as a lay opinion, (2) Mr. Byrd had been deposed and \nany matters in his report that involved hearsay could have been explored at that time and (3) while \nRule 403 can be applied to non-jury trials, an administrative law judge is competent and comfortable \nin evaluating these tests and giving such the appropriate weight in reaching its decisions.  \nHEARING TESTIMONY \n \n Claimant’s first witness was his wife, Emily Bruning. She testified that they had been married \nfor  six  years  and  had  four  children. They  had  known  each  other  since  high  school, and  she  said \nclaimant had a dream to be a detective.  To that end, he worked as a reserve officer in the City of \nDecatur  before  becoming  a  police  officer. Claimant  said  she  was  employed  as  a  CNA  and  in  that \ncapacity, she and claimant’s mother provided home health care for claimant after his accident.  She \nsaid claimant was in a coma for nine days after the accident and was bedridden for two years.  He \nsometimes uses a wheelchair now and always uses a cane. Claimant has not driven a vehicle since the \naccident because he is afraid to do so; just sitting behind the wheel of the car caused him to throw up \nand have a panic attack. She testified that her husband has trouble getting in a vehicle and cannot do \nso without taking medication for nausea.  \n Mrs.  Bruning  testified  that  claimant  takes  Tramadol  for  his  pain. He  cuts  them  in  half  and \ntakes three half pills, morning, noon, and night. If he engages in any activity outside of his home, he \nrequires the fourth half pill for that day. Claimant attended two or three tee-ball games for one of his \n\nBruning-H105195 \n6 \n \n \nchildren but on a normal day, he sits with his leg elevated for the majority of the day.  \n Mrs. Bruning said that claimant’s medication makes him “dizzy, foggy, tired.”  He is not to \noperate machinery or drive while taking the Tramadol. Even elevated, claimant’s foot swells to two or \nthree  times  its  normal  size.   Attending a  ball  game  or  going to a doctor’s visit causes it to be even \nworse.  \nMrs. Bruning discussed the photographs that were introduced to show claimant’s injury, some \nof which she took and others she was present when they were taken. These photographs demonstrate \nthe extent of claimant’s surgeries, which included having screws in his hip as well as a rod that goes \ninto his thigh. There are also photographs of the screws that were placed in claimant’s knee.  (Cl. X. \n#3). Additionally, she took photographs of x-rays of claimant’s foot.  \n Mrs. Bruning said that claimant had worked with a vocational expert to apply for jobs.  She \nhelps him focus and remember certain dates. As of the date of the hearing, the vocational expert had \nworked with claimant for a few months, but he has found no employment. Were he to find a job, Mrs. \nBruning said someone would have to provide transportation for him and that he would have to be \nable to sit or lie down every thirty to forty-five minutes. The City of Decatur did not make him an \noffer to do any kind of work for the police department.  \n Mrs. Bruning said that claimant has difficulty sleeping, because if his knees or ankles happen \nto touch while sleeping, it is very painful for him.  Most nights, he cannot sleep through the night, and  \ngoes either to his recliner or to a hospital bed they have in their home.  \n Mrs. Bruning was present with claimant during the functional capacity evaluation. She did not \nremember Mr. Byrd typing anything while claimant was being examined. She said her husband did not \nwalk around the room in multiple repetitions, and did not use both hands when he lifted because he \nhad a cane in his right hand, thus disputing portions of Mr. Byrd’s report. \n\nBruning-H105195 \n7 \n \n \n On cross-examination, Mrs. Bruning says that the injury to husband has been very hard on \nher, because she is bearing the bulk of the financial load. She agreed things would be easier for her if \nclaimant was able to work.  She did not believe her husband could return to being a police officer. \nMrs. Bruning was aware that nothing in the medical records said that claimant could not drive. She \nwas unaware that Dr. Roman encouraged claimant to ease back into driving.   \n Claimant  next  called  his  mother,  Malissa  Brown,  to  testify. She  stated  that  she  has  to \ncoordinate with Emily Bruning’s schedule to help get the children to school. Emily works one job \nwith twelve-hour shifts three days a week and then a second job for twelve hours for another three \ndays during the week. Ms. Brown said she takes the children to ball practice. She observed her son in \na vehicle and noticed that he is nauseous when he does so.  \n On cross-examination, Ms. Brown testified that before the accident, she did help take care of \nthe children but not nearly as often as she does now. She believes that if Emily were only working one \njob that she would not have to take care of the children as often. \n Claimant  then  testified  on  his  own  behalf. Claimant  related  the  steps  he  took  to  become  a \npolice  officer,  including  working  as  an  unpaid  reserve officer and  working  part-time  until  he  was \ncertified to be an officer. On his last day of field training, he was going on a call to assist Gravette with \na warrant when he was in an automobile collision. His description of the accident was as follows: \n“I was still in my driver's seat. My seatbelt had ripped all of my stuff off my \nexternal vest, including my tourniquet. And when I looked over to the driver's \nside door, I saw ~ well, actually, technically, I reached over and I felt a third \nand I was thinking to myself that's not a door handle, and I looked over and it \nwas  my  boot  and  my  leg  was - it  looked  like  I  was  kneeling  the  opposite \ndirection backwards by my head, and I couldn't see out the window because \nthere was blood. I didn't hit my head hard, but the glass had cut my face and \nmy forehead a lot. And then my elbow, my belly, and my right leg were also \ncut open and bleeding. I just remember thinking to myself I'm about to bleed \nout because there was so much blood just profusely leaking out of my body at \nthat point.” (TR.82) \n \n\nBruning-H105195 \n8 \n \n \nClaimant was airlifted to Freeman Health hospital in Joplin, Missouri for emergency treatment \nbefore  being  transferred  to Cox  Health in Springfield,  Missouri. He  was  hospitalized  for about  six \nweeks. \nClaimant wore shorts to the hearing so his leg would be visible, but also because wearing long \npants  causes  his  leg  pain. Since  it  was  stipulated  that  he  had  an  injury,  the  extreme nature  of  the \naccident was relevant to his reluctance to drive or even ride in a vehicle. At this time, he can be in the \npilot seat in the middle of the car and is working his way to ride in the passenger front seat, but he \nstill has difficulties getting in the car and if he does not have to do it, he probably will not.  \n Claimant said that he begins the day with a constant dull, throbbing pain and then as the day \ngoes  on,  it  becomes  more  of a  searing  issue. As  his  foot  swells,  it  becomes almost unbearable. He \ntakes  Tramadol  for  the  pain  three  or  four  times  a  day,  the  fourth  being  necessary  if  he  engages  in \nfamily activities or does anything where he is not able to elevate his leg much. He said he leaves the \nhouse once or twice a week at the most and must use his cane whenever he walks. Claimant testified \nthat if he were working, he would need to elevate his left leg easily over half of the day, and perhaps \nas much as six hours. He says that if he is not using the cane, he is in his wheelchair. He estimated \nthat his day was about sixty percent using the cane and forty percent in the wheelchair. \n Claimant said that he struggled in applying for jobs without his wife’s assistance, because he \nhas trouble remembering dates and focusing, which makes him upset. Despite his applications, he has \nnot  received  a  single  job  offer  since  the  accident. Each  Wednesday  around one  p.m.,  he  consulted \nwith the vocational expert and had taken all her recommendations the best he can. He has kept the \nvocational expert informed as to what jobs he has applied for, what qualifications he might need for \na particular job, and how telephone interviews have gone.  \n On  cross-examination,  claimant  admitted  that  he  did  not  believe  that  he  could  be  a  police \n\nBruning-H105195 \n9 \n \n \nofficer  in  his  current  condition. He  testified  that  he  was  a  high-school  graduate  but  did  not  attend \ncollege. His work history before serving as a police officer was mostly retail and food service. He did \nuse computers in some of the jobs but said it was very simple operations. \n Claimant  understands  that  he  had  been cleared  to sedentary  duty and  applied  for  every  job \nthat  the  vocational  expert  had  laid  out  for  him  as  long  as  it had  not been  redacted  by  the  time  he \napplied. He  said  his  computer  skills  were such  that  he  could  use  Google,  look  up  videos,  type  on \nMicrosoft Word and perhaps prepare a PowerPoint.  He agreed he was both capable and willing to be \ntaught new technology, and he was still actively applying for jobs. He did not know that he could work \nat a sedentary job but was willing to try. He wants to help his wife out financially. He was aware that \nhis doctors wanted him to get back to normal, including driving.  \n On redirect examination, claimant said that despite his best efforts, as well as his wife and the \nvocational expert, no employer had been willing to give him a shot at any occupation, be it part-time \nor full-time.   \n Even taking into consideration the natural bias that I would expect a spouse and a parent to \nhave for claimant, I found claimant’s wife and mother to be credible witnesses. Claimant’s testimony \nwas likewise consistent with the medical records; having had the benefit of watching him throughout \nthe  hearing, I  found  nothing  to  suggest  that  he  was  being  deceptive  or  exaggerating  his  physical \ncondition.     \nREVIEW OF THE EXHIBITS \n \n The parties submitted what I estimate to be over 700 pages of exhibits. Some of these were \nprehearing exhibits regarding claimant’s Daubert motion; these were incorporated into the record of \nthis hearing. At the hearing, there were additional documents, the most pertinent of which were the \nmedical records. Rather than try to summarize all of them in this portion of this opinion, I will simply \n\nBruning-H105195 \n10 \n \n \nlist what was submitted and then refer to the portions of these exhibits that I relied upon in making \nmy decision: \n Claimant’s Prehearing #1: Motion  to  Exclude  Testimony  and  Report  of  Rick  Byrd,  which \nincluded  Byrd’s deposition and  a  separate  binder  of  the  exhibits  to  that  deposition (mistakenly \nidentified by the court reporter as a second Claimant’s Exhibit #2) \n \n Claimant’s Prehearing #2: Respondents’ Response to the Motion to Exclude. \n \n Claimant’s Prehearing #3: Claimant’s Reply to Respondent’s Response. \n \n Claimant’s Prehearing #4 Order denying the Motion to Exclude \n \n Claimant’s Hearing Exhibit #1 Claimant’s medical records.  \n \n Claimant’s Hearing Exhibit #2 Claimant’s Prescriptions \n \n Claimant's Hearing Exhibit #3 Claimant’s Photographs \n \n Claimant’s Hearing Exhibit #4 Claimant's Job Search Index \n \n Respondents’ Hearing Exhibit #1 Additional medical records \n \n Respondents' Hearing Exhibit #2 Claimant’s non-medical records, which include a vocational \nanalysis conducted by Melissa Jones Wilkins, the indemnity payment log, and the AMA Guides to the \nEvaluation of Permanent Impairment.  \n \n Additionally, the Commission’s Prehearing Order was made an exhibit to the hearing. I am \nblue backing the post-hearing briefs submitted by the parties. These briefs were quite helpful and very \nmuch appreciated.  \nADJUDICATION \n \n As enumerated above, there are five issues in this matter. However, I do not need to decide \nthe third and fourth issue, as I am convinced the evidence in this matter supports claimant’s position \nthat he is permanently and totally disabled as a result of his compensable injury.  \n The  parties spent considerable time  arguing  whether  the  impairment  rating  of Rick  Byrd \nshould be admitted into evidence, and after I ruled that it was admissible, whether his rating or that \n\nBruning-H105195 \n11 \n \n \nDr. Steven Cherney should be given more weight. Having reviewed both, I find Dr. Cherney’s ratings \nare more credible than that of Mr. Byrd on the 12% to the grade 4 muscle weakness of flexion. Mr. \nByrd rejected that rating as a subjective test. However, there is no requirement that medical testimony \nbe based solely on objective findings, only that the record contains supporting objective findings, Ark. \nDep't. of Corr. v. Washington, 2024 Ark. App. 181, 685 S.W. 3d 347; Singleton v. City of Pine Bluff, 97 Ark. \nApp. 59, 244 S.W. 3d 709 (2006)—of which there are ample. I also agree with Dr. Cherney that a 15% \nimpairment whole person impairment rating due to claimant’s gait derangement is appropriate under \nthe Guides. The more specific methods of establishing impairments do not adequately address all the \nissues with claimant’s left leg, such as the shortened stance phase and the arthritic changes. However, \nI do agree with respondent that the 10% left lower extremity impairment for range of motion is not \nsupported by Table 40, page 78 of the Guides, because claimant did not have less than 110 degrees of \nflexion. Therefore, I find the rating on the left leg to be 29% and for the whole person to be 12%. \nAccording  to  the  Combined  Value  Chart  on  page  322  of  the Guides, I  find  the total whole-body \nimpairment to be 25%.  \n However, it mattered little if I agreed, in whole or in part, with the ratings by Dr. Cherney or \nMr. Byrd. As claimant pointed out in his brief, Mr. Byrd’s observations as a lay witness support the \ntestimony of the witnesses at the hearing. Claimant used a cane during the examination; nothing was \nsaid that indicated that he did not consistently need it. When he was on his feet for a brief period of \ntime, his left foot began to swell, eventually to the point that claimant had to loosen his shoelaces. Mr. \nByrd found claimant put forth a reliable effort on 46 of 46 consistency measures. Nothing in the FCE \nindicates that claimant was malingering or otherwise exaggerating his condition for the purposes of \nthe examination.  \n In  considering  claims  for  permanent  disability  in  excess  of  the  percentage  of  permanent \n\nBruning-H105195 \n12 \n \n \nphysical  impairment,  the  Commission  may consider other  factors  such  as  the  employee’s  age, \neducation,  work  experience,  and  all  other  matters  reasonably  expected  to affect his future  earning \ncapacity. In this case, claimant is a relatively young person—29 years old at the time of the hearing. \nHe completed high school and had no college or vocational training. Taken alone, those factors would \nindicate he could find or be trained for sedentary work. However, everything else mitigates against \nthis  claimant  ever finding meaningful  employment. His prior work  experience was  outlined  in  the \nvocational analysis report prepared by Melissa Jones Wilkins (R. X 1, pages 2-21). None of the jobs \nhe  previously  performed  appear  to  be  within  his  current  physical  limitations,  as  I  am  convinced \nclaimant would need to be able to sit, stand and even lie down at will during the course of the day.  \nHe is taking Tramadol, an opioid pain medication, to cope with the pain in his left foot, which would \nalso affect his ability first travel to work and then to function in any type of employment that would \nrequire him to use any sort of cognition.\n2\n    \n Perhaps the biggest factor in my decision is claimant’s motivation to work, as I believe he is \nhighly motivated.  He is married with four children. Because of his decreased income, claimant’s wife \nis working 72 hours a week. I believe if there were any jobs he could do, he would have already been \nworking to support his family. This accident was almost three and a half years ago; I see nothing in \nthe  record  that  causes  me  to  believe  claimant will recover  sufficiently  to  perform  even limited \nsedentary  work. Thus,  after  considering all the  relevant  wage  loss  factors  in  this  case,  I  find  that \nclaimant has met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is permanently \ntotally disabled as he is unable to earn any meaningful wages in the same employment he previously \nperformed or any other employment. \n \n2\n While there was testimony regarding claimant’s mental state, such as his fear of riding in a car, and mention of \nsituational depression in the medical records, claimant did not pursue a claim for a compensable mental injury in this \nhearing, and as such, that issue is reserved. \n\nBruning-H105195 \n13 \n \n \n Because I have found claimant to be permanently and totally disabled based on the evidence \nbefore  me,  it  is  unnecessary  for  me  to  determine wage  loss  disability  and/or benefits  pursuant  to \nA.C.A.§11-9-505.\n3\n \n  Since Claimant has proven herein his entitlement to permanent and total disability benefits, \nand  because Respondents  have controverted  this matter  above  the  10%  whole  body  impairment  it \naccepted  and  paid,  he  has  shown  that  his  attorney  should  be  awarded  a  controverted  fee at  their \nexpense under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-715 on the indemnity benefits awarded herein. \nORDER \n \n Respondents are directed to pay/furnish benefits in accordance with the findings of fact set \nforth above. All accrued sums shall be paid in a lump sum without discount, and this award shall earn \ninterest at the legal rate until paid, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-809. See Couch v. First State Bank \nof Newport, 49 Ark. App. 102, 898 S.W.2d 57 (1995). \n Claimant’s attorney is entitled to a twenty-five percent (25%) attorney’s fee awarded herein, \none-half of which is to be paid by Claimant and one-half to be paid by Respondents in accordance \nwith Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-715.  \n Respondents are responsible for paying the court reporter her charges for preparation of the \nhearing transcript in the amount of $1,557.00. \n IT IS SO ORDERED. \n                                                                                              \n_______     \n JOSEPH C. SELF \nADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE \n \n \n3\n While the latter was listed in the prehearing order as an issue to be decided, the parties subsequently agreed to have \nclaimant seen by a vocational analysis before the hearing. Based on this opinion, any further such efforts would be \nuseless.","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION CLAIM NO. H105195 TAYLOR C. BRUNING, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT CITY OF DECATUR, EMPLOYER RESPONDENT ARKANSAS MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, CARRIER RESPONDENT OPINION FILED OCTOBER 31, 2024 Hearing before ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE JOSEPH C. SELF in Springdale, Washington County, Arkansas....","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T22:48:23.402Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H105195-2024-10-31","pdf":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/BRUNING_TAYLOR_H105195_20241031.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}