{"id":"alj-G701584-2026-01-07","awcc_number":"G701584","decision_date":"2026-01-07","opinion_type":"alj","claimant_name":"Marie Baucom","employer_name":"West Haven, Inc","title":"BAUCOM VS. WEST HAVEN, INC. AWCC# G701584 January 07, 2026","outcome":"denied","outcome_keywords":["dismissed:1","denied:2"],"injury_keywords":["back","neck"],"pdf_url":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/BAUCOM_MARIE_G701584_20260107.pdf","source_index_url":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/","filename":"BAUCOM_MARIE_G701584_20260107.pdf","text_length":37521,"full_text":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION \nCLAIM NO. G701584  \n \nMARIE R. BAUCOM, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT \n \nWEST HAVEN, INC., UNINSURED EMPLOYER RESPONDENT \n  \n \nOPINION FILED 7 JANUARY 2026 \n \n \nHeard before Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission Administrative Law Judge \nJayO. Howe on 9 October 2025 in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. \n \nMr. Terence C. Jensen, Jensen, Young & Butler, PLLC, appeared on behalf of the claimant. \n \nMr. Joseph H. Purvis, Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, LLP, appeared on behalf of the \nrespondent. \n \nI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE \n \n A Prehearing Order was filed on 18 September 2025 and admitted to the record as \nCommission’s Exhibit No 1. For this litigation, and consistent with that Order, the parties \nagreed to the following at the hearing: \nSTIPULATIONS \n \n 1. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission (the Commission) has \n  jurisdiction over this claim. \n \n 2. The Employee/Employer relationship existed at all relevant times. \n \n 3. The claimant’s average weekly wage would entitle her to temporary total  \n  disability (TTD) benefits of $237 per week and permanent partial disability  \n  (PPD) benefits of $170 per week. \n \n 4. The respondent has controverted this claim in its entirety. \n \nISSUES TO BE LITIGATED \n \n 1. Whether this claim should be dismissed under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-  \n  702(a)(4) for want of prosecution. \n \n 2. Whether the claimant sustained compensable injuries by specific   \n  incident on 8 February 2017. \n \n\nM. BAUCUM- G701584 \n2 \n \n 3. Whether the claimant is entitled to temporary total disability benefits from  \n  the date of the injury to a date yet to be determined. \n \n 4. Whether the claimant is entitled to medical benefits, including past and  \n  future treatment and reimbursable expenses. \n \n 5. Whether the claimant is entitled to an attorney’s fee. \n \n All other issues are reserved. \n \nCONTENTIONS \n \n The parties’ Contentions are set out in their respective Prehearing Questionnaire \nresponses: \n Claimant: \n \n The claimant contends that she sustained a compensable injury on \nFebruary 8, 2017. Claimant contends that this injury occurred on the \nemployer’s premises and at a time when the claimant was in furtherance of \nher duties with the employer and in furtherance of the necessary business \nactivities of the respondent. Claimant incurred significant burn injuries and \nwas hospitalized at Arkansas Children’s Hospital for approximately twenty-\ntwo days wherein she received extensive treatment for 2\nnd\n degree burn \ninjuries which covered approximately 19% of her body. Claimant has incurred \nsignificant medical expenses of approximately $109,000 which are the \nresponsibility of the respondent. Claimant was within her healing period \nfrom February 8, 2017, until June 22, 2017, and entitled to appropriate \ntemporary total disability benefits. Claimant will stipulate that the The \nrespondent is entitled to a credit for any medical bills paid and any \ntemporary total disability benefits voluntarily paid; however, approximately \n$109,000 of medical bills are currently owed by the respondent.  \n \n  The claimant reserves all other issues. \n \n Respondent: \n \nThe respondent contends that the claimant had signed off the clock and \nwas not working at the time that she was injured. The claimant did not sustain \na compensable injury within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Act. \nShe was not injured in the course and scope of her employment.  \n \nRespondent also contends that claimant was injured doing something \nthat she knew was specifically prohibited from doing and had been admonished \nseveral times about doing the act that she did. In addition to other matters, \nshe was in a place and position in the kitchen where she knew she was \nprohibited by institution rules and regulations as well as those of the state \nhealth department and had specifically been told not to do it.  \n\nM. BAUCUM- G701584 \n3 \n \n \n The respondent reserves the right to raise additional contentions, or to \nmodify those stated herein, pending the completion of discovery. \n \nII. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW \n \nHaving reviewed the record as a whole, including the evidence summarized below, \nand having heard testimony from the witnesses, observing their demeanor, I make the \nfollowing findings of fact and conclusions of law under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704: \n1. The Commission has jurisdiction over this claim. \n \n2. The Stipulations as set forth above are reasonable and are hereby accepted. \n \n3. The claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she  \n  suffered any compensable injuries by specific incident.     \n  Specifically, she has failed to prove that she was acting in the course and  \n  scope of her employment when she was injured. \n \n4. Because the claimant has failed to prove a compensable injury, the remaining \n  issues are moot and will not be addressed in this Opinion. \n \nIII. ADJUDICATION \nThe stipulated facts as outlined above are reasonable and accepted. It is settled that \nthe Commission, with the benefit of being in the presence of a witness and observing their \ndemeanor, determines a witness’ credibility and the appropriate weight to accord their \nstatements. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. VanWagner, 337 Ark. 443, 990 S.W.2d 522 (1999). A \nclaimant's testimony is never considered uncontroverted. Nix v. Wilson World Hotel, 46 \nArk. App. 303, 879 S.W.2d 457 (1994). The determination of a witness' credibility and how \nmuch weight to accord to that person's testimony are solely up to the Commission. White v. \nGregg Agricultural Ent., 72 Ark. App. 309, 37 S.W.3d 649 (2001). The Commission must \nsort through conflicting evidence and determine the true facts. Id. In so doing, the \nCommission is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant or any other witness \nbut may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony that \nit deems worthy of belief. Id. \n\nM. BAUCUM- G701584 \n4 \n \nSUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE \n The claimant and Charlene West testified at the hearing. Christine Cupples and \nBailey O’Dell testified via deposition. The respondent also called Ms. Karen Golden, a co-\nworker who was present on the day of the workplace accident, to testify at the hearing. The \nrecord consists of the hearing transcript and the following exhibits: Commission’s Exhibit \nNo 1 (the 18 September 2025 Prehearing Order); Claimant’s Exhibit No 1 (one index page \nand 19 pages of medical records); Claimant’s Exhibit No 2 (one index page and two pages of \nnon-medical records); Claimant’s Exhibit No 3 (two pages of correspondence from the \nCommission); Joint Exhibit No 1 (the deposition transcript of Cupples); Respondent’s \nExhibit No 1 (one page of an attendance record for the claimant); and Respondent’s Exhibit \nNo 2 (the deposition transcript of O’Dell). \n A. CLAIMANT MARIE R. BAUCUM’S TESTIMONY \n Respondent West Haven, Inc., (“West Haven”) is a residential care facility that was \npurchased by Charlene West on 12 January 2017. The facility had been in operation under \ndifferent ownership for some time preceding Ms. West’s purchase of the property. \n The claimant testified that she was employed by West Haven as a CNA (Certified \nNursing Assistant) Supervisor on the date of her accident. Her duties included “a little bit \nof everything; helping cook, helping clean, passing meds, all the things.” Residents at the \nfacility had “their own little houses,” while meal services and support with daily activities \nlike medication management were provided by facility staff. \n According to the claimant, she had been on-site for breakfast and dispensing \nmedicines on the morning of her accident. She then left to attend a morning class at the \nlocal community college campus before returning to the facility before lunchtime. She \ncorroborated her time sheet showing that she had been at work between 6:30 AM and 7:45 \n\nM. BAUCUM- G701584 \n5 \n \nAM and that she had signed back in at 10:00 AM. [Resp. Ex. No 1.] She denied signing back \nout at “12p” on the day of the accident, as reflected on the sheet: \nQ:  That is not your writing? \nA:  It is not. \nQ:  Okay. And tell me why you say that is not your writing. \nA:  Well because the 2 doesn’t match my other 2’s, and I put everything with \n“p.m.,” not just a “p.” \nQ:  Okay. And it looks as if you’re talking about the dates of 2-7 and 2-8, -- \nA:  Yes. \nQ:  -- and you clearly make a loop on your 2. \nA:  Yes, sir. \nQ:  Okay. And there’s no loop on this 2 at all, correct? \nA:  Correct. \n \n[TR at 28.] She went on to testify that she was on the clock and working at the time of her \naccident. \nQ:  Okay. And even besides being on the clock, were you performing duties or \nperforming work for your employer, West Haven? \nA:  I was. \nQ:  Okay. And tell me, if you will, what were you doing at the time of this \naccident? \nA:  So, I went into the kitchen to help serve. Bailey O’Dell was in there. She \nsaid that she couldn’t get the lid [of the pressure cooker] off the top and so, \nyou know, I went in to help her, ‘cause we had pat- -- residents, not patient – \nresidents in there that were ready to eat ‘cause it was lunchtime, and so I \nhelped her—well, I attempted to help her get the lid off. \n \n[TR at 29-30.]  \n She explained that the residents benefitted from maintaining regular schedules and \nthat scheduling disruptions, like a late meal service, could cause anxiety or other \nbehavioral problems with some residents. According to her testimony, the claimant went \ninto the kitchen to help because the lunch service was running behind. She said that Ms. \nO’Dell was the day’s cook and that Ms. O’Dell asked her for help with getting the lid off of \nthe pressure cooker that contained the day’s lunch. “The pressure release valve was \nreleasing like it was—there was no more pressure inside of it, so we thought it was stuck. \n\nM. BAUCUM- G701584 \n6 \n \nNeither of us had ever used a pressure cooker before, so I did not know that there was \npressure behind it.” [TR at 34.] Her testimony continued: \nQ:  Okay. Now tell me what happened when you’re trying to get the lid off. \nA:  It exploded. \nQ:  Okay. And when it exploded, what happened? \nA:  It covered me and got on Bailey’s leg. It covered the front side of my body \nand got on my face... \nQ:  Okay. And then after that, did you seek medical attention? \nA:  I did. I—I threw off all my clothes and was running around. Christine had \ncame in the door, and she was taking me to the hospital, and she drove me to \nthe [Dewitt] hospital. \n[...] I was treated as [best as] they could at the smaller facility, and then was \nsent by ambulance to Arkansas Children's Hospital Burn Unit. \nQ:  Okay. And I understand you spent quite some substantial period of time \nin the Burn Unit at Arkansas Children's Hospital? \nA:  Yes, sir, almost a month. \n \n. . .  \n \nQ:  ... And tell me, did you have any conversations about your injury with \nCharlene West? \nA:  Yes, sir. When I was at the hospital [...] she had asked me to say that I \nwas not on the clock and that she would just pay me for the time that I was \noff. \nQ:  Okay. And did you agree to do that? \nA:  I did not. \nQ:  Okay. Did you ever understand why Ms. West wanted you to say that you \nwere off the clock? \nA:  I did not. \nQ:  Did you find out later that Ms. West didn’t carry insurance? \nA:  I did later on. \nQ:  And she was, in fact, an uninsured employer? \nA:  Yes, sir. \nQ:  And that she didn’t have any insurance to cover for your medical bills or \nfor your treatment of your time off, is that right? \nA:  Yes. \n \n. . .  \n \nQ:  Okay. All right. And were you off work for at least a while? \nA:  I was. \nQ:  Okay. And were you paid compensation by anyone while you were off \nwork? \nA:  I received one check the week after I got burned, from Charlene. \n \n\nM. BAUCUM- G701584 \n7 \n \n[TR at 35-37.] She clarified that the check she received was only for the time she had \nactually worked. She denied receiving any payment related to the time that she was unable \nto work due to her injuries. Her employment was apparently terminated at some time after \nthe accident. \n On cross-examination, the claimant denied that she was assigned to work \nhousekeeping the day of the accident. She also denied that she was trying to open the \npressure cooker to feed only herself. She reiterated that after returning from her morning \nclass, consistent with her class schedule [Cl. Ex. No 2], she planned to remain at the facility \nand on-duty through the remainder of the work day, until she had class again that evening. \n B. CHARLENE WEST’S TESTIMONY \n Charlene West testified that she was the owner of West Haven and that she had \ntaken control and responsibility for the facility in the several weeks preceding the \nclaimant’s accident. She acknowledged not having workers’ compensation insurance in \nplace at the time of the accident. She explained that that she mistakenly believed coverage \nhad been secured along with the other insurance products that she had in place since \ntaking over. \n Ms. West testified that employees were not supposed to handle housekeeping and \nfood service duties at the same time due to state regulations. Ordinarily, one person was \nassigned to do the meal preparation and cooking and one or two other people would be \nassigned to assist outside of the kitchen with serving the residents. Meals were passed from \nthe kitchen via a Dutch door that had shelf on its lower half where plates and bowls could \nbe placed. “It’s explicitly written in the state regs. If you did housekeeping, it’s ‘cause \nthere’s cross-contamination. You cannot be cleaning rooms and then serve food or go in the \nkitchen.” [TR at 62.] She testified with certainty that the claimant was assigned to \nhousekeeping duties on the day of the accident. Another employee, Christine Cupples, was \n\nM. BAUCUM- G701584 \n8 \n \nresponsible for cooking on the day of the accident. According to the respondent, Ms. Cupples \ncomplained to her immediately before the accident about the claimant and Ms. O’Dell \ntrying to get the lid off the pressure cooker: “Ms. Cupples, she said, ‘They won’t listen to me. \nThey’re trying to get...’ And then boom.” [TR at 67.] \n  Immediately after the accident, the respondent told Ms. Cupples to take the \nclaimant to the emergency department. The local hospital provided care before transferring \nthe claimant to Arkansas Children’s Hospital. Ms. West believed that the claimant was off \nthe clock at the time of the accident. \n According to Ms. West, she paid the claimant her normal weekly wages during that \ntime that she was in the hospital. Copies of the checks she testified about were not offered \ninto evidence.  \n On cross-examination, Ms. West confirmed that during meal service, one employee \nwould usually be responsible for cooking, while another employee or two would be \nresponsible for actually serving the food to the residents. All employees, however, were \nbeing cross-trained to help cover all of the facility’s staffing needs, as might be required for \nscheduling. Staff coverage and scheduling needs had to conform with state regulations. She \nsaid that on the day of the accident, Ms. O’Dell would have been the only employee assigned \nto serve food. She acknowledged that the day’s lunch was inside of the pressure cooker and \nthat the cooker would need to be opened in order for the residents to be fed.  \n Lastly, Ms. West acknowledged that the time sheet purporting to show the \nclaimant’s hours on the day of the accident appeared to have different-looking entries for \nthe claimant’s sign-out; but she denied forging the record. \n C. MS. KAREN GOLDEN’S TESTIMONY \n Ms. Golden testified that she is an employee of the respondent, and that had worked \nat the facility before it was acquired by Ms. West. At around the time of the accident, she \n\nM. BAUCUM- G701584 \n9 \n \nwas working as a Personal Care Assistant and was responsible for helping residents with \neverything from their medication management to their dressing and laundry. She was \nworking at the front office with Ms. O’Dell on the day of the accident. \n She recalled that she was planning to cover the claimant’s shift during the afternoon \nof the accident so that the claimant could attend a school event. She testified that she saw \nthe claimant sign out before the accident and that the claimant was going to the kitchen to \nget some lunch with Ms. O’Dell before leaving for the day. She also testified that staff were \nnot allowed to eat until after all of the residents were served their meals. \n D. MEDICAL AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE \n Records from Arkansas Children’s Hospital show that the claimant underwent \nsurgery on 14 February 2017. According to the Operative Note: \nPOSTOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS: 19% total body surface area scald burns \nbilateral upper extremities, anterior torso, bilateral lower extremities. \n \nOPERATION PERFORMED: Excisional debridement, wound bed \npreparation to 3% total body surface area, left arm 570 sq cm and 5% total \nbody surface area anterior chest, 960 sq cm. \n \n A Discharge Report shows that the claimant was admitted on 8 February 2017 and \ndischarged on 24 February 2017. In pertinent part, that report includes: \nCONDITION: Good \n \nDISCHARGE DISPOSITION: Home \n \nPROBLEMS: ... Onset Acute pain due to trauma, Acute Impaired activities of \ndaily living, Acute Neuropathic pain, Acute second degree burn of chest wall, \nAcute second degree burn of face, Acute second degree burn of left arm, Acute \nsecond degree burn of left arm, Acute second degree burn of left leg, Acute \nsecond degree burn of neck, Acute second degree burn of right arm, Acute \nsecond degree burn of right leg. \n \nPROCEDURES: Excisional debridement and autograft of left arm 3% TBSA \nand anterior chest 5% TBSA. \n \nHOSPITAL COURSE: Ms. Baucom is a 31 years of age Caucasian female who \npresented to ACH burn unit from the referring facility after sustaining 8.5% \n\nM. BAUCUM- G701584 \n10 \n \nTBSA Second degree burns to her anterior chest and upper extremities from \na pressure cooker. The patient works at an assisted living facility where she \nwas helping prepare lunch for her tenants. The pressure cooker was on for \nabout 30 minutes whenever she tried to release the pressure. The cooker then \nbroke open causing the patient and another worker to suffer scald burns. The \npatient went to her local ED where double antibiotic and xenoform gauze was \nplaced over her burns, a tetanus toxoid shot was given, a foley catheter was \nplaced, and she was sent to ACH burn unit for further care. \n... \nOn 2/9/17, pt underwent deep sedation procedure for further evaluation and \ndisposition of burn wounds. Pt tolerated the procedure well, without any \nsignificant adverse events. Initially, Pt was going to [be] placed in Santyl and \nmonitored until her next deep sedation before the decision was made for \nconservative treatment vs surgery. Her pain medication doses were adjusted \nover the next few days to provide relief. On 2/13, she underwent another deep \nsedation, and at that time, it was decided that she would need an operation. \n \nOn 2/14/17, she went to the OR for excisional debridement, wound bed \npreparation, and autografting to BUE and shoulders. She tolerated the \noperation well without any adverse events. She did have difficulty with pain \ncontrol during the postoperative period, but her medications were adjusted to \nprovide relief. She underwent another deep sedation 2/19 for staple removal \nand dressing change. At this point, her pain medications were slowly weaned \nto a point where she could tolerate dressing changes with home medications. \nShe was ambulating the hallways and meeting nutritional requirements. She \nwas able to tolerate yesterday’s dressing changes with PO medications. Her \nroommate has been at bedside and has agreed to assist with wound care at \nhome. Also of note, she states that she has a large church family that \nincludes some nurses who can help with wound care as well. She will be \ndischarged home today and will follow up in ACH burn clinic in 7-10 days. \n \n A Burn Reconstruction Clinic Note dated 23 June 2017 includes, in pertinent part, \nthe following: \nHPI: ... At her last clinic visit on 3/23/2017, she had healed and was fitted for \ncustom garments. We prescribed her gabapentin 600 mg morning and noon \nand 900 at night to see if this would help with her neuropathic pain. She was \nalso given outpatient occupational therapy referral due to decreased range of \nmotion. She also had a band noted to her left axilla for which she was given \nneoprene to use at night. The patient called last week and stated that she \nwould like to be weaned off her gabapentin. So we began to have her decrease \nher dosage down to 600 three times a day. We did evaluate her today in our \nclinic. She states that she has had some increased pain to her left upper arm \nsince decreasing her gabapentin down. She is not sure if this is due to the \nchange of her dosing. At this time she has been going to occupational therapy \nand feels she has increased range of motion back to normal. \n \n. . .  \n\nM. BAUCUM- G701584 \n11 \n \n \nPLAN: We will continue with the gabapentin 600 mg 3 times a day. I have \ninstructed the patient if in 1 week the pain to her arm has not decreased, we \ncan go back up on her gabapentin to 900 mg at night and 600 mg in the a.m. \nand at noon time. The patient was instructed at this time I do not think she \nhas to continue with occupational therapy and can be discharged per their \nrecommendations. I consulted our physical therapist today to remeasure her \nfor her custom garments and we discussed the use of neoprene over the \nhypertrophic scarring to her chest. The therapist indicated that when she \nreturns to be fitted for custom garments they will at that time fit the \nneoprene as well. She was reminded about scar massage and SPF use greater \nthan 50 when out in the sun. I do think at this time since her range of motion \nhas improved she could return back to work. She was given a note for this. \nWe will have her return back to our plastic clinic to be evaluated again in 3 \nmonths. \n  \n[Cl. Ex. No 1.] \n The claimant also introduced a copy of the schedule of college courses she was \nenrolled in at the time of her accident [Cl. Ex. No 2]; and the respondents introduced a copy \nof a time sheet for the claimant on the day of her accident [Resp. Ex. No 1]. \n In response to the respondent’s assertion that the claim was filed after the \nexpiration of the statute of limitations, the claimant introduced copies of correspondence \nfrom the Commission, dated 8 March 2017, indicating that she had filed a Form AR-C \nrelating to an 8 February 2017 workplace injury. The claim number indicated in the \ncorrespondence (G701584) is the same as the claim number in the present matter. [Cl. Ex. \nNo 3.] \nDeposition of Christine Cupples \n The witness testified that she was working as the facility’s cook on the date of the \nclaimant’s accident. She recalled the lunch service running late because the lid would not \nrelease on the pressure cooker. She stated that over her objections, the claimant and Ms. \nO’Dell entered the kitchen and put the cooker on the floor. “So, then, that’s when I stepped \nout of the room to go find Charlene, and it just so happened that she was coming in the \nback door. She was right there, and just in that little period of time of me stepping away \n\nM. BAUCUM- G701584 \n12 \n \nand seeing Charlene coming in the back door, and I’m explaining to her, “Hey, you need to \ncome here. You know, they’re trying to get in this pressure cooker, and I don’t know how to \nget it open.” [Joint Ex. No 1 at 15-16.]  She testified further: \nQ:  Had—had you—you’d specifically told them not to open— \nA:  I told them not to open it. I told them just to leave it alone, and they just \nwouldn’t listen to me. \nQ:  Now, were you cooking that day, or was Bailey cooking? \nA:  I was cooking that day. [...] \nQ:  All right. All right. And you had told both Bailey and Maire to leave it \nalone, do not try to open it? \nA:  Yes. \n \n[Id. at 17-18.]  \nDeposition of Bailey O’Dell \n The witness stated that she was working as a CNA at the respondent’s facility on \nthe date of the claimant’s accident. She testified that assisting with food service was one of \nher job duties. According to her testimony, the claimant signed out before they went to the \nkitchen together to get some lunch. She explained that Ms. Cupples was assigned to the \nkitchen that day and that over the objection of Ms. Cupples, she and the claimant moved \nthe pressure cooker to the floor to try to force off the lid before it burst open. Ms. O’Dell was \nalso burned in the accident, but not as badly as the claimant. \n She explained that according to the facility rules, access to the kitchen was \nrestricted: \nA:  You cannot go into the kitchen at all. We could only be on the other side of \nthe door where the residents were to serve. That’s the only place we were \nsupposed to be. You can’t go from the floor to the kitchen or the kitchen to the \nfloor. \nQ:  Was that, like, a health regulation or whatever? \nA:  Yeah, I’m assuming. It’s by the nursing board all over the state that they \ndon’t allow you—you can’t go from the floor to the kitchen. It’s like—I don’t \nknow what the word is I’m looking for. It’s a health hazard, moral of the \nstory. \nQ:  But if you were out on the floor, you did not go to the kitchen? \nA:  You are not allowed to be in the kitchen. \nQ:  I see. \n\nM. BAUCUM- G701584 \n13 \n \nA:  If you’re scheduled for the kitchen, that’s the only person who is to be in \nthe kitchen at all times. \n \n. . .  \n \nQ:  Did you encounter [Ms. Cupples] that day? \nA:  Yes. She was the cook for the day. And she told us we couldn’t be in there. \nShe told us we could not be operating on the pressure cooker because it was \nnot done. \n \n[Joint Ex. No 1 at 10-12.]  \n On cross-examination, the witness said that the respondent paid her full wages \nduring the time that she was out with her own burn injuries. She also stated that the \nrespondent paid the claimant similarly for her time out.  \n According to Ms. O’Dell, the claimant was assigned to work housekeeping on the day \nof the accident. She went on to explain that she and the claimant went into the kitchen \neven though they knew that they were not supposed to be there. \nQ:  Why were you in the kitchen? \nA:  To get us something to eat. Me and Marie were hungry and Marie was \nleaving. And then, I was going to go ahead and eat before we served the \nresidents, which is wrong, as well, because the residents are to be served \nbefore anybody else. \nQ:  Had you ever done that before? \nA:  Never. \n. . . \nQ:  And after this accident, did you ever eat West Haven’s food before the \nresidents were served? \nA:  No. \nQ:  Do you know of anybody that ever did that, eat before the residents were \nserved? \nA:  Not that I can recall. \nQ:  Just something that you wouldn’t do? \nA:  No, we’re not allowed to do by law, by state law... \n. . . \nQ:  Although you hadn’t done it before, you’ve never done it after? \nA:  No. \nQ:  And you knew at the time it wasn’t right? \nA:  Correct. \nQ:  Would you intentionally violate a rule of the nursing home? \nA:  I did that day. \nQ:  Have you ever violated a rule before? \nA:  No. \n\nM. BAUCUM- G701584 \n14 \n \nQ:  Or after? \nA:  No. \n. . .  \nQ:  But your idea was to open up the pressure cooker and then help serve the \nmeal? \nA:  Our idea was to open the pressure cooker and then I [would] help serve \nbecause Maria was to leave. \nQ:  That’s exactly—your idea was to open the pressure cooker and then serve \nthe residents after that? \nA:  Correct, after we got a bowl of food. \n \n[Id. at 30-34.] \nDISCUSSION \nThe claimant alleges that she suffered compensable burn injuries to multiple body \nparts by specific incident on 8 February 2017. To prove a compensable injury by specific \nincident, she must establish four (4) factors by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the \ninjuries arose out of and in the course of her employment; (2) the injuries caused internal or \nexternal harm to the body that required medical services or resulted in disability or death; \n(3) the injuries are established by medical evidence supported by objective findings, which \nare those findings which cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient; and (4) the \ninjuries were caused by a specific incident identifiable by time and place of occurrence. \nMikel v. Engineered Specialty Plastics, 56 Ark. App. 126, 938 S.W.2d 876 (1997). If the \nclaimant fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence any of these elements, then \ncompensation must be denied. Id. As explained below, the claimant has failed to prove by a \npreponderance of the evidence that she was injured in the course and scope of her \nemployment. \nA compensable injury is defined, in part, as an accidental injury which arises out of \nand in the course of employment. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i). However, a \ncompensable injury does not include an injury “inflicted upon the employee at a time when \nemployment services were not being performed.” Id. §11-9-102(4)(B)(iii). \n\nM. BAUCUM- G701584 \n15 \n \nIn Williams v. Malvern Sch. Dist. Ark. Sch. Bds. Ass’n., 2025 Ark. App. 208, the \nCourt of Appeals recently explained: \nAn employee is performing employment services when he or she is \ndoing something that is generally required by his or her employer. Cont'l \nConstr. Co. v. Nabors, 2015 Ark. App. 60, 454 S.W.3d 762. We use the same \ntest to determine whether an employee is performing employment services as \nwe do when determining whether an employee is acting within the course \nand scope of employment. Pifer v. Single Source Transp., 347 Ark. 851, 69 \nS.W.3d 1 (2002). The test is whether the injury occurred within the time and \nspace boundaries of the employment when the employee was carrying out the \nemployer's purpose or advancing the employer's interest, either directly or \nindirectly. Id. Moreover, whether an employee was performing employment \nservices within the course of employment depends on the particular facts and \ncircumstances of each case. Ctrs. for Youth & Families v. Wood, 2015 Ark. \nApp. 380, 466 S.W.3d 422. \n  \n Here, the claimant was certainly at her workplace when the accident occurred. And \nher burns were no doubt caused by the pressure cooker exploding (at her apparent \ninstigation) that day. But there is a factual dispute as to whether the claimant was acting \nin the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident that caused her \ninjuries. The claimant, for her part, claims that she was working on the clock at the time of \nthe accident, trying to help with preparing a lunch that was running behind schedule and, \nthus, advancing her employer’s interests. The respondent, on the other hand, argues that \nthe injuries are not compensable because she had signed out of work for the day and \nbecause she was violating workplace policy and direct instructions at the time of the \naccident. Because she was acting in violation of workplace rules, they argue, she was acting \noutside of the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident. \n In Arkansas State Police v. Davis, 45 Ark. App. 40, 870 S.W. 2d 408, 1994 Ark. App. \nLEXIS 81, our Court of Appeals reviewed the facts around an employee who was injured \nwhile working in violation of workplace policy. In that case, the Court stated: \n Section 31.00 of 1A A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation \n(1993) provides that \"when the misconduct involves a prohibited overstepping \n\nM. BAUCUM- G701584 \n16 \n \nof the boundaries defining the ultimate work to be done by the claimant, the \nprohibited act is outside the course of employment.\" Likewise, § 31.14(a) \nprovides that: \n \nIt has already been observed that the modern tendency is to bring \nwithin the course of employment services outside regular duties \nperformed in good faith to advance the employer's interests, even if this \ninvolves doing an unrelated job falling within the province of a co-\nemployee. This, of course, assumes that no prohibition is thereby \ninfringed. But if the unrelated job is positively forbidden, all connection \nwith the course of the claimant's own employment disappears, for he \nhas stepped outside the boundaries defining, not his method of working, \nbut the ultimate work for which he is employed. \n \n Larson's discusses the case of Fowler v. Baalmann, 361 Mo. 204, 234 \nS.W.2d 11 (1950), which applies the principles above. We find the case of \nFowler illustrative. In that case, the decedent, James Fowler, a flight \ninstructor for Baalmann, Inc., was forbidden to fly on a particular night of \nbad weather by his superior and was aware that the flight had been canceled. \nHowever, the decedent proceeded with the flight which resulted in his death. \nIn denying benefits the Missouri Supreme Court observed: \n \nMere disobedience of an order as to the detail of the work in hand or the \nmere breach of a rule as to the manner of performing the work are not \ngenerally sufficient to deprive an employee of his right to compensation \nso long as he does not go out of the sphere of his employment. But \ncompensation cannot be allowed when the employee goes outside of the \nsphere and scope of his employment and is injured in connection with \nan activity he has been expressly forbidden to undertake. \n. . . \nAn employer has the unqualified right to limit the scope of a servant's \nemployment and activity and to determine what an employee shall or \nshall not do. The employer likewise has the unqualified right to \ndetermine when an employee shall do a certain thing. The prohibition \nwhich the employer laid down in this case (the direct order expressly \ncanceling the flight) goes deeper into the relationship of the parties \nthan any mere rule, for it severed utterly and terminated completely \nthe employer-employee relationship for the day. \n \n I find Davis to be instructive. In that case, the Court reversed a finding of a \ncompensable injury for a police officer shot during a drug bust when the evidence showed \nthat he was suspended from duty and should not have been performing any police work at \nthe time he was injured.  \n\nM. BAUCUM- G701584 \n17 \n \n Similarly, in Pratt v. Landers McLarty Bentonville, 2021 Ark. App. 184, 2021 Ark. \nApp. LEXIS 182, the Court of Appeals affirmed a finding that an employee was not \nperforming employment services when he was injured while walking across a culvert in \nviolation of a workplace policy prohibiting the same. Because the claimant was “in direct \nviolation of the respondents’ policy,” he was not performing employment services at the \ntime of his injury. Id. \n Here, the credible evidence shows that West Haven’s rules limited who could be \nworking in the kitchen during the day. Employees assisting with meal service had to \nremain outside of the kitchen. The testimony reflected that State health and safety rules \nrequired compliance with that rule.  \n The claimant’s assertion the Bailey O’Dell was the cook that day is not credible and \nstands against the testimony of the other witnesses. Ms. West, Ms. Cupples, and even Ms. \nO’Dell (whom the claimant testified was cooking that day) testified that Ms. Cupples was \nthe cook assigned for that day, and that facility rules prohibited the claimant from being in \nthe kitchen at the time. Additionally, Ms. Cupples testified that at the very moment the \naccident occurred, she had stepped out of the kitchen to bring in Ms. West because the \nclaimant was refusing to follow directives that she leave the cooker alone. To put it another \nway, Ms. Cupples was attempting to report that the claimant’s behavior was not only \ndangerous, but in violation of the facility’s rules. And according to the testimony of Ms. \nO’Dell, she and the claimant knew that they were in violation of the facility’s rules at the \ntime of their actions. Employers clearly have an interest in promulgating rules for the \nsafety of their employees and the clients they serve; and they certainly have an interest in \npromulgating rules to comply with statutory and regulatory requirements related to their \nbusiness functions. The respondent’s rules around restricting access to the kitchen are \nconsistent with those interests, and the evidence shows that those rules were known to the \n\nM. BAUCUM- G701584 \n18 \n \nrespondent’s employees at the time of this workplace accident. I, therefore, find that the \ncredible evidence establishes that the claimant was in violation of workplace rules by being \nin the kitchen and acting against the directions of the day’s cook when she pried the lid off \nthe cooker and caused the accident that resulted in her burns.  \n Because the claimant was acting in violation of the facility’s rules at the time of the \naccident, her conduct was outside of the course and scope of her employment. See Davis, \nsupra. Having failed to satisfy that element proving a compensable injury by specific \nincident, her claim must fail. In the absence of a finding of a compensable injury, the other \nissues are moot and will not be addressed in this Opinion. \nIV.  CONCLUSION  \n The claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she \nsuffered compensable injuries by specific incident. Accordingly, this claim for initial \nbenefits is DENIED and DISMISSED. \nSO ORDERED. \n      ________________________________ \n       JAYO. HOWE \n       ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE","preview":"BEFORE THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION CLAIM NO. G701584 MARIE R. BAUCOM, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT WEST HAVEN, INC., UNINSURED EMPLOYER RESPONDENT OPINION FILED 7 JANUARY 2026 Heard before Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission Administrative Law Judge JayO. Howe on 9 October 2025 in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. Mr....","fetched_at":"2026-05-19T22:32:32.316Z","links":{"html":"/opinions/alj-G701584-2026-01-07","pdf":"https://www.labor.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/BAUCOM_MARIE_G701584_20260107.pdf","source_publisher":"https://labor.arkansas.gov/workers-comp/awcc-opinions/administrative-law-judge-opinions/"}}