{"id":"alj-G903654-2023-05-10","awcc_number":"G903654","decision_date":"2023-05-10","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Kaitlyn Iglehart","employer_name":"City Of Jonesboro","title":"IGLEHART VS. CITY OF JONESBORO AWCC# G903654 & H208271 MAY 11, 2023","outcome":"granted","outcome_keywords":["granted:4"],"injury_keywords":["back","lumbar","shoulder","wrist"],"pdf_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/IGLEHART_KAITLYN_G903654_H208271_20230510.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"IGLEHART_KAITLYN_G903654_H208271_20230510.pdf","text_length":20440,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \nWCC NO. G903654 & H208271 \n \nKAITLYN M. IGLEHART,  \nEmployee                                                                                             CLAIMANT \n \nCITY OF JONESBORO,  \nEmployer                                                                                        RESPONDENT \n \nMUNICIPAL LEAGUE WC PROGRAM, \n Insurance Carrier / TPA                                                                RESPONDENT \n \n \nOPINION FILED MAY 11, 2023 \nHearing before Administrative Law Judge Steven Porch on April 14, 2023, in Jonesboro, \nCraighead County, Arkansas. \n \nClaimant was represented by Phillip J. Wells, Attorney at Law, Jonesboro, Arkansas. \n \nRespondents are represented by Mary K. Edwards, Attorney at Law, North Little Rock, \nArkansas.  \n \nI.  BACKGROUND \n These  matters  came  before  the  Commission on  April  14,  2023,  on  the \ncompensability of two work-related injuries in Jonesboro, Arkansas. Testimony was taken. \nThe  evidentiary  record  consists  of  both  Respondents’  and  Claimant’s  exhibits, oral \nargument,  Claimant’s  testimony,  and  post-hearing  briefs.  Without  objection,  the  two \nCommission files have been incorporated herein by reference in their entirety. \n A prehearing conference was conducted on February 15, 2023, and a Prehearing \nOrder was filed on February 22, 2023.  A copy of the Prehearing Order has been marked \nas Commission’s Exhibit #1 and made a part of the record without objection. \nBy mutual agreement of the parties, the stipulations applicable to this claim are as \nfollows: \n\nIGLEHART – G903654 & H208271 \n2 \n \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction of the \nwithin claims. \n2. The employer/employee/carrier-TPA relationship existed on May 4, 2019, \nand February 5, 2022, when the Claimant sustained a compensable lower \nback/lumbar spine injury on May 4, 2019, (G903654), and a compensable \nright  shoulder  injury  on  February  5,  2022,  (H208271)  for  which  the \nRespondents paid both medical and indemnity benefits. \n3. The Claimant’s average weekly wage (AWW) is $748.50, which is sufficient \nto entitle her to weekly compensation rates of $499.00 for temporary total \ndisability (TTD), and $374.00 for permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits \nif the claimant’s alleged lower back/lumbar spine injury of February 5, 2022, \nis deemed compensable. \n4. The Respondents controvert only the Claimant’s alleged lower back/lumbar \nspine injury of February 5, 2022. \n5. The parties specifically reserve any and all other issues for future litigation \nand/or determination. \n By mutual agreement of the parties, the issues to be litigated at the hearing are as \nfollows: \n1. Whether  the  Claimant  also  sustained  a  compensable  injury  within  the \nmeaning of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) to her lower \nback/lumbar spine on February 5, 2022. \n \n\nIGLEHART – G903654 & H208271 \n3 \n \n2. If the Claimant’s alleged injury is deemed compensable, the extent to which \nshe is entitled to medical and indemnity benefits. \n3. Whether the Claimant’s attorney is entitled to a controverted fee on these \nfacts. \n4. The parties specifically reserve any and all other issues for future litigations \nand/or determination. \n The  Claimant’s  and  Respondents’  contentions  are  set  out  in  their  respective \nresponse to the prehearing questionnaire. Said contentions are as follows: \n Claimant:  The Claimant contends she sustained a fall during the course of her \nemployment on February 12, 2022. The Claimant further contends that the fall resulted in \na disc injury to her lumbar spine resulting in lumbar disc surgery. \nThe Claimant further contends the  Respondents should be deemed liable for \npayment of any and all of her related, reasonably necessary medical treatment and \nassociated expenses, including but not limited to mileage, etc.; to TTD benefits from \nDecember 7, 2022, through the date she reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) \non or about February 10, 2023; and eventually to appropriate PPD benefits. The Claimant \nreserves any and all other issues for future determination and/or litigation. \n Respondent:  The  Respondents  contend  the  Claimant  filed  a  workers’ \ncompensation claim for a fall on February 5, 2022. They accepted the Claimant’s right \nshoulder as compensable and paid related, reasonably necessary medical benefits. The \nClaimant now contends she also injured her lower back/lumbar spine in this fall. The \nRespondents contend the Claimant cannot meet her burden of proof pursuant to the Act \nin demonstrating by a preponderance of the credible evidence that she sustained a \n\nIGLEHART – G903654 & H208271 \n4 \n \ncompensable lower back/lumbar spine injury on February 5, 2022. The Claimant has a \nhistory of lower back problems dating back to a prior workers’ compensation injury she \nsustained in a motor vehicle accident (MVA) on May 4, 2019. The Respondents contend \nthat any problems the Claimant is currently experiencing are related to this prior injury \nand are the result of the February 5, 2022, fall. The Respondents reserve the right to file \nan amended response to the prehearing questionnaire or other appropriate pleading, and \nto allege any further affirmative defense(s) that might be available upon the completion \nof any and all necessary and appropriate discovery. Finally, the Respondents reserve all \nother issues for future determination and/or litigation. \n The  record  reflects  the  following  history:   The  Claimant  alleges,  under  claim \nnumber  G903654,  that  she  has  sustained  a  compensable  injury  to  her  whole  body \nincluding her lower back resulting from a specific incident on May 4, 2019. There an \nunderage and unlicensed driver struck Claimant’s patrol car. Respondents allege that this \nclaim was not filed within the statute of limitations deadline.  \nClaimant also had a second claim, claim #H208271, where she alleges, she has \nsustained a compensable injury to her right shoulder, elbow, and wrist resulting from a \nspecific incident on February 5, 2022. There Claimant slipped on ice and fell onto the curb \nas she was heading to her patrol car to go on a work-related call. The Respondents \naccepted, as a medical only claim, Claimant’s injuries to her right shoulder, elbow, and \nwrist. However, during the full hearing, Claimant further alleged that she also injured her \nback during the February 5, 2022, incident. The injury to Claimant’s back was not noted \non her Form AR-1 filed on November 23, 2022, but was noted on her Form AR-C filed on \nNovember 22, 2022. The Respondents have controverted Claimant’s claim for her lower \n\nIGLEHART – G903654 & H208271 \n5 \n \nback injury on grounds that this was a pre-existing injury since the May 4, 2019, car \naccident. Respondents further state that Claimant’s spine has a degenerative disease \nand there is a lack of objective findings to substantiate an award for her lower back injury.  \nII.  FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \n After reviewing the record as a whole, I hereby make the following findings of fact \nand conclusions of law in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704 (Repl. 2012): \n1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction over \nthese claims. \n2. Claim #G903654 was not filed with the Commission until after the statute of \nlimitations has passed. Thus, I find Claim #G903654, the May 4, 2019, \nincident is time-barred.  \n3. The  Commission  further  finds,  by  the  preponderance  of  evidence,  that \nClaimant’s back injury sustained on February 5, 2022, claim #H208271, is \ncompensable.  Respondents  shall  pay  for  the  medical  treatment  for \nClaimant’s back injury and pay all indemnity benefits due Claimant from \nDecember  7,  2022,  to  February  10,  2023.  Respondents  shall  pay  all \nbenefits consistent with this opinion. \n4.        The Claimant is entitled to Temporary Total Disability at a rate of $539.00 \nand  Permanent  Partial  Impairment  benefits  at  a  rate  of  $404.00.  The \nClaimant is entitled to medical benefits and services for her injury until \nClaimant reaches maximum recovery. \n \n \n\nIGLEHART – G903654 & H208271 \n6 \n \nIII.  DISCUSSION \n At the start of the April 14, 2023, full hearing, we first addressed the issue of the \nStatute  of  Limitations  for  case  #G903654,  the  May  4,  2019,  vehicle  collision  claim. \nClaimant’s counsel, Phillip Wells, conceded that the statute of limitations has run, and it \nshould be dismissed. All parties agreed, and I ruled from the bench that Claim #G903654 \nwas time-barred. And in this opinion, for clarity, I again find that case #G903654 is time-\nbarred. Under Ark. Code Ann. §11-9-702(b)(1) (Repl. 2012):  \nIn cases in which any compensation, including disability or medical, has \nbeen paid on account of injury, a claim for additional compensation shall be \nbarred unless filed with the commission within one (1) year from the date of \nthe last payment of compensation or two (2) years from the date of the \ninjury, whichever is greater. \n \n The burden rests on Claimant to prove that his claim was timely filed.  Stewart v. \nArk. Glass Container, 2010 Ark. 198, 366 S.W.3d 358; Kent v. Single Source Transp., 103 \nArk. App. 151, 287 S.W.3d 619 (2008).  Under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-705(a)(3) (Repl. \n2012),  he  must  prove  this  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence.  The  standard \n“preponderance of the evidence” means the evidence having greater weight or convincing \nforce.  Barre v. Hoffman, 2009 Ark. 373, 326 S.W.3d 415; Smith v. Magnet Cove Barium \nCorp., 212 Ark. 491, 206 S.W.2d 442 (1947). \nClaimant’s injury occurred on May 4, 2019. Claimant did not file a Form AR-C by \nMay 4, 2021, the statute of limitations deadline. A Form AR-C is the means for filing a \n“formal claim.”  See Yearwood v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2003 AR Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 739, \nClaim No. F201311 (Full Commission Opinion filed June 17, 2003).  See also Sinclair v. \nMagnolia  Hospital,  1998  AR  Wrk.  Comp.  LEXIS  786,  Claim  No.  E703502  (Full \n\nIGLEHART – G903654 & H208271 \n7 \n \nCommission Opinion filed December 22, 1998)(a claim is “typically” filed via a Form AR-\nC).  \nClaimant made no arguments regarding the statute of limitations deadline, only an \nimmediate concession that Claim #G903654 is time-barred and should be dismissed. I \nfind that Claimant has not proven by the preponderance of evidence that an official claim \nfor Claim #G903654 was timely filed and is hereby dismissed. Therefore, there will be no \nfurther dealings with Claim #G903654 beyond this point as a viable claim. We will only \ndeal with the February 5, 2022, claim, Claim #H208271, for the remainder of this opinion. \nThe  remaining  claim  has  an  issue  of  whether  Claimant’s  lower  back  injury  is \ncompensable. \nStandards.  Arkansas  Code  Annotated  §  11-9-102(4)(A)(i)  (Repl.  2012)  defines \n“compensable injury\": \n(i) An accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body \n. . . arising out of and in the course of employment and which requires \nmedical services or results in disability or death.  An injury is \"accidental\" \nonly if it is caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place \nof occurrence[.] \n \nA compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective \nfindings.  Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Repl. 2012).  \"Objective findings\" are those \nfindings that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient.  Id. § 11-9-102(16).  \nThe element “arising out of . . . [the] employment” relates to the causal connection \nbetween the claimant’s injury and his or her employment.  City of El Dorado v. Sartor, 21 \nArk. App. 143, 729 S.W.2d 430 (1987). \n If the claimant fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence any of the \nrequirements for establishing compensability, compensation must be denied.  Mikel v. \n\nIGLEHART – G903654 & H208271 \n8 \n \nEngineered Specialty Plastics, 56 Ark. App. 126, 938 S.W.2d 876 (1997).  This standard \nmeans the evidence having greater weight or convincing force.  Barre v. Hoffman, 2009 \nArk. 373, 326 S.W.3d 415; Smith v. Magnet Cove Barium Corp., 212 Ark. 491, 206 S.W.2d \n442 (1947). \n The determination of a witness’ credibility and how much weight to accord to that \nperson’s testimony are solely up to the Commission.  White v. Gregg Agricultural Ent., 72 \nArk. App. 309, 37 S.W.3d 649 (2001).  The Commission must sort through conflicting \nevidence and determine the true facts.  Id.  In so doing, the Commission is not required \nto believe the testimony of the claimant or any other witness but may accept and translate \ninto findings of fact only those portions of the testimony that it deems worthy of belief.  Id.  \nMoreover, Arkansas Code Annotated Section 11-9-508(a) (Repl. 2012) states that \nan employer shall provide for an injured employee such medical treatment as may be \nnecessary in connection with the injury received by the employee.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. \nv. Brown, 82 Ark. App. 600, 120 S.W.3d 153 (2003).  But employers are liable only for \nsuch treatment and services as are deemed necessary for the treatment of the claimant’s \ninjuries.  DeBoard v. Colson Co., 20 Ark. App. 166, 725 S.W.2d 857 (1987).  The claimant \nmust prove by a preponderance of the evidence that medical treatment is reasonable and \nnecessary for the treatment of a compensable injury.  Brown, supra; Geo Specialty Chem. \nv. Clingan, 69 Ark. App. 369, 13 S.W.3d 218 (2000).  What constitutes reasonable and \nnecessary  medical  treatment  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  Commission.   White \nConsolidated Indus. v. Galloway, 74 Ark. App. 13, 45 S.W.3d 396 (2001); Wackenhut \nCorp. v. Jones, 73 Ark. App. 158, 40 S.W.3d 333 (2001).  I do find that Claimant has \nproven by a preponderance of the evidence a compensable lower back injury and that \n\nIGLEHART – G903654 & H208271 \n9 \n \nshe is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical treatment of her compensable lower \nback injury.  Moreover, I have reviewed her medical records that are in evidence, and I \nfind that she has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that all of the treatment of \nher compensable lower back injury that is in evidence, on and after February 5, 2022, \nwas  reasonable  and  necessary.    However,  before  going  any  further,  I  do note \nRespondents’ argument that Claimant’s lower back injury was pre-existing. I do agree \nthat Claimant had a pre-existing back injury. \n However,  the  law  is  clear  that  an  employer  under  the  Arkansas  Workers’ \nCompensation  Act  takes  an  employee  as  the  employer  finds  her.  Employment \ncircumstances  that  aggravate  pre-existing  conditions  are  compensable.   Nashville \nLivestock Comm. v. Cox, 302 Ark. 69, 787 S.W.2d 64 (1990).  A pre-existing infirmity does \nnot disqualify a claim if the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the \ninfirmity to produce the disability for which compensation is sought.  St. Vincent Med. Ctr. \nv. Brown, 53 Ark. App. 30, 917 S.W.2d 550 (1996).  “An aggravation, being a new injury \nwith  an  independent cause,  must  meet  the  requirements for a  compensable  injury.”  \nCrudup v. Regal Ware, Inc., 341 Ark. 804, 20 S.W.3d 900 (2000);  Ford v. Chemipulp \nProcess, Inc., 63 Ark. App. 260, 977 S.W.2d 5 (1998).  This includes the prerequisite that \nthe alleged injury be shown by medical evidence supported by objective findings.  See \nHeritage Baptist Temple v. Robison, 82 Ark. App. 460, 120 S.W.3d 150 (2003).  These \nstandards have been met here. \n As previously stated, I do find that Claimant has proven by a preponderance of the \nevidence  that  she  sustained  a  compensable  lower  back  injury,  by  specific  incident, \nsupported by objective evidence. The facts in support of my decision are as follows: \n\nIGLEHART – G903654 & H208271 \n10 \n \nThe parties have stipulated to the employer/employee relationship existing on \nFebruary 5, 2022, when the Claimant sustained her compensable lower back/lumbar \nspine injury. The Claimant is a police officer that was actively working for the City of \nJonesboro on February 5, 2022. The Claimant was heading to her patrol car to respond \nto a call when she slipped on some ice striking the curb and injured her lower back as \nwell as her right shoulder, elbow, and wrist. Claimant stated, during her sworn testimony, \nthat she told her supervisor about her back issues but was discouraged by her supervisor \nfrom pursuing that lower back injury claim. Claimant testified that her supervisor told her \nto focus on the shoulder, elbow, and wrist injuries so she can get back to work. Claimant \nhas also admitted under oath to taking shots to help with her back pain before the \nFebruary 5, 2022, incident. I do find the Claimant’s testimony credible.  \nThe  Claimant  has  presented  an  MRI  report  written  by  Dr.  Ezekiel  Shotts for \nClaimant’s September 19, 2022, visit. Dr. Shotts did a comparison of two MRIs, one taken \non December 12, 2021, a few months before the February 5, 2022, because of her pre-\nexisting back issues and another on September 9, 2022, after the February 5, 2022, \nincident. Dr. Shotts stated in his report, referencing Claimant’s L5-S1, “There is a large \nright paracentral disc protrusion, significantly increased in size compared with the prior \nstudy. The protrusion contacts and displaces the right S1 nerve root and contacts the right \nS2 nerve root.” Dr. Shotts’ “IMPRESSION” was as follows: “Enlarging right paracentral \ndisc protrusion at L5-S1 with contact of both the right S1 and S2 nerve roots.” I find Dr. \nShotts’ report and analysis credible. Thus, I also find that Claimant has proven by a \npreponderance of the evidence a compensable aggravated lower back injury stemming \nfrom her February 5, 2022, slip and fall with objective findings. Whether you look at \n\nIGLEHART – G903654 & H208271 \n11 \n \nClaimant’s injury as a new injury or a pre-existing aggravated injury, the results are the \nsame. The specific injury was the slip and fall during the course and scope of employment \nand the objective finding is the comparison MRI report showing significant difference in \nClaimant’s lower spine after her fall than what was shown on her MRI a couple of months \nbefore the February 5, 2022, incident.  \nTherefore, the Respondents shall pay Claimant temporary total disability benefits \nand  permanent  partial  impairment  benefits  in  accordance  with  state  law. The \nRespondents shall pay Claimant’s outstanding medical bills associated with her February \n5, 2022, slip and fall injury to her lower lumbar spine, including Claimant’s lumbar disc \nsurgery. I also find that Claimant is entitled to mileage associated with her compensable \nlower back injury. \nOne of the purposes of the attorney’s fee statute is to put the economic burden of \nlitigation on the party who makes litigation necessary. Brass v. Weller, 23 Ark. App. 193, \n745 S.W.2d 647 (1998). I find that Respondents have controverted Claimant’s entitlement \nto medical benefits and treatment of her lower back injury. Consequently, Claimant has \nproven by a preponderance of the evidence that her attorney should be awarded a \ncontroverted fee thereon pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. §11-9-715 (Repl. 2012). \nIV.    CONCLUSION \n Respondents are hereby directed to pay/furnish benefits in accordance with the \nfindings of fact and conclusions of law set forth above.  All accrued sums shall be paid in \na lump sum without discount, and this award shall earn interest at the legal rate until paid, \npursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-809 (Repl. 2012).  See Couch v. First State Bank of \nNewport, 49 Ark. App. 102, 898 S.W.2d 57 (1995). \n\nIGLEHART – G903654 & H208271 \n12 \n \n Claimant’s attorney is entitled to a 25 percent (25%) attorney’s fee on the indemnity \nbenefits awarded herein, one-half of which is to be paid by Claimant and one-half to be \npaid by Respondents, in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-715 (Repl. 2012).  See \nDeath & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Brewer, 76 Ark. App. 348, 65 S.W.3d \n463 (2012). \nIT IS SO ORDERED. \n                                                        ________________________________ \n                                                        STEVEN PORCH \n                                                        Administrative Law Judge","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION WCC NO. G903654 & H208271 KAITLYN M. IGLEHART, Employee CLAIMANT CITY OF JONESBORO, Employer RESPONDENT MUNICIPAL LEAGUE WC PROGRAM, Insurance Carrier / TPA RESPONDENT OPINION FILED MAY 11, 2023 Hearing before Administrative Law Judge Steven Porch on April 14, 2023, ...","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T23:07:30.470Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-G903654-2023-05-10","pdf":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/IGLEHART_KAITLYN_G903654_H208271_20230510.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}