{"id":"alj-H003585-2023-04-24","awcc_number":"H003585","decision_date":"2023-04-24","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Tina Walker","employer_name":"Hino Motor Mfg. USA, Inc","title":"WALKER VS. HINO MOTOR MFG. USA, INC. AWCC# H003585 APRIL 24, 2023","outcome":"granted","outcome_keywords":["granted:3"],"injury_keywords":["back","neck","hip","lumbar","cervical"],"pdf_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/Walker_Tina_H003585_20230424.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"Walker_Tina_H003585_20230424.pdf","text_length":50007,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \nWCC NO. H003585 \n \n \nTINA WALKER, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT \n \nHINO MOTOR MFG. USA, INC., \n EMPLOYER RESPONDENT \n \nSOMPO AMER. INS. CO., \n CARRIER RESPONDENT \n \n \nOPINION FILED APRIL 24, 2023 \n \nHearing before Chief Administrative Law Judge O. Milton Fine II on January 27, 2023, in \nMarion, Crittenden County, Arkansas. \n \nClaimant  represented  by  Mr.  Steven  R.  McNeely,  Attorney  at  Law,  Jacksonville, \nArkansas. \n \nRespondents  represented  by  Messrs.  Michael  E. and  Zachary  F. Ryburn,  Attorneys  at \nLaw, Little Rock, Arkansas. \n \n \nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE \n \n On January 27, 2023, the above-captioned claim was heard in Marion, Arkansas.  \nA  pre-hearing  conference  took  place  on  October  31,  2022.    The  Prehearing  Order \nentered  on  November  1,  2022,  pursuant  to  the  conference  was  admitted  without \nobjection  as  Commission  Exhibit  1.    At  the  hearing,  the  parties  confirmed that  the \nstipulations, issues and respective contentions, as amended, were properly set forth in \nthe order. \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n2 \nStipulations \n At  the  hearing,  the  parties  discussed  the  stipulations  set  forth  in  Commission \nExhibit 1.  With an amendment of the third, they are the following, which I accept: \n1. The  Arkansas  Workers’  Compensation  Commission  has  jurisdiction  over \nthis claim. \n2. The  employer/employee/carrier  relationship  existed  on  June  2,  2020, \nwhen Claimant sustained a compensable back injury. \n3. Respondents  accepted  this  rating  and  have  paid  Claimant  medical  and \nindemnity  benefits  pursuant  thereto,  with  the  latter  including  temporary \ntotal  disability  benefits  through  May  5,  2021, and  permanent  partial \ndisability  benefits  in  accordance  with  an  impairment  rating of five percent \n(5%)  to  the  body  as  a  whole  assigned  by Dr.  Laverne  Lovell  on  May  5, \n2021. \n[T. 3-4, 41] \nIssues \n At the hearing, the parties discussed the issues\n1\n set forth in Commission Exhibit \n1.  The following were litigated: \n1. What was Claimant’s average weekly wage? \n \n \n1\nRespondents  at  the  hearing,  without  objection  by  Claimant,  added  an  issue \nconcerning  whether  the  instant  claim,  or  a  portion  thereof,  is  barred  by  the  statute  of \nlimitations.  [T. 5-6]  However, when Claimant clarified later that she was not asking the \nCommission  in  this  proceeding  to  address  whether  she  had  sustained  a  compensable \ninjury  to  her  neck,  Respondents  elected  to  reserve  this  issue,  which  only  went  to  that \naspect of the claim.  [T. 42-44] \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n3 \n2. Whether Claimant is entitled to additional medical treatment. \n3. Whether   Claimant   is   entitled   to   additional   temporary   total   disability \nbenefits. \n4. Whether Claimant is entitled to wage loss disability benefits. \n5. Whether Claimant is entitled to a controverted attorney’s fee. \n All other issues have been reserved.  [T. 4-5] \nContentions \n The respective contentions of the parties, following amendments\n2\n at the hearing, \nare as follows: \nClaimant: \n1. Claimant  contends  that  she  suffered  a  compensable  back  injury  on  June \n2, 2020. \n2. Claimant  contends  that  she  is  entitled  to  additional  medical  treatment, \nspecifically  medial  branch  block  injections  recommended  by  Dr.  Michael \nScarbrough, along with pain management at Pain Centers of America. \n3. Claimant contends that in light of the recommended treatment, she is still \nin  her  healing  period  and  entitled  to  additional  temporary  total  disability \nbenefits from the date last paid until she is returned to work. \n4. All other issues are reserved. \n \n \n2\nBecause  of  the  reservation  of  the  statute  of  limitations  issue,  the  supplemental \ncontentions concerning it have been removed.  [T. 5-6, 44] \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n4 \nRespondents: \n The claim was accepted and all appropriate benefits have been paid.  The \nclaimant is not entitled to additional medical treatment in the form of pain \nmanagement.  She is not entitled to wage loss.  The claimant has reached \nmaximum medical improvement. \n[T. 5] \nFINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \n After reviewing the record as a whole, including medical reports, documents, and \nother  matters  properly  before  the  Commission,  and  having  had  an  opportunity  to  hear \nthe testimony of the claimant and to observe her demeanor, I hereby make the following \nfindings  of  fact  and  conclusions  of  law  in  accordance  with  Ark.  Code  Ann. §  11-9-704 \n(Repl. 2012): \n1. The  Arkansas  Workers’  Compensation  Commission  has  jurisdiction  over \nthis claim. \n2. The stipulations set forth above are reasonable and are hereby accepted. \n3. The preponderance  of  the  evidence  establishes  that  Claimant’s  average \nweekly wage was $609.33, with compensation rates of $406.00/$305.00. \n4. Claimant  has  proven  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  she  is \nentitled to additional treatment of her compensable back injury in the form \npain management by Pain Treatment Centers of America. \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n5 \n5. Claimant  has not  proven  by a  preponderance  of  the evidence  that she  is \nentitled to additional treatment of her compensable back injury in the form \nmedial branch blocks by Dr. Michael Scarbrough. \n6. Claimant  has not  proven  by a  preponderance  of  the evidence  that she  is \nentitled to additional temporary total disability benefits for any period. \n7. Claimant  has  proven  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  she  is \nentitled to wage loss disability of five percent (5%). \n8. Claimant  has  proven  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  her \nattorney, the Hon. Steven R. McNeely, is entitled to a controverted fee on \nthe indemnity benefits awarded herein, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-\n715 (Repl. 2012). \nCASE IN CHIEF \nSummary of Evidence \n Claimant was the sole witness. \n In  addition  to  the  prehearing  order  discussed  above,  admitted  into  evidence in \nthis case were the following:  Claimant’s Exhibit 1, a compilation of her medical records, \nconsisting  of  two  abstract/index  pages  and 43  numbered  pages  thereafter;  Claimant’s \nExhibit  2,  non-medical  records,  consisting  of  one  abstract/index  page  and  seven \nnumbered pages thereafter; and  Respondents’ Exhibit 1, the Form AR-C that was filed \nin connection with this claim on December 6, 2021, consisting of one page. \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n6 \nAdjudication \nA. Average Weekly Wage \n Introduction.    Claimant  has  argued  that  her  average  weekly  wage  for  the  time \nperiod   pertinent   to   this   claim   was   $654.00,   yielding   compensation   rates   of \n$437.00/$328.00.    On  the  other  hand,  Respondents  assert  that  the evidence  and \napplicable law establish that her compensation rates should be $355.00/$266.00.  [T. 4] \n Standards.    Arkansas  Code  Annotated  §  11-9-705(a)(3)  (Repl.  2012)  provides \nthat  “[w]hen  deciding  any  issue,  administrative  law  judges  .  .  .  shall  determine,  on  the \nbasis  of  the  record  as  a  whole,  whether  the  party  having  the  burden  of  proof  on  the \nissue   has   established   it   by   a   preponderance   of   the   evidence.”  The   standard \n“preponderance   of   the   evidence”   means   the   evidence   having   greater   weight   or \nconvincing  force.   Barre  v.  Hoffman,  2009  Ark.  373,  326  S.W.3d  415  (citing  Smith  v. \nMagnet Cove Barium Corp., 212 Ark. 491, 206 S.W.2d 442 (1947)). \n In  determining  the  average  weekly  wage  of  a  claimant,  Ark.  Code  Ann.  § 11-9-\n518 (Repl. 2012) gives the following guidance: \n(a)(1)  Compensation  shall  be  computed  on  the  average  weekly  wage \nearned  by the  employee  under  the  contract  of  hire  in  force  at the  time  of \nthe  accident  and  in  no  case  shall  be  computed  on  less  than  a  full-time \nworkweek in the employment. \n \n(2)  Where  the  injured  employee  was  working  on  a  piece  basis,  the \naverage weekly wage shall be determined by dividing the earnings  of the \nemployee  by  the  number  of  hours  required  to  earn  the  wages  during  the \nperiod not to exceed fifty-two (52) weeks preceding the week in which the \naccident  occurred  and  by  multiplying  this  hourly  wage  by  the  number  of \nhours in a full-time workweek in the employment. \n \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n7 \n(b)  Overtime  earnings  are  to  be  added  to  the  regular  weekly  wages  and \nshall  be  computed  by  dividing  the  overtime  earnings  by  the  number of \nweeks  worked  by  the  employee  in  the  same  employment  under  the \ncontract of hire in force at the time of the accident, not to exceed a period \nof fifty-two (52) weeks preceding the accident. \n \n(c)  If,  because  of  exceptional  circumstances,  the  average  weekly  wage \ncannot   be   fairly   and   justly   determined   by   the   above   formulas,   the \ncommission may determine the average weekly wage by a method that is \njust and fair to all parties concerned. \n \nThe term “wages” is defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(19) (Repl. 2012) in pertinent \npart as follows: \n“Wages”   means   the   money   rate   at   which   the   service   rendered   is \nrecompensed  under  the  contract  of  hiring  in  force  at  the  time  of  the \naccident,  including  the  reasonable  value  of  board,  rent,  housing,  lodging, \nor similar advantage received from the employer . . . . \n \n Discussion.      When   Respondents   cross-examined   Claimant,   the   following \nexchange took place: \nQ. At Hino you made about $14.00 an hour, does that sound right? \n \nA. No, I was $15.50 plus a dollar shift. \n \nQ. According to the Form W that you submitted in your exhibit, it looks \nlike you were paid $1,120.00 for 80 hours of work, does that sound \nright? \n \nA. It kind of sounds close. \n \nQ. If you do the math on that, is that $14.00 an hour? \n \nA. They offered me 15, so I don’t know where the 14 came from. \n \nQ. Are you incorporating your overtime to get to that $15.00 an hour? \n \nA. I didn’t  know  if  that’s  what  they  were  required,  I  mean,  you  know, \nonce they added in.  I don’t know.  I’m not sure but I thought that’s \nwhat it was. \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n8 \n \nQ. Okay.    Your  Form  [AR-]W  seems  to  indicate  that  you  made \n$14.00 an hour with an additional $1,627.75 in overtime during \nthat period.  Does that sound about right? \n \nA. It’s [sic] sounds almost right, yeah. \n \n[T. 22-23]  (Emphasis added) \n At the outset, I note that the Form AR-W that is in evidence does not comply with \nthe  law  regarding  how  Claimant’s  wages  for  the  52  weeks  preceding  her  stipulated \ncompensable  injury  are  to  be  set  forth.    The  entries  thereon  are  not  broken  out  by \nweeks, as they should be.  And “Weeks” (which, again, is a misnomer because they do \nnot  reference  individual  weeks)  8,  10,  13,  and  18  on  the  form  list  more  than  40  hours \nworked, but identify it as all “[s]traight [t]ime.”  For example, the “Week 13” line reflects \nthat Claimant worked 83.75 hours in a 10-day (i.e., two-week) period with no overtime, \neven  though  there  had  to  be  3.75  hours  of  overtime  allocated  between  those  two \nweeks.    After  due  consideration,  I  am  giving  no  weight  to  this  form,  except  for its \nreflecting that she worked for Respondent Hino during 33 weeks\n3\n preceding the injury at \nissue. \n \n \n3\nPer  Buxton  v.  City  of Nashville, 132  Ark.  511, 201  S.W. 512  (1918),  I  can take \njudicial notice of the contents of a calendar.  According to the 2019 and 2020 calendars, \n42  weeks  elapsed  between  Claimant’s  start  date  of  August  12,  2019,  at  Respondent \nHino (per her testimony) and her stipulated injury date of June 2, 2020.  Consequently, I \ncan only  conclude  that  Claimant  did  not  work  at  all  during nine  weeks  of her tenure  at \nHino,  since  they  are  not  reflected  on  the  Form  AR-W  in  evidence.  Those  nine  weeks \nare excluded from the calculation in § 11-9-518(b), which takes into account only weeks \n“worked”—not “employed.”  The statute  must  be  strictly  construed,  in  accordance  with \nArk. Code Ann. § 11-9-704(c)(3) (Repl. 2012).  See Duke v. Regis Hairstylists, 55 Ark. \nApp. 327, 935 S.W.2d 600 (1996).  “Strict construction means narrow construction and \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n9 \n That said, Claimant testified that it was “almost right” that she earned $14.00 per \nhour  during  the  period  in  question,  and  $1,627.75  in  overtime.    I  credit  this.  The \ndetermination  of  a  witness’  credibility  and  how  much  weight  to accord  to  that  person’s \ntestimony  are  solely  up  to  the  Commission.   White  v.  Gregg  Agricultural  Ent.,  72  Ark. \nApp.  309,  37  S.W.3d  649  (2001).    The  Commission  must  sort  through  conflicting \nevidence and determine the true facts.  Id.  In so doing, the Commission is not required \nto  believe  the  testimony  of  the  claimant  or  any  other  witness,  but  may  accept  and \ntranslate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony that it deems worthy of \nbelief.  Id. \n With that to build on, Claimant’s average weekly wage calculation is thus: \n$14.00 x 40 hours =  $560.00 \n+ \n$1,627.75 ÷33 weeks =      $49.33 \n_____________________________ \n     $609.33 \n \nThe preponderance  of  the  evidence  thus  establishes  that  Claimant’s  average  weekly \nwage was $609.33, entitling her to compensation rates of $406.00/$305.00. \n B. Additional Treatment \n Introduction.    Again,  as  the  parties  have  stipulated,  Claimant  sustained  a \ncompensable  injury  to  her  back.    In  this  action,  she  is  seeking,  inter  alia,  additional \ntreatment  of  this  injury  in  the  forms  of  medial  branch  block  injections  and  pain \n \nrequires  that  nothing  be  taken  as  intended  that  is  not  clearly  expressed.”   Hapney  v. \nRheem Mfg. Co., 341 Ark. 548, 26 S.W.3d 771 (2000). \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n10 \nmanagement.  Respondents  have  argued  that  they  are  not  responsible  for  this \ntreatment. \n Standards.    Arkansas  Code  Annotated  Section  11-9-508(a)  (Repl.  2012) states \nthat an employer shall provide for an injured employee such medical treatment as may \nbe  necessary  in  connection  with  the  injury  received  by  the  employee.   See  Wal-Mart \nStores,  Inc.  v.  Brown,  82  Ark.  App.  600,  120  S.W.3d  153  (2003).    But  employers  are \nliable only for such treatment and services as are deemed necessary for the treatment \nof  the claimant’s  injury.   DeBoard  v.  Colson  Co.,  20  Ark.  App.  166,  725  S.W.2d  857 \n(1987).    The  claimant  must  prove  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  medical \ntreatment  is  reasonable  and  necessary  for  the  treatment  of  a  compensable  injury.  \nBrown, supra; Geo  Specialty  Chem.  v.  Clingan,  69  Ark.  App.  369,  13  S.W.3d  218 \n(2000).    The  standard  “preponderance  of  the  evidence”  means  the  evidence  having \ngreater weight or convincing force.  Barre v. Hoffman, 2009 Ark. 373, 326 S.W.3d 415; \nSmith  v.  Magnet  Cove  Barium  Corp.,  212  Ark.  491,  206  S.W.2d  442  (1947).    What \nconstitutes  reasonable  and  necessary  medical  treatment  is  a  question  of  fact  for the \nCommission.  White Consolidated Indus. v. Galloway, 74 Ark. App. 13, 45 S.W.3d 396 \n(2001); Wackenhut Corp. v. Jones, 73 Ark. App. 158, 40 S.W.3d 333 (2001). \n As  the  Arkansas  Court  of  Appeals  has  held,  a  claimant  may  be  entitled  to \nadditional  treatment,  even  after  the  healing  period  has  ended,  if  said  treatment  is \ngeared toward management of the injury.  See Patchell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 86 Ark. \nApp.  230,  184  S.W.3d  31  (2004); Artex  Hydrophonics,  Inc.  v.  Pippin,  8  Ark.  App.  200, \n649 S.W.2d 845 (1983).  Such services can include those for the purpose of diagnosing \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n11 \nthe  nature  and  extent  of  the  compensable  injury,  reducing  or  alleviating  symptoms \nresulting  from  the  compensable  injury,  maintaining  the  level  of  healing  achieved,  or \npreventing  further  deterioration  of  the  damage  produced  by  the  compensable  injury.  \nJordan v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 51 Ark. App. 100, 911 S.W.2d 593 (1995); Artex, supra.  A \nclaimant is not required to furnish objective medical evidence of her continued need for \nmedical  treatment.   Castleberry  v.  Elite  Lamp  Co.,  69  Ark.  App.  359,  13  S.W.3d  211 \n(2000). \n Testimony.   Claimant  is  a  high  school  graduate.    In  addition,  she  has  attended \ntwo semesters at East Arkansas Community College and three at Strayer University.  At \nthe  former,  she  studied  nursing  and  occupation  therapy;  at  the  latter,  the  focus  of  her \nstudy  was  business.    [T.  25-26]    Asked  how  her  stipulated  compensable  back  injury \nhappened on June 2, 2020, she related: \nWell,  we  came on  board  after  the  first  shift,  cause I  worked  second  shift.  \nAnd we got on the line, the team lead told me, well, we’re going to have to \nlift the pallets.”  I said, “For what?”  [The team lead responded:]  “Until we \ncan  get  somebody  over  here.”  So  I  told  her, “Wow,  those  pallets  are \nheavy,” you know, “I’m going to lift all night long,” you know, because the \npallets  that  these  parts  go  onto  after  they  are  made  and  after  they’re \nformed, they’re really heavy.  And they have a machine that you take your \nhand and lay it up against and the pallet comes to you, which the pallet is \nnever lifted up no type of way, because the machine slides it down to you \nonto the little belt, so you’re never having to lift it up.  Well, that night I had \nto lift it up.  I lifted it up till about 3:30 that night, after I told my team lead at \n12:00 that, you know, my back, I was feeling something in my back, cause \nyou know, I had been lifting since I got there at 6:00.  And she said, “Well,” \nyou  know, “we’ve got to get  this  production out.”  I  said, “You  should  call \nMr. Frye.”  Mr. Frye was the supervisor over all of us.  She didn’t do that, \nshe just told me to just go back to the line and continue to do it . . . About \n5:15, between 5:00 and 5:15 I got off of work.  I talked to Mr. Frye before I \nleft.    I  said, “Mr.  Frye,  I’m  hurting  so  bad,”  you  know  what  I’m  saying, “I \ncan’t hardly,” you know, I’m saying go to my time clock or whatever. \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n12 \n \n[T.  12-14]  After  the  injury  was  reported,  Claimant  was  sent  to  the  plant  nurse,  Chris \nGross. \nThe following exchanged occurred: \nQ. Now, what kind of physical problems were you having at this point? \n \nA. At that point I was having, it was my neck and it was the lower part \nof my back.  And you know, he [Gross] just, like I said, he examined \nme, gave me a  couple  of  shots,  gave  me  some  pills,  and  told  me, \n“I’m gonna take you off,” so he did.” \n \n[T.  16]  Claimant  treated  with  Gross  a  number  of  times.    These  visits  included  hip \ninjections.    Eventually,  she  was  sent  for  an  MRI.    This  occurred  on  October  13,  2020.  \n[T. 16-17]  In describing the condition of her back at this time, Claimant stated: \nGetting up in the morning, in back, going to bed at night, back.  I’m just still \nhaving  the  same  problems.    I  don’t  see  where  nothing  that  they  have \ndone, no medication that they have given even worked, just even worked. \n \n[T. 17] \n From there, Claimant went to Dr. LaVerne Lovell.  But while Lovell recommended \nsurgery to address the condition of her back, Claimant did not want to go through with it.  \nShe  feared  that  the  operation  would  make  her  worse  instead  of  better.    [T.  17-18]  \nThereafter, Claimant went to a pain management doctor.  But still, her condition did not \nimprove.  [T. 18]  The following exchange took place: \nQ. Then  after  that  you  went  and  got  treatment  on  your  own  with  the \nPain  Treatment  Center  of  America.    Now  did  that  treatment  help \nyou any? \n \nA. They’re  still  working  with  me.    This  is  something  that  my  primary \ndoctor  wanted  me  to  see,  because  my  blood  pressure  stayed  up \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n13 \ntoo high, she said, and it’s all about pain.  That’s why she sent me \nover there to the new pain doctor. \n \n[T. 19] \n Claimant  denied  having  any  pre-existing  back  problems.    She  pointed  out  that \nprior  to  beginning  work  at  Hino,  she  had  to  pass  a  physical  examination.    It was  her \ntestimony that since her stipulated injury, she has not been involved in any accident.    [T. \n21-22] \n On   cross-examination,   Claimant   stated   that   Dr.   Lovell   assigned   her   an \nimpairment rating of five percent (5%).  She acknowledged that she refused to proceed \nwith  the  back  surgery  because  of,  inter  alia,  the  risks  of  it  that  the  doctor  disclosed  to \nher.  [T. 22-23] \n When asked whether the pain medication that she is currently taking is working, \nClaimant  simply  responded, “No.”  That  being  the  case,  she  was  questioned  why  she \nwas  still  using  it.    Her  reply  was  that  her  physician  has  recently  doubled  her  allowed \ndosage,  and  had  scheduled  her  for  a  follow-up  visit  to  look  into  the  matter  further.  \nNotwithstanding this, Claimant volunteered her assessment of the situation:  “So it’s just \na  mess.”  [T.  29-30]  Later,  she  described  her  back  pain  as “unbearable  sometimes,” \nand explained  that  the  benefit  of  the  increased  dosage  has  helped  in  the  sense  that  it \nhelps  her  sleep  because “you  don’t  feel  no  pain  when  you  sleep.”  In  her  opinion,  her \ncondition has worsened since the injury occurred.  [T. 33] \n Under  questioning  by the  Commission,  Claimant  testified  that  along  with medial \nbranch block injections, she is seeking “[w]hatever the physicians that I go to, whatever \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n14 \nthey suggest that can help I’m willing to accept . . . .”  But she confirmed that this does \nnot  include  the  surgery  proposed  by  Lovell,  because  she  does  not  wish  to  undergo  it.  \n[T. 39] \n Medical  records.    The  records  in  evidence  reflect  that  Claimant  underwent  a \nlumbar x-ray on June 9, 2020, that reflected only “[m]ild arthritic changes involving L2-\nL5 [and] [n]o acute abnormality of the spine . . . .”  She was sent for physical therapy.  A \nlumbar  MRI  that  took  place  on  October  13,  2020,  showed,  inter  alia, “[a]  small  left \nparacentral disc protrusion” at L5-S1. \n After Claimant saw Dr. Lovell on January 12, 2021, he wrote: \nHISTORY:    Ms.  Tina  Walker  is  a  54-year-old  lady  referred  by  Workers’ \nCompensation  for  an  injury  that  occurred  on  June  2,  2020.    The  patient \nwas at her workplace leaning over picking up a little platform of some sort \no[f] car parts in a box that strained her low back and giving her left-sided \nradicular  pain.    The  item  she  was  lifting  weighs  between  20  and  25 \npounds.  She indicated this to the workplace.  She was seen several times \nby local physicians and had physical therapy as well.  An MRI scan of the \nlumbar spine was completed. \n \nReview  of  MRI  of  the  lumbar  spine  shows  stenosis  at  L3-4  moderate  in \nnature that is unrelated to her work injury.  She has a small left-sided L5-\nS1  disc  herniation  that  does  compress  the  S1  root  up  against  the \nfacet  joint  on  that  left  side.    This is  very  likely  the  cause  of  the \nsymptoms which she complains of today. \n \n. . . \n \nPlan: \nI have gone over the MRI scan with the patient in detail.  I have explained \nto her that the lumbar stenosis at L3-4 is not what I believe is symptomatic \nand is not related to her work injury but more than likely, she will progress \nat that site and sometime in the future need to have someone address that \nfor her. \n \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n15 \nI showed her the left-sided L5-S1 disc herniation and used a model as well \nto  talk  to  her  about  the  condition  she  has.    I  have  offered  her  a  lumbar \nepidural  steroid  injection  and  talked  to  her  about  a  left-sided  L5-S1 \nmicrodiscectomy.    I  went  over  the  risks,  complications  and  recovery  of  a \nmicrodiscectomy,  which  include  but  are  not  limited  to  death,  paralysis, \nbleeding, infection, nerve root injury with residual weakness, residual neck \npain, arm pain, paresthesias, bone graft migration, and recurrent laryngeal \nnerve  palsy.  The  case  manager  and  the  patient  will  make  contact  with \neach  other  after  the  Thanksgiving  holiday  which  is  coming  up  and  the \npatient  will  relay  whether  or  not  she  would  like  to  try  steroid  injection  or \nproceed on with surgical intervention.  We will wait to hear from them and \nif she wants to have either one, we will get that scheduled for her.  She will \nstay in an off work status. \n \n(Emphasis added) \n On  April  29,  2021,  Claimant  underwent  a  functional  capacity  evaluation.    The \nreport thereof reflects that she gave an inconsistent and unreliable effort, with only 15 of \n45  consistency  measures  within  expected  limits.    Because  of  this,  the  evaluator  found \nthat  she  demonstrated  the  ability  to  perform  work “in  at  least  the  SEDENTARY \nclassification of work . . . .\" \n On May 6, 2020, Dr. Lovell wrote that Claimant had declined surgery to address \nher  back  injury.    He  assigned  her  permanent  lifting  restrictions  of  50  pounds  on  an \noccasional basis and 25 pounds on a frequent basis.  Also, he gave her an impairment \nrating  of  five  percent  (5%)  to  the  body  as  a  whole.    In  response  to  an  inquiry  by \nRespondents’  counsel,  Dr.  Lovell  on  May  20,  2021,  wrote  that  Claimant  reached \nmaximum  medical  improvement  on  May  6,  2021.    He  added  that  while  she  is  not  in \nneed of future treatment, she does have permanent restrictions as outlined above. \n Claimant returned to Lovell on August 24, 2021.  The report of that visit includes \nthe following: \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n16 \nHISTORY:    Ms.  Walker  returns  for  follow-up.    I  released  her  with  a  PPI \nrating  and  permanent  restrictions  three  months  ago.    The  patient  is  sent \nback today because she was evidently complaining to her adjuster that no \none was managing her pain.  Prior to coming to see me, she was seen by \nan  advanced  practice  nurse  named  Christopher  Gross  over  in  West \nMemphis.    When  she  came  to  see  me,  her  relationship  with  him  was \nterminated.  The patient desires to return back to him for longer-term pain \nmanagement.  I  have  discussed  with  the  patient  once  again,  whether  [or] \nnot  she  is  interested  in  surgery  and  her  response  is  “I  am  thinking  about \nit.” \n \n. . . \n \nThe patient continues to complain of left sciatica and generalized low back \nand hip pains bilaterally.  She has known left-sided L5-S1 disc herniation, \nand  L3-4  stenosis  which  I  have  counseled  her  about  and  went  over  the \nsurgical intervention, including risks and complications. \n \n. . . \n \nPlan: \nThe patient appears not interested in any treatment from me today so I will \ngive her a prescription of some Lortab and refer her back to Mr. Gross for \nlong-term  pain  management.    No  follow-up  is  given  to  this  patient  at  this \ntime as I have nothing further to offer her. \n \nADDENDUM:   Ms. Walker evidently misconstrued the fact that Mr.  Gross \nwas a pain management doctor as he does not do that.  We will, therefore, \nrefer  the  patient  back  to  her  adjuster  to  allow  them  to  seek  [a]  pain \nmanagement doctor near the patient’s home that will manage her. \n \n From  there,  Claimant  began  undergoing  pain  management  at  Pain  Treatment \nCenters  of  America.    When  she  first  presented  there  on  June  14,  2022,  she  rated  her \npain as 5/10 on average and 9/10 at its most severe.  She incorrectly informed treating \npersonnel  that  she  had  not  had “any  imaging  done.”  While  her  hands,  knees,  and \ncervical  spine  were  also  identified  as  potential  problem  areas,  the  treatment  included \nher  lumbosacral  spine.    When  Claimant  went  back  there  on  August  18,  2022,  Dr.  Ted \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n17 \nShields  wrote  that the  prescriptions  of,  inter  alia,  Hydrocodone,  were  to  address \nconditions  that  included  the  following:    chronic  pain  syndrome,  facet  arthritis  of  lumbar \nregion, and lumbar spondylosis. \n Discussion.  In reviewing the medical records, I note that Dr. Lovell, in response \nto  Claimant’s  request  for  pain  management,  referred  her  to  Gross,  the  plant  manager.  \nThe  last  time  he  saw  her,  he  wrote:   “We  will,  therefore,  refer  the  patient  back  to  her \nadjuster to allow them to seek [a] pain management doctor near the patient’s home that \nwill manage her.”  Lovell did not opine that such treatment was unwarranted, but instead \nacted to accommodate the request on August 24, 2021.  This was three months after he \ninformed  Respondents’  counsel  that  Claimant  needed  no  additional  treatment  of  her \nback.  The implication is clear that the doctor reversed course from his earlier opinion.  I \ncredit this.   The Commission is authorized to accept or reject a medical  opinion and is \nauthorized  to  determine  its  medical  soundness  and  probative value.   Poulan  Weed \nEater  v.  Marshall,  79  Ark.  App.  129,  84  S.W.3d  878  (2002); Green  Bay  Packing  v. \nBartlett,  67  Ark.  App.  332,  999  S.W.2d  692  (1999).  Similarly,  I  credit  Dr.  Shields \nregarding the need for administration of medications as part of her pain management. \n The evidence shows that as a result of  Claimant’s stipulated compensable back \ninjury, she still suffers from pain.  She has proven by a preponderance of the evidence \nthat  the pain  management treatment  she  is  undergoing  at  Pain  Treatment  Centers  of \nAmerica is reasonable and necessary, in that it is geared toward reducing or alleviating \nthe  symptoms  resulting  from her  compensable  injury,  and  that  it  is  causally  related  to \nthat injury.  On the other hand, while Claimant has also contended that she is entitled to \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n18 \nadditional treatment in the form of medial branch blocks by Dr. Michael Scarbrough, the \nrecords  of  Scarbrough  are  not  in  evidence  to  show,  among  other  things,  that he  has \nrecommended them.  Thus, I am unable to find that she is entitled to these injections by \nhim. \nC. Additional Temporary Total Disability Benefits \n Introduction.  The parties have stipulated that Claimant was paid temporary total \ndisability benefits regarding her compensable back injury through May 5, 2021.  Herein, \nshe is asking that she be awarded additional benefits  of this type “until she is returned \nto work.”  Respondents dispute this. \n Standards.    The  compensable  injury  to  Claimant’s back  is  unscheduled.    See \nArk.  Code  Ann.  §  11-9-521  (Repl.  2012).    An  employee  who  suffers  a  compensable \nunscheduled  injury  is  entitled  to  temporary  total  disability  compensation  for  that  period \nwithin the healing period in which he has suffered a total incapacity to earn wages.  Ark. \nState  Hwy.  &  Transp. Dept.  v.  Breshears,  272  Ark. 244, 613  S.W.2d  392  (1981).    The \nhealing  period  ends  when  the  underlying  condition  causing  the  disability  has  become \nstable  and  nothing  further  in  the  way  of  treatment  will  improve  that  condition.   Mad \nButcher, Inc. v. Parker, 4 Ark. App. 124, 628 S.W.2d 582 (1982).  Also, a claimant must \ndemonstrate that the disability lasted more than seven days.  Id. § 11-9-501(a)(1). \n Evidence.  Claimant  has  undergone  some  training  in  the  areas  of  nursing  and \nphlebotomy.  [T. 8]  Asked to describe her work experience pre-Hino, she related: \nI  did  a  lot  of  sitting,  you  know,  for  the  elderly,  sitting.    It’s  like  classified \nunder  the  nurse  aide,  you  know,  grounds,  you  know,  just  sitting  with  the \nelderly,  you  know  what  I’m  saying?    Like  reading  mail  to  them,  getting  a \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n19 \nmeal,  and  different  things  like  that,  nothing  really  hard,  just  a  sitter.    It’s \nalmost like a companion to her. \n \n[T. 10] \n She worked in this position from 2011 until she was hired by Hino in 2019.  When \nshe began work there, Claimant first performed the following tasks: \n[B]efore I got on the line, I was taking parts out of the box which went to a \ngate, taking the parts out of the box, putting them on the conveyor where \nthey’ll go around, you know, cause they were making, you know, the rear \nend part of the trucks for the trucks. \n \n[T.  11]    Later,  she  was  transferred  to  the  assembly  line.    This  job  had  multiple \ncomponents: \nI  had  eight  different  little  jobs  that  I  do  from  one  side  to  the \nnext.  I’d take and I’d put the little seals, rubber seals into the \npart,  and  then  it  starts  to  go around,  and  then  I might put a \nscrew  in  and  it’ll  come  around,  then  where  we  have  this  lift \nthe  part  up  off  the  belt,  put  it  onto  a  pallet,  rivet  it  down  on \nboth ends. \n \n[T. 11-12] \n According  to  Claimant,  when  she  first  began  treating  for  her  back  injury  with \nNurse Gross, he took her off of work.  She stated that she never went back to work at \nRespondent Hino since that time.  [T. 16]  The following exchange took place: \nQ. Now,  Dr.  Lovell  released  you  from  his  care  [o]n  May  6  of  2021.  \nNow,  did  you  try  to  go  back  to  work  or  talk  to  anybody  at  Hino’s \nabout going back to work? \n \nA. I did, I talked to Linda. \n \nQ. Linda who? \n \nA. Linda McDoniel. \n \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n20 \nQ. And she worked with Hino? \n \nA. Yes. \n \nQ. What was the nature of that conversation? \n \nA. The nature of that conversation was, “Linda, when are they going to \ndecide  what  they’re  gonna  do,  and  are  they  gonna  allow  me,  with \neverything that they’ve got going on, but will they let me come back \nto work?  She said to me, “Are they releasing you [to] full [duty], or \nare you on restrictions?”  I said to her, “Lovell said I was gonna be \non  restrictions.”  So  she  told  me  I  couldn’t  come  back  with \nrestrictions, because they didn’t have any type of position that, you \nknow,  I  could  do  on  restrictions,  so  that’s  why  I  didn’t  go  back.  \nThat’s why I haven’t gone back. \n \nQ. So have you been back to work anywhere since then? \n \nA. No. \n \n[T. 19-20]  No one has taken her off work since Dr. Lovell released her  from treatment.  \n[T. 24] \n Discussion.  As the   parties   have   stipulated,   Respondents   paid   Claimant \ntemporary total disability benefits through May 5, 2021.  Under Poulan Weed Eater and \nGreen  Bay  Packing,  supra, I  am  crediting  Dr.  Lovell’s  opinion  that  Claimant  reached \nmaximum medical improvement as of May 6, 2021.  The evidence establishes that she \nreached the end of her healing period on that date.  Consequently, she has not proven \nher entitlement to additional temporary total disability benefits. \nD. Wage Loss Disability Benefits \n Introduction.    In  addition,  Claimant  has  asserted  that  her  injury  merits  her  wage \nloss disability benefits.  Respondents oppose this. \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n21 \n Standards.  To repeat, Claimant’s June 2, 2020, compensable injury to her back \nis unscheduled.  Cf. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-521 (Repl. 2012).  Her entitlement to wage \nloss disability benefits is controlled by § 11-9-522(b)(1), which states: \nIn considering claims for permanent partial disability  benefits in excess of \nthe   employee’s   percentage   of   permanent   physical   impairment,   the \nWorkers’ Compensation Commission may take into account, in addition to \nthe  percentage  of  permanent  physical  impairment,  such  factors  as  the \nemployee’s    age,    education,    work    experience,    and   other   matters \nreasonably expected to affect his or her future earning capacity. \n \nSee  Curry  v.  Franklin  Elec.,  32  Ark.  App.  168,  798  S.W.2d  130  (1990).   Such  “other \nmatters” include motivation, post-injury income, credibility, demeanor, and a multitude of \nother  factors.   Id.; Glass  v.  Edens,  233  Ark.  786,  346  S.W.2d  685  (1961).    As  the \nArkansas  Court  of  Appeals  noted  in Hixon  v.  Baptist  Health,  2010  Ark.  App.  413,  375 \nS.W.3d  690,  “there  is  no  exact  formula  for  determining  wage  loss  .  .  .  .”  Pursuant  to      \n§ 11-9-522(b)(1), when a claimant has been assigned an impairment rating to the body \nas  a  whole,  the  Commission  possesses  the  authority  to  increase  the  rating,  and  it  can \nfind a claimant totally and permanently disabled based upon wage-loss factors.  Cross \nv. Crawford County Memorial Hosp., 54 Ark. App. 130, 923 S.W.2d 886 (1996). \n To  be  entitled  to  any wage-loss disability  in  excess of  an  impairment  rating, the \nclaimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained permanent \nphysical  impairment  as  a  result  of  a  compensable  injury.  Wal-Mart  Stores,  Inc.  v. \nConnell,  340  Ark.  475,  10  S.W.3d  727  (2000).    The  wage  loss  factor  is  the  extent  to \nwhich  a  compensable  injury  has  affected  the  claimant’s  ability  to  earn  a  livelihood.  \nEmerson  Elec.  v.  Gaston,  75  Ark.  App.  232,  58  S.W.3d  848  (2001).    In  considering \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n22 \nfactors that may impact a claimant’s future earning capacity, the Commission considers \nhis  motivation  to  return  to  work,  because  a  lack  of  interest  or  a  negative  attitude \nimpedes the assessment of his loss of earning capacity.  Id.  The Commission may use \nits  own  superior  knowledge  of  industrial  demands,  limitations,  and  requirements  in \nconjunction  with  the  evidence  to  determine  wage-loss  disability.   Oller  v.  Champion \nParts  Rebuilders,  5 Ark.  App.  307,  635 S.W.2d  276  (1982).    Finally,  Ark.  Code  Ann.  § \n11-9-102(4)(F)(ii) (Repl. 2012) provides: \n(a)  Permanent  benefits  shall  be  awarded  only  upon  a  determination  that \nthe   compensable   injury   was   the   major   cause   of   the   disability   or \nimpairment. \n \n(b)  If  any  compensable  injury  combines  with  a  preexisting  disease  or \ncondition or the natural process of aging to cause or prolong disability or a \nneed  for  treatment,  permanent  benefits  shall  be  payable  for  the  resultant \ncondition  only  if  the  compensable  injury  is  the  major  cause  of  the \npermanent disability or need for treatment. \n \n“Major cause” is more than fifty percent (50%) of the cause, and has to be established \nby  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence.    Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11-9-102(14)  (Repl.  2012).  \n“Disability” is the “incapacity because of compensable injury to earn, in the same or any \nother  employment,  the  wages  which  the  employee  was  receiving  at  the  time  of  the \ncompensable injury.”  Id. § 11-9-102(8). \n Evidence.  Claimant described her jobs at Hino: \nI got hired on to do . . . taking parts out of the box which went to a gate, \ntaking the parts out of the box, putting them on the conveyor where they’ll \ngo  around,  you  know,  cause  they  were  making,  you  know,  the  rear  end \npart  of  the  trucks  for  the  trucks.    And then  after  that  I  was  moved  to  the \nline. \n \n. . . \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n23 \n \nI had eight different little jobs that I do from one side to the next.  I’d take \nand  I’d put  the  little  seals,  rubber  seals  into the part,  and  then  it  starts  to \ngo  around,  and  then  I  might  put  a  screw  in  and  it’ll  come  around,  then \nwhere  we  have  this  lift  to  lift  the  part  up  off  the  belt,  put  it  onto  a  pallet, \nrivet  it  down  on  both  ends.    It  goes  into  the  machine  and  the  machine \nreads it, it turns it upside down, it reads the part then, and then I move on \nand I read the serial numbers on the top and the bottom. \n \n[T. 11-12] \nThe following exchange occurred: \nQ. Let’s  go  over  your  conditions and  how that  affected  other areas  of \nyour life since June of 2020 . . . [s]o has it changed your social life \nany?  Are there things you used to do that you can’t do now? \n \nA. Yeah, it has changed a lot in my life, because I go to bed with pain, \nI  wake  up  with  pain.    They  want  to  put  me  on  all  of  these  hypo-\npower   [sic—obviously, “high-powered”]   medications   that   all,   it \ndoesn’t even give you a life  because all you do is sleep your days \naway,  you  know,  and  I  don’t  know,  I  just  see  no  use  to  it,  do  you \nknow what I’m saying, for your know, the medication, you know, the \npain. \n \n[T. 20-21]  Her back condition has negatively impacted her dancing.  She added: \nMy household chores, it takes a long time for me to do certain things like \nstand  in  the  kitchen  for  a  long  time  at  the  sink  washing  dishes  and  stuff \nlike that without me having to take a seat to, you know, rest my back . . . . \n \n[T. 21]  Notwithstanding  her injury, Claimant feels that she still possesses the ability to \nwork—albeit in a limited capacity:  “I am sure with my—I have a super duper back brace \nhe gave me that works for me.  I mean, I could do it [work] sitting down.”  [T. 21] \n When  Dr.  Lovell  released  Claimant,  he  assigned  her  permanent  restrictions  of \nfrequent  lifting  of  no  more  than  25  pounds,  and  occasional  lifting  of  no  more  than  50.  \nHer testimony was that based on her education and experience, she could find another \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n24 \njob  within  those  restrictions.    She  hastened  to  add:   “Well,  there’s  some  jobs  out  here \nthat  you  don’t  have  to  lift  much.    It  ain’t  a  lot,  but  it’s,  you  know  .  .  .  [y]ou’re  gonna  lift \nsomething.”  [T.26-27] \n The following exchange occurred on cross-examination: \nQ. Do you feel like you could get a job that paid more than $14.00 an \nhour without having to lift 25 pounds? \n \nA. I’m not really sure in the State of Arkansas, no. \n \nQ. You  are  fairly  educated  and  have  some  college  experience.    I’m \nassuming you can read and write well? \n \nA. I can read and I can write, yes. \n \nQ. And you are [at] least capable with math and arithmetic? \n \nA. Yes, I am. \n \nQ. Do you think you could work as a clerk, a cashier, or anything like \nthat with that injury? \n \nA. Well, I wouldn’t say with that prolonged standing.  I think that would \nget to me as far as a cashier or something like that.  The prolonged \nnormally standing, I think I could probably— \n \nQ. And prolonged standing, is that because of your knees? \n \nA. Well, my back.  I mean, really my back was really the major thing, \nyou  know,  that  started.    You  know  what  I’m  saying?    All  the  rest \nstarted,  you  know,  coming  in,  but  I  think  the  prolonged  standing \nwould probably get me. \n \n[T. 27] \n Asked why she has not applied for work anywhere,  Claimant gave the following \nexplanation: \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n25 \nBecause  when  I  get  up  in  the  morning,  I  have  to  take  a  hydro[codone].  \nThat’s why I haven’t applied for no job.  When I lay down at night I have to \ntake one.  She upped them to twice a day now, cause I’m having a lot of \nproblems.  So that’s why I haven’t got no job, because the medication that \nthey  give,  it’s  a  real  drowsy,  sleepy  type  of  medication,  so,  and  I  don’t \nwant to drive and hurt myself or hurt no one else, so that’s why. \n \n[T. 29] \n Claimant has been approved for Social Security Disability.  She draws $1,394.00 \nin monthly benefits.  It was her testimony that her receipt of these benefits has not been \nthe  cause  of  her  not  looking  for  work.    She  denied  that  the  prospect of  her  benefits \nbeing   reduced   or   ended   if   she   got   another   job   would   keep   her   from   seeking \nemployment;  and  she  denied  stating  the  opposite  of  this  in  her  deposition.    [T.  30-31]  \nClaimant  related  that  her  goal  is  to  return  to  work  once  her  pain  situation  has  been \nresolved.    [T.  33]  It  was  not  her  plan  to  draw  disability  benefits  at  age  56.    She \nelaborated: \nI mean,  I  just thought I  had  at  least  three  or  four more  years  out there  in \nthe  workforce.    I’ve  worked  most  of  my  life,  so  I  didn’t  feel  like  I  should \nhave  been  hindered  for  a  company  that  didn’t  even  care  about  their \nemployees, so no, I wasn’t looking to be on disability at this age, no. \n \nHino has not offered her another job since this injury.  [T. 34] \n As for her returning to another position that she held earlier in her career, that of \nbeing a sitter or companion for an elderly individual, Claimant explained that  while she \ncould  perform  the  aspect  of  the  job  that  involved  her  simply  sitting  and  watching  the \nclient, her back condition would not allow her to help the client if, for example, that were \nto fall onto the floor.  [T. 35] \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n26 \n With  respect  to  Claimant’s  functional  capacity  evaluation,  which  indicated  that \nshe put forth a sub-optimal effort (see infra), she explained: \nWell,  I’m  not  saying  that  I  hadn’t  limited  myself,  I  only  could  do  what  I \ncould do, and that was what the test was about, no pushing me.  He [the \nevaluator] told me to do what I could do.  So no, I wasn’t limiting myself, I \nwas just doing what he asked of me, but it strained anyway. \n \n[T. 32-33] \n Discussion.  The evidence before me reflects that Claimant is 56 years old and a \nhigh  school  graduate.    She  has  attended  five  semesters  of  college  at  two different \ninstitutions.  Her courses of study there were occupational therapy and business.  Prior \nto going to work for Respondent Hino, Claimant worked as a sitter/companion for elderly \nclients.  While this job by its nature is largely sedentary, a person performing it might be \ncalled upon to help up a fallen patient. \n Her position at Hino, on the other hand, involved working on an assembly line at \na  plant  that  manufactured  truck  parts.    Some  lifting  was  involved—in  fact,  extensive \nlifting the day of her back injury. \n With  respect  to  her  stipulated  compensable  injury,  Claimant  has  undergone \nprimarily  conservative  treatment.    While  Dr.  Lovell  offered  her  surgery  to  address  her \nherniation  at  L5-S1,  she  declined.    Thereafter,  the  doctor  placed  her  at maximum \nmedical improvement as of May 6, 2021, and assigned her an impairment rating of five \npercent  (5%)  to  the  body  as  a  whole.  To  help  assess  Claimant,  she  was  sent  for  a \nfunctional capacity evaluation.  However, her effort was very unreliable, with only 15 of \n45 consistency measures within expected limits. \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n27 \n Since that time, her treatment has consisted of pain management.  This has only \nbeen marginally successful; her dosage of Hydrocodone has been increased to address \nher pain, which she rated as averaging 5/10 to her pain management provider.  As she \nrelated  both to  the  provider  and to the  Commission  in  her  testimony,  the pain  at  times \ncan be very severe. \n As  a  consequence  of  Claimant’s  injury,  her  activities  have  been  curtailed.    She \ncan no longer go dancing.  While she believes she could still work, due to use of a back \nbrace,  she  thinks  she  could  only  do  so  from  a  seated  position.    Notwithstanding  this \nopinion, she has not looked for work in the aftermath of her injury.  Hino did not return \nher to work there because she remains under the restrictions assigned by Dr. Lovell:  no \nlifting more than 25 pounds frequently or 50 occasionally.  She is now receiving Social \nSecurity Disability benefits. \n I  find,  after  consideration  of  Claimant’s  testimony,  that  she  is  not  motivated  to \nreturn   to   the workforce.      But   this   does   not   prevent   me   from   finding   that   the \npreponderance of the evidence establishes that she has suffered wage loss disability of \nfive  percent  (5%), and  that her  compensable  back  injury  of  June  2,  2020,  is  the major \ncause of this. \nE. Attorney’s Fee \n One of the purposes of the attorney's fee statute is to put the economic burden of \nlitigation  on  the  party  who  makes  litigation  necessary.   Brass  v.  Weller,  23  Ark.  App. \n193,  745  S.W.2d  647  (1998).    I  find  that  Respondents  have  controverted  Claimant’s \nentitlement  to  the  wage  loss  disability  benefits  that  have  been  awarded  herein.  \n\nWALKER – H003585 \n \n28 \nConsequently,  she  has  proven  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  her  attorney \nshould be awarded a controverted fee  thereon pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-715 \n(Repl. 2012). \nCONCLUSION AND AWARD \n Respondents  are  hereby  directed  to pay/furnish  benefits  in  accordance  with  the \nfindings of fact and conclusions of law set forth above.  All accrued sums shall be paid \nin a lump sum without discount, and this award shall earn interest at the legal rate until \npaid,  pursuant  to  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11-9-809  (Repl.  2012).   See Couch  v.  First  State \nBank of Newport, 49 Ark. App. 102, 898 S.W.2d 57 (1995). \n Claimant’s  attorney  is  entitled  to  a  25 percent  (25%)  attorney’s  fee  awarded \nherein,  one-half  of  which  is  to  be  paid  by  Claimant  and  one-half  to  be  paid  by \nRespondents in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-715 (Repl. 2012). \n IT IS SO ORDERED. \n       ________________________________ \n       Hon. O. Milton Fine II \n       Chief Administrative Law Judge","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION WCC NO. H003585 TINA WALKER, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT HINO MOTOR MFG. USA, INC., EMPLOYER RESPONDENT SOMPO AMER. INS. CO., CARRIER RESPONDENT OPINION FILED APRIL 24, 2023 Hearing before Chief Administrative Law Judge O. Milton Fine II on January 27, 2023, in Marion, Critten...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T23:08:45.806Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-H003585-2023-04-24","pdf":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/Walker_Tina_H003585_20230424.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}